



# Final After Action Report

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant  
Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise  
Exercise Date: December 8, 2020

*March 8, 2021*



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## **Executive Summary**

On December 8, 2020, the offsite response organizations of the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 10-mile emergency planning zone participated in a plume exposure pathway exercise. FEMA Region IV Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program staff evaluated that exercise, which also included out of sequence activities conducted on December 9, 2020. This report outlines that exercise and out of sequence activities.

The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of states and local preparedness in responding to an incident at the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant. It was conducted in accordance with FEMA policies and guidance concerning the exercise of state and local radiological emergency response plans and procedures.

Officials and representatives from participating agencies and organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures, and successfully implemented them during the exercise and out of sequence activities. FEMA had 22 people evaluating 11 separate venues in the two states of Georgia, South Carolina and four risk counties Burke, Allendale, Aiken, and Barnwell. Virtual evaluators were assigned to the joint information system and Barnwell County Emergency Operations Center. The following six Core Capabilities were evaluated during the exercise: Operational Coordination; Operational Communications; Situational Assessment; Public Information and Warning; Environmental Response, Health, and Safety; On Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement. There were four exercise objectives that correlated to FEMA's evaluation requirements. All objectives were met, and all Core Capabilities were successfully demonstrated. There were no Level 1 or Level 2 Findings identified during the exercise. All jurisdictions met their exercise objectives and successfully demonstrated the corresponding core capabilities identified in Section 2.2 of this report.

It was apparent that a great deal of virtual training and practice was conducted by the offsite response organizations to successfully demonstrate the ability to protect the health and safety of the public in a COVID-19 environment. They provided the necessary support and resources to respond in the event of an incident involving the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated in the exercise and made it a success. The professionalism and teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all phases of the exercise.

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## **Section 1: Exercise Overview**

### **1.1 Exercise Details**

**Exercise Name**

2020 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise

**Type of Exercise**

Full Participation Exercise

**Exercise Date**

December 8, 2020

**Exercise Off Scenario/Out of Sequence Dates**

December 9, 2020

**Locations**

See the extent of play agreement in Appendix C for exercise locations.

**Program**

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program

**Mission**

Response

**Scenario Type**

Plume Exposure Pathway Radiological Emergency

### **1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership**

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### **1.3 Participating Organizations**

Agencies and organizations of the following jurisdictions participated in the 2020 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant exercise.

#### State of Georgia:

Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency  
Georgia Department of Natural Resources Environmental Protection Division  
Georgia Department of Public Safety (DPS), Georgia State Patrol

#### State of South Carolina:

South Carolina Office of the Adjutant General, Emergency Management Division  
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control  
South Carolina Highway Patrol  
South Carolina Department of Social Services  
South Carolina Department of Natural Resources

#### Joint Operations:

Joint Information System  
Emergency Operations Facility

#### Risk Counties:

Burke County, Georgia  
Aiken County, South Carolina  
Allendale County, South Carolina  
Barnwell County, South Carolina



## Section 2: Exercise Design Summary

### 2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design

The Federal Emergency Management Agency administers the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program pursuant to the regulations found in Title 44 Code of Federal Regulation parts 350, 351, and 352. Title 44 Code of Federal Regulation part 350 codifies sixteen planning standards that form the basis for radiological emergency response planning for state, tribal, and local governments impacted by the emergency planning zones established for each nuclear power plant site in the United States. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations also codify the sixteen planning standards for the licensee. Title 44 Code of Federal Regulation Part 350 sets forth the mechanisms for the formal review and approval of state, tribal, and local government radiological emergency response plans and procedures by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. One of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program cornerstones established by these regulations is the biennial exercise of offsite response capabilities. During these exercises, affected state, tribal, and local governments demonstrate their abilities to implement their plans and procedures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the nuclear plant.

The results of this exercise, together with review of the radiological emergency response plans and procedures and verification of the periodic requirements set forth in *"Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980* (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1), the annual letter of certification, and staff assistance visits, enabled the Federal Emergency Management Agency to provide a statement with the transmission of this final after action report to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission that the affected state, tribal, and local plans and preparedness are: (1) adequate to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the nuclear power facility by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological emergency; and (2) capable of being implemented.

Formal approval of the radiological emergency response plans for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, submitted to the Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV by the States of Georgia and South Carolina and involved local jurisdictions, occurred on June 9, 1987 under Title 44 Code of Federal Regulation Part 350. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on April 30 – May 1, 1986.

## 2.2 Exercise Core Capabilities and Objectives

Core Capabilities-based planning allows for exercise planning teams to develop exercise objectives and observe exercise outcomes through a framework of specific action items. Using the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program methodology, the exercise objectives meet the REP Program requirements and encompass the emergency preparedness evaluation areas. The critical tasks to be demonstrated were negotiated with the States of Georgia and South Carolina and the participating counties. The Core Capabilities scheduled for demonstration during this exercise were:

- **Operational Coordination:** Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.
- **Operational Communication:** Ensure the capacity for timely communications in support of security, situational awareness, and operations by any and all means available, among and between affected communities in the impact area and all response forces.
- **Situational Assessment:** Provide all decision makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response.
- **Public Information and Warning:** Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.
- **Environmental Response/Health and Safety:** Conduct appropriate measures to ensure the protection of the health and safety of the public and workers, as well as the environment, from all-hazards in support of responder operations and the affected communities.
- **On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement:** Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas and also for response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.

These Core Capabilities, when successfully demonstrated, meet the exercise objectives. The objectives for this exercise were as follows:

- **Objective 1:** Demonstrate the ability to provide direction and control and make protective action decisions through the state emergency operations centers, county emergency operations centers, and field activities by exercise play and discussion of plans and procedures.
- **Objective 2:** Demonstrate the ability to activate the prompt alert and notification system utilizing the primary notification system and the emergency alert system through exercise play.

- **Objective 3:** Demonstrate the effectiveness of plans, policies, and procedures in the joint information center for public and private sector emergency information communications
- **Objective 4:** Demonstrate the ability to provide dose projection and protective action decision making for the plume phase.

### 2.3 Exercise Scenario

The following is a summary of the scenario developed by Southern Nuclear to drive exercise play. This scenario and supporting documents were adequate for the demonstration of the exercise objectives and associated technical criteria identified in the extent of play agreement. Actual exercise times and events may have differed from those shown below.

<b>Emergency Classification Level (ECL):</b>	<b>Time Utility to Declare:</b>	<b>Off Site Organizations to be Informed:</b>
Start of Exercise	0730	N/A
Usual Event	0850	0905
Alert	N/A	N/A
Site Area Emergency	0917	0932
Rad Release Begins	1137	1147
General Emergency	1132	1147
End of Exercise	(onsite)	Offsite exercise may continue to complete JIS play.
Rad release Ends	1200	

The exercise began at 0810 when a condensate storage tank makeup pump was shut down due to excessive vibrations. At 0822 the digital metal impact monitoring system alarmed. Radiation levels in containment began to increase. At 0835 a radiation monitor exceeded a threshold level. Conditions existed to declare a Notice of Unusual Event emergency classification level based on emergency action level SU3 (reactor coolant activity greater than technical specification allowable limits). At 0850 the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant declared a Notice of Unusual Event emergency classification level. At 0905 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant notified the counties of the Notice of Unusual Event. At 0902 chemistry results for reactor coolant system activity exceed a threshold level and therefore conditions existed to declare an Alert emergency classification level based on EAL FA1 (loss or potential loss of either the fuel clad or RCS barrier). At 0904 a 450-gallon per minute steam generator tube rupture occurred creating conditions to declare a Site Area Emergency based on EAL FS1 (loss or potential loss of any two barriers). A monitored radiological release begins to occur at this time. At 0917 Utility declared a Site Area Emergency. At 0932 Utility notifies OROs of the Site Area Emergency. At 1117 a main steam code safety lifts and will not reseal. Conditions exist to declare a General Emergency based on EAL FG1 (loss of any two barriers and loss or potential loss of the third barrier). An unmonitored release was occurring. At 1132 Utility

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declares a General Emergency. At 1147 Utility notifies the counties of the General Emergency. Expected protective action recommendations from the utility were to evacuate zones A, SRS-2, B-5 and consider the use of potassium Iodide in accordance with county plans and policies. At 1200 The main steam code safety is closed. The unmonitored release is stopped. At 1330 the exercise was terminated for the utility.

## Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities

### 3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results

This section contains the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the December 8, 2020, plume exposure pathway exercise and out of sequence activities on December 9, 2020.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated based on the demonstration of Core Capabilities, capability targets, critical tasks, and the underlying REP criteria as delineated in the FEMA REP Program Manual dated January 2016. Exercise criteria are listed by number and demonstration status of those criteria are indicated by the use of the following terms:

- M: Met (no unresolved level 1 or level 2 findings assessed and no unresolved findings from prior exercises)
- 1: Level 1 finding assessed
- 2: Level 2 finding assessed or an unresolved level 2 finding(s) from a prior exercise
- P: Plan issue
- N: Not demonstrated

### 3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation

The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) methodology is an analytical process used to assess the demonstration of specific capabilities during an exercise. A capability provides a means to perform one or more critical tasks under specified conditions and to specific performance standards. Core Capabilities form the foundation of the FEMA Region IV REP Program evaluations. The Core Capability summaries below provide an overall combined assessment of state and local jurisdictions based upon their collective demonstrated performance as it relates to the specific Core Capability. Each jurisdiction's standalone capability summaries are listed in Section 3.3 of this report.

**Operational Coordination:** Key leadership personnel from different agencies established and maintained a unified and coordinated operational structure which provided effective direction and control. Overall, the decision-making process integrated all critical stakeholders which enabled protective action recommendations to be thoroughly understood. The decision-making process allowed for consideration of relevant and appropriate factors, with protective action decisions made in a sensible and timely manner.

**Operational Communication:** The states of Georgia, South Carolina, risk counties, and other agencies demonstrated the capability of well-time communications in support of security, situational awareness, and operations among and between affected communities in the impact area and all response forces. The Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency established and facilitated all decision line calls over an open conference bridge line telephone. They also coordinate all precautionary actions, protective action decisions, and periodic updates. Key decision-makers from the State of Georgia and Burke County, the State of South Carolina, and the counties of Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell participated. There was also support staff represented from the emergency operations facility. Emergency managers successfully led their team, citizens, media, and partners through emergencies during the exercise with effective communication. They were clear, consistent, and appropriate when it was crucial to managing exercise response efforts and emergencies.

**Situational Assessment:** Georgia Department of Natural Resources Environmental Protection Division and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control personnel successfully demonstrated the ability to assess plant conditions and provide sound recommendations to decision-makers in response to a radiological incident at the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant. County and state decision-makers were provided with relevant and accurate radiological information by state dose assessors throughout the demonstration. The data allowed decision-makers to understand the extent of the hazards and cascading effects and make appropriate protective action decisions..

**Public Information and Warning:** The risk jurisdictions, aided by the States of Georgia and South Carolina emergency response teams, effectively demonstrated the activation of the primary alert and notification system during a General Emergency. The siren sounding was well coordinated during decision line call with concurrence from risk jurisdictions.

Due to the COVID-19 environment they didn't use the conventional joint information center. For the first time a joint information system process, which was supported by each jurisdiction's emergency operations center at the Vogtle exercise. This provided them a mechanism to organize, integrate, and coordinate information and instruction that were accurate, accessible, and consistent messaging across multiple jurisdictions. They were very successful with well-time coordinated, prompt, and reliable information to be delivered to the public and media.

**Environmental Response/Health and Safety:** Aiken County Public Works demonstrated the ability to establish an emergency worker decontamination station where emergency workers, emergency vehicles, and equipment were monitored for radiological contamination, decontaminated, and returned to service. The field monitoring teams of the Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency demonstrated thorough and comprehensive record-keeping as well as conduct appropriate measures to protect the environment and the affected communities.

**On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement:** Georgia's and South Carolina's State and local law enforcement officers were knowledgeable of their duties and radiological limits. All the jurisdictions and agencies involved in traffic control point operations came together to discuss the entire process. Stakeholders were knowledgeable of the coordinating and execution of establishing the traffic control point as well as their exposure control limits.

### **3.3 Jurisdictional Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation**

#### **3.3.1 State of Georgia**

##### **3.3.1.1 State Operations Center/Dose Assessment**

###### **Operational Coordination Capability Summary:**

Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency staff successfully demonstrated the capability to coordinate emergency response efforts for the emergency planning zone of Vogtle Electric Generating Plant. The capability was demonstrated in a COVID-19 environment during a simulated radiological event. The initial notification of an emergency classification level at the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant was received on the Emergency Notification Network line located in the state operations center 24-hour warning point. Warning point personnel immediately contacted the state radiological emergency preparedness manager who preceded to notify key personnel, such as the governor's authorized representative. Upon receiving notification of a Site Area Emergency at the plant, state operations center staff were contacted and notified to report to the state operation center. Additional notifications were made as required.

The state operation center was well equipped to support emergency operations. The primary communication with the utility was the Emergency Notification Network line located in the warning point. Landline telephones are the back up to the Emergency Notification Network. Multiple additional communication capabilities were also available. A large multiscreen display located behind the command workstation displayed situational awareness and logs, a digital emergency planning zone map, wind direction and speed, plant status, and other information as needed. Emergency planning zones maps and the current emergency classification level were also displayed throughout the operations center. Workstations provided ample connectivity and supplies.

Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency personnel placed emphasis on providing a safe working environment during the COVID-19 pandemic. Temperature checks were conducted upon entrance to the facility and the state operations center. Face masks were mandatory for all persons inside the building and hand sanitizer stations were located throughout. The staff maintained appropriate social distancing standards by marking the floors with 6-foot distance markers and hanging mask guidance signage throughout the building. Staff rooms were changed to accommodate social distancing standards.

Direction and control within the state operations center was managed by the radiological emergency preparedness manager, the operations chief, and governor's authorized representative. The utility liaison officer and the operations support analyst also supported the response. Update briefings to the operations center staff and coordination calls with South Carolina Emergency Management Division and the risk counties were held after the receipt of each emergency notification form from the utility. Coordination for protective action decisions occurred on the open conference bridge line located in the state operations center after each emergency classification level change. The briefings consisted of relevant information for maintaining situational awareness and making informed decisions. Decisions concerning protective actions for emergency workers, evacuation traffic control, and the general public were made during the calls as required. There were no impediments to evacuation identified during the exercise.

The state operation center staff were professional and knowledgeable. They used internal guides and checklist effectively and adhered to COVID – 19 protective protocols to maintain an efficient and safe operational rhythm.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.b.2, and 3.d.2.

