After Action Report

Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise

Exercise Date: February 14, 2023

Final

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Executive Summary

On February 14, 2023, the offsite response organizations of the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant 10-mile emergency planning zone participated in a hostile action-based plume exposure pathway exercise. FEMA Region 4 Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program staff evaluated that exercise, which also included out of sequence activities conducted on November 1-2, 2022; December 1, 2022; December 14, 2022; and January 10, 2023. This report outlines that exercise and out of sequence activities.

The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of state and local preparedness in responding to an incident at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. It was conducted in accordance with FEMA policies and guidance concerning the exercise of state and local radiological emergency response plans and procedures. The federal approval of the formal submission of the radiological emergency response procedures for the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant by the state of Florida was granted on June 20, 1980, and the qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on August 7, 1980. The previous federally evaluated exercise at this site was conducted February 10, 2021.

Officials and representatives from participating agencies and organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures, and successfully implemented them during the exercise and out of sequence activities. All jurisdictions met their exercise objectives and successfully demonstrated the corresponding core capabilities identified in Section 2.2 of this report. FEMA staff did not identify any level 1 or level 2 findings.

FEMA recognizes the unique challenges overcome by those who participated in the planning and the conduct of the exercise. Most of the participating agencies were actively involved in response or recovery operations for Hurricanes Ian and/or Nicole during the exercise planning cycle. Some participating emergency operations centers were still activated in support of those operations or other emergencies during the exercise or out-of-sequence activities. Despite ongoing real-world response efforts, the participants provided appropriate support and resources in response to a simulated emergency at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant.

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Section 1: Exercise Overview

Exercise Name	2023 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise	
Type of Exercise	Full Participation	
Exercise Date	February 14, 2023	
Out of Sequence Date(s)	November 1-2, December 1 and 14, 2022; January 10, 2023	
Program	Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program	
Mission Area	Response	
Scenario Type	Hostile Action-Based, Plume Phase Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise	
Participating Organizations	See Appendix C for the list of participating organizations	
Locations	See Appendix D for the extent of play agreement and exercise locations	
Points of Contact	Mr. Robert Spence South Section Chief FEMA Region 4 3005 Chamblee-Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341	Mr. Nathan Nienhius Turkey Point Site Specialist FEMA Region 4 3005 Chamblee-Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341
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Section 2: Exercise Design Summary

2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design

FEMA administers the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program pursuant to the regulations found in Title 44 CFR parts 350, 351, 352, 353 and 354. CFR 350 codifies 16 planning standards that form the basis for radiological emergency response planning for the licensee, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments impacted by the emergency planning zones established for each nuclear power plant site in the United States. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations also codify the 16 planning standards for the licensee. 44 CFR 350 sets forth the mechanisms for the formal review and approval of state, local, tribal, and territorial government radiological emergency response plans and procedures by FEMA. One of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program cornerstones established by these regulations is the biennial exercise of offsite response capabilities. During these exercises, affected state, local, tribal, and territorial governments demonstrate their abilities to implement their plans and procedures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological incident at a nuclear plant.

The results of this exercise, together with reviews of the radiological emergency response plans and verification of the periodic requirements set forth in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision 2, dated December 2019; the annual letter of certification, and staff assistance visits, enabled FEMA to provide a statement with the transmission of this final after-action report to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This statement verifies that the affected state, local, tribal, and territorial plans and preparedness are: (1) adequate to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the nuclear power facility by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological incident; and (2) capable of being implemented.

2.2 Exercise Core Capabilities and Objectives

Core capabilities-based planning allows for exercise planning teams to develop exercise objectives and observe exercise outcomes through a framework of specific action items. Using the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program methodology, the exercise objectives meet Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program requirements and objectives. The capability targets were negotiated with the state of Florida and risk counties. The core capabilities demonstrated during this exercise were:

- **Operational Coordination:** Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.
- **Situational Assessment:** Provide all decision makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response.
- **Public Information and Warning:** Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard, as well as the actions being taken and the assistance being made available, as appropriate.

- **Environmental Response/Health and Safety:** Conduct appropriate measures to ensure the protection of the health and safety of the public and workers, as well as the environment, from all-hazards in support of responder operations and the affected communities.
- **On Scene Security, Protection and Law Enforcement**: Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within the affected areas and also for response personnel performing lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.
- **Critical Transportation**: Provide transportation (including infrastructure access and accessible transportation services) for response priority objectives, including the evacuation of people and animals, and the delivery of vital response personnel, equipment, and services into the affected areas.
- **Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services**: Provide lifesaving medical treatment via Emergency Medical Services and related operations and avoid additional disease and injury by providing targeted public health, medical and behavioral health support, and products to all affected populations.

