After Action Report

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise

Exercise Date: May 17, 2022

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Executive Summary

On May 17, 2022, the offsite response organizations of the Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 10-mile emergency planning zone participated in a plume exposure pathway exercise. Federal Emergency Management Agency Region 4 Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program staff evaluated that exercise, which also included out of sequence activities conducted on April 27, 2022, June 14, 2022, and July 18, 2022. This report covers the exercise and out of sequence activities.

The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of state and local preparedness in responding to an incident at the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant. It was conducted in accordance with Federal Emergency Management Agency policies and guidance concerning the exercise of state and local radiological emergency response plans and procedures. The federal approval of the formal submission of the radiological emergency response procedures for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant by the states of Georgia and South Carolina was granted on June 9, 1987. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on April 30, and May 1, 1986; and the previous biennial exercise was conducted on December 8, 2020.

Officials and representatives from participating agencies and organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them during the exercise and out of sequence activities. All jurisdictions met their exercise objectives and successfully demonstrated the corresponding core capabilities identified in Section 2.2 of this report. Federal Emergency Management Agency staff did not identify any Level 1 or Level 2 Findings during the exercise or the out of sequence activities.

It was apparent that a great deal of training and practice was conducted by the offsite response organizations to successfully demonstrate the ability to protect the health and safety of the public. They provided the necessary support and resources to respond to an incident at the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated in the exercise and made it a success. The professionalism and teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all phases of the exercise planning process.

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Section 1: Exercise Overview

Exercise Name	2022 Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise	
Type of Exercise	Full Scale Exercise	
Exercise Date	May 17, 2022	
Out of Sequence Date	April 27, 2022, June 14, 2022, and July 18, 2022	
Program	Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program	
Mission Area	Response	
Scenario Type	Full Participation Plume Phase Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise	
Participating Organizations	See Appendix C for the list of participating organizations	
Locations	See Appendix D for the extent of play agreement and exercise locations	
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Section 2: Exercise Design Summary

2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design

FEMA administers the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program pursuant to the regulations found in Title 44 CFR parts 350, 351, 352, 353 and 354. CFR 350 codifies 16 planning standards that form the basis for radiological emergency response planning for the licensee, state, local, tribal and territorial governments impacted by the emergency planning zones established for each nuclear power plant site in the United States. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations also codify the 16 planning standards for the licensee. 44 CFR 350 sets forth the mechanisms for the formal review and approval of state, local, tribal and territorial government radiological emergency response plans and procedures by FEMA. One of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program cornerstones established by these regulations is the biennial exercise of offsite response capabilities. During these exercises, affected state, local, tribal and territorial governments demonstrate their abilities to implement their plans and procedures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological incident at a nuclear power plant.

The results of this exercise, together with reviews of the radiological emergency response plans and verification of the periodic requirements set forth in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, the annual letter of certification, and staff assistance visits, enabled FEMA to provide a statement with the transmission of this final after-action report to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This statement verifies that the affected state, local, tribal and territorial plans and procedures are: (1) adequate to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the nuclear power plant by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological incident; and (2) capable of being implemented.

The federal approval of the formal submission of the radiological emergency response procedures for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant by the states of Georgia and South Carolina was granted on June 9, 1987, and the qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on April 30, and May 1, 1986.

2.2 Exercise Core Capabilities and Objectives

Core capabilities-based planning allows for exercise planning teams to develop exercise objectives and observe exercise outcomes through a framework of specific action items. Using the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program methodology, the exercise objectives meet Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program requirements and objectives. The capability targets to be demonstrated were negotiated with the states of Georgia and South Carolina and risk counties. The core capabilities scheduled for demonstration during this exercise were:

- **Operational Coordination:** Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.
- **Operational Communications:** Ensure the capacity for timely communications in support of security, situational awareness, and operations by any and all means available, among and between affected communities in the impact area and all response forces.

- **Situational Assessment:** Provide all decision makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response.
- **Public Information and Warning:** Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard, as well as the actions being taken and the assistance being made available, as appropriate.
- **Environmental Response/Health and Safety:** Conduct appropriate measures to ensure the protection of the health and safety of the public and workers, as well as the environment, from all-hazards in support of responder operations and the affected communities.
- **On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement:** Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas and also for response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.
- **Mass Care Services:** Provide life-sustaining and human services to the affected population, to include hydration, feeding, sheltering, temporary housing, evacuee support, reunification, and distribution of emergency supplies.

These core capabilities, when successfully demonstrated, meet the exercise objectives. The objectives for this exercise were as follows:

- **Objective 1:** Emergency Operations Management
- **Objective 2:** Exposure Control
- **Objective 3:** Alert and Notification
- **Objective 4:** Detect, Measure, Sample, Analyze, and Assess
- **Objective 5:** Operate

2.3 Exercise Scenario

The exercise started with an Alert emergency classification level declaration due to the loss of one fission product barrier. The loss of a second barrier a little more than an hour later led to a Site Area Emergency declaration and a release of radioactive material. Throughout the exercise the wind was blowing from east to west and there was no precipitation. The wind direction kept the plume in the state of Georgia and Burke County. An hour after the Site Area Emergency declaration the third fission product barrier was lost, and a General Emergency was declared. The utility notified the states and counties and made the protective action recommendation to evacuate the two miles around the plant and five miles downwind.

The recommended four zones for evacuation were A, D-5, E-5, and SRS to 02. The utility also recommended that the rest of the 10-mile emergency planning zone be told to monitor local media for further information and that the use of potassium iodide be considered. Zone SRS to 02 was the portion of the Savannah River Site that was within two miles of the Vogtle

Electric Generating Plant and was in Barnwell County, South Carolina. The other zones recommended for evacuation were all in Burke County, Georgia. There were three follow-up emergency notification forms provided by the utility after the initial General Emergency declaration. The first had the initial dose projections, the second showed a fivefold increase in the dose projections, and the third a further increase of fifty percent.

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Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities

3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results

This section contains the results and findings, if applicable, of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the May 17, 2022, plume exposure pathway exercise and out of sequence activities on April 27, 2022, June 14, 2022, and July 18, 2022.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity were evaluated based on the demonstration of core capabilities, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program objectives, and capability targets as delineated in the Federal Emergency Management Agency Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual dated December 2019. Capability targets are listed by number and the demonstration status of those capability targets are indicated by the following terms:

- **Met:** The jurisdiction or functional entity performed all activities under the objective/capability target to the level required per the work plan and/or the extent of play agreement, with no Level 1 or Level 2 Findings evaluated under that objective/capability target during the current activity and no unresolved prior Level 2 Finding(s).
- **Level 1 Finding:** An observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance during an assessment activity that could cause a determination that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant.
- **Level 2 Finding:** An observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance during an assessment activity that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health and safety.
- **Plan Issue:** An observed or identified inadequacy in the offsite response organization's emergency plan/implementing procedures, rather than in that of the offsite response organization's performance.
- **Not Demonstrated:** For a justifiable reason, the jurisdiction or functional entity did not perform assessment activities under the objective/capability target as specified in the extent of play agreement.

3.2 Jurisdictional Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation

3.2.1 State Jurisdiction

3.2.1.1 State of Georgia State Operations Center

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

Georgia State Operations Center staff successfully demonstrated the operational coordination core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.

The initial notification of an Alert emergency classification level was received through the emergency notification network at the state's 24-hour warning point from the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant. At the time of this exercise the state warning point operators were operated remotely due to rising fuel costs. Operators assigned to the warning point were issued dedicated telephones and computers to access incident management software and departmental programs enabling remote work.

Upon receiving the notification, the warning point operator verbally confirmed the message with the sender at the utility and immediately notified state leadership and essential personnel through a group page system. This system automatically verified message receipt. The decision was made by the state operations center deputy chief to activate the state operations center to a level two (yellow) status. This mobilized state operations center staff and additional agencies representing emergency support functions 2, 3, 5, 10, 11, and 15. Personnel from the Georgia Department of Agriculture, Georgia Department of Natural Resources, and Southern Nuclear were present. All subsequent notifications were received within the state operations center, which remained activated at level two (yellow) for the remainder of the exercise. The state operations center planning section developed an incident action plan for one 24-hour operational period. This document contained a 24-hour staffing roster on incident command system form 203.

Direction and control within the state operations center was overseen by the radiological emergency preparedness manager, the operations chief, and governor's authorized representative. The utility liaison and the operations support analyst also supported the response. Coordinated briefings to state operations center personnel and coordination calls with the South Carolina Emergency Management Division and the risk counties were held after the receipt of each emergency notification form from the utility. The briefings consisted of relevant information for maintaining situational awareness and making informed decisions. Precautionary and protective action decisions were discussed on the conference bridge decision line after each emergency classification level change.