- a. Level 1 Finding:** None
- b. Level 2 Finding:** None
- c. Not Demonstrated:** None
- d. Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- e. Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

#### **Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:**

Emergency public information and warning was successfully demonstrated during the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Exercise on December 8, 2020, using the Joint Information System and the virtual news media briefings. Established procedures were used to alert and mobilize appropriate personnel to operate the joint information system and the external affairs function at the state operations center. Redundant communications systems, equipment, and office supplies were available to support

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emergency operations. A joint information system bridge line linked public information officers from participating jurisdictions, Southern Nuclear Company, and state agencies in both Georgia and South Carolina. Emergency information and instructions were reviewed and approved by the appropriate agencies before being disseminated to the relevant public and news media. News releases were reviewed by state operations center leadership and disseminated electronically. News media briefings were done remotely. Alert and notification of the public was facilitated over the decision line and implemented by Burke County. Public information officers-maintained awareness and tracked those operations.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 5.a.1, 5.b.1

- a. Level 1 Finding:** None
- b. Level 2 Finding:** None
- c. Not Demonstrated:** None
- d. Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- e. Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

#### **Situational Assessment Capability Summary:**

The Georgia Department of Natural Resources Environmental Protection Division dose assessment staff successfully performed their dose assessment function at the state operations center in Atlanta, Georgia. The staff was alerted, mobilized and activated in a timely manner. Sufficient communications capabilities, equipment, and supplies were available to support emergency operations. The radiation emergency coordinator provided direction and control for the dose assessment function and state field monitoring teams. The Georgia state dose staff coordinated with the utility technical liaison, South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, and utility dose assessment personnel at the emergency operations facility for determination of protective action recommendations. The dose assessment staff performed dose projections to quantify the monitored radiological release following the Site Area Emergency declaration as well as the unmonitored release following the General Emergency declaration. All dose projection results were well below the Environmental Protection Agency Protective Action Guide limits for total effective dose equivalent and committed dose equivalent. The radiation emergency coordinator worked closely with state operations center management and Burke County in making timely and appropriate protective action decisions for the public and emergency workers. Effective exposure control measures were in place for the protection of emergency workers.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met:  
1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, and 2.b.2

- a. Level 1 Finding:** None
- b. Level 2 Finding:** None
- c. Not Demonstrated:** None
- d. Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- e. Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

**Environmental Response/Health and Safety Capability Summary:**

The Georgia Department of Natural Resources Environmental Protection Division dose assessment coordinator at the state operations center in Atlanta, Georgia, effectively managed state field monitoring teams to locate and characterize the radioactive release and ensure effective exposure control. The dose assessment staff utilized field data to conduct and verify dose calculations. Two state field monitoring teams were deployed to traverse the projected plume path at two miles and five miles from the plant. Air samples were taken by both teams that verified dose projection results were well below the Environmental Protection Agency Protective Action Guide limits for total effective dose equivalent and committed dose equivalent. These actions allowed for the successful demonstration of this core capability.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met:  
4.a.2.

- a. Level 1 Finding:** None
- b. Level 2 Finding:** None
- c. Not Demonstrated:** None
- d. Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- e. Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

**3.3.1.2 Field Monitoring Teams**

**Environmental Response/Health and Safety Capability Summary:**

State of Georgia Field Monitoring Teams Alpha and Bravo successfully demonstrated the ability to locate, measure, sample the radiological plume, and implement effective emergency worker exposure control. The teams were each staffed with two or three individuals from the Georgia Department of Natural Resources Environmental Protection Division.

The field monitoring teams were successfully alerted and mobilized. In accordance with the extent of play agreement, the teams were prepositioned at the state operations center located in Atlanta, Georgia. The teams were staged in the parking lot awaiting notification from the field team coordinator to report and ready their equipment and supplies for deployment. Normally, the field monitoring teams would report to the forward emergency operations center in Burke County when activated.

The teams were supplied with field monitoring equipment and communication equipment at the staging area. Four-wheel drive response vehicles were provided by Georgia Department of Natural Resources. Field teams were issued cellular phones with push to talk capability to use as their primary communication system and used their state-issued and personal cellular telephones as backup. Communication checks were conducted prior to team dispatch and were operational throughout the exercise.

The teams inventoried, and checked all equipment, prior to field deployment. Each team was equipped with sufficient supplies and equipment to perform ambient monitoring and air sampling. A comprehensive radiological briefing was provided by the field team coordinator who issued the teams dosimetry kits, including potassium iodide, to each emergency worker and established a record of the distribution. The teams were briefed on plant status, meteorological conditions, and field assignments. Each team described and demonstrated proper use of dosimetry, exposure control, record-keeping, and the use of potassium iodide. A decision to ingest potassium iodide was not made for this demonstration. Permanent record dosimeters and potassium iodide were simulated during the exercise; actual dosimetry and potassium iodide were inspected during a recent site assistance visit.

In accordance with the extent of play agreement, the field team demonstration was performed in the parking lot due to COVID-19. The field teams used proper monitoring and air sampling techniques to track the plume and determine an appropriate location to take an air sample. Team Alpha was assigned to perform a projected plume path traverse along River Rd, from pre-determined sampling point K2-1 to G3-1 approximately two miles from the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant. Team Bravo was assigned to monitor from sampling point J5-1 to F5-1 approximately five miles from the site. Exposure readings were taken along each traverse at regular 0.2-mile intervals and transmitted to the field team coordinator who directed the field teams to take an air sample at the location of the highest reading. At each location, the field teams confirmed that they were in the plume before taking an air sample. Each team followed their procedures in demonstrating the collection of a proper air sample. The samples were transported to a background location and counted, and results were transmitted to the field team coordinator. Air samples were packaged and labeled in accordance with the procedure.

When field monitoring was completed, the teams were directed to proceed to the emergency worker decontamination center, located at Burke County High School. After decontamination, all dosimetry and records would be turned in to the field team coordinator at the forward emergency operations center.

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For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, and 4.a.3.

- a. Level 1 Finding:** None
- b. Level 2 Finding:** None
- c. Not Demonstrated:** None
- d. Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- e. Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

### **3.3.2 State of South Carolina**

#### **3.3.2.1 State Emergency Operations Center/Dose Assessment**

##### **Operational Coordination Capability Summary:**

During the radiological emergency preparedness exercise, the South Carolina Emergency Management Division established and maintained a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrated all critical stakeholders and supported the execution of core capabilities. The South Carolina Emergency Management Governor’s Authorized Representative, Chief of Operations, Technical Officer, and supporting staff demonstrated their ability to carry out the essential management functions of the radiological response effort. They made appropriate protective action decisions, utilizing available resources and information. While responding to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the leadership team prioritized the needs of the citizens of South Carolina and the three South Carolina counties, Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell, while supporting the State of Georgia and the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant. Due to pandemic restrictions, personnel reporting to the state emergency operations center were limited to decision makers, while emergency support function personnel were available virtually or by telephone if needed.

The South Carolina State Emergency Operations Center is located near Columbia, South Carolina and is collocated with the State Warning Point. Initial and subsequent notifications of an event at the nuclear power plant occurred via the dedicated emergency notification network telephone line. The plant submitted the emergency notification forms to the offsite response organizations via fax machine and a virtual response platform. The virtual platform was also utilized to facilitate inter-agency communication and the official archive of documents for the response. Response personnel were notified via email or phone calls to alert and mobilize for the incident as necessary. Plant status

and classification levels were provided to response personnel within the emergency operation center through emergency notification forms and through briefings provided by a utility liaison or South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control subject matter expert. As the nuclear power plant is located within the State of Georgia, South Carolina assumed a supporting role and posture for the exercise.

Primary communication was accomplished using landline telephones, with back up communications via cellular telephones, a reverse 9-1-1 calling system, the virtual response platform, various emergency services 800-MHz radio systems in use by first responders, and satellite phones. All communications systems remained in operation during the exercise. Position specific briefing books, supplies and equipment were readily available. Within the decision-making room, three computer-controlled wall mounted video monitors were used to display information concerning plant status, emergency classification level, emergency planning zone maps and other event related data. The larger rooms within the state emergency operations center were not staffed due to pandemic restrictions but were also equipped with video projection systems, TVs, clocks, and messaging boards that displayed plant statuses.

Decision makers maintained situational awareness to help facilitate the decision-making process. Utilizing meteorological conditions, available plant data, and discussion with the State of Georgia and relevant counties, the Governor's Authorized Representative made appropriate protective actions for emergency workers and the general public. Although it was not required by the scenario, the Technical Officer discussed how the state would provide for and equip emergency workers with a thyroid blocking agent, monitor potential exposure, and dosimetry.

Implementation of traffic and access control, plus clearance of impediments to evacuation were discussed by the Traffic Management emergency support function decision maker. Through discussion they described the ability to perform needed control traffic related to an event at the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, as well as the ability to clear traffic impediments that would hinder evacuation. The personnel also described how they would utilize the virtual response platform to inform the external affairs section of any impediments.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.b.2, and 3.d.2

- a. Level 1 Finding:** None
- b. Level 2 Finding:** None
- c. Not Demonstrated:** None
- d. Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- e. Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

**Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:**

The South Carolina Public Information Chief demonstrated capable direction and control of the operation and coordination of the Joint Information System throughout the exercise. The Joint Information system was involved with the lead state of Georgia on coordinating the release of information and decisions as to when the siren would be sounded. Some of the South Carolina counties weren't present on the Public Information Officer conference calls, but the decision makers had received the information during the decision makers conference calls.

Timely and accurate messages and instructions were simulated being provided to the media and public, by issuance of one Emergency Alert message and three news releases. These had been developed at the South Carolina Joint Information Center, approved by a conference call with decisionmakers via Joint Information System with affected Emergency Operation Centers and Plant Vogtle. The news releases that affected the State were released from the State Joint Information System. The Emergency Alert System message was approved by decision makers, included protective action recommendations, and made reference to the Plant Vogtle emergency information calendar, livestock precautions for farmers in Barnwell County, and monitoring Emergency Alert System stations. The staff member developing the news releases stated there were pre-scripted messages and news releases in the State's procedures. The one siren activation was discussed during a decisionmakers conference call, and a time for the counties to activate their sirens was selected, plus a time for the Emergency Alert Message to be released.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met: 5.a.1, 5.a.3, 5.b.1

- a. Level 1 Finding:** None
- b. Level 2 Finding:** None
- c. Not Demonstrated:** None
- d. Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- e. Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

**Situational Assessment Capability Summary:**

The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control personnel demonstrated the ability to assess radiological, meteorological, and plant conditions in response to a radiological incident at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant. Staff members were prepositioned at the State Emergency Operations Center in accordance with the extent of play agreement. Minimal staffing was observed due to the coronavirus pandemic. The facility and the team had adequate equipment, communications, and supplies to support emergency operations.

The emergency response coordinator provided direction to the emergency support function 10 team members. The team gathered the information for changing plant conditions to assess the radiological release. The dose assessment coordinator performed dose projection calculations and compared them with data from emergency notification forms. There were initially significant differences in results obtained by the utility and those calculated by the state. Review of the actual dose assessment runs provided a more independent assessment of the projected doses used to make protective action decisions. It was later identified that an error on the emergency notification form caused the differences in calculations, and the issue was resolved.

South Carolina was not in the downwind location for this exercise. The Savannah River Site comprised most of the South Carolina emergency planning zone for Vogtle. The emergency response coordinator recommended precautionary actions which primarily affected Barnwell County. The State of South Carolina concurred with utility protective action recommendations to evacuate out to two miles within the Savannah River Site due to the degrading plant status.

Potassium iodide was not recommended for the general public or emergency workers. Although field teams did not participate in this exercise, the emergency response coordinator simulated dispatching two teams to the border zone with Georgia. The Department of Health and Environmental Control personnel were familiar with the dose limits for emergency worker exposure control and the approval process for exceeding the limits.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, and 4.a.2

- a. 1 Finding:** None
- b. Level 2 Finding Level:** None
- c. Not Demonstrated:** None
- d. Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- e. Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

#### **On Scene Security and Protection Capability Summary:**

South Carolina Department of Natural Resources and Department of Public Safety personnel successfully discussed via interview the establishment of traffic and access control and the clearance of the Savannah River around the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant. The Department of Natural Resources officer described how they would coordinate with the State of Georgia to notify the general population along the river, maintain communication with the counties they were operating in, and how they would maintain emergency worker exposure control through the proper use of dosimetry and

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radioprotective drugs in accordance with their plans and procedures. Public Safety officers were prepared to implement traffic control and were knowledgeable of how to handle impediments to the evacuation, request additional resources, reroute traffic, and to implement emergency worker exposure control according to their plans and procedures.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.d.1, and 3.d.2.

- a. Level 1 Finding:** None
- b. Level 2 Finding:** None
- c. Not Demonstrated:** None
- d. Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- e. Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

### **3.3.3 Joint Operations**

#### **3.3.3.1 Southern Company EOF**

##### **Situational Assessment Capability Summary:**

The situational assessment core capability was successfully accomplished through a unified operational structure that integrated state liaisons with licensee staff. The Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency, the South Carolina Emergency Management Division, and, the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, Division of Emergency Response deployed liaisons to the licensee's emergency operations facility. The Emergency Operations Facility Manager, Offsite Response Coordinator, and Dose Assessment Supervisor effectively engaged the Georgia and South Carolina state liaisons keeping them abreast of the plant conditions, field monitoring data, and utility dose projections. The state liaisons provided plant-relevant information back to their decision makers without delay. Likewise, the liaisons provided offsite precautionary and protective actions to the licensee. The liaisons monitored the joint conference bridge line hosted by the Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency for situational awareness. Each liaison also maintained multiple lines of communication with their respective agencies. No communication failures were observed.



For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were met:  
1.d.1, 2.b.1

- a. Level 1 Finding:** None
- b. Level 2 Finding:** None
- c. Not Demonstrated:** None
- d. Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- e. Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

### **3.3.3.2 Joint Information System**

#### **Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:**

Using the joint information system concept, public information staff from the States of Georgia and South Carolina; Burke County; Georgia Power; and Southern Nuclear Company coordinated virtually to successfully deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information for the whole community affected by a simulated incident at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant. Led by the utility's public information director, the newly adopted virtual joint information system was successfully employed by the public information representatives to relay information regarding threats and hazards, actions taken, and assistance available.

Alert and notification of the joint information system participants was demonstrated successfully in accordance with respective state and county plans and procedures, as well as the extent of play agreement. Due to pre-positioning, public information staff were quickly available virtually to support the simulated incident. Following the notification of a Site Area Emergency declared by plant staff, an email was sent from the utility to a pre-designated public information distribution list consisting of representatives from Georgia and South Carolina requesting those included to dial into the utility-provided conference bridge line. From their respective virtual locations, all public information representatives were quickly able to establish the joint information system.

Public information staff used laptops, computers, cellular phones, landline conferencing telephones, email, conference bridge lines, video conference platform, and web-based emergency management information systems to communicate and collaborate in support of emergency operations. A conference bridge line for exclusive use by joint information system staff was established following notification of Site Area Emergency. The bridge line was used to establish and maintain communication among public information officers for joint information system coordination. A video conference platform was used to conduct media briefings, with a video streaming link available for remote viewing. A technical issue occurred early in the exercise when the conference bridge disconnected multiple lines. This was resolved within minutes with no impact to operations after an email with a backup conference line number was sent to all public

information staff operating within the joint information system. No additional communication failures were observed. Public information staff had sufficient equipment, maps, displays, supplies, and administrative resources to support emergency operations. Due to virtual operations, monitoring equipment, dosimetry, and potassium iodide were not required.