These core capabilities, when successfully demonstrated, meet the exercise objectives. The objectives for this exercise were as follows:

- **Objective 1:** Demonstrate the ability to alert, activate and mobilize staff in accordance with plans and procedures to support emergency operations; provide direction and control through the state and county emergency operations centers.
- **Objective 2:** Demonstrate the ability to assess conditions and make protective action decisions for state and county emergency workers and the general public through exercise demonstration and discussions of plans and procedures.
- **Objective 3:** Demonstrate the ability to implement protective actions for state and county emergency workers and the general public through exercise demonstration and discussions of plans and procedures.
- **Objective 4:** Demonstrate the ability to activate the Primary Alert and Notification System, complemented by other systems, and validate the back-up Alert and Notification System through exercise demonstration or discussions of plans and procedures.
- **Objective 5:** Demonstrate the effectiveness of plans, policies, and procedures within the joint information system for public and private sector emergency information communications.
- **Objective 6:** Demonstrate the ability to provide dose projections and protective action recommendations for the plume phase.
- **Objective 7:** Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the use of off-site resources with on-site personnel in response to a hostile action taken against the facility.
- **Objective 8:** Demonstrate the ability to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to a contaminated injured individual(s).

2.3 Exercise Scenario

The following is a summary of the scenario developed by Florida Power & Light to drive exercise play.

The Turkey Point operations personnel were notified by security of a hostile action occurring in the east side of the protected area. Both reactors were manually tripped. The shift manager then declared a Site Area Emergency.

Security reported to the operating crew that a large explosion had occurred in the Unit 3 spent fuel pool building. Security informed the shift manager that all adversaries were terminated.

A radioactive release to the environment started from the Unit 3 spent fuel pool building. The emergency coordinator then declared a General Emergency. Notifications and protective action recommendations to evacuate two miles around and five miles downwind were made to the state and county officials.

Security informed the shift manager that a suspicious satchel was left by the adversaries. Security evacuated the area to keep personnel a safe distance from the satchel. Security informed the incident command post that there was a suspicious satchel on site and requested the county bomb disposal squad. After all exercise objectives were reviewed, the exercise was terminated.

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Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities

3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results

This section contains the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the exercise and associated out of sequence activities.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated based on the demonstration of core capabilities, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program objectives, and capability targets as delineated in the FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual dated December 2019. Capability targets are listed by number and the demonstration status of those capability targets are indicated using the following terms:

- **Met (M):** The jurisdiction or functional entity performed all activities under the objective/capability target to the level required per the work plan and/or the extent-of-play agreement, with no Level 1 or Level 2 Findings evaluated under that objective/capability target during the current activity and no unresolved prior Level 2 Finding(s).
- **Level 1 Finding (L1):** An observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance during an assessment activity that could cause a determination that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant.
- **Level 2 Finding (L2):** An observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance during an assessment activity that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health and safety.
- **Plan Issue (P):** An observed or identified inadequacy in the ORO's emergency plan/implementing procedures, rather than in that of the ORO's performance.
- **Not Demonstrated (N):** For a justifiable reason, the jurisdiction or functional entity did not perform assessment activities under the objective/capability target as specified in the extent-of-play agreement.

3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation

The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program methodology is an analytical process used to assess the demonstration of specific capabilities during an exercise. A capability provides a means to perform one or more capability targets under specified conditions and to specific performance standards. Core capabilities form the foundation of the FEMA Region 4 Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program evaluations. The core capability summaries below provide an overall combined assessment of state and local jurisdictions based upon their collective demonstrated performance as it relates to the specific core capability. Each jurisdiction's standalone capability summaries are provided below.

- **Operational Coordination:** State and county decision makers and supporting staff at the participating emergency operations centers, incident command post, and utility emergency operations facility established and maintained a unified and coordinated operational structure that appropriately integrated all critical stakeholders and supported the execution of core capabilities.

- **Situational Assessment:** State dose assessment personnel provided decision makers with relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response. Personnel collected and assessed data associated with a radiological release, compared results with the utility's dose projections, and provided timely protective action recommendations to decision makers.
- **Public Information and Warning:** State, county, and utility public information officers and spokespersons delivered coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information through various means including Emergency Alert System messages, news releases, and press conferences.
- **Environmental Response/Health and Safety:** State personnel supporting radiological field monitoring and laboratory activities conducted appropriate measures to ensure the protection of the health and safety of the public and workers, as well as the environment.
- **On Scene Security, Protection and Law Enforcement:** Through demonstration and interview, county traffic and access control personnel ensured a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within the affected areas and also for response personnel performing lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.
- **Critical Transportation**: Through interview, Miami-Dade County school officials validated district plans and procedures to provide timely transportation and accountability for students and faculty.
- **Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services**: Baptist Health Hospital staff and county first responders provided lifesaving medical transport and treatment to contaminated, injured individuals while minimizing the spread of contamination.

3.3 Jurisdictional Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation

3.3.1 Joint Operations

3.3.1.1 Joint Information System/Center

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

State, county, and utility public information officers and spokespersons successfully demonstrated the public information and warning core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant.

The public information officers and spokespersons