As precautionary actions, the Georgia Department of Agriculture recommended farm animals be placed on stored feed and water and the Georgia Department of Natural Resources banned hunting/fishing activities. During the conference bridge decision line call, it was noted that the state of South Carolina had issued slightly different instructions to the public. So, as to not cause confusion to the general public, the Georgia State Operations Center made minor adjustments and aligned their instructions with South Carolina's, clearly demonstrating a cross state alliance to serve the public.

Following the General Emergency declaration, command staff decided that Georgia emergency workers were to ingest potassium iodide. This instruction was relayed to Burke County during the conference bridge decision line call. Burke County made the decision to evacuate zones A, D-5, E-5, D-10, E-10, F-10 and the state of Georgia concurred.

The state operations center was equipped with communications systems to support emergency operations. Emergency notification forms from the utility were received through the emergency network notification, a dedicated secure line. An open conference bridge decision line served as the primary method of communicating and coordinating with the state of South Carolina and risk counties. Landline telephones, internet and several radio systems were available as backup communications. The conference bridge decision line in the command room experienced audio interruptions during two calls. This was quickly

corrected by disconnecting and redialing into the system. There were no communications system failures.

The state operations center contacted federal agencies and other transportation authorities to successfully control transportation movement around the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant. The liaison officer in the state operations center called the United States Coast Guard and requested the closure of the Savannah River in the vicinity of the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant following the Alert declaration. After the Site Area Emergency declaration, the liaison officer was instructed by command staff to secure railroad access and closure of the airways over the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant. Using the position procedures, the Federal Aviation Administration was contacted and requested to secure the air space. The call was actual, but the request was simulated.

Using the phone number listed in position procedures three attempts were made to reach Norfolk Southern Railroad's operation center. The intent was to coordinate closure of the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant spur line. The liaison officer promptly discussed the situation with the radiation emergency program manager. The Norfolk Southern Railroad's police department phone was then called, and the simulation proceeded without delay. It was later determined that Norfolk Southern Railroad's operation center was busy with a real-world emergency.

For this core capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 3.1, 5.4.

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

The Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency external affairs staff and the public information officer successfully demonstrated the public information and warning core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.

The public information officer was the lead for the state and represented the state in the joint information system. The external affairs staff provided continuous support to the public information officer using a variety of tools including a video conferencing platform, text messages, emails, and telephones.

At the start of the exercise the external affairs staff logged into the state's incident management software and video conferencing platform and initiated contact with the public information officer stationed in the public information room. The team began crafting press release number one. Once the draft was completed the external affairs staff processed approvals using a checklist which assured all managers reviewed the press release. Once approved the final press release was sent via email to the managers and the joint information system distribution list. Three subsequent press releases were processed with this approval procedure.

The deputy operations chief instructed the external affairs staff to craft three additional press releases as a result of the conference bridge decision line calls. This was accomplished with prescripted templates contained in the procedures. Information related to protective actions was identified appropriately in the press releases and contained necessary and applicable instructions to assist the public.

The public information officer provided two briefings to the joint information system through a video conferencing platform. Media briefings, held at a separate location, were monitored for inquiries from the media. If there had been any inquiries from the media for the state of Georgia, the public information officer would have responded through the video conferencing platform used for the briefings.

For this core capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability target was met: 3.2.

Operational Communication Capability Summary:

Georgia State Operations Center command staff successfully demonstrated the operational communication core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.

An open conference bridge decision line was used as the primary means of communicating decisions with the state of South Carolina and risk counties. This call allowed the states and counties to have coordinated precautionary and protective action decisions. Secondary communications system included landline and cellular telephones, 800-megahertz radios, incident management software, and facsimile machines. All these systems were operable and could have been used to communicate interoperably between states and counties.

For this core capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability target was met: 3.1.

3.2.1.2 State of Georgia Dose Assessment

Situational Assessment Capability Summary:

Georgia Department of Natural Resources personnel successfully demonstrated the situational assessment core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.

Staff members were prepositioned at the state operations center in accordance with the extent of play agreement and responded to their workstation following notification of the Alert declaration. Through interview, a team member described the process that would be used for staff recall and to activate the facility. A 24-hour staffing roster was available. The facility and personnel had adequate equipment, communications, and supplies to support emergency operations.

The emergency support function 10 assessment team consisted of the radiological emergency coordinator, who served as team leader, and dose assessment coordinator. The two staff members worked in a complementary manner and were supported by a technical liaison from the utility. The radiological emergency coordinator focused on the overall mission of the team with special emphasis placed on changing plant conditions that could affect radiological releases and the impacts on protective action decision making. The dose assessment coordinator performed dose projection calculations using two dose assessment software programs and compared them with data from emergency notification forms. This process provided an independent assessment of the projected doses. Precautionary actions included a livestock advisory (use of stored feed and water), waterway clearing, and hunting/fishing ban within the 10-mile emergency planning zone.

In general, there were no significant differences between the dose assessments performed by the utility and the state; however, there was one dose value reported by the utility's input program toward the end of the exercise that did not indicate an acceptable comparison. This appeared to be a transcription error by the utility when entering data. Because the apparent error appeared late in the exercise, the effort to confirm whether the low dose value was correct was not successful. Later, it was determined that protective action guides had been exceeded at the site boundary. Since the higher state estimated dose value impacted the decision to authorize the use of potassium iodide for emergency workers, the radiological emergency coordinator decided to proceed with recommending the ingestion of potassium iodide. Potassium iodide was recommended to be ingested by emergency workers when the thyroid dose projection exceeded the protective action guides.

Due to the wind coming from the east, Burke County, Georgia was the only county impacted by the plume. After reviewing state and utility dose projections, conferring with the dose assessment coordinator, and reviewing the utility's protective action recommendations, the radiological emergency coordinator concurred with the utility's recommendation to evacuate two miles around and five miles downwind. This concurrence was provided in the form of a protective action recommendation to the governor's authorized representative for sharing with Burke County officials who were responsible for the protective action decision making process in their county. Ultimately, the county made the decision to evacuate out to 10-miles downwind.

In addition, Georgia Department of Natural Resources personnel were familiar with dose limits for emergency workers and the approval process for exceeding the limits. After representative air sample results were available, the team calculated a plume specific dose correction factor and shared this information with the field teams. However, this dose correction factor was not available until near exercise termination.

For this core capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 4.5.

3.2.1.3 State of Georgia Field Team Management

Situational Assessment Capability Summary:
The Georgia field team coordinator successfully demonstrated the situational assessment core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.

The field team coordinator was prepositioned at the Burke County Emergency Management Agency in accordance with the extent of play. The field team coordinator received notification of an Alert declaration by email from personnel in the Georgia State Operations Center. The radiological emergency coordinator directed the field team coordinator to report to the Burke County Emergency Management Agency for management of state radiological monitoring and air sampling operations. Simultaneous mobilization orders were sent to field team members. Following arrival, the field team coordinator informed the radiological emergency coordinator that the teams had arrived and were initiating actions in preparation for deployment to conduct monitoring and air sampling, and that preparations were underway to manage field operations.

The field team coordinator conducted a radiological briefing for the field teams, which included a video describing dosimetry and potassium iodide use and administrative dose limits. Following the briefing, the teams were directed to receive their dosimetry kits, which

were distributed by a representative from the Burke County Emergency Management Agency. The kits included dosimetry, potassium iodide tablets, and appropriate forms to record dosimeter readings and potassium iodide ingestion. The administrative and turnback levels were reviewed during the briefing. The field teams were directed to complete their deployment preparation, including an inventory and operational equipment check, and report back when completed.

The field teams reported their dosimeter readings at regular intervals as instructed during deployment. The teams were continually updated regarding plant conditions, event status, and meteorological information. Each emergency notification form was reviewed following receipt, along with additional information transmitted to the teams. Following a protective action decision based on plant conditions, the field teams were instructed to ingest potassium iodide.

The field team coordinator successfully managed and directed field operations without the usual assigned assistant. The field team coordinator and the radiological emergency coordinator jointly determined the monitoring locations based on meteorological conditions and plume projections. Teams were directed to conduct one traverse, take radiological readings at designated monitoring locations for plume characterization, conduct an air sample at the estimated centerline of the plume, and proceed to a determined safe location for air sampling. Exposure was minimized by directing only one traverse of the plume, as determined by a collaborative effort between the field team coordinator and the radiological emergency coordinator based on stable meteorological conditions. Readings were called in as they were completed, and immediately forwarded to the state. Following air sampling, teams were directed to a specific location to transport the material, and report for monitoring and decontamination.