The joint information system fulfilled its role of providing follow-up messaging of the activation of the alert and notification system and additional emergency information and instructions to the public and media after the initial instructional message. The decision to activate the alert and notification system was coordinated by command staff on the decision conference bridge line following declaration of General Emergency. Burke and Barnwell Counties activated their respective sirens; Burke County activated the Emergency Alert System for the 10-mile emergency planning zone. Public information staff were made aware of the decision to activate the alert and notification system and times of activation by listening to the utility's administrative decision line or from staff within their home jurisdictions. This information was shared on the joint information system bridge line for the development of accurate and timely follow-up messaging.

Through news releases and media briefings, joint information system members successfully demonstrated the ability to provide emergency information and instructions to the public and media in a timely manner. Though no impediments to evacuation were relayed to the joint information system, all members of the system maintained continuous contact with their appropriate agencies. Instructions from the State of Georgia and Burke County through news releases and media briefings advised residents to adhere to local law enforcement while traversing evacuation routes.

Public information staff demonstrated strong collaboration and teamwork in the preparation and delivery of coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the public in news releases. Pre-scripted message templates were modified to include accurate precautionary action and protective action decisions made by command staff on the decision line. Draft messages were shared in a dedicated joint information system email group and were coordinated, reviewed, and edited by public information staff prior to approval by the originating jurisdiction. During the review of a draft release, staff successfully identified standard pre-script language which required modification to accurately reflect unique exercise conditions, validating the effectiveness of a new and recently approved joint information system procedure. The release of approved messages to the media and public was simulated by adding a time stamp, marking as final, and sharing within the joint information system email group. A total of 11 news releases developed by the State of Georgia, the State of South Carolina, and the utility were disseminated from the joint information system. All news releases included essential message elements and accurate emergency information and instructions consistent with the precautionary actions and protective action decision as applicable to each jurisdiction.

Rumor control functions were performed at other locations, with rumors reported to public information staff in the joint information system. Rumors were frequently shared on the joint information system bridge line and validated as true or false among the public information staff before being addressed to the public and media as needed during media briefings.

Two media briefings conducted through a video conference platform to accommodate the current pandemic environment were effective in providing timely and coordinated information to the media and public. Prior to each media briefing, a pre-caucus meeting was held on the conference bridge line to ensure accurate information was delivered in a cascading manner from most affected county/state to the utility. Facilitated by the public information director from the utility, information was delivered as discussed during the pre-caucus meeting. Inquiries from media present on the video conference were referred by the facilitator to the appropriate agency and answered accurately.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.d.2, 5.b.1

- a. Level 1 Finding:** None
- b. Level 2 Finding:** None
- c. Not Demonstrated:** None
- d. Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- e. Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

### **3.3.3.3 Operational Communications**

#### **Operational Communication Summary:**

The States of Georgia and South Carolina demonstrated the capability of timely communications in support of security, situational awareness, and operations among and between affected communities in the impact area and all response forces. The Georgia Emergency Management Agency and Homeland Security established and facilitated a decision line call over a conference bridge line telephone call which stay open during the exercise to coordinate precautionary actions and protective action decisions. Key decision makers from the State of Georgia; Burke County; the State of South Carolina; and the counties of Allendale, Aiken, and Barnwell participated. Other support staff from the States of Georgia and South Carolina, the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, Georgia Department of Natural Resources Environmental Protection Division and utility emergency operations facility liaisons were also represented on the decision line.

The decision line was established by the Georgia Emergency Management Agency and Homeland Security following declaration of Site Area Emergency and was maintained throughout the exercise. The decision line was primarily used to coordinate precautionary actions and protective action decisions, validate successful activation of sirens, and confirm receipt of Emergency Alert System messages. Further, facilitated discussions to maintain situational awareness also occurred for the benefit of stakeholders. Participants were provided frequent opportunities to brief on significant activities, raise unmet needs, and query other jurisdictions. Notably, real-world factors not explicitly part of exercise play were considered by key leaders.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met: 1.d.1.

- a. **Level 1 Finding:** None
- b. **Level 2 Finding:** None
- c. **Not Demonstrated:** None
- d. **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- e. **Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved:** None

### **3.3.4 Risk Jurisdictions**

#### **3.3.4.1 Burke County, Georgia**

##### **3.3.4.1.1 Emergency Operations Center**

###### **Operational Coordination Capability Summary:**

The Burke County Emergency Management Agency staff successfully demonstrated the ability to manage an emergency operations center and implement protective actions during a pandemic in response to a radiological emergency at the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant. The Burke County Emergency Management Agency Interim Director displayed effective leadership and his staff were supportive and knowledgeable. These actions together allowed for the fulfillment of the operational coordination core capability. Burke County is a risk county, with a significant portion of the 10-mile emergency planning zone. The director used timely notifications to fully activate the emergency operations center staff based upon plant conditions. This allowed him to effectively gather emergency information and analyze it, and then make appropriate recommendations to the county Commission Chairman and County Administrator who both participated throughout the exercise. Periodic staff briefings by the operations officer kept the staff informed of emergency conditions and plant status, and the staff periodically briefed the status of their actions to maintain effective internal coordination. Despite operating in limited space with minimum staffing due to a global pandemic, the participants performed their duties in accordance with plans and procedures.

Burke County 911 (24-hour warning point) successfully received multiple notifications from the utility; subsequently, appropriate authorities were notified, and emergency personnel were mobilized in a timely manner. The Burke County Emergency Operations Center employed redundant communications; the primary method utilized between the utility and Burke County was the Emergency Notification Network. Backup communications included commercial and cellular telephone, local radio networks, electronic mail, facsimile machines, and an electronic incident management system. All systems were fully functional and demonstrated successfully during the exercise. Participants had access to sufficient equipment and supplies to perform their duties.

The Burke County Radiation Protection Officer provided a detailed briefing, appropriate radiological exposure supplies, and associated forms and standard operating procedures to select emergency workers. After issuance, the emergency workers displayed a comprehensive understanding of the supplies and materials provided.

The emergency management director ensured effective communications among the staff by providing detailed information to the Operations Officer to conduct periodic briefings. These briefings provided situational awareness to the emergency operations staff during the event.

Direction and Control was successfully demonstrated by the Burke County Emergency Management Agency Director. Direction and Control in the County Emergency Operations Center was demonstrated through decisions, coordination and discussions with the Georgia state operations center, the state of South Carolina emergency operations center, the risk counties and Southern Company the utility. The director effectively synchronized situational awareness with all stakeholders through frequently attending coordinated decision line calls and coordinated protective action decisions with the stakeholders and local officials. The protective action decision making process coordinated all available information to make timely, well informed protective action decisions, and Emergency Alert System messages which were approved and disseminated to the public.

The director coordinated decisions that considered relevant factors with offsite response organizations during the exercise. Protective action decisions were successfully discussed, coordinated and agreed to among the stakeholders and local officials over the conference line. The public notification process was comprised of one siren activation and one simulated emergency alert system message to the affected populace. There were no orders given to the emergency workers to ingest potassium iodide.

The emergency operations center staff effectively coordinated the movement of impacted populations, including the relocation of 17 individuals with access and functional needs. There are no schools located within the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 10-mile emergency planning zone; however, school officials were prepared to provide notification to families living in the impacted area with students attending schools outside the emergency planning zone. Additionally, school busses were made available to assist evacuation efforts, if needed. Burke County Sheriff's Office representatives managed the establishment of 24 traffic control points to assist evacuation efforts. The sheriff officers discussed their ability to resolve impediments in a timely manner. Staff members were knowledgeable, and effectively used checklists from county plans to ensure the safety of the public and emergency workers.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.

- a. Level 1 Finding:** None
- b. Level 2 Finding:** None
- c. Not Demonstrated:** None
- d. Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- e. Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

#### **Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:**

Public information and warning were successfully demonstrated by the Burke County public information officers in the emergency operations center. Due to the current COVID-19 situation, the newly developed Joint Information System was perfect to demonstrate the flow of information from many various locations simultaneously. Utilizing a variety of computer programs and telephonic/video conference systems to engage with their counterparts in other locations, the rapid development of accurate and timely public information was greatly enhanced by having Burke County Joint Information System and Emergency Operations Center Public Information staff in the same location during the exercise. The Staff monitored a dedicated telephone bridge line throughout the event. These combined steps ensured that timely, coordinated decisions and the latest accurate information approved by the Chair of County Commissioners and Emergency Management Director were developed and released to the media and general public quickly. No news releases were issued by Burke. Rumor calls were received and responded to accurately by staff and reported on the bridge line in case media questions were raised. No trends were noted.

Siren activation, to be followed by an emergency alert system radio broadcast message was accomplished by Burke County after a coordinated decision by all risk counties, Georgia and South Carolina. The personnel followed their detailed, procedural aid and easily walked through the process to simulate the activation of the 46 sirens in Georgia at the siren console in the emergency operations center. Also coordinated on the decision line, the emergency alert system message to be released through a local radio station, was recorded and release simulated from the emergency operations center. The message broadcast over radio covers the emergency planning zone area in both states. The console allows the message to interrupt the normal radio broadcast and will be repeated as necessary.

Although there was no siren failures simulated, the Emergency Management Director discussed, in detail, the activities taken in the event of siren failure using the same reverse 9-1-1 computerized automated text and voice messaging system that alerts the public in the event of an emergency at the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant. The system enables selective targeting (in the failed siren area) of populations for telephone/cellular voice and text messages with specific emergency information. This system is effectively used for emergency weather alerts and mobilization of key Burke staff.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met: 5.a.1, 5.a.3, 5.b.1.

- a. Level 1 Finding:** None
- b. Level 2 Finding:** None
- c. Not Demonstrated:** None
- d. Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- e. Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

### **3.3.4.2 Aiken County, South Carolina**

#### **3.3.4.2.1 Emergency Operations Center**

##### **Operational Coordination Summary:**

Aiken County Emergency Operations Center staff successfully established and maintained an effective operational structure and process that provided direction and control for a county-wide response effort. Specifically, the County Emergency Management Department Director made and implemented protective action decisions in coordination with officials from the States of South Carolina and Georgia, and the risk counties of the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 10-mile emergency planning zone. This

coordination demonstrated the capability to integrate all partners and ensure decisions were well-informed and ultimately, protected the health and safety of the public and emergency workers alike. The evaluation of their response to a simulated radiological incident at the plant was completed in accordance with county plans and procedures.

Due to the SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19 pandemic, the EOC was minimally staffed. Pre-positioning of the EOC was permitted per the extent of play agreement. Alert and notification of staff was demonstrated immediately after the receipt of the Notice of Unusual Event notification from the plant. Incident notifications were received within the county warning point which is located with the 911 center. The notification of staff was made via electronic means by the county warning point and was completed within one minute of receipt the notification.

Communications and equipment within the emergency operations center was robust and redundant. The primary means of communication between Vogtle Electric Generating Plant and the county was the emergency notification network system; a dedicated commercial phone line. This dedicated line was used extensively throughout the exercise and operated without fail. Additional means of communication included the administrative decision line which was an open conference call among the 10-mile emergency planning zone risk counties and both states. This line was also used extensively throughout the exercise and operated without fail. Other communication nodes included local government radio, satellite phones, county cell phones, electronic communications, and amateur radio. Equipment and supplies were sufficient as demonstrated. If a full staff activation was required, the emergency operations center had ample space, equipment and supplies to provide for the response.

Key personnel responsible for the direction and control of the county's response rests with the county commissioners, managed by the county administrator and delegated to the Emergency Management Department Director. For this demonstration, the Director was in command of the county response with the county administrator participating as an observer. Throughout the exercise, the Director and staff demonstrated their abilities to coordinate and implement essential response management functions. There were 10 separate internal briefings which provided the most up to date plant status and conditions as well as county and whole community updates. There was a total of seven emergency notification network calls and seven decision line calls. The decision line calls were led by the State of Georgia and occurred throughout the exercise. On these calls, protective action recommendations and decisions were discussed, coordinated and concurred upon.

The decision making and management process to implement and monitor exposure control for county emergency workers was not fully demonstrated because it was not applicable to the scenario of the exercise. Through interview with the Director, it was determined that procedures called for the distribution of dosimetry, potassium iodide and equipment along with the presentation of a radiological briefing before any emergency worker were to deploy.



Aiken County has no schools or day care centers within their portion of the 10-mile emergency planning zone. There were no institutionalized individuals nor were there any identified persons with access or functional needs. The county portion of the 10-mile emergency planning zone consists solely of a privately owned hunting preserve. The property owner/operator maintains a registry of all incoming individuals and always has the ability to contact them. Any individuals with access and or functional needs would be known to the owner/operators of this facility and that information would be available to the county staff at time of notification. Conversely, the county did have transportation resources available to assist the hunting preserve move access/functional needs person if required.

Traffic control within the county is the responsibility of the Sheriff's Office and South Carolina Highway Patrol respectively. There are five traffic control points within the county and per interview, it was determined the county had the ability to quickly establish and maintain those points. Impediments to evacuation on those roadways was also completed via interview and it was noted that any impediments could be effectively removed by local resources and/or the South Carolina Department of Transportation.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.c.1, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2.

- a. Level 1 Finding:** None
- b. Level 2 Finding:** None
- c. Not Demonstrated:** None
- d. Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- e. Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

#### **Public Information and Warning:**

The capability to develop and disseminate reliable and timely information to the public and media during a simulated radiological event at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant was not fully demonstrated by Aiken County. This action was completed by the Joint Information System which was made up of representatives for the States of Georgia and South Carolina respectively.

Primary alert and notification of the public via the alert/notification system was demonstrated by Barnwell County, SC. Aiken County does not have a siren in their portion of the 10-mile emergency planning zone however the county did participate in the decision to activate the sirens. In the event backup route alerting is necessary within the county, it was explained the single person that may live on the private hunting preserve within the county's portion of the emergency planning zone would be notified via phone. If contact was not made with the preserve, Sheriff's Office deputies would be dispatched to make physical contact and make the applicable notifications/instructions.

The Sheriff's Office representative was designated as the public information officer and he did not participate nor was involved in Joint Information System coordination. It should be noted that he was engaged in a real-world law enforcement public information matter and this exercise simultaneously. Given the scenario and uniqueness of the Aiken County portion of the 10-mile emergency planning zone, the lack of participation did not have an adverse effect nor would it have. The process in which a news release would be generated, reviewed, approved, and released was explained detail. As such, the county had the capability to prepare, coordinate and release county specific news releases.

Public inquiry was not demonstrated during this exercise in part due to the SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19 pandemic. The county does have the capability to staff public inquiry hotlines and same has been demonstrated in previous reasonable assurance exercises as well as real world events.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met: 5.a.1, 5.a.3, and 5.b.1.