The Georgia field team coordinator and field team members used radios as the primary means of communication and cellular telephones as a backup. Prior to deployment, the field team coordinator conducted a radio communications check and determined that it was not operational and could not be relied upon for communications. Direction was given to use cellular telephones for all communication. Using the backup system slightly delayed the transmission of data as there was frequent dialing time and interruptions with other incoming calls. However, the conversations were clear and easily understood.

For this core capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 2.2, 3.1, 4.1 4.2.

3.2.1.4 State of Georgia Field Teams

Situational Assessment Capability Summary:

Georgia field monitoring team members successfully demonstrated the situational assessment core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.

The two field teams, consisting of personnel from the Georgia Department of Natural Resources and Georgia National Guard Civil Support Team, were prepositioned in accordance with the extent of play agreement. The team members were notified at the Alert emergency classification level, in a timely manner, by email, text, and telephone. All subsequent changes to the emergency classification level were communicated by radio.

Upon activation, the teams were provided a pre-deployment briefing by the field team coordinator, received dosimetry kits, inventoried equipment, and conducted operational checks on each of their radiation survey instruments, including source response checks and background radiation measurements. Both field teams were considered operational following completion of equipment checks and pre-deployment briefing.

Field monitoring team members demonstrated the capability to monitor and manage their radiation dose, use dosimetry equipment and radioprotective drugs, and explained the procedures to obtain authorization to receive emergency exposures in excess of exposure limits. The provided direct read dosimeters were appropriate for reading turnback radiation exposure limits. Team members began recording dosimetry readings prior to deployment and continued to record their dosimetry readings at regular intervals throughout the exercise. There was no default dosimeter correction factor available for use by field team members prior to the plume analysis correction factor provided toward the end of the exercise. Team members demonstrated knowledge of procedures for the use of potassium iodide. They simulated ingesting potassium iodide and recorded the ingestion time when advised to do so by the field team coordinator. Field team alpha members demonstrated an additional procedure for practicing "As Low As Reasonably Achievable" by splitting tasks outside of their vehicle between two members to minimize the dose accumulated during their mission.

Communication processes, systems, and equipment were sufficient to support emergency operations. The field team members demonstrated the capability to utilize and maintain reliable communications with the field team coordinator. Communications systems utilized by field team members during the exercise included radios and cellular telephones.

Field monitoring team members made, recorded, and reported measurements of ambient radiation to the field team coordinator, and successfully collected radioiodine and particulate air samples. One field team's radiation survey instruments and air sampler were within their calibration dates and were within the acceptable range of readings during operational and source checks. The other field team had a meter that failed the source response check. The process for replacing an instrument was for the field team coordinator to contact the Burke County Sheriff at the Burke County Emergency Operations Center or the radiation emergency coordinator and request a replacement, as there were no spare meters onsite.

The equipment kits contained supplies, equipment, and personal protective equipment sufficient to support field team operations. Although a list of personal protective equipment was available for field team members, there was no procedure for donning and doffing. Field team members used appropriate contamination control techniques and protected radiation survey instrumentation from contamination with the use of protective film and plastic bags. Team members also explained that they would contact their field team coordinator for any needed additional resources.

During their simulated deployments, field team members continuously monitored their survey instruments to prevent inadvertent radiation exposure to the plume. Team members took measurements to assist in the characterization of the plume. During their assigned traversals, field team members encountered increasing, then decreasing radiation exposure rates until they located the outer edges and centerline of the plume. Each team took an air sample at a designated point provided to them by the field team coordinator. Team members took radiation measurements while collecting the air sample to determine the plume had not shifted during the air sampling process.

Packaging and handling of samples was adequate to prevent cross-contamination and provide sample identification. The chain of custody procedures were completed effectively to maintain integrity of the samples. Team members appropriately packaged samples and explained that they would seal the outer bag containing the packaged samples to prevent tampering. The teams completed chain of custody documentation and explained that they would transport the samples to the mobile radiation laboratory.

For this core capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 2.2, 3.1, 4.2.

3.2.1.5 State of South Carolina Emergency Operations Center

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

South Carolina Emergency Operations Center staff successfully demonstrated the operational coordination core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.

The state warning point operators used an automated communications system to notify and mobilize staff to respond to the emergency operations center. The system was accessed through the internet and templates were available for each emergency classification level; the template to be used at each level as outlined in their procedures. The templated message was sent by telephone, text, and email; message receipt was observed following the Alert declaration. Redundant communications systems included landline and cellular telephone with personnel contact information available in their procedures, as well as 24-hour staffing rosters.

There were adequate equipment and supplies to support emergency operations within the state emergency operations center. In addition, a conference bridge decision line was the primary system used to coordinate incident status and precautionary and protective action decisions between South Carolina Emergency Management Division, Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency, and the risk counties. Secondary communications systems included landline and cellular telephones, a voice over internet protocol system, incident management software, 800-megahertz radios, and satellite telephones. Multiple digital screens displayed information and maps to keep staff informed.

Protective action recommendations were provided primarily by South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control staff, but input was solicited from emergency support functions 1, 6, 8, 10, 13, 15, 16, and 17, as well as command staff, a utility liaison, and risk county emergency management directors. Precautionary and protective action decisions were based on plant conditions, meteorological data, dose projections, and local factors such as small population numbers, Savanah River Site considerations, and evacuation time estimates via the conference bridge decision line with concurrence from state and county leadership. The chief of operations kept emergency operations center staff informed by conducting frequent briefings.

Precautionary actions for this exercise were implemented following the Site Area Emergency declaration and included waterway clearance, a hunting/fishing ban, an agricultural advisory to place livestock on stored feed and water, rail closure, and air space restrictions. Following the General Emergency declaration, decision makers coordinated the evacuation of zones A, D-5, E-5, D-10, E-10, F-10. Zone A was the only area requiring evacuation in South Carolina; zone A encompassed the Savannah River Site. The coordination between the state of South

Carolina and Savannah River Site was simulated. The outdoor warning system was activated to alert residents and transients of the precautionary and protective actions and was followed by an Emergency Alert System message.

Command and technical staff engaged in detailed conversations about the ingestion of potassium iodide by emergency workers and the public as a protective action. Even though protective action guidelines for the ingestion of potassium iodide were exceeded, a decision was made for emergency workers and the public to not ingest potassium iodide. The decision was based primarily on wind direction and speed and evacuation time estimates. It was determined there would be adequate time to evacuate residents if a wind shift occurred.

For this core capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 3.1.

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

The South Carolina Emergency Management Division public information officer and state warning point operator successfully demonstrated the public information and warning core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.

There was one siren in the South Carolina portion of the 10-mile emergency planning zone, which was activated by Barnwell County. Redundant systems in the event of a siren activation failure included reverse 911 and the Integrated Public Alert and Notification System. Emergency Alert System messages were disseminated through a web-based system and the Integrated Public Alert and Notification System. The messages were prescripted and available for each emergency classification level and protective action type, such as evacuation or shelter in place. System security and accidental activation and/or dissemination were mitigated by a two-factor authentication process. All messages contain the required elements, including the responsible organization, affected plant, reference to available emergency information, and request to stay tuned for additional information.

For this core capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability target was met: 3.2.

Operational Communications Capability Summary:

South Carolina operations center command staff successfully demonstrated the operational communication core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.

An open conference bridge decision line was used as the primary means of communicating decisions with the state of Georgia and risk counties. This call allowed the states and counties to have coordinated precautionary and protective action decisions. Secondary communications system included landline and cellular telephones, 800-megahertz radios, and incident management software. All of these systems were operable and could have been used to communicate interoperably between states and counties.

For this core capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability target was met: 3.1.

3.2.1.6 State of South Carolina Dose Assessment

Situational Assessment Capability Summary:

South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control personnel successfully demonstrated the situational assessment core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.

Staff members were prepositioned near the state emergency operations center and responded when notified of the Alert declaration, staffing emergency support functions 8 and 10. A roster was provided for 24-hour operations. The emergency support functions had workstations equipped with computers, landline telephones, office supplies, and reference materials. The team members brought portable computers, radios, and cellular telephones.

The emergency response coordinator provided direction to the emergency support functions 8 and 10 team members. The team monitored meteorological conditions and plant status with the aid of a utility liaison and emergency operations facility liaison. The emergency response coordinator participated in conference bridge decision line calls with the states of South Carolina and Georgia, and risk county decision makers, providing technical information and recommendations during discussions of precautionary and protective actions. Precautionary actions taken in this exercise included waterway clearing, a hunting/fishing ban, and a livestock advisory in the 10-mile emergency planning zone. The affected emergency planning zone area in South Carolina was comprised of the Savannah River Site property and the state simulated the sites response during the exercise.

The utility provided numerous dose projections to the state via email. The dose assessor monitored information provided on the projections and ran dose assessments using a different software program. The state dose projections were generally lower when compared with the utility dose projections but within acceptable agreement. The utility calculated adult thyroid committed dose, while the state used the more restrictive child thyroid committed dose. These differences were accounted for and noted. Although South Carolina had no field teams participating in this exercise, the dose assessor demonstrated the method for comparing field data to dose assessments.

The state public health medical officer and emergency response coordinator approved the distribution of potassium iodide for emergency workers but did not authorize ingestion of potassium iodide. Although the child thyroid doses exceeded protective action guides, the South Carolina portion of the emergency planning zone was located upwind for the duration of the exercise. The team closely monitored wind direction for possible wind shifts and was prepared to authorize potassium iodide.

For this core capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 4.5.

3.3 Joint Operations

3.3.1 Joint Information System/Center

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

State, county, and utility public information officers successfully demonstrated the public information and warning core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.

State, county, and utility public information officers operated within the joint information system to develop and deliver prompt and reliable information to the public and media. Following notification of an Alert declaration, the joint information system was activated and used for the duration of the exercise. Each public information officer participated in the joint information system virtually from their respective facilities. The state of South Carolina did activate and use a joint information center during the exercise, but it was used only by their state public information officers and not county, the state of Georgia, or utility public information officers.

As noted above, because the joint information system was used, the primary means of communication was a bridge line. This bridge line was used to communicate information related to news releases, as well as provide situational awareness between all public information officers. Each agency/organization public information officer functioned within their respective agency/organization and information was shared as it was occurring or had occurred. The joint information system was not leveraged in a way that facilitated coordinated messaging which could enhance and expand the public information capabilities within both states and multiple counties.

Overall direction and control for the joint information system was provided by a utility public information officer. The utility public information officer facilitated all discussions via the bridge line. State and county public information officers shared information as it became available, but the utility public information officer initiated all group discussions, including the prebriefing caucuses and concurrence on press briefing times. All news releases were developed, reviewed, approved, and disseminated outside of the joint information system bridge line. The joint information system public information officers received a copy of the disseminated news releases.

The joint information system was used to coordinate two virtual press briefings. A prebriefing caucus was held via the bridge line to share information and confirm the speaking order. A separate video conferencing platform was used to conduct the press briefings virtually. The utility public information officer solicited feedback on a prebriefing caucus and press briefing time from the joint information system public information officers. At the agreed upon times the utility public information officer initiated the prebriefing caucus and conducted roll call. Once roll call was complete rumors and responses to dispel them were shared. Following that the utility public information officer established the speaking order. Each public information officer then reviewed the information they anticipated sharing during the press briefing. The press briefings were conducted within 10 minutes or so of the prebriefing caucus ending.

The first press briefing ended about 3 minutes after it began because the utility received new information on the status of the Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant. This did not allow

for much information to be shared with the public or media. It was more than 2 hours later before the second press briefing was conducted. During the second press briefing the information shared was relevant, timely, and accurate. Once each public information officer had spoken, the mock media was given the opportunity to ask questions. A couple of the questions asked were quite difficult and unexpected. For example, a mock media outlet asked if Burke County parents should pick up their daycare/school children, especially those parents being asked to evacuate. While Burke County does not have schools within the emergency planning zone, they still have a responsibility to protect the health and safety of school children, especially those students that may live in the portion of the emergency planning zone being asked to evacuate. The response to the question did not accurately reflect the planning effort between the county emergency management staff and school and/or school district officials. More than 15 questions were asked and answered.

For this core capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability target were met: 3.3.

3.3.2 Southern Company Emergency Operations Facility

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

The South Carolina Emergency Management Division and Department of Health and Environmental Control liaisons in the utility's emergency operations facility successfully demonstrated the operational coordination core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.

Per the extent of play, the liaisons were prepositioned in the area and responded to the facility upon notification by their agencies. Upon arrival, the liaisons tested and opened multiple communications links with the South Carolina Emergency Operations Center. This included cellular telephone, email, and access to the state's incident management software. Due to unforeseen circumstances, the Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency liaison was unable to participate in the exercise. In the Georgia liaison's absence, the South Carolina Emergency Management Division liaison established a three-way text message group that included both South Carolina and Georgia emergency management officials.

Working closely with utility's offsite coordinator, the emergency management liaison relayed all updates on the plant's emergency conditions and provided that information as a heads-up to the critical partners in both state's operations centers. During the exercise the liaison monitored the conference bridge decision line with the states and counties and made sure the utility was aware of the state and local response activities and precautionary and protective action decisions. The Department of Health and Environmental Control liaison provided all utility dose calculations to the South Carolina dose assessment team for comparison.

For this core capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.3, 3.1.

3.4 Risk Jurisdictions

3.4.1 Burke County Emergency Operations Center

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

The Burke County Emergency Operations Center staff successfully demonstrated the operational coordination core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.

Emergency operations center staff were prepositioned in the area in accordance with the extent of play agreement and reported to their duty stations upon receipt of a call or text message to report to the emergency operation center. The emergency operations center director used a call down list to check off each staff as they arrived. All staff were notified and mobilized shortly after the Site Area Emergency declaration, and it was at this time the facility was declared operational.

The emergency operations center director provided direction and control for all Burke County response activities. The operations officer facilitated periodic briefings to update emergency operations center staff on current events and allowed supporting agencies to provide status updates on their respective activities. In addition to regular briefings, the emergency operations center staff utilized conference bridge decision line calls, an activity log, and a significant events board to maintain and provide situational awareness. Burke County's activities and decision making were synchronized with other impacted entities through the conference bridge decision line calls beginning at the Alert emergency classification level and each subsequent increase in classification. In accordance with written agreements, the state of Georgia and Southern Nuclear Company dispatched representatives at the Alert emergency classification level to support Burke County.

In the absence of the Chairperson of the Burke County Board of Commissioners, protective actions decisions were authorized by the vice chairperson and county manager who were in frequent consultation with the director and participated in the periodic conference bridge decision line calls. The Burke County leadership group communicated effectively and listened to input from staff, utility, state, and other neighboring jurisdictions prior to making timely decisions. After the emergency classification level increased to Site Area Emergency, Burke County made the decision to declare a local state of emergency, initiate traffic and access control points, relocate the preidentified access and functional needs population, and implement the following precautionary actions. The precautionary actions included placing livestock on stored feed and water, a hunting/fishing ban, waterway clearance; and the issuance of potassium iodide to emergency workers with responsibilities inside the 10-mile emergency planning zone.

After the emergency classification level increased to General Emergency, Burke County made the decision to evacuate zones A, D-5, E-5, D-10, E-10, F-10. Burke County leadership coordinated the timing of siren activation and emergency alert system message dissemination with neighboring jurisdictions. Additionally, Burke County coordinated the relocation of Burke County Fire Rescue – Company 11, which was located downwind and within ten miles of the plant, to the Burke County Emergency Management Agency headquarters, located outside of the of the 10-mile emergency planning zone. During a subsequent conference bridge decision line call, the state of Georgia advised Burke County that ingestion of potassium iodide was recommended for emergency workers with

responsibilities inside the 10-mile emergency planning zone based on independent dose assessments. Burke County leadership concurred with the recommendation and directed implementation by personnel operating the dosimetry station established at the Burke County Emergency Management Agency headquarters. No potassium iodide was issued to the Burke County public in accordance with plans.

Implementation of protective actions was successfully demonstrated through coordination emanating from the Burke County Emergency Operations Center and follow-on interviews with appropriate staff. After the decision to initiate precautionary and protective actions by Burke County leadership, the Burke County Sheriff's Office, the Waynesboro Police Department, the United States Coast Guard, and the Georgia Department of Natural Resources Law Enforcement Division coordinated implementation of traffic control measures to ensure a safe and timely evacuation. Upon request by the Burke County Emergency Operations Center director and subsequent permission granted by the American Red Cross to set up a shelter, emergency management staff coordinated with the American Red Cross, the Burke County Department of Health, and Burke County Division of Family and Children Services to facilitate the movement of citizens with access and functional needs. Through discussion, the health and family and children services representatives explained that they maintain a list of individuals with access and functional needs, which is updated annually and provided to the Burke County Emergency Management Agency. No schools are located within the emergency planning zone of Burke County; however, the emergency management staff coordinated with Board of Education officials to facilitate the setup of the reception and congregate care center at Burke County High School. The Burke County Emergency Management Agency Radiological Emergency Plan includes a map of designated traffic control points and evacuation routes. Through discussion, the Burke County Sheriff's Office explained that the traffic control points in the affected zones would be staffed, advising the public of the correct travel routes.