- a. **Level 1 Finding:** None
- b. **Level 2 Finding:** None
- c. **Not Demonstrated:** None
- d. **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- e. **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

#### **3.3.4.2.2 Emergency Worker Decontamination**

##### **Environmental Response/Health and Safety Capability Summary:**

The Aiken County emergency worker/vehicle decontamination facility was sufficient to support emergency worker contamination monitoring operations in the event of an emergency at the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant. The facility was staffed with two eight person teams that allowed for 24-hour operation of the facility. The Redcliffe Elementary School field property provided adequate space for monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and their vehicles. A large grassy area was available to hold contaminated vehicles. Response staff were issued appropriate direct reading and permanent record dosimetry. Personnel were briefed on the use of radiation exposure control equipment and their administrative exposure limits. One team member tracked radiation exposure for all team members using a specialized form. Workers were able to demonstrate use of their assigned radiation exposure monitoring equipment and were able to explain radiation exposure limits. Since the venue was 15 miles from Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, radioprotective drugs would not be needed.

Equipment and supplies were sufficient to support required monitoring and decontamination activities. Equipment was stored at the Aiken County Emergency Operations Center and would be transported to the decontamination location when needed. Because the equipment was mobile, it could be set-up at other areas using a similar layout. Available equipment was prepackaged into three large boxes plus dosimetry and survey instrumentation. Radiation survey instrumentation was within current annual calibration and was successfully operationally checked prior to use. Redundant communication systems were available and allowed for this stand-alone site to communicate with other agencies such as the emergency operations center and the reception center. The set-up of the facility allowed for smooth flow of emergency worker vehicles and personnel through the monitoring and decontamination process. This was accomplished by the use of verbal instructions, signs, and traffic cones to direct emergency workers through the facility.

Personnel were well trained and appropriate contamination monitoring techniques were demonstrated using handheld radiation survey instruments. Customized forms were used to document contamination found on vehicles and individuals being hand monitored. Vehicle decontamination techniques were demonstrated. Contaminated materials would be appropriately segregated and controlled until arrangements could be made for transport to a secure location. The team management and response staff responsible for vehicles, equipment and personal effects were well prepared for their individual tasks. All team members showed personal interest in their specific responsibilities and for success of the overall mission.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.b.1

- a. Level 1 Finding:** None
- b. Level 2 Finding:** None
- c. Not Demonstrated:** None
- d. Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- e. Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

#### **3.3.4.2.3 Traffic Control Point**

##### **On-Scene Security and Protection Core Capability Summary:**

Aiken County Emergency Management Division personnel and emergency operations center support staff successfully demonstrated the capability to establish and maintain traffic control points in the event of a radiological event at the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant. The Aiken County Sheriff's Office was responsible for the orderly evacuation of the citizenry in the event of a recommended evacuation and they were assisted in this task by the South Carolina Highway Patrol. It should be noted that during this exercise the

Aiken County Sheriff's Office was involved in a real-world event and its representation within the Aiken County Emergency Operation Center was curtailed due to Covid-19 considerations. It was demonstrated through interview that the Sheriff's Office had a sufficient cadre of trained personnel to effectively establish and maintain the four traffic control points assigned to their department. Each officer was equipped with adequate communications systems that were demonstrated to be operable and dependable. Each also possessed sufficient maps (digital and paper) to locate their assignments in a most expedient manner. They received annual radiological training from the Aiken County Emergency Management Department and proved to be proficient in the use of issued radiological equipment. They were aware of the hazards of ionizing radiation and knowledgeable in methods for managing and minimizing their exposure. An understanding of the use of dosimetry and potassium iodide was evident during the interview. When presented with hypothetical impediments to the expedient flow of evacuating traffic the deputy was able to quickly and efficiently design an alternative route.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2

- a. Level 1 Finding:** None
- b. Level 2 Finding:** None
- c. Not Demonstrated:** None
- d. Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- e. Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

### **3.3.4.3 Allendale County, South Carolina**

#### **3.3.4.3.1 Emergency Operations Center**

##### **Operational Coordination Capability Summary:**

The Allendale County Emergency Management Agency successfully demonstrated the Operational Coordination Core Capability in response to a radiological incident at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant during this exercise. The Emergency Operations Center staff established and maintained a unified, coordinated operational structure and process.

Following the county 911 Center's initial notification, the Assistant Director, acting as the Director, used procedures to promptly alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate the emergency operations center in real-time. Due to COVID-19 considerations, the staffing response was limited. The Director provided arriving staff and liaisons from the State and utility a detailed orientation, and situation briefing before assuming their positions. The Emergency Operations Center staff was well trained and performed their duties efficiently. The Director quickly established and maintained

command and control. Staff briefings followed all decision line coordination calls and emergency notifications. The acting Director discussed the actions with the appropriate support agencies and ensured they could respond appropriately. The Director was aware of all actions on conference calls and maintained situational awareness. The acting Director discussed the actions with the appropriate support agencies and ensured they could respond appropriately.

Communications equipment, both primary and secondary, operated properly. Communication links with appropriate locations were established and maintained throughout the exercise. Equipment, maps, displays, and administrative equipment were sufficient to support emergency operations. Large monitors displayed emergency information and mapping. Copies of plans, procedures, and emergency information calendars were available at each station in the emergency operations center.

The county Department of Social Services was responsible for client tracking of functional needs individuals. However, none reside within the emergency planning zone portion of Allendale County. The county police department demonstrated a thorough working knowledge of radiological exposure control, traffic management, and backup route alerting procedures.

Representing the Allendale County Emergency Management Agency, the Director participated in decision-line discussions throughout the exercise. The Director concurred with protective action decisions to evacuate affected zones and the emergency alerting system's timing and activation. The Allendale County Emergency Management Agency did not participate directly with the joint public information system. The Director shared information regarding county actions with decision-line participants and virtually monitored a media briefing in the joint information system. News releases were available to the Director using the South Carolina Emergency Management Division Palmetto system.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2

- a. Level 1 Finding:** None
- b. Level 2 Finding:** None
- c. Not Demonstrated:** None
- d. Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- e. Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

**Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:**

The Allendale County Emergency Management Agency Emergency Operations Center staff successfully demonstrated the capability to notify and warn the public of a simulated emergency at Plant Vogtle, by coordination via the Emergency Notification Network , open conference call, Palmetto operations tracking system, and telephone with the States of South Carolina and Georgia, Burke County, Georgia, Aiken and Barnwell County, South Carolina, Plant Vogtle, activation of the Alert Notification System including release of an Emergency Alerting System message, which met FEMA message requirements. The Emergency Management Director and Deputy Emergency Management Director managed coordination of public information and warning from the Emergency Operations Center and drafted with accuracy and timeliness, one news release for the activation of the State Emergency Operations Center and a local Declaration of Emergency for the County. The Emergency Management Director used this opportunity to train and familiarize the newly assigned Deputy Emergency Management Director with protocols for development, approval and dissemination of information. Rumor control was managed and resolved by the Emergency Management Director. Activities performed were consistent with plans and procedures.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met: 5.a.1, 5.a.3, 5.b.1

- a. **Level 1 Finding:** None
- b. **Level 2 Finding:** None
- c. **Not Demonstrated:** None
- d. **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- e. **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

**3.3.4.3.1 Traffic Control Points****On-Scene Security and Protection Core Capability Summary:**

The Allendale Police Department successfully demonstrated the on-scene security and protection core capability at the Allendale emergency operations center during the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant exercise. The officers ensured a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations.

Due to COVID-19 considerations, the staffing response was limited. The director mobilized two Allendale Police Department officers assigned to the emergency operations center through telephone contact with the department. Both officers demonstrated a thorough working knowledge of radiological protection requirements, reporting and turn-back values, traffic impediment identification and resolution, traffic control point operations, and backup route alerting procedures. Communication with the

police department occurred through the law enforcement radio system. Dispatched officers reported to the emergency operations center (simulated) for a radiological briefing, equipment, and a traffic and access control points checklist. The checklist included a radiological briefing and exposure limit information and requirements, evacuation zones and routes, and shelter locations. Both officers correctly identified the two plans indicated traffic control points, operational logistics, and the designated reception center name and location. Evacuation route impediment identification and resolution would occur through communication from the law enforcement representative(s) at the emergency operations center. Coordination would occur between law enforcement, the Allendale County Roads and Bridges Department, and the South Carolina Department of Transportation office located in the county as necessary.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met: 3.a.1, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2

- a. Level 1 Finding:** None
- b. Level 2 Finding:** None
- c. Not Demonstrated:** None
- d. Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- e. Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

#### **3.3.4.4 Barnwell County, South Carolina**

##### **3.3.4.4.1 Emergency Operations Center**

###### **Operational Coordination Capability Summary:**

The Barnwell County Emergency Management Director participated in the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant plume phase exercise via cellular telephone, and not in-person at the emergency operations center due to the SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19 pandemic. The evaluation of the county's response to a simulated radiological incident was completed via interview. Each applicable critical task was successfully discussed and addressed in accordance the Barnwell County Emergency Operations Plan.

Initial notification of a Notice of Unusual Event declaration at the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant was received from the utility, at the state warning point, via the emergency notification network. The declaration was relayed from a state warning point communications officer via the emergency notification network to a Barnwell County Warning Point Communications Officer. The Barnwell County Warning Point Communications Officer then notified the director via cellular telephone of the declaration. Following the call, the director logged into the utility's electronic incident management system to verify the emergency notification form was accessible electronically. Once access to the electronic form was verified, the director called the

communications officers back and informed the officer that all subsequent notifications would be retrieved electronically via the incident management system. While a deviation from the written plan, the process was successfully used and still allowed the director to receive the emergency notification forms in a timely manner.

Through interview notification and mobilization of emergency operations center staff was discussed and actual calls were made for evaluative purposes. The director first called the county administrator via cellular telephone and asked for authorization to assume direction and control of the incident. By assuming direction and control, the director was authorized to make decisions on behalf of the county, including procuring resources – both staff and equipment – and expending county funds. The county administrator authorized the director to assume direction and control. Several other local and state representatives and liaisons were contacted; staff were not mobilized to the emergency operations center, but instead supported virtually. The director noted that no contact with the American Red Cross or an emergency support function 6 representative was made because Barnwell County was not responsible for monitoring, decontaminating, or sheltering the public within zone H-10.

Through interview the director described the communications, equipment, maps, displays, and other supplies available in the emergency operations center to support emergency operations. The primary means of communication between Southern Nuclear, the State of South Carolina, and Barnwell County was the emergency notification network. Multiple additional internal and external communications systems were available during the exercise. The emergency operations center was equipped with multiple displays to provide staff with incident management information, emergency planning zone maps, etc. Other equipment such as computers, printers, and supplies would have been readily available. Dosimetry and potassium iodide calibration and expiration dates, respectively, were validated during the November 23, 2020 staff assistance visit.

Frequent administrative decision line calls were conducted to discuss changes in emergency classification levels and protective action recommendations, and to make protective action decisions. The State of Georgia Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manager initiated and facilitated the calls as the “lead state.” Officials with the State of South Carolina and four risk counties participated in the calls and provided direction and control for the response effort for which they were responsible. The Barnwell County Emergency Management Director proactively considered appropriate factors such as resource availability, logistics, and restrictions related to the SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19 pandemic when concurring with protective action decisions. A protective action decision was not considered or implemented related to the issuance and/or ingestion of potassium iodide for emergency workers or the public.



Through interview the director explained that in Barnwell County there were no schools, day cares, hospitals, nursing homes, jails/prisons, or individuals with access and functional needs that would have required precautionary actions to be taken. If evacuation of the public was required, all evacuees would evacuate through Barnwell County into Allendale County. In the event there was an impediment on Highway 125 in Barnwell County, appropriate resources were discussed to identify and resolve the impediment. Any impact that would delay or impeded an evacuation would be discussed on the administrative decision line.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2

- a. Level 1 Finding:** None
- b. Level 2 Finding:** None
- c. Not Demonstrated:** None
- d. Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- e. Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

**Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:**

The Barnwell County Public Information Officer demonstrated the capability, albeit the very limited role the county played in public information and warning, to disseminate reliable and timely information to the public and media during a simulated radiological incident at the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.

The Barnwell County Emergency Management Director served as the public information officer during the exercise. Traditionally, a Barnwell County Sheriff's Office Deputy would serve in this role, but due to the SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19 pandemic the sheriff's office did not participate in the exercise. That said, even if the sheriff's office had participated, the Barnwell County Emergency Management Public Information Officer would have had a very limited role in delivering coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information. The public information officer was not responsible for developing county-specific press releases, nor would the public information officer report to the joint information center, if activated. The public information officer simply disseminated approved and published state and utility press releases to a local newspaper and radio station for reprint and rebroadcast.

The activation of the alert and notification system, consisting of sirens and emergency alert system messages, was coordinated with the Burke County Emergency Management Director via the administrative decision line. The activation of the siren was simulated and discussed through interview. A siren failure would be shown on the siren activation program screen and a report generated indicating the affected siren. There was not a siren failure indicated in Barnwell County; however, in the event of a siren failure, the

director explained the process to notify the public using back-up route alerting. One route was included in the plan for Barnwell County; the route would be driven by sheriff's office deputies or fire department firefighters. The route was designed to be accomplished in a timely manner while traveling at a reasonable speed slow enough for the public to hear the announcement.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met: 5.a.1, 5.a.3, 5.b.1

- a. Level 1 Finding:** None
- b. Level 2 Finding:** None
- c. Not Demonstrated:** None
- d. Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- e. Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

## **Section 4: Conclusion**

Overall, the exercise was a success. Officials and representatives from the State of Georgia; Burke County, the State of South Carolina; Aiken County, Allendale County, Barnwell County, Southern Nuclear; Georgia Power Company; and numerous other organizations participated in the exercise. The cooperation and teamwork of the participants were evident throughout all phases of the exercise. This exercise was originally scheduled for May but was postponed until December due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Physical staffing of participants was reduced, but response organizations used virtual platforms and communications capabilities to coordinate the response with participants working remotely. Response stakeholders worked together to gather pertinent incident information to make informed protective action decisions.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated and made this exercise a success. All offsite response organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures, and successfully demonstrated the ability to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of an incident involving the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, even while simultaneously responding and reacting to a global pandemic.

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# Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program

After Action Report

2020 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant

## Appendix A: Exercise Timeline

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Time Utility Declared	Time That Notification Was Received Or Action Was Taken						
		GEORGIA/ DOSE ASSESSMENT GEORGIA SOC	BURKE COUNTY	SC-SEOC/ DOSE ASSESSMENT	AIKEN COUNTY	ALLENDAL E COUNTY	BARNWELL COUNTY	JIS
Unusual Event	0842	0851	0854	0851	0851	0854	0848	-
Alert	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Site Area Emergency	0914	0924	0924	0927	0923	0923	0923	-
General Emergency	1121	1126	1132	1133	1127	1127	1127	1128/1200*
Simulated Rad. Release Started	0904	0924	0924	0927	0923	0923	0923	0914/1105*
Simulated Rad. Release Terminated	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing
Facility Declared Operational	0937	0927	1010	0930	0915	0933	0929	0951
Declaration of State of Emergency	Georgia	1040	1040	-	-	1040	-	1040/1200*
	South Carolina	-	-	1121	-	1121	-	-
	Local	-	1011	-	-	-	-	1101/1200*
Exercise Terminated	1211	1214	1215	1220	1214	1212	1213	1250
<b>Precautionary Actions:</b> Close Savannah River from Stoney Bluff to Jackson Landing/air restriction/rail closure; Movement of AFN to Burke County HS  Livestock on stored feed and water and hunting/fishing ban for Barnwell County		0957	0957	0957 1140	0957	0957	0957	1005/1025*
<b>1<sup>st</sup> Protective Action Decision:</b> Evacuate Zones: A, B5, B10, C10, D10, SRS to 2mi		1145	1145	1145	1145	1147	1145	1146/1200*
<b>1<sup>st</sup> Siren Activation</b>		1155	1155	1155	1155	1155	1155	1155
<b>1<sup>st</sup> EAS Message</b>		1205	1205	1205	1205	1205	1205	1205
<b>KI Decision:</b> Georgia Emergency Workers		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
South Carolina		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

\* Indicates when the decision or actions was messaged.

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## Appendix B: Evaluator Assignments

**Technological Hazards Branch Chief:** Kevin B. Wells

**Interim Section Chief:** Matthew Bradley    **Admin Support:** Erin McCarty

**Documentation Lead:** DeShun Lowery    **ICF Regional Coordinator:** Roy Smith

Location / Venue	Evaluation Team	Core Capabilities
<b>State of Georgia:</b> Director – Chris Stalling (Atlanta, Georgia)		
SOC/DOSE	Quintin Ivy, FEMA* Brad McRee, Dose ICF Technical Tom Hegele, PIO-ICF Non-Technical	Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning Situational Assessment Operational Communication
2-Field Teams Red Blue Field Team Management	Bart Ray, ICF Technical Deborah Blunt, ICF Technical	Environmental Response/Health and Safety
Virtual JIS	Libby Adkins, FEMA* (Virtual) Glenda Bryson, FEMA (Virtual)	Public Information and Warning
Southern Company EOF	Gerald McLemore, FEMA	Operational Coordination
<b>State of South Carolina:</b> Director – Kim Stenson (Columbia, South Carolina)		
SEOC/DOSE	Russell Bergmann, FEMA* Jill Leatherman, Dose-ICF Technical	Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning Situational Assessment Operational Communication
<b>RISK COUNTIES</b>		
<b>Burke County: EMD</b> – Chief Steven Mathews (Waynesboro, Georgia)		
EOC	Deshun Lowery, FEMA* Roy Smith, ICF Non-Technical Nate Nienhius, FEMA	Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning
<b>Aiken County: EMD</b> – Paul Matthews (Aiken, South Carolina)		
EOC	JT Ackermann, FEMA Gene Taylor, Jr, FEMA	Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning
EWD - December 9, 2020 0900 start time at Redcliffe Elementary School	Marcy Campbell, ICF Technical* Danny Loomis, ICF Non-Technical Mark Dalton, ICF Non-Technical	Environmental Response/Health and Safety
<b>Allendale County: EMD</b> – Gidget Stanley (Allendale, South Carolina)		
EOC	Robert Nash, FEMA PJ Nied, ICF Non-Technical	Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning
<b>Barnwell County: EMD</b> – Roger Riley (Barnwell, South Carolina)		
EOC	Erica Houghton, FEMA* Brenda Rembert, ICF Non-Technical	Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning

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## **Appendix C: Extent of Play Agreement**

### **Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Full Participation Plume Phase Exercise**

**December 8, 2020**

**ALVIN W. VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT**

**STATE OF GEORGIA**

**EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE**

### **DECEMBER 8, 2020**

All activities will be demonstrated fully in accordance with respective plans and procedures as they would be in an actual emergency. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Regional Office must receive these plans, guides and procedures at least 60 days before the exercise. This Extent of Play Agreement (EOPA) is written by exception. If it is not listed as an exception it will be demonstrated as described in the plans, standard operating guides (SOGs) and/or procedures (SOPs). Any issue or discrepancy arising during exercise play may be re-demonstrated if allowed by the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) Chair or as listed herein. This allowance may be granted if it is not disruptive to exercise play and is mutually agreed to by the Offsite Response Organization (ORO) Exercise Controller and FEMA Evaluator. Some activities may be performed as a training-only opportunity and are identified in the participant description.

Due to state and county responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic, alterations to the traditional processes and procedures used to demonstrate required criteria, as defined in NUREG 0654/FEMA REP-1 and the 2016 FEMA REP Program Manual will be required.

These alterations will comprise the administration of meetings, to include the State and Federal Briefing, Participant Critique and Public Meeting.

The State and Federal Briefing will be conducted on December 7, 2020 at 2: 00 PM EST. The meeting will be conducted in a remote/virtual environment.

The Participant Critique and Public Meeting will be conducted on December 11, 2020 at the Plant Vogtle Joint Information Center, located at 624 Woodland Road, Waynesboro, GA. The Participant Critique will be held at 10: 00 AM EST with the Public Meeting to follow at 11: 00 AM EST.

The State of Georgia, to include GEMA/HS, GA DNR, and other state agency participants will participate from the State Operations Center (SOC) while adhering to COVID-19 protocols of social distancing, wearing masks, and sanitizing hands and workstations.

## **PART I: STATE OF GEORGIA**

### **Core Capability: Operational Communications (Interstate Communications)**

**Definition:** Ensure the capacity for timely communications in support of security, situational awareness, and operations by all means available, among and between affected communities in the impact area and all response forces

**Critical Task:** At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, F.1, 2; Criterion 1.d.1)

### **Observe communications and coordination between the State of GA and SC.**

- State of Georgia in agreement

**Core Capability: Operational Coordination**– State and county emergency operations centers (EOCs); emergency operations facility (EOF).

**Definition:** Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

### **Capability Target: Emergency Operations Management**

**Performance Measure:** Procedures to alert and notify personnel will be demonstrated and personnel will respond only upon notification. Identified communications will be operational. Key personnel with leadership roles will provide direction and control. A particular facility's equipment and supplies must be sufficient and consistent with that facility's assigned role in the ORO's emergency operations plans. Specific equipment and supplies that must be demonstrated under this criterion include KI inventories, dosimetry, and monitoring equipment.

Participants: **State of Georgia**

**Critical Task:** OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, A.1.a, e; A.3, 4; C.1, 4, 6; D.4; E.1, 2; H.3, 4; Criterion 1.a.1)

Pre-positioning of a limited number of exercise participants will be allowed. However, exercise participants must adhere to COVID-19 protocols and will not be allowed to report to their assigned duty station prior to receiving notification that the exercise has begun, and they are instructed to respond.

- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.

**Critical Task:** At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, F.1, 2; Criterion 1.d.1)

A GEMA/HS liaison will be deployed to the Burke County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and based upon the participation status of the Southern Nuclear Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), a GEMA/HS liaison may be deployed to the EOF in Birmingham, AL. These liaisons will assist in communications and coordination between the State Operations Center (SOC) liaison and multiple off-site response organizations.

- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.

**Critical Task:** Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, H.7, 10; I.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b; Criterion 1.e.1)

**Quantities of KI for emergency workers, quantities of dosimetry, survey equipment, and their calibration/testing were verified during staff assistance visits (SAVs) identified below:**

Staff Assistance Visits:

Burke County

Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 277 GA-24

Waynesboro, GA 30830

**Date: February 6, 2020 Time: 9: 00 AM EST**

- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.

#### **Capability Target: Action Decision Making**

**Performance Measure:** ORO's demonstrate the capability to; assess and control the radiation exposure received by emergency workers; Radiological Assessment, Protective Action Recommendations, and Precautionary and/or Protective Action Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency; and Precautionary and/or Protective Action Decision Consideration for the Protection of Persons with Disabilities and Access/Functional Needs.

**Participant:** State of Georgia

**Critical Task:** Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, A.1.d, A.2.a, b; A.3; C.4, 6; Criterion 1.c.1)

State direction and control will be provided from the State Operations Center (SOC) located at GEMA/HS Headquarters, 935 United Avenue, Atlanta, GA 30316.

- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.

**Critical Task:** OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers, including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or PAGs. (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, C.6; J.10.e, f; K.3.a; K.4; Criterion 2.a.1)

- State of Georgia in agreement

**Critical Task:** A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make PADs for the general public (including the recommendation for use of KI, if ORO policy. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP- 1, A.3; C.4, 6; D.4; J.9; J.10.f, m; Criterion 2.b.2)

The State of Georgia, to include local counties, does not issue KI to the general public.

- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.

### **Capability Target: Protective Action Implementation**

**Performance Measure:** Demonstrate the capability to implement emergency worker exposure control; KI decision for institutionalized individuals and the general public; protective actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs; schools; traffic and access control and impediments to evacuation.

**Participant:** State of Georgia

**Critical Task:** Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, A.3; C.1, 4; J.10.g, j; Criterion 3.d.1)

State and/or local law enforcement personnel will demonstrate, by interview, that they are capable of selecting, establishing, and staffing appropriate traffic and access control points consistent with current conditions and PADs in a timely manner. State and/or local law enforcement personnel may be located at the Burke County EOC or may be contacted via telephone for interview.

- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.

**Critical Task:** Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, J.10.k; Criterion 3.d.2)

- State of Georgia in agreement.

### **Core Capability: Situational Assessment**

**Definition:** Provide all decision makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response.

**Capability Target:** Protective Action Decision Making

**Performance Measure:** OROs must have the capability to independently project integrated dose from projected or actual dose rates and compare these estimates to the PAGs. OROs must have the capability to choose, among a range of protective actions, those most appropriate in a given emergency.

**Participants:** of Georgia DNR-Environmental Radiation Program

**Critical Task:** Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, A.1.d, A.2.a, b; A.3; C.4, 6; Criterion 1.c.1)

- State of Georgia in agreement.

**Critical Task:** OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers, including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or PAGs. (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, C.6; J.10.e, f; K.3.a; K.4; Criterion 2.a.1)

- State of Georgia in agreement.

**Critical Task:** Appropriate PARs are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, I.10; Supp. 3; Criterion 2.b.1)

- State of Georgia in agreement.

**Core Capability: Public Information and Warning** – *State/County EOCs, and JIS*

**Definition:** Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

**Capability Target: Emergency Notification and Public Information**

**Performance Measure:** Sirens and the EAS system will be activated, if needed, in a timely manner to alert the general public along with waterway warning. CodeRED reverse 911 calling system will be activated in case of failure of the primary alert and notification system.

**Participant:** of Georgia

**Critical Task:** Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include at a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance. (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, E.5, 6, 7; Criterion 5.a.1)

- State of Georgia in agreement.

**Critical Task:** OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, E.5, 7; G.3.a; G.4.a, c; Criterion 5.b.1)

- State of Georgia in agreement.

**Participants:** Joint Information System

**Definition:** A Joint Information System (JIS) is a structure that integrates incident information and public affairs into a cohesive organization designed to provide consistent, coordinated, accurate, accessible, timely and complete information during a crisis. Public Information Officers (PIOs) representing Burke County, Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency, Georgia DNR-Environmental Radiation Program, and Georgia Power Company (GPC) will utilize a JIS in adherence to COVID-19 protocols to provide accurate subsequent emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner.

**Critical Task:** OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, A.1.a, e; A.3, 4; C.1, 4, 6; D.4; E.1, 2; H.3, 4; Criterion 1.a.1)

- State of Georgia in agreement.

**Critical Task:** At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, F.1, 2; Criterion 1.d.1)

- State of Georgia in agreement.

**Critical Task:** Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, H.7, 10; I.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b; Criterion 1.e.1)

- State of Georgia in agreement.

**Critical Task:** Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved (public messaging). (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, J.10.k; Criterion 3.d.2)

Impediments to evacuation will be coordinated within the Burke County EOC by local law enforcement agency representatives and/or Burke County EMA officials and provided to the JIS to communicate alternate routes to evacuees.

- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.

**Critical Task:** OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, E.5, 7; G.3.a; G.4.a, c; Criterion 5.b.1)

County and State PIOs will play remotely from their respective duty locations (EOC/SOC).

GPC will provide a media bridge line to use for coordination between county, state, and utility PIOs.

County PIOs may choose to participate in media briefings or may choose to provide their county information to State PIOs for dissemination during a media briefing.

A minimum of one (1) media briefing will be conducted. Additional media briefings may be conducted based upon exercise play.

Media releases will be posted to the SNC WebEOC portal by PIO representatives and provided to the JIS for dissemination to media representatives.

Press conference/ media briefings will be held via a Microsoft Teams event created for the exercise. GPC will create the event and then provide access to county and state PIOs. Skype telephone will be used as a backup in the event of Microsoft Teams being unavailable.

FEMA evaluators will have access to the GPC media bridge line and the Microsoft Teams exercise event. Evaluations will be based on observations taken from the media bridge line and the Microsoft Teams exercise event.

- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.

### **Core Capability: Environmental Response/Health and Safety**

**Definition:** Ensure the availability of guidance and resources to address all hazards including hazardous materials, acts of terrorism, and natural disasters in support of the responder operations and the affected communities.

#### **Capability Target: Protective Action Decision Making**

**Performance Measure:** OROs authorized to send emergency workers into the plume exposure pathway EPZ must demonstrate a capability to assess and control the radiation exposure received by emergency workers and have a decision chain in place, as specified in the ORO's plans/procedures, to authorize emergency worker exposure limits to be exceeded for specific missions. As appropriate, OROs must demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure for emergency workers.

**Participants:** State of Georgia

**Critical Task:** OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for EWs, including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or PAGs. (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, C.6; J.10.e, f; K.3.a; K.4 Criterion 2.a.1)

- State of Georgia in agreement.

#### **Capability Target: Protective Action Implementation**

**Performance Measure:** OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide emergency workers *(including supplemental resources) with the appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, dosimeter chargers, KI, and instructions on the use of these items.*

**Participants:** State of Georgia



**Critical Task:** OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures. EWs periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate recordkeeping of the administration of KI to EWs. (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, J.10.e, K.3.a, b, K.4; Criterion 3.a.1)

State of Georgia Field Monitoring Teams (FMTs) will be provided a Radiological Protection Officer (RPO) Briefing at GEMA/HS Headquarters. The RPO briefing will be conducted out-of-sequence.

FMTs will be available following the RPO briefing to demonstrate, by interview, that they understand the directions and guidance given by the RPO and how to operate the equipment and complete the paperwork they have been provided.

If the GEMA RPO video is used to augment the briefing, an RPO will be available to issue the materials and answer any questions.

- State of Georgia in Agreement with clarifications above.

#### **Capability Target: Field Measurement and Analysis**

**Performance Measure:** OROs must demonstrate the capability to deploy FMTs with the equipment, methods, and expertise necessary to determine the location of airborne radiation and particulate deposition on the ground from an airborne plume.

**Participants:** State of Georgia

**Critical Task** Field teams (two or more) are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG C.1; H.12; I.7, 8, 11; J.10.a; Criterion 4.a.2)

The State of Georgia will deploy two (2) FMTs that are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure.

Field Monitoring Teams Demonstration:  
GEMA/HS HQ (State of Georgia Complex) 935 United Avenue  
Atlanta, GA 30316

**Date: December 9, 2020**

**Time: 9:00 AM EST**

- State of Georgia in agreement.