The new emergency operations center, which resides in the renovated basement of the Burke County Judicial Center, was adequate in size and security, and well equipped to support prolonged emergency response operations. The main room provided workspace and seating for over 50 staff and was equipped with telephones, laptops, general office supplies and equipment, and binders that contained copies of radiological emergency plans and procedures. The walls were adorned with an array of digital and static displays to maintain situational awareness and provide emergency information, including four large computer monitors, a whiteboard, emergency action level wall charts, various mapping products, and emergency classification level signage that was updated as the incident progressed. Adjacent to the main room were additional meeting and breakout rooms that provided additional workspace for public information officers and decision makers. The facility, which also houses the Burke County Warning Point/911 center, provided a kitchen, restrooms, and additional space for deployed resources and personnel. If needed, a large natural gas generator can provide backup power for the entire facility.

The 911 center and adjoining emergency operations center had multiple communication systems including internet access, email, regular and dedicated landline and cellular telephones. Backup communications also included facsimile machines, and county 800 megahertz radios with dedicated local government frequencies. A dedicated secure radio was tested as a backup to telephone and functioned well. An open conference bridge decision line was maintained for immediate coordination and decision making. Sufficient redundant communications were observed and are available for extended operations if required.

For this core capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 2.1, 3.1.

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

The Burke County public information officers successfully demonstrated the public information and warning core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.

The Burke County public information officer in the emergency operations center and the public information officer (performing virtually in the joint information system) ensured the director was continuously updated regarding public information messages. All information specific to the emergency situation in Burke County was specifically approved by the director prior to inclusion in a media release by the Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency, assuring that no incorrect county information was released to the media.

At the approved designated time, a communications officer coordinated the activation of Georgia sirens and issuance of an Emergency Alert System message to the public over primary radio station WBBQ-FM, Augusta. The siren activation and radio station messaging to the public were both simulated silently. All procedures were followed correctly, and timely/accurate alerting of the public was simulated. Per agreement with the radio station, messages were to be recorded and could be repeated at preestablished intervals if requested.

Information regarding rumor inquiries from the public was received on the dedicated public information officer bridge line and immediately passed to the emergency operations center director and staff for public awareness. No calls were received in Burke County.

For this core capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability target was met: 3.2.

On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement Core Capability Summary:

Personnel representing Burke County Emergency Management Agency, the Georgia Department of Natural Resources Law Enforcement Division, the Burke County Sheriff's Office, and the Waynesboro Police Department successfully demonstrated the on-scene security, protection, and law enforcement core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.

At the Burke County Emergency Management Agency headquarters, a representative from the Georgia Department of Natural Resources Law Enforcement Division received an emergency worker briefing and equipment prior to supporting waterway clearance. The Burke County Emergency Management Agency representative explained that they had enough emergency worker kits to supply the field teams and Burke County emergency workers. All equipment was within the proper calibration and expiration dates.

The Georgia Department of Natural Resources Law Enforcement Division explained that the primary communications system between the emergency workers performing waterway clearance and their supervisor, located in the Burke County Emergency Operations Center, would be a cellular telephone. The Burke County Sheriff's Office Deputy and Waynesboro

Police Department Officer discussed through an interview that emergency workers stationed at traffic control points would be contacted using vehicle radio systems on designated channels or cellular telephones. The representative from the Georgia Department of Natural Resources Law Enforcement Division, successfully demonstrated a communications check and coordination with their supervisor in the emergency operations center. The representative also explained that they would notify their supervisor every 10-15 minutes to brief them on task status and dosimetry readings.

The Burke County Sheriff's Office Deputy and Waynesboro Police Department Officer explained traffic control point procedures through interview. A map of evacuation routes and traffic control points was available in the Burke County Emergency Management Agency Radiological Emergency Plan. The representatives identified the zones being evacuated, zones A, E-5, D-5, E-10, D-10, F-10. Using the map, they explained that the traffic control points would be staffed along the evacuation routes of the affected zones. Adequate equipment for staffing the traffic control points was stored in their patrol vehicles. If additional equipment or signage were needed, they would coordinate with the Burke County Public Works Road Department and emergency management director.

The Burke County Sheriff's Office Deputy also described the mobilization process, identifying that the traffic control point staff would first report to the Burke County Emergency Management Agency headquarters to receive an emergency worker briefing and dosimetry kit. After their shift, supervisors would instruct the traffic control point staff to report to the emergency worker decontamination site at the Burke County High School. The Sheriff's Office would report any impediments to evacuation routes to the emergency management director and coordinate with other agencies to manage the impediment or reroute traffic.

For this core capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 2.2, 3.1, 5.4.

3.4.2 Burke County Emergency Vehicle Decontamination

Environmental Response, Health, and Safety Capability Summary:

During an out of sequence demonstration on June 14, 2022, at the Burke County High School in Waynesboro, Georgia, Burke County Emergency Management Agency staff and Burke County Fire and Rescue Department firefighters successfully demonstrated the environmental response, health, and safety core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.

The facilities, equipment, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, potassium iodide, and other supplies were sufficient to support the monitoring and decontamination of emergency vehicles and equipment. Burke County Emergency Management Agency staff and Burke County Fire and Rescue Department firefighters issued appropriate dosimetry and potassium iodide to manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically, and at the end of each operational period, read their dosimeters and recorded the readings on the appropriate exposure record cards.

The Burke County Fire and Rescue Department Chief gave a thorough radiological and safety brief which included exposure limits, contamination action levels, reporting, potassium iodide issuance and ingestion, and personal protective equipment. The chief detailed actions to take for reporting call back exposure limits and the option to stay or return to receive medical

treatment. The briefing also informed the emergency workers to report their dose readings every 30 minutes to supervisors. All handheld radiation survey meters were within current calibration dates and before operations began operational checks were performed.

Donning and doffing of personal protective equipment was demonstrated using a new procedure and process. The workers were not familiar with the process and supervisor intervention was frequently required to prevent potential cross contamination.

Specific areas at the facility were set up for gross decontamination, initial emergency worker vehicle monitoring, vehicle decontamination, interior monitoring, a holding area for emergency workers waiting for transport to the reception center, and contaminated vehicle parking. When a vehicle entered the facility, a scribe spoke with the driver and recorded information on a form. The vehicle was then directed through a gross decontamination station which consisted of a purpose-built rinse station that sprayed the vehicle with water. The driver was then directed to drive through the portal monitor.

The portal monitor alarmed on the first vehicle, and it was designated as contaminated. A site worker directed the driver to continue forward for spot monitoring and decontamination. In this area a site worker used a handheld meter to survey the front and rear of the vehicle, paying special attention to the front intake system, radiator, door handles, tires, and wheel wells. The site worker held the meter consistently one inch above the surface while moving at a rate of one inch per second while monitoring the vehicle. Using this method, contamination was found on the vehicles' rear hatch handle and near the license plate. The site worker reported that the meter was reading above the acceptable limits and that decontamination would then be needed. A site worker using a hose with an adjustable nozzle rinsed the area from the top working downwards. Following the rinse, a large scrub brush with soap and water was used to scrub the area in a downwards fashion, with a final rinse afterwards. Once the decontamination process was concluded the site worker re-checked the area and found no contamination present. The driver was directed to next area. Once the driver moved onto the next area, the site worker surveyed the brush for contamination. No contamination was found on the brush and it was placed back into service. The site worker noted that vehicles not decontaminated to acceptable limits would be parked in the contaminated parking lot.

The second vehicle did not trigger an alarm on the portal monitor, the driver was also directed to the decontamination area where surveys were done on the front and back of the vehicle to confirm no contamination above limits was present. The driver was then directed to the interior monitoring area.

At the interior monitoring area, the driver was instructed to open the driver's side door and their hands were surveyed. The site worker then surveyed the bottom of the driver's feet, provided protective shoe coverings, and instructed them to exit the vehicle. The site worker then surveyed the interior of the emergency worker vehicle beginning on the driver's side. While monitoring the interior, the site worker routinely surveyed his own knee and hands after contacting potentially contaminated surfaces, at the request of the radiological protection officer. The site worker detected elevated readings of 600 counts per minute inside the vehicle, which was recorded by the scribe. After using a cleaning cloth to swipe the area identified as contaminated, the monitor resurveyed the area and reported it was below contamination limits.

Vehicles that could not be sufficiently decontaminated would be directed to the contaminated parking lot for future disposition. A small bus or golf cart would be used to

transport all drivers and passengers to the nearby reception and congregate care center for monitoring and decontamination.

For this core capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 2.2, 5.1, 5.2.

3.4.3 Burke County Reception and Congregate Care

Environmental Response, Health, and Safety Capability Summary:

During an out of sequence demonstration on June 14, 2022, at the Burke County High School in Waynesboro, Georgia, Burke County Emergency Management Agency and Burke County High School staff successfully demonstrated the environmental response, health, and safety core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.

The facility and traffic lanes was clearly marked with signage, traffic cones, markings, and site workers directing individuals to the appropriate area. Signs, contamination control supplies, personal protective equipment, stanchions, and barrier ribbon were sufficient to minimize the spread of contamination. Appropriate equipment and supplies were available to support monitoring and decontamination of individuals. Direct reading dosimeters and handheld radiation survey meters were within annual calibration dates. The portal monitor and handheld survey meters were checked for proper operation using an appropriate source. A radiological safety briefing was provided to site workers that explained the use of dosimetry, potassium iodide, and record keeping. Site workers who could come into contact with contamination were issued a dosimetry packet containing a direct reading dosimeter, permanent record dosimeter, potassium iodide, exposure record card, and thyroid blocking agent control form. When interviewed, site workers understood their administrative limits, and how and when to read their dosimeters and record the values and ingest potassium iodide.

Evacuees and emergency workers entering the facility by vehicle were directed through a vehicle portal monitor and then to appropriate areas for vehicle holding or parking. There was adequate space to park the number of vehicles expected at this location. Individuals with a contaminated vehicle would be transported from the contaminated vehicle holding area to the reception center entrance by a bus or golf cart. At the entrance route markings and site workers directed evacuees and emergency workers to an initial monitoring area where they were monitored for contamination by a portal monitor. Individuals entering the facility were provided shoe coverings to prevent the spread of contamination in the facility. Facilities were also available for pet monitoring and decontamination by owners.

One portal monitor was set up to demonstrate initial monitoring of evacuees and emergency workers and seven individuals walked through the portal monitor. Based on the average time for each individual, it was determined that one portal monitor was sufficient to monitor twenty percent of the expected population arriving at this facility within a 12-hour time period. A monitoring and decontamination form was initiated for every individual entering the facility and accompanied them through the facility.

Those who did not alarm the portal monitor were instructed to remove their shoe coverings and directed to the registration area. These individuals were given a green armband which

was used to identify those with no contamination. Individuals who alarmed the portal monitor were escorted to the decontamination area.

Separate locker rooms for male and female decontamination were used. Contaminated individuals were instructed to place personal items such as keys, wallets, and jewelry in a sealable plastic bag and then instructed to remove their clothing and shower. Following the shower, individuals were provided clean clothing and surveyed with a handheld meter. Site workers were able to explain the contamination action level requiring further decontamination. A maximum of two attempts would be made at decontamination. If individuals were successfully decontaminated, it would be indicated on their monitoring form. If an individual could not be decontaminated, the reception center manager would arrange transport to a hospital for further evaluation and medically supervised decontamination. Personal belongings were surveyed for contamination and if no contamination was found they were returned to the individual.

For this core capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 2.2, 5.1, 5.2.

Mass Care Services Capability Summary:

Registration operations at the reception and congregate care center were staffed by Burke County High School and the Burke County Public Schools Central Office. The Burke County High School Principal was the designated manager for the reception and congregate care center; however, the principal was new and observed this demonstration while two assistant principals oversaw operations.

Burke County Emergency Management Agency staff were responsible for notifying the Burke County Public Schools Superintendent of the need for a reception and congregate care center. The superintendent would then notify district staff in accordance with procedures. The superintendent and staff would consider early release of students prior to evacuee and emergency worker arrival if school was in session.

Registration started when individuals were found not contaminated by the portal monitor or were successfully decontaminated; green wristbands identified them as “clean”. Upon receiving the required wristband, individuals were directed to the registration area. Access to the registration and sheltering area was controlled and various barriers, like emergency tape, stanchions, and benches prevented access. As part of the registration process, center staff recorded the individual’s information on a form and the completed form was then taken to the checkout area where they were collected for the Burke County Emergency Management Agency. Once registration was complete, individuals either entered the shelter or checked out and left.

There were six center staff working the registration area which was adequate for the expected population, and registration supplies and equipment were sufficient to support emergency operations. Additionally, an auditorium capable of seating approximately 2,050 people and a large athletic court on which cots could be set up on were available to support shelter operations. The shelter would accommodate service animals, but household pets would be housed elsewhere.

The American Red Cross did not participate during the out of sequence demonstration on June 14, 2022, at the Burke County High School in Waynesboro, Georgia. As such shelter

operations were evaluated by interview on July 18, 2022. The Burke County Emergency Management Agency, American Red Cross, and Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency all participated in the interview. When preparing to open their reception and congregate care center at Burke County High School, the Burke County Emergency Management Agency will notify the American Red Cross. Upon receipt of notification the American Red Cross will use internal procedures to notify and mobilize a liaison for the Burke County Emergency Operations Center and shelter personnel and equipment for the operations at Burke County High School.

All evacuees will be monitored and decontaminated, if needed, prior to registering and entering the shelter area at the high school. Evacuees that were decontaminated will be given a wristband that identifies they were decontaminated and free of contamination. It is expected that the shelter has sufficient capacity but if not, the middle school located on the same campus could be used for additional shelter space.

For this core capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability target was met: 5.1.

3.4.4 Aiken County Emergency Operations Center

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

The Aiken County Emergency Operations Center staff successfully demonstrated the operational coordination core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.

Upon notification of the Alert emergency classification level the emergency management director sent out a message, via a mass communications system, to notify and mobilize emergency operations center staff. Notifications were received and verified via landline and cellular telephone and email. The emergency management director stated that if the call from the plant came in after duty hours the 911 center would receive it, and a notification to staff would be generated from the 911 center.

Robust and redundant internal and external communications systems were available and used to provide continuous communication and situational awareness within the emergency operations center. Equipment and supplies were sufficient, and all systems used were operational with no communication failures.

The Aiken County Emergency Management Director provided direction and control of the county's response as delegated by the county commissioners. Throughout the exercise, the director maintained situational awareness through conference bridge decision line calls with the states of South Carolina and Georgia, the risk counties, and other partners; these calls were led by the state of Georgia. After each emergency notification form and conference bridge decision line call the emergency management director briefed the emergency operations center staff. During these briefings each emergency support function updated actions taken, and actions planned. The national weather service had a representative present to discuss the metrological data on the emergency notification forms and the plant liaison discussed the emergency action levels. There was a total of nine emergency notification network calls and eight conference bridge decision line calls. On these calls, protective action recommendations and decisions were discussed, coordinated, and concurred upon.

Aiken County had no schools or day care centers within their portion of the 10-mile emergency planning zone. There were no institutionalized individuals nor were there any identified persons with access or functional needs. Their portion of the 10-mile emergency planning zone consisted solely of a privately owned hunting preserve. Memorandums of understanding and letters of agreement were in place to request additional resources as necessary.

The establishment of traffic control points was discussed by interview with the Aiken County Sheriff's Office Sergeant following the Alert declaration. The sergeant explained that Aiken County Sheriff's Office Deputies would be contacted and advised to standby for their traffic control point deployment assignments. Dosimetry and potassium iodide were maintained by the Aiken County Sheriff's Office and assigned to each deputy. A radiological safety briefing and remedial dosimetry training would be provided to the deputies as outlined in job aides. Any evacuation route impediments would be identified, and their removal coordinated with local resources and/or the South Carolina Department of Transportation. If rerouting of traffic was required, deputies would be notified and reassigned as appropriate, and the new route provided to the joint information system for dissemination to the public.

For this core capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 5.4.

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

Due to the nature of the exercise scenario and in accordance with the extent of play agreement the public information and warning core capability within the Aiken County Emergency Operations Center was not demonstrated. The South Carolina Emergency Management Division Public Information Officer represented both the state of South Carolina and Aiken County Emergency Management Agency in the joint information system and on bridge line calls.

3.4.5 Aiken County Emergency Worker Decontamination

Environmental Response, Health, and Safety Capability Summary:

During an out of sequence demonstration on April 27, 2022, at the Redcliffe Elementary School in Aiken, SC, Aiken County Emergency Management Agency and Aiken County Road and Bridges Services staff successfully demonstrated the environmental response, health, and safety core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.