**Critical Task:** Radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low-background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG C.1; I.8, 9; H.12; J.10.a; Criterion 4.a.3)

The State of Georgia will deploy two (2) FMTs and equipment to determine the location of airborne radiation and particulate deposition on the ground from an airborne plume.

- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.

## **PART II: BURKE COUNTY**

**Core Capability: Operational Coordination**– State and county emergency operations centers (EOCs); emergency operations facility (EOF).

**Definition:** Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

### **Capability Target: Emergency Operations Management**

**Performance Measure:** Procedures to alert and notify personnel will be demonstrated and personnel will respond only upon notification. Identified communications will be operational. Key personnel with leadership roles will provide direction and control. A particular facility's equipment and supplies must be sufficient and consistent with that facility's assigned role in the ORO's emergency operations plans. Specific equipment and supplies that must be demonstrated under this criterion include KI inventories, dosimetry, and monitoring equipment.

Participants: **Burke County**

**Critical Task:** OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, A.1.a, e; A.3, 4; C.1, 4, 6; D.4; E.1, 2; H.3, 4; Criterion 1.a.1)

Pre-positioning of a limited number of exercise participants will be allowed. However, exercise participants must adhere to COVID-19 protocols and will not be allowed to report to their assigned duty station prior to receiving notification that the exercise has begun, and they are instructed to respond.

- Burke County in agreement with clarifications above.

**Critical Task:** At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, F.1, 2; Criterion 1.d.1)

A GEMA/HS liaison will be deployed to the Burke County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and based upon the participation status of the Southern Nuclear Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), A GEMA/HS liaison may be deployed to the EOF in Birmingham, AL. These liaisons will assist in communications and coordination between the State Operations Center (SOC) liaison and multiple off-site response organizations.

- Burke County in agreement with clarifications above.

**Critical Task:** Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, H.7, 10; I.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b; Criterion 1.e.1)

**Quantities of KI for emergency workers, Quantities of dosimetry, survey equipment, and their calibration/testing were verified during staff assistance visits (SAVs) identified below:**

Staff Assistance Visits: Burke County  
Emergency Operations Center 277 GA-24  
Waynesboro, GA 30830

**Date: February 6, 2020 Time: 9: 00 AM EST**

- Burke County in agreement with clarifications above.

**Capability Target: Protective Action Decision Making**

**Performance Measure:** ORO's demonstrate the capability to; assess and control the radiation exposure received by emergency workers; Radiological Assessment, Protective Action Recommendations, and Precautionary and/or Protective Action Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency; and Precautionary and/or Protective Action Decision Consideration for the Protection of Persons with Disabilities and Access/Functional Needs.

**Participant:** Burke County

**Critical Task:** Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, A.1.d, A.2.a, b; A.3; C.4, 6; Criterion 1.c.1)

Burke County will provide direction and control from the county EOC.

- Burke County in agreement with clarifications above.

**Critical Task:** OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers, including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or PAGs. (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, C.6; J.10.e, f; K.3.a; K.4; Criterion 2.a.1)

- Burke County in agreement.

**Critical Task:** A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make PADs for the general public (including the recommendation for use of KI, if ORO policy). (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP- 1, A.3; C.4, 6; D.4; J.9; J.10.f; m; Criterion 2.b.2)

The State of Georgia, to include local counties, does not issue KI to the general public.

- Burke County in agreement with clarifications above.

**Critical Task:** PADs are made, as appropriate, for groups of people with disabilities and those with access / functional needs. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, D.4; J.9; J.10.d, e; Criterion 2.c.1)

- Burke County in agreement.

### **Capability Target: Protective Action Implementation**

**Performance Measure:** Demonstrate the capability to implement emergency worker exposure control; KI decision for institutionalized individuals and the general public; protective actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs; schools; traffic and access control and impediments to evacuation.

**Participants:** Burke County

**Critical Task:** The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans/procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. Appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers is maintained. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.e, K.3.a, b; K.4; Criterion 3.a.1)

This capability to be demonstrated during an RPO briefing to selected emergency workers within the Burke County EOC. The RPO briefing may be conducted out-of-sequence.

Participating emergency workers will be available following the RPO briefing to demonstrate, by interview, that they understand the direction and guidance given by the RPO and how to use the equipment and documentation they have been issued.

The GEMA/HS RPO Video may be used to supplement the local RPO Briefing.

- Burke County in agreement with clarifications above.

**Critical Task:** KI and appropriate instructions are made available in case a decision to recommend use of KI is made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for institutionalized individuals and the general public are maintained. (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, J.10.e, f; Criterion 3.b.1)

The State of Georgia, to include local counties, does not issue KI to the general public. There are no institutionalized individuals with the Plant Vogtle 10-mile EPZ.

The recommendation to administer KI to emergency workers is provided by the State of Georgia Radiological Emergency Coordinator (REC) to GEMA/HS, by agreement with the Georgia Department of Public Health. The decision to administer KI is coordinated by GEMA/HS with the Burke County EMA. This coordination takes place over the conference bridge line. The administration of KI is the responsibility of the Burke County EMA.

- Burke County in agreement with clarifications above.

**Critical Task:** PADs are implemented for people with disabilities and those with access/functional needs other than schools within areas subject to protective actions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.c, d, e, g; Criterion 3.c.1)

Demonstration regarding implementation of protective actions for special populations will be demonstrated by interview within the Burke County EOC or via telephone by local Human Services representatives and/or Burke County EMA officials.

- Burke County in agreement with clarifications above.

**Critical Task:** OROs/school officials implement protective actions for schools. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10. c, d, e, g; Criterion 3.c.2)

There are no schools in Burke County within the Plant Vogtle 10-mile EPZ.

**Critical Task:** Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, A.3; C.1, 4; J.10.g, j; Criterion 3.d.1)

Traffic and access control will be demonstrated by interview within the Burke County EOC or via telephone by local law enforcement agency representatives and/or Burke County EMA officials.

- Burke County in agreement with clarifications above.

**Critical Task:** Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, J.10.k; Criterion 3.d.2)

Impediments to evacuation will be demonstrated by interview within the Burke County EOC or via telephone by local law enforcement agency representatives and/or local EMA officials.

- Burke County in agreement with clarifications above.

### **Core Capability: Critical Transportation**

**Definition:** School systems/districts (these include public and private schools, kindergartens, and preschools) must demonstrate the ability to implement precautionary and/or protective action decisions for students.

**Capability Target: Protective Action Implementation Participants:** Burke County

**Critical Task:** OROs/school officials implement protective actions for schools. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10. c, d, e, g; Criterion 3.c.2)

There are no schools in Burke County within the Plant Vogtle 10-mile EPZ.

### **Core Capability: Situational Assessment**

**Definition:** Provide all decision makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response.

**Capability Target:** Protective Action Decision Making

**Performance Measure:** OROs must have the capability to independently project integrated dose from projected or actual dose rates and compare these estimates to the PAGs. OROs must have the capability to choose, among a range of protective actions, those most appropriate in a given emergency.

**Participants:** Burke County

**Critical Task:** A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make PADs for the general public (including the recommendation for use of KI, if ORO policy. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP- 1, A.3; C.4, 6; D.4; J.9; J.10.f, m; Criterion 2.b.2)

The State of Georgia, to include local counties, does not issue KI to the general public.

- Burke County in agreement with clarifications above.

**Critical Task:** PADs are made, as appropriate, for groups of people with disabilities and those with access / functional needs. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, D.4; J.9; J.10.d, e; Criterion 2.c.1)

- Burke County in agreement with clarifications above.

**Core Capability: Public Information and Warning – State/County EOCs, and JIC**

**Definition:** Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

**Capability Target: Emergency Notification and Public Information**

**Performance Measure:** *Sirens and the EAS system will be activated, if needed, in a timely manner to alert the general public along with waterway warning. CodeRED reverse 911 calling system will be activated in case of failure of the primary alert and notification system.*

**Participants:** Burke County

**Critical Task:** OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, A.1.a, e; A.3, 4; C.1, 4, 6; D.4; E.1, 2; H.3, 4; Criterion 1.a.1)

- Burke County in agreement.

**Critical Task:** At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, F.1, 2; Criterion 1.d.1)

- Burke County in agreement.

**Critical Task:** Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, H.7, 10; I.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b; Criterion 1.e.1)

- Burke County in agreement.

**Critical Task:** Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, J.10.k; Criterion 3.d.2)

Impediments to evacuation will be demonstrated by interview within the Burke County EOC or via telephone by local law enforcement agency representatives and/or Burke County EMA officials. Coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information will be provided to the JIC to communicate alternate routes to evacuees.

- Burke County in agreement with clarifications above.

**Critical Task:** Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include at a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP. (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, E.5, 6, 7; Criterion 5.a.1)

The Plant Vogtle Emergency Planning Zone ANS is composed of a primary and back-up component. The primary component is an Outdoor Siren Warning System and the Emergency Alert System (EAS). Activation of the sirens and EAS will be simulated up to the point of transmission. The back-up component is a reverse 911 calling system, CodeRED.

- Burke County in agreement with clarifications above.

**Critical Task:** Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within a reasonable time following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, E.6; Appendix 3.B.2.c; Criterion 5.a.3)

A demonstration, by interview, of the reverse 911 calling system, CodeRED, will be provided in the Burke County EOC / Warning Point by local EMA personnel.

- Burke County in agreement with clarifications above.

**Critical Task:** OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, E.5, 7; G.3.a; G.4.a, c; Criterion 5.b.1)

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Burke County may deploy a Public Information Officer (PIO) using the Joint Information System (JIS). This individual will serve as information liaisons between their respective county, the State of Georgia, and utility participants using the JIS.

- Burke County in agreement with clarifications above.

**Participants:** Joint Information System

**Definition:** A Joint Information System (JIS) is a structure that integrates incident information and public affairs into a cohesive organization designed to provide consistent, coordinated, accurate, accessible, timely and complete information during a crisis. Public Information Officers (PIOs) representing Burke County, Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency, Georgia DNR-Environmental Radiation Program, and Georgia Power Company (GPC) will utilize a JIS in adherence to COVID-19 protocols to provide accurate subsequent emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner.

**Critical Task:** OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, A.1.a, e; A.3, 4; C.1, 4, 6; D.4; E.1, 2; H.3, 4; Criterion 1.a.1)

- Burke County in agreement.

**Critical Task:** At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, F.1, 2; Criterion 1.d.1)

- Burke County in agreement.

**Critical Task:** Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, H.7, 10; I.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b; Criterion 1.e.1)

- Burke County in agreement.

**Critical Task:** Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved (public messaging). (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, J.10.k; Criterion 3.d.2)

Impediments to evacuation will be coordinated within the Burke County EOC or via telephone by local law enforcement agency representatives and/or Burke County EMA officials and provided to the JIS to communicate alternate routes to evacuees.

- Burke County in agreement with clarifications above.

**Critical Task:** OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, E.5, 7; G.3.a; G.4.a, c; Criterion 5.b.1)

County and State PIOs will play remotely from their respective duty locations (EOC/SOC).

GPC will provide a media bridge line to use for coordination between county, state, and utility PIOs.

County PIOs may choose to participate in media briefings or may choose to provide their county information to State PIOs for dissemination during a media briefing.

A minimum of one (1) media briefing will be conducted. Additional media briefings may be conducted based upon exercise play.

Media releases will be posted to the SNC WebEOC portal by PIO representatives and provided to the JIS for dissemination to media representatives.

Press conference/ media briefings will be held via a Microsoft Teams event created for the exercise. GPC will create the event and then provide access to county and state PIOs. Skype telephone will be used as a backup in the event of Microsoft Teams being unavailable.

FEMA evaluators will have access to the GPC media bridge line and the Microsoft Teams exercise event. Evaluations will be based on observations taken from the media bridge line and the Microsoft Teams exercise event.

- Burke County in agreement with clarifications above.

### **Core Capability: On-Scene Security and Protection**

**Definition:** Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas and also for all traditional and atypical response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.

### **Capability Target: Protective Action Implementation**

**Performance Measure:** *Demonstrate the capability to select, establish and staff traffic control and access points; identify and resolve impediments to evacuation; distribute dosimetry and KI; and implement and manage EW exposure control.*

**Participants:** Burke County

**Critical Task:** At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations.

Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, F.1, 2; Criterion 1.d.1)

- Burke County in agreement.

**Critical Task:** Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654 H.7, 10; I.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b; Criterion 1.e.1)

- Burke County in agreement.

**Critical Task:** OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures. EWs periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate recordkeeping of the administration of KI to EWs. (NUREG-0654 J.10.e, K.3.a, b, K.4; Criterion 3.a.1)

- Burke County in agreement.

**Critical Task:** Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654 A. 3; C.1, 4; J.10.g, j; Criterion 3.d.1)

A DNR Law Enforcement Officer will participate at the Burke County EOC or be available via telephone during the exercise to discuss river clearance procedures.

- Burke County in agreement with clarifications above.

**Critical Task:** Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (NUREG-0654 J.10.k; Criterion 3.d.2)

- Impediments to evacuation will be simulated
- Burke County in agreement with clarifications above.

**Extent of Play Agreement**

## Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 2020 Plume Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Exercise

Unless otherwise noted, all activities will be fully demonstrated in accordance with respective plans and procedures as they would be in an actual emergency. South Carolina Emergency Management Division (SCEMD) must provide these plans, guides and procedures to Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) NLT 60 days before the exercise. If an activity is not listed as an exception, it will be demonstrated as described in the plans, standard operating guides (SOGs) and/or standard operating procedures (SOPs). In some cases, a task may be listed as “demonstrate/discuss” to indicate that actions may be completed or discussed via interview as the scenario dictates. Any activity to be evaluated out-of-sequence (OOS), during staff assistance visits (SAVs), and/or by discussion will be clearly identified. Any issue or discrepancy arising during exercise play may be re-demonstrated, if allowed by the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) Chair or as listed herein. This allowance may be granted if it is not disruptive to exercise play and is mutually agreed to by the Offsite Response Organization (ORO) Controller and FEMA Evaluator.

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**STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA****State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) Core Capability: Operational Coordination**

**Definition:** Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

Capability Target: 1.a.1. Alert, Notify, Mobilize

ORO use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.1.a, e; A.3, 4; C.1, 4, 6; D.4; E.1, 2; H.3, 4).

South Carolina Emergency Management Division (SCEMD) will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to receive notification of an incident from the licensees; verify the notification; contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner.
- The ability to staff and maintain 24-hour operations.
- The activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel upon their arrival.
- The ability to identify and request additional resources or identify compensatory measures.

**Exception: Personnel can be at their duty station or in the same room prior to notification. SERT alert and notification will be simulated. In response to the COVID pandemic, the SEOC will only be staffed by key personnel from SCEMD and DHEC all other SERT members will be made available virtually.**

Capability Target: 1.c.1. Direction and Control

Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.1.d; A.2.a, b; A.2; C.4, 6).

The State Emergency Response Team (SERT) will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The ability to carry out the essential management functions of the response effort.
- The ability to prioritize resource tasking and replace/supplement resources.

**Exception: If a non-participating agency cannot or will not be present in the SEOC, a call can be made to a known contact within that agency or organization as needed.**

Capability Target: 1.d.1. Communications Equipment

At least 2 communications systems are available, at least 1 operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations.

Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, F.1, 2).

SCEMD will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- A primary system and at least one backup system are fully functional at all times.
- The capability to manage the communications systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.

**Note: State and County decision makers will use the WebEx conference bridge line to conduct protective action discussions/decision making among OROs. Southern Nuclear Companies CommsLab will be used for notifications and conducting siren activations.**

Capability Target: 1.e.1. Equipment & Supplies to Support Operations

Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, H.7, 10; I.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b).

SCEMD will demonstrate that the SEOC has sufficient equipment, maps and displays to perform the assigned role.

Capability Target: 2.b.2. Protective Action Decisions for the General Public

A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make PADs for the general public (including the recommendation for use of KI, if ORO policy) (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.4, 6; D.4; J.9; J.10.f, m).

The SERT will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to make both initial and subsequent precautionary and/or protective action decisions in a timely manner appropriate to the incident.
- The capability to change protective actions based on the combination of the following factors: subsequent dose projections, field monitoring data, or information on plant conditions, magnitude of ongoing threat, the response, and/or site conditions.
- The capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI to supplement sheltering and evacuation.
- The capability to communicate the results of decisions to all the affected locations.

Capability Target: 3.d.2. Impediments to Evacuation and Traffic and Access Control

Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.k).

ESF-16 (Traffic Management) will demonstrate/discuss the capability to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation, including re-routing of traffic and coordination with the JIS to communicate alternate routes to evacuees, as appropriate.

### **Core Capability: Operational Communications**

**Definition:** Ensure the capacity for timely communications in support of security, situational awareness, and operations by any and all means available, among and between affected communities in the impact area and all response forces.

Capability Target: 1.d.1. Communications Equipment (Interstate Communications) At least 2 communications systems are available, at least 1 operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations.

Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, F.1, 2).

SCEMD will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- A primary system and at least one backup system are fully functional at all times.
- The capability to manage the communications systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.
- Participating agencies include South Carolina, Georgia, Allendale County, Aiken County, Barnwell County and Burke County, GA

### **Core Capability: Public Information and Warning**

**Definition:** Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

Capability Target: 5.a.1. Initial Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification System Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP Guidance (Timely: The responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay) (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.5, 6, 7).

The SERT will demonstrate the capability to coordinate siren activation followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ. The procedures to broadcast the message will be fully demonstrated as they would in an actual emergency up to the point of transmission.

**Exception: All siren soundings will be conducted via silent test.**

Capability Target: 5.b.1. Emergency Info and Instructions for Public and the Media  
ORO provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and news media in a timely manner (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.5, 7; G.3.a; G.4.a, c).

The SERT will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The ability to provide emergency information and instructions to the public and media in a timely manner following the initial alert and notification (not subject to specific time requirements).
- The capability to ensure that emergency information that is no longer valid is rescinded and not repeated by broadcast media.
- The capability to ensure that current emergency information is repeated at pre-established intervals.
- The capability to provide timely, accurate, concise, and coordinated information to the news media for subsequent dissemination to the public.
- The capability to respond appropriately to inquiries from the news media.
- The capability to deal with calls received via the public inquiry hotline.
- The capability to provide or obtain accurate information for public inquiry callers or make appropriate referrals.
- The capability to ensure that emergency information and instructions are consistent with PADs made by appropriate officials.
- The capability to ensure that emergency information contains all necessary and applicable instructions to assist the public in carrying out the PADs provided.
- The capability to conduct timely and pertinent media briefings and distribute media releases as the incident warrants.

**County and State PIOs will play remotely from their respective duty locations (EOC/SEOC). Georgia Power Company (GPC) will provide a media bridge line to use for coordination between county, state, and utility PIOs. County PIOs may choose to participate in media briefings or may choose to provide their county information to State PIOs for dissemination during a media briefing. A minimum of one (1) media briefings will be conducted based upon exercise play. Media releases will be posted to the SNC WebEOC portal by PIO representatives and provided to the JIS for dissemination to media representatives. Press conference/media briefings will be held via a Microsoft Teams event created for the exercise. GPC will create the event and then provide access to county and state PIOs. Skype telephone will be used as a backup in the event of Microsoft Teams being unavailable. FEMA evaluators will have access to the GPC media bridge line and the Microsoft Teams exercise event. Evaluations will be based on observations taken from the media bridge line and the Microsoft Teams exercise event.**



**Dose Assessment****Core Capability: Operational Coordination**

**Definition:** Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

Capability Target: 2.a.1. Emergency Worker (EW) Exposure Control

OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including use of KI is in place for emergency workers, including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or PAGs (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.6; J.10e, f; K.3.a; K.4).

SC DHEC will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to comply with emergency worker exposure limits.
- The capability to make decisions concerning authorization of exposure levels in excess of pre-authorized levels and the number of emergency workers receiving radiation doses above pre-authorized levels.
- The capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure for emergency workers based on the established PAGs for KI administration.

**Core Capability: Situational Assessment**

**Definition:** Provide all decision-makers with decision-relevant information regarding

Capability Target: 1.a.1. Alert, Notify, Mobilize

OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.1.a, e; A.3, 4; C.1, 4, 6; D.4; E.1, 2; H.3, 4).

SCDHEC will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to receive notification of an incident; contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner.
- The ability to staff and maintain 24-hour operations.
- The ability to identify and request additional resources or identify compensatory measures.

**Exception: Personnel can be at their duty station or in the same room prior to notification.**

Capability Target: 1.d.1. Communications Equipment

At least 2 communications systems are available, at least 1 operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations.

Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, F.1, 2).

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SCDHEC will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- A primary system and at least one backup system are fully functional at all times.
- The capability to manage the communications systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.

Capability Target: 1.e.1. Equipment & Supplies to Support Operations

Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, H. 7, 10; I.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b).

SCDHEC will demonstrate that they have sufficient equipment, maps and displays to perform the assigned role.

Capability Target: 2.b.1. Protective Action Recommendations (PARs)

Appropriate PARs are based on available information on plant condition, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, I. 10; Supp. 3).

SCDHEC will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to develop PARs for decision-makers based on available information and recommendations provided by the licensee, as well as field monitoring data if available.
- The capability to independently validate dose projections.
- The capability to use any additional data to refine projected doses and exposure rates and revise the associated PARs.

Capability Target: 2.b.2. Protective Action Decisions for the General Public

A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make PADs for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy) (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.4, 6; D.4; J.9; J.10.f, m).

SCDHEC will demonstrate the provision of additional PARs based on dose projections, field monitoring data, and information on plant conditions.

### **Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Liaisons Core Capability: Situational Assessment**

**Definition:** Provide all decision-makers with decision-relevant information regarding nature and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response.

Capability Target: 2.b.1. Protective Action Recommendations (PARs)

Appropriate PARs are based on available information on plant condition, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, I. 10; Supp. 3).

SCEMD and SC DHEC Liaisons will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to provide enhanced flow of information between the utility and offsite response organizations.
- The ability to ensure state and county decision-makers and utility personnel are kept up to date with accurate and timely information.

## **Waterway Clearance**

### **Core Capability: On Scene Security Protection**

**Definition:** Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas and also for all traditional and atypical response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.

Capability Target: 1.a.1. Alert, Notify, Mobilize

OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.1.a, e; A.3, 4; C.1, 4, 6; D.4; E.1, 2; H.3, 4).

SC Department of Natural Resources (SCDNR) will discuss the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to receive notification of an incident; contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner.
- The ability to staff and maintain 24-hour operations.
- The ability to identify and request additional resources or identify compensatory measures.

**Exception: If a non-participating agency cannot or will not be present in the SEOC, a call can be made to a known contact within that agency or organization as needed.**

Capability Target: 1.d.1. Communications Equipment

At least 2 communications systems are available, at least 1 operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations.

Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, F.1, 2).

SCDNR will discuss the following Critical Tasks:

- A primary system and at least one backup system are fully functional at all times.
- The capability to manage the communications systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.

Capability Target: 1.e.1. Equipment & Supplies to Support Operations

Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, H.7, 10; I.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b).

SCDNR will provide verification via discussion that their equipment, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to perform the assigned role.

Capability Target: 3.a.1. Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control

OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures. EWs periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI to EWs (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.e, K.3.a, b, K.4).

SCDNR will discuss the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to provide emergency workers (including supplemental resources) with the appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, dosimeter chargers, KI, and instructions on the use of these items.
- Procedures to monitor and record dosimeter readings and manage radiological exposure control.
- Procedures for when administrative exposure limits and turn-back values are reached.
- The capability to determine whether to replace workers, authorize workers to incur additional exposures, or other actions related to exposure limits.
- The capability to accomplish distribution of KI to emergency workers consistent with decisions made.
- The capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take.
- The basic knowledge of procedures for using KI.

**Exception: KI and PRDs will be simulated by props.**

Capability Target: 3.d.1. Implementation of Traffic and Access Control

Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.1.4; J.10.g, j)

SCDNR will discuss the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to select, establish, and staff appropriate access control points consistent with current conditions and PADs (e.g., evacuating, sheltering, and relocation) in a timely manner.
- The capability to provide instructions to access control staff on actions to take when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.
- Accurate knowledge of their roles and responsibilities including verifying emergency worker identification and access authorization to the affected areas.

### **Traffic Control Points (TCPs)**

#### **Core Capability: On Scene Security Protection**

**Definition:** Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas and also for all traditional and atypical response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.

Capability Target: 1.a.1. Alert, Notify, Mobilize

OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.1.a, e; A.3, 4; C.1, 4, 6; D.4; E.1, 2; H.3, 4).

ESF-16 (Traffic Management) will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to receive notification of an incident; contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner.
- The ability to staff and maintain 24-hour operations.
- The ability to identify and request additional resources or identify compensatory measures.

**Exception: If a non-participating agency cannot or will not be present in the SEOC, a call can be made to a known contact within that agency or organization as needed.**

Capability Target: 1.d.1. Communications Equipment

At least 2 communications systems are available, at least 1 operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations.

Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, F.1, 2).

ESF-16 (Traffic Management) will discuss the following Critical Tasks:

- A primary system and at least one backup system are fully functional at all times.
- The capability to manage the communications systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.

Capability Target: 1.e.1. Equipment & Supplies to Support Operations

Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, H.7, 10; I.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b).

ESF-16 (Traffic Management) will provide verification via discussion that equipment, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient and consistent with the assigned role.

Capability Target: 3.a.1. Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control

OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures. EWs periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI to EWs (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.e, K.3.a, b, K.4).

ESF-16 (Traffic Management) will discuss the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to provide emergency workers (including supplemental resources) with the appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, dosimeter chargers, KI, and instructions on the use of these items.
- Procedures to monitor and record dosimeter readings and manage radiological exposure control.
- Procedures for when administrative exposure limits and turn-back values are reached.
- The capability to determine whether to replace workers, authorize workers to incur additional exposures, or other actions related to exposure limits.
- The capability to accomplish distribution of KI to emergency workers consistent with decisions made.
- The capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take.
- The basic knowledge of procedures for using KI.

Capability Target: 3.d.1. Implementation of Traffic and Access Control

Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.1,4; J.10.g, j)

ESF-16 (Traffic Management) will discuss the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to select, establish, and staff appropriate traffic and access control points consistent with current conditions and PADs (e.g., evacuating, sheltering, and relocation) in a timely manner.
- The capability to provide instructions to traffic and access control staff on actions to take when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.
- Accurate knowledge of their roles and responsibilities, including verifying emergency worker identification and access authorization to the affected areas.

Capability Target: 3.d.2. Impediments to Evacuation and Traffic and Access Control  
Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.k)

ESF-16 (Traffic Management) will demonstrate/discuss the capability to respond to evacuation impediments with re-routing of traffic during the evacuation and coordination with the Joint Information Center/ Joint Information System (JIC/JIS) to communicate alternate evacuation routes.

### **Joint Information System (JIS)**

#### **Core Capability: Public Information and Warning**

**Definition:** Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

Capability Target: 1.a.1. Alert, Notify, Mobilize  
OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.1.a, e; A.3, 4; C.1, 4, 6; D.4; E.1, 2; H.3, 4).

ESF-15 (Public Information) will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks for the State JIC/JIS:

- The ability to staff and maintain 24-hour operations.
- The capability to activate the State JIC for immediate use by mobilized personnel upon their arrival.
- The ability to identify and request additional resources or identify compensatory measures.

**Exception: Personnel can be at their duty station or in the same room prior to notification.**

Capability Target: 1.d.1. Communications Equipment

At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations.  
Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, F.1, 2).

ESF-15 (Public Information) will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks for the State JIC/JIS:

- A primary system and at least one backup system are fully functional at all times.
- The capability to manage the communications systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.

Capability Target: 1.e.1. Equipment & Supplies to Support Operations

Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, H.7, 10; I.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b).

ESF-15 (Public Information) will demonstrate that the State JIC has sufficient equipment, maps and displays to perform the assigned role.

Capability Target: 3.d.2. Impediments to Evacuation and Traffic and Access Control

Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.k).

ESF-15 (Public Information) will demonstrate/discuss the capability to communicate alternate routes to evacuees, as appropriate.

Capability Target: 5.a.1. Initial Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification System Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP Guidance (Timely: The responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay) (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.5, 6, 7).

ESF-15 (Public Information) will demonstrate the capability to coordinate siren activation followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ. The procedures to broadcast the message will be fully demonstrated as they would in an actual emergency up to the point of transmission.

**Exception: All siren soundings will be conducted via silent test.**

Capability Target: 5.b.1. Emergency Info and Instructions for Public and the Media

OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and news media in a timely manner (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.5, 7; G.3.a; G.4.a, c).

ESF-15 (Public Information) will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The ability to provide emergency information and instructions to the public and media in a timely manner following the initial alert and notification (not subject to specific time requirements).
  - The capability to ensure that emergency information that is no longer valid is rescinded and not repeated by broadcast media.
  - The capability to ensure that current emergency information is repeated at pre-established intervals.
  - The capability to provide timely, accurate, concise, and coordinated information to the news media for subsequent dissemination to the public.
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- The capability to respond appropriately to inquiries from the news media.
- The capability to deal with calls received via the public inquiry hotline.
- The capability to provide or obtain accurate information for public inquiry callers or make appropriate referrals.
- The capability to ensure that emergency information and instructions are consistent with PADs made by appropriate officials.
- The capability to ensure that emergency information contains all necessary and applicable instructions to assist the public in carrying out the PADs provided.
- The capability to conduct timely and pertinent media briefings and distribute media releases as the incident warrants.

**County and State PIOs will play remotely from their respective duty locations (EOC/SEOC). Georgia Power Company (GPC) will provide a media bridge line to use for coordination between county, state, and utility PIOs. County PIOs may choose to participate in media briefings or may choose to provide their county information to State PIOs for dissemination during a media briefing. A minimum of one (1) media briefings will be conducted based upon exercise play. Media releases will be posted to the SNC WebEOC portal by PIO representatives and provided to the JIS for dissemination to media representatives. Press conference/media briefings will be held via a Microsoft Teams event created for the exercise. GPC will create the event and then provide access to county and state PIOs. Skype telephone will be used as a backup in the event of Microsoft Teams being unavailable. FEMA evaluators will have access to the GPC media bridge line and the Microsoft Teams exercise event. Evaluations will be based on observations taken from the media bridge line and the Microsoft Teams exercise event.**

## **EAS**

### **Core Capability: Public Information and Warning**

**Definition:** Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

Capability Target: 5.a.1. Initial Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification System Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP Guidance (Timely: The responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay) (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.5, 6, 7).

ESF-15 (Public Information) will discuss the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to provide initial and subsequent messages to populated areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ.
- The capability to broadcast an instructional message on a 24-hour basis, including verification of provisions for backup power or an alternate station.

## **RISK COUNTIES**

**Aiken, Allendale and Barnwell**

## **EOC**

### **Core Capability: Operational Coordination**

**Definition:** Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

Capability Target: 1.a.1. Alert, Notify, Mobilize

OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.1.a, e; A.3, 4; C.1, 4, 6; D.4; E.1, 2; H.3, 4).

Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell Counties will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to receive notification of an incident from the licenses; verify the notification; contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner.
- The ability to staff and maintain 24-hour operations.
- The activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel upon their arrival.
- The ability to identify and request additional resources or identify compensatory measures.

**Exception: Personnel can be at their duty station or in the same room prior to notification.**

Capability Target: 1.c.1. Direction and Control

Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.1.d; A.2.a, b; A.2; C.4, 6).

Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell Counties will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The ability to carry out the essential management functions of the response effort.
- The ability to prioritize resource tasking and replace/supplement resources.

**Exception: All coordination telephone calls should occur in accordance with plans and procedures; however, the SimCell may substitute for non-participating agencies.**

**Capability Target: 1.d.1. Communications Equipment**

At least 2 communications systems are available, at least 1 operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations.

Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, F.1, 2).

Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell Counties will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- A primary system and at least one backup system are fully functional at all times.
- The capability to manage the communications systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.

**Capability Target: 1.e.1. Equipment & Supplies to Support Operations**

Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, H.7, 10; I.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b).

Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell Counties will demonstrate that each EOC has sufficient equipment, maps and displays to perform the assigned role.

**Exception: of KI, equipment, and equipment calibration and testing are evaluated during Staff Assistance Visits (SAVs).**

**Capability Target: 2.a.1. Emergency Worker (EW) Exposure Control**

ORO use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including use of KI is in place for emergency workers, including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or PAGs (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.6; J.10e, f; K.3.a; K.4).

Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell Counties will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to comply with emergency worker exposure limits.
- The capability to make decisions concerning authorization of exposure levels in excess of pre-authorized levels and the number of emergency workers receiving radiation doses above pre-authorized levels.
- The capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure for emergency workers based on the established PAGs for KI administration.

**Exception: County Public Health officials will be available virtually during the exercise.**

**Capability Target: 2.b.2. Protective Action Decisions for the General Public**

A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make PADs for the general public (including the recommendation for use of KI, if ORO policy) (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.4, 6; D.4; J.9; J.10.f, m).

Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell Counties will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to make initial and subsequent precautionary and/or protective action decisions in a timely manner appropriate to the incident.
- The capability of decision-makers to change protective actions based on the combination of the following factors: subsequent dose projections, field monitoring data, or information on plant conditions, magnitude of ongoing threat, the response, and/or site conditions.
- The capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI to supplement sheltering and evacuation.
- The capability to communicate the results of decisions to all the affected locations.

**Exception: County Public Health officials will be available virtually during the exercise.**

Capability Target: 3.a.1. Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control

The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans/procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. Appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers is maintained (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.e; K.3.a, b; K.4).

Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell Counties will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to provide emergency workers (including supplemental resources) with the appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, dosimeter chargers, KI, and instructions on the use of these items.
- The capability to determine whether to replace workers, authorize workers to incur additional exposures, or other actions related to exposure limits.
- The capability to accomplish distribution of KI to emergency workers consistent with decisions made.
- The capability to disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take.

**Exception: County Public Health officials will be available virtually during the exercise.**

Capability Target: 3.b.1. Implementation of KI Decision for Institutionalized and General

Public KI and appropriate instructions are made available in case a decision to recommend use of KI is made. Appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI for institutionalized individuals and the general public is maintained (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.e, f).

SC DHEC will discuss the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to accomplish distribution of KI consistent with decisions made.
- The capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take it.

Capability Target: 3.d.1. Implementation of Traffic and Access Control

Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.1, 4; J.10.g, j).

Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell Counties will discuss the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to select, establish, and staff appropriate traffic and access control points consistent with current conditions and PADs (e.g., evacuating, sheltering, and relocation) in a timely manner
- The capability to provide instructions to traffic and access control staff on actions to take when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.
- The capability to demonstrate accurate knowledge of their roles and responsibilities, including verifying emergency worker identification and access authorization to the affected areas.

**Exception: County Law Enforcement will be available virtually during the exercise.**

Capability Target: 3.d.2. Impediments to Evacuation and Traffic and Access Control

Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.k).

Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell Counties will demonstrate/ discuss the capability to respond to impediments to evacuation with re-routing of traffic during the evacuation and coordination with the JIC/JIS to communicate alternate evacuation routes.

### **Core Capability: Public Information and Warning**

**Definition:** Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

Capability Target: 5.a.1. Initial Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification System Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP Guidance (Timely: The responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay) (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.5, 6, 7).

Barnwell County will demonstrate/discuss the capability to provide an alert signal followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ.

**Exception: All siren soundings will be conducted via silent test.**

Capability Target: 5.a.3. Backup Alert and Notification

Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within a reasonable time following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.6; Appendix 3.B.2.c).

Aiken, Allendale, Barnwell Counties will demonstrate/discuss backup alert and notification procedures utilized in the event of a siren failure.

Capability Target: 5.b.1. Emergency Info and Instructions for Public and the Media

OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and news media in a timely manner (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.5, 7; G.3.a; G.4.a, c).

Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell Counties will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The ability to provide emergency information and instructions to the public and media in a timely manner following the initial alert and notification (not subject to specific time requirements).
- The capability to ensure that emergency information that is no longer valid is rescinded and not repeated by broadcast media.
- The capability to ensure that current emergency information is repeated at pre-established intervals.
- The capability to provide timely, accurate, concise, and coordinated information to the news media for subsequent dissemination to the public.
- The capability to respond appropriately to inquiries from the news media.
- The capability to deal with calls received via the public inquiry hotline.
- The capability to provide or obtain accurate information for public inquiry callers or make appropriate referrals.
- The capability to ensure that emergency information and instructions are consistent with PADs made by appropriate officials.
- The capability to ensure that emergency information contains all necessary and applicable instructions to assist the public in carrying out the PADs provided.
- The capability to conduct timely and pertinent media briefings and distribute media releases as the incident warrants.

County and State PIOs will play remotely from their respective duty locations (EOC/SEOC). Georgia Power Company (GPC) will provide a media bridge line to use for coordination between county, state, and utility PIOs. County PIOs may choose to participate in media briefings or may choose to provide their county information to State PIOs for dissemination during a media briefing. A minimum of one (1) media briefings will be conducted based upon exercise play. Media releases will be posted to the SNC WebEOC portal by PIO representatives and provided to the JIS for dissemination to media representatives. Press conference/media briefings will be held via a Microsoft Teams event created for the exercise. GPC will create the event and then provide access to county and state PIOs. Skype telephone will be used as a backup in the event of Microsoft Teams being unavailable. FEMA evaluators will have access to the GPC media bridge line and the Microsoft Teams exercise event. Evaluations will be based on observations taken from the media bridge line and the Microsoft Teams exercise event.

### Traffic Control Points (TCPs)

#### Core Capability: On Scene Security Protection

**Definition:** Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas and also for all traditional and atypical response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.

Capability Target: 1.a.1. Alert, Notify, Mobilize

OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.1.a, e; A.3, 4; C.1, 4, 6; D.4; E.1, 2; H.3, 4).

Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell Counties will discuss the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner
- The ability to staff and maintain 24-hour operations.
- The ability to identify and request additional resources or identify compensatory measures.

**Exception: Local County Law Enforcement will be available virtually during the exercise.**

Capability Target: 1.d.1. Communications Equipment

At least 2 communications systems are available, at least 1 operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations.

Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, F.1, 2).



Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell Counties will discuss the following Critical Tasks:

- A primary system and at least one backup system are fully functional at all times.
- The capability to manage the communications systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.

**Exception: Local County Law Enforcement will be available virtually during the exercise.**

Capability Target: 1.e.1. Equipment & Supplies to Support Operations

Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, H. 7, 10; I.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b).

Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell Counties will provide verification via discussion that their equipment, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to perform the assigned role.

**Exception: Local County Law Enforcement will be available virtually during the exercise.**

Capability Target: 3.a.1. Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control

OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures. EWs periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI to EWs (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.e, K.3.a, b, K.4).

Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell Counties will discuss the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to provide emergency workers (including supplemental resources) with the appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, dosimeter chargers, KI, and instructions on the use of these items.
- Procedures to monitor and record dosimeter readings and manage radiological exposure control.
- Procedures for when administrative exposure limits and turn-back values are reached.
- The capability to determine whether to replace workers, authorize workers to incur additional exposures, or other actions related to exposure limits.
- The capability to accomplish distribution of KI to emergency workers consistent with decisions made.
- The capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take.
- The basic knowledge of procedures for using KI.



**Exception: Local County Law Enforcement will be available virtually during the exercise.**

Capability Target: 3.d.1. Implementation of Traffic and Access Control

Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.1,4; J.10.g, j)

Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell Counties will discuss the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to select, establish, and staff appropriate traffic and access control points consistent with current conditions and PADs (e.g., evacuating, sheltering, and relocation) in a timely manner.
- The capability to provide instructions to traffic and access control staff on actions to take when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.
- Accurate knowledge of their roles and responsibilities, including verifying emergency worker identification and access authorization to the affected areas.

**Exception: Local County Law Enforcement will be available virtually during the exercise.**

Capability Target: 3.d.2. Impediments to Evacuation and Traffic and Access Control

Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.k).

Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell Counties will demonstrate/discuss the capability to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation, including re-routing of traffic and coordination with the JIS to communicate alternate routes to evacuees, as appropriate.

**Exception: Local County Law Enforcement will be available virtually during the exercise.**

### Emergency Worker Decontamination (EWD)

EWD Facility to be evaluated as **GRADED** is:

Date & Time	County	Facility
December 9, 2020 9: 00 AM	Aiken	Redcliffe Elementary School; 22 Double Springs Road, Aiken, SC 29803

**Core Capability: Environmental Response/Health and Safety**

**Definition:** Ensure the availability of guidance and resources to address all hazards including hazardous materials, acts of terrorism, and natural disasters in support of the responder operations and the affected communities.

Capability Target: 1.a.1. Alert, Notify, Mobilize

OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.1.a, e; A.3, 4; C.1, 4, 6; D.4; E.1, 2; H.3, 4).

Aiken County will discuss the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to receive notification of an incident from the licensee; verify the notification; contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner.
- The ability to staff and maintain 24-hour operations.
- The activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel upon their arrival.
- The ability to identify and request additional resources or identify compensatory measures.

Capability Target: 1.d.1. Communications Equipment

At least 2 communications systems are available, at least 1 operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations.

Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, F.1, 2).

Aiken County will demonstrate/discuss the following Critical Tasks:

- A primary system and at least one backup system are fully functional at all times.
- The capability to manage the communications systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.

Capability Target: 1.e.1. Equipment & Supplies to Support Operations

Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, H.7, 10; I.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b).

Aiken County will demonstrate that equipment and supplies are sufficient and consistent with their assigned role.

**Exception: Quantities of KI, equipment, and equipment calibration and testing are evaluated during Staff Assistance Visits (SAVs).**

**Capability Target: 3.a.1. Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control**

OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures. EWs periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI to EWs (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.e, K.3.a, b, K.4).

Aiken County will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to provide emergency workers (including supplemental resources) with the appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, dosimeter chargers, KI, and instructions on the use of these items.
- Procedures to monitor and record dosimeter readings and manage radiological exposure control.
- Procedures for when administrative exposure limits and turn-back values are reached.
- The capability to determine whether to replace workers, authorize workers to incur additional exposures, or other actions related to exposure limits.
- The capability to accomplish distribution of KI to emergency workers consistent with decisions made.
- The capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take.
- The basic knowledge of procedures for using KI.

**Capability Target: 6.b.1. Monitor Decontamination of EWs/Equipment & Vehicles** The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources to accomplish monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and their equipment and vehicles (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, K.5.a, b).

Aiken County will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to monitor emergency worker personnel and their equipment and vehicles for contamination.
- The capability to make decisions on the need for decontamination of personnel, equipment, and vehicles based on trigger/action levels and procedures.
- The process of checking the instruments for proper operation before use.
- Monitoring procedures for a minimum of two emergency workers, their equipment, and one vehicle.
- Provisions for separate showering and same-sex decontamination.
- Provisions for limiting the spread of contamination.
- Provisions to separate contaminated and uncontaminated individuals, provide changes of clothing for those with contaminated clothing, and store contaminated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further contamination of emergency workers or facilities.
- The capability to register emergency workers upon completion of the monitoring and decontamination activities.

**Exception: Water for vehicle decontamination will be simulated**

**Backup Route Alerting**

**Core Capability: Public Information and Warning**

**Definition:** Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

Capability Target: 1.a.1. Alert, Notify, Mobilize

OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.1.a, e; A.3, 4; C.1, 4, 6; D.4; E.1, 2; H.3, 4).

Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell, Counties will demonstrate the capability to receive notification of an incident; contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner.

Capability Target: 1.d.1. Communications Equipment

At least 2 communications systems are available, at least 1 operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations.

Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, F.1, 2).

Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell Counties will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- A primary system and at least one backup system are fully functional at all times.
- The capability to manage the communications systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.

Capability Target: 1.e.1. Equipment & Supplies to Support Operations

Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, H.7, 10; I.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b).

Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell Counties will demonstrate that equipment and supplies are sufficient and consistent with the assigned role.

Capability Target: 3.a.1. Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control

OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures. EWs periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI to EWs (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.e, K.3.a, b, K.4).

Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell Counties will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to provide emergency workers (including supplemental resources) with the appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, dosimeter chargers, KI, and instructions on the use of these items.
- Procedures to monitor and record dosimeter readings and manage radiological exposure control.
- Procedures for when administrative exposure limits and turn-back values are reached.
- The capability to determine whether to replace workers, authorize workers to incur additional exposures, or other actions related to exposure limits.
- The capability to accomplish distribution of KI to emergency workers consistent with decisions made.
- The capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take.
- The basic knowledge of procedures for using KI.

Capability Target: 5.a.3. Backup Alert and Notification

Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within a reasonable time following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.6; Appendix 3.B.2.c).

Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell Counties will demonstrate/discuss backup alert and notification procedures utilized in the event of a siren failure.