Aiken County Emergency Management Agency and Aiken County Road and Bridges Services staff had sufficient equipment, survey instruments, dosimetry, potassium iodide, and other supplies to support the monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers, vehicles, and equipment. Following a radiological safety brief staff were issued appropriate dosimetry and potassium iodide and instructed on how to manage radiological exposure in accordance with the plans/procedures. Aiken County Emergency Management Agency maintained appropriate record keeping of the administration of potassium iodide to emergency workers.

Site staff donned and doffed personal protective equipment to prevent cross contamination. Site signage was set up and used to direct emergency worker traffic arriving onsite for

monitoring and decontamination. The first emergency worker vehicle was met at the vehicle monitoring area. The two occupants were greeted by a staff member and asked to provide information that was annotated on a form. The emergency worker in the passenger seat was asked to step out of the vehicle and directed to the personnel monitoring area adjacent to the vehicle monitoring area.

The vehicle monitoring team began surveying the vehicle; the team included a monitor and recorder. A survey meter was placed into operation as per the Aiken County Monitoring and Decontamination Standard Operating Guide and the manufacture's product manual, and a reading was taken to establish background. The interior of the vehicle was surveyed first and determined to be free of contamination. The team then surveyed the exterior of the vehicle. The front passenger side wheel read 700 counts per minute; the team continued to survey the front fender. The same reading was detected on all four-wheel wells; no other areas of contamination were detected on the vehicle.

The vehicle was then driven to the vehicle decontamination area by the driver who remained in the vehicle while at the decontamination station. The monitoring team briefed the decontamination team on the contamination found on the wheel wells. The decontamination team began decontaminating the vehicle. The vehicle decontamination team consisted of two team members. The decontamination team sprayed the identified contamination points with a simulated steady flow of water. After the decontamination was complete, the vehicle was moved back by the driver to a secondary monitoring area to be resurveyed. It was determined to be free of contamination and guided to the clean vehicle lot to await mission reassignment.

The driver was escorted back to the personnel monitoring area where the passenger waited. The vehicle driver was surveyed first. A personnel monitoring team member began completing a form and used the form to direct the other team member responsible for surveying the emergency worker through the process. The team member started the survey at the head and proceeded methodically down the emergency worker's body to the emergency worker's shoes. The team member used survey techniques according to plans and procedures in terms of pace and distance. This method was used for both the front and back of the emergency worker. The emergency worker's palms, and shoe soles were found to be contaminated. Contamination was simulated and provided via controller inject at 500 counts per minute for both the palms and shoe soles. Spot decontamination was used to decontaminate the emergency worker. The area of concern was resurveyed and found to be free of contamination.

The passenger was surveyed next. The same survey was used. The emergency worker was also found to be contaminated on their palms and shoe soles at 500 counts per minute. The same actions were taken, and the emergency worker was found to be free of contamination following the second survey. Both emergency workers were directed towards the site exit.

For this core capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 2.2, 3.1, 5.2.

3.4.6 Allendale County Emergency Operations Center

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

The Allendale County Emergency Operations Center staff successfully demonstrated the operational coordination core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.

An Allendale County Warning Point Operator received the initial notification of an Alert emergency classification level over the emergency notification network and advised the Allendale County Emergency Management Director without delay. Upon being notified of the Alert declaration, the emergency management director and assistant director began notifying and mobilizing staff. Mobilization of emergency operations center staff was conducted using a call down roster. The emergency operations center was declared operational upon staff arrival.

The emergency operations center had sufficient equipment, supplies, and communications systems to support emergency operations. There were several digital and static displays indicating the current emergency classification level, maps of the emergency planning zones, wind direction, and logs from their incident management software. Each workstation had a laptop, landline telephone, and a copy of the county emergency operations plan. Coordination with the states and other counties occurred over an open conference bridge decision line. Additional methods of communication included cellular telephones, 800 megahertz radios, email, text messaging, and facsimile machines.

The emergency management director provided direction and control within the emergency operations center and conducted regular situational briefings. Staff, including a utility liaison, briefed the emergency operations center on actions specific to their agency/organization. All briefings followed this pattern throughout the exercise. In addition, precautionary and protective actions were coordinated between Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency and the South Carolina Emergency Management Division over an open conference bridge decision line. Coordination calls occurred after receiving emergency notification forms or as required and were led by the state of Georgia.

When required, protective action decisions were concurred upon by all participants before they were implemented. The Allendale County Emergency Management Director concurred with the issuance of potassium iodide to emergency workers and the general public. This was the only decision that impacted the county. There were no schools, daycares, or residents with access and function needs located within the Allendale County portion of the emergency planning zone.

A South Carolina Highway Patrol Trooper was dispatched to the emergency operations center following the Alert declaration. The trooper's primary role and responsibility was to facilitate staffing of the predesignated traffic and access control points. Through interview it was explained that each trooper, or emergency worker, had cones, barrier signs, and road maps of the area in their vehicles. In addition, the troopers would receive a radiological safety briefing and a dosimetry kit. Following their shift, the troopers would be instructed to report to the emergency workers decontamination site where their person, equipment, and vehicle would be monitored for contamination. The supervisor also outlined what actions would be taken if there was an impediment on evacuation route. Any heavy equipment needed would be requested through their representative in the emergency operations center, or through mutual aid agreements with other agencies such as the Allendale County Department of Public Works or the South Carolina Department of Transportation.

Due to the nature of the exercise scenario Allendale County did not demonstrate exposure control decision making and management during the exercise; however, dosimetry, survey equipment, and potassium iodide quantities were verified during a staff assistance visit on April 26, 2022.

For this core capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 3.1, 5.4.

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

The public information officer position was unavailable for duty upon activation of the Allendale County Emergency Management Agency. As a result, the public information and warning core capability within the Allendale County Emergency Operations Center was not demonstrated. A South Carolina Emergency Management Division Liaison represented Allendale County Emergency Management Agency in the joint information system and on bridge line calls.

3.4.7 Barnwell County Emergency Operations Center

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

The Barnwell County Emergency Operations Center staff successfully demonstrated the operational coordination core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.

Upon receipt of the Alert declaration, the emergency management director used a call down list to notify key emergency operations center staff by telephone. The staff arrived at the emergency operations center and the emergency operations center was declared operational. Functions staffed within the emergency operations center included emergency management, public information, transportation, fire, law enforcement, public health, natural resources, facility security, as well as state and utility liaison positions.

All notifications were received from Vogtle Electric Generating Plant by secure facsimile and verified by the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant communicator over the emergency notification network. The emergency management director stated that the Barnwell County 24-hour warning point was located at the 911 Center, and the 911 Center would answer the emergency notification network and notify the emergency management director if the emergency operations center was not staffed. The emergency management director developed a 24-hour staffing roster.

The emergency notification network was the primary means of receiving and coordinating emergency information from the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant. The emergency notification network was successfully utilized; no communication failures were noted. A conference bridge decision line was utilized to make protective action decisions among offsite organizations. A commercial telephone line was a backup method of communication. In addition to redundant communication systems, the county emergency operations center and warning point were adequately equipped with monitors, computers, office supplies, desks with electrical outlets, chairs, screens, breakout rooms, and printers.

The Barnwell County Emergency Management Director accomplished critical tasks associated with the direction and control capability target by maintaining situational

awareness, tracking significant events, and providing an abundance of guidance to the operations center staff. Situational awareness briefings were conducted frequently, and as new information was received. The Barnwell County Emergency Operations Center had adequate space and equipment to support emergency operations.

Following concurrence on the precautionary actions to issue a livestock advisory (use of stored feed and water), clear waterways, and issue a hunting/fishing ban within the 10-mile emergency planning zone a waterway clearance interview was conducted with a South Carolina Department of Natural Resources Officer. The officer explained that once a precautionary action decision was made to clear the Savannah River, officers would receive a radiological briefing from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control. The officers would be issued equipment at the Barnwell County Emergency Operations Center with the exception of potassium iodide pills. Potassium iodide pills would be issued at the Aiken County Emergency Operations Center while enroute to the Jackson boat ramp on the Savannah River. Upon arrival, the officers would launch a watercraft and begin a sweep of the river advising boaters from a pre-scripted message to leave the area immediately. Upon route completion, the officers would report to the emergency worker decontamination site in Aiken County for monitoring and decontamination.

Protective action recommendations were coordinated, and decisions made over the conference bridge decision line. Zone H-10, which includes portions of Barnwell County was not in the affected area as determined by the wind direction. Furthermore, there were no members of the public with access and functional needs, schools, or institutions which would require advanced planning and evacuation. The Barnwell County Emergency Management Director agreed with the Burke County Emergency Management Director to synchronize and activate the outdoor warning system and Emergency Alert System; both systems were activated without failure.

For this core capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 2.1, 3.1.

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

The Barnwell County public information officer and 911 center staff successfully demonstrated the public information and warning core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.

Staff at both the Barnwell County Emergency Operations Center and the Barnwell County 911 Center demonstrated the ability to alert and notify the public in a timely manner. The first protective action decision was coordinated by the states and risk counties to evacuate zones A, D-5, E-5, D-10, E-10, F-10 in Georgia. Since Barnwell County was a risk county on the Savannah River, the county agreed to sound their one siren in conjunction and synchronization with Burke County. Burke County, Georgia was responsible for issuing the Emergency Alert System message. The Barnwell County 911 Center staff were notified by the Barnwell County Emergency Management Agency Director of the decision to activate the one siren in Barnwell County. The emergency management director coordinated with the Barnwell County 911 Center staff at the time the siren was being sounded and the 911 Center staff successfully followed the procedures to activate the siren on time.

Following the siren activation, a backup route alerting interview was conducted with a Barnwell County Sheriff's Office Deputy. The deputy explained that once a protective action

decision was made to activate the outdoor warning system, a deputy would receive a radiological briefing from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control. The deputy would be issued equipment at the Barnwell County Emergency Operations Center. The deputy would be dispatched to notify the general public within zone H-10. There were prescripted messages which the deputy would read aloud over vehicle speakers while following the designated route. Upon route completion, the deputy would proceed to the emergency worker decontamination site at Barnwell Fire Rural District 11 Station for monitoring and decontamination.

The Barnwell County Public Information Officer function at the emergency operations center was to receive and review news releases in conjunction with the emergency management director from the state of Georgia, state of South Carolina, and Georgia Power Company and coordinate those releases with media in the county. Barnwell County did not issue any county news releases; the emergency management director and the public information officer quickly verified and recirculated the news releases from to a simulated media center outside of the emergency operations center.

The public information officer monitored two phone lines available for public inquiry. The public information officer stated that if the phone lines became busy additional volunteers would be called in to manage the phones and social media outlets. The public information officer stated that the news releases available would be used to provide information to the callers and any trends in calls would be forwarded to the South Carolina Emergency Management Division Public Information Officer. There were no media or public inquiries directed to the public information officer.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 3.2, 3.3.

Section 4: Conclusion

FEMA assesses offsite response organization preparedness on an ongoing basis which meets the intent of the 44 CFR 350 planning standards and, through the assessment of selected core capabilities, the National Preparedness Goal. This report is used to document biennial demonstration-based assessment activities and will be used to inform the Biennial Preparedness Report in December 2022.

The analysis of capabilities in section 3 described the states of Georgia and South Carolina and the Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant offsite response capabilities. Overall, the exercise was a success. The demonstration-based assessment activities evaluated by core capabilities, objectives, and capability targets were successfully demonstrated and no Level 1 or Level 2 Findings were identified. All offsite response organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures, and successfully demonstrated the ability to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of an incident involving the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.

Based on the results of this exercise and FEMA's review of the 2021 Annual Letter of Certification submitted by Georgia and South Carolina, the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness of the states of Georgia and South Carolina and the affected local jurisdictions site specific to the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant can be implemented. They are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of an emergency at the site. The Title 44 CFR, Part 350 approval of the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness site specific to the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant granted on June 9, 1987, will remain in effect.

Despite the current pandemic and other ongoing real world response efforts, the professionalism and teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all phases of the exercise. FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated and made this exercise a success.

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Appendix A: Exercise Timeline

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Time Utility Declared	Time That Notification Was Received or Action Was Taken						
		Georgia SOC/ Dose Assessment	Burke County	SS-SEOC / Dose Assessment	Aiken County	Allendale County	Barnwell County	JIS/JIC*
Unusual Event	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Alert	8:25 a.m.	8:30 a.m.	8:30 a.m.	8:30 a.m.	8:30 a.m.	8:30 a.m.	8:30 a.m.	10:08 a.m.
Site Area Emergency	10:04 a.m.	10:10 a.m.	10:10 a.m.	10:10 a.m.	10:10 a.m.	10:10 a.m.	10:10 a.m.	11:15 a.m.
General Emergency	11:01 a.m.	11:13 a.m.	11:13 a.m.	11:13 a.m.	11:13 a.m.	11:13 a.m.	11:13 a.m.	12:24 p.m.
Simulated Rad. Release Started	10:04 a.m.	10:10 a.m.	10:10 a.m.	10:10 a.m.	10:10 a.m.	10:10 a.m.	10:10 a.m.	-
Simulated Rad. Release Ended	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Facility Declared Operational	8:45 a.m.	8:47 a.m.	10:52 a.m.	9:04 a.m.	9:14 a.m.	8:51 a.m.	8:30 a.m.	9:24 a.m.
State of Emergency Declared	Georgia	10:50 a.m.	10:50 a.m.	-	-	-	-	12:02 p.m.
	South Carolina	-	-	10:20 a.m.	10:20 a.m.	10:20 a.m.	10:20 a.m.	10:53 a.m.
	Local	10:49 a.m.	10:49 a.m.	-	-	-	-	-
End Exercise	1:20 p.m.	1:45 p.m.	1:35 p.m.	1:23 p.m.	1:33 p.m.	1:24 p.m.	1:24 p.m.	1:21 p.m.
Precautionary Actions: GA: Agriculture advisory; hunting/fishing ban; waterway clearance; potassium iodide issuance to emergency workers		10:47 a.m.	10:47 a.m.	-	-	-	-	11:14 a.m.
SC: Agriculture advisory; hunting/fishing ban; waterway clearance; potassium iodide issuance to emergency workers		-	-	10:41 a.m.	10:41 a.m.	10:41 a.m.	10:41 a.m.	11:00 a.m.
Protective Action Decision 1: Evacuate: A, D5, E5, D10, E10, F10		11:45 a.m.	11:48 a.m.	11:48 a.m.	11:45 a.m.	11:47 a.m.	11:49 a.m.	12:13 p.m.
Siren Activation		12:00 p.m.	12:00 p.m.	12:00 p.m.	12:00 p.m.	12:00 p.m.	12:00 p.m.	12:13 p.m.
EAS Message		12:05 p.m.	12:05 p.m.	12:05 p.m.	12:05 p.m.	12:05 p.m.	12:05 p.m.	12:13 p.m.
Potassium Iodide Decision: Georgia: Ingestion (Emergency Workers)		12:48 p.m.	12:48 p.m.	-	-	-	-	-
South Carolina: No Ingestion		-	-	12:48 p.m.	-	-	-	-

**Denotes the time in which a decision was messaged from the joint information system/center.*

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Appendix B: Evaluator Assignments

Location/Venue	Evaluation Team	Core Capability
State of Georgia Operations Center & Dose Assessment	Robert Nash Kevin Reed Tom Essig	Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning Operational Communications Situational Assessment
State of Georgia Field Team Management & Field Teams	Cheryl Weaver Carol Shepard Gary Goldberg	Environmental Response/Health and Safety
Joint Information System/Center	Erica Houghton	Public Information and Warning
Southern Company Emergency Operations Facility	Robert Spence	Operational Coordination
State of South Carolina Emergency Operations Center & Dose Assessment	Matthew Bradley Dave Ortman Jill Leatherman	Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning Operational Communications Situational Assessment
Burke County Emergency Operations Center	Nate Nienhius Randi Hendrix Roy Smith	Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement Environmental Response, Health, and Safety Mass Care Services
Aiken County Emergency Operations Center	DeShun Lowery Farrah Stewart Irvin Gibson	Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning Environmental Response, Health, and Safety
Allendale County Emergency Operations Center	Quintin Ivy Brenda Rembert	Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning
Barnwell County Emergency Operations Center	Gerald McLemore Rosemary Samsel	Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning

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Appendix C: Exercise Participants

Participating Organizations
State of Georgia
Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency
Georgia Department of Natural Resources
Georgia Department of Public Safety
State of South Carolina
South Carolina Emergency Management Division
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control
South Carolina Highway Patrol
South Carolina Department of Social Services
South Carolina Department of Natural Resources
Burke County
Burke County Board of Commissioners
Burke County Fire/Rescue
Burke County Board of Education and Transportation
Aiken County
Aiken County Sheriff's Office
Aiken County Board of Commissioners
Allendale County
Aiken County Sheriff's Office
Allendale County Fire
Allendale County Board of Education
Barnwell County
Barnwell County Board of Education

Participating Organizations
Barnwell County Sheriff's Office
Barnwell County Fire Services
Private Sector
Southern Nuclear Company
Federal
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region 4
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region 2

Appendix D: Extent of Play Agreement

The signed extent of play agreements and accompanying approval letters were provided to the state directors and program managers. The signed agreements are available upon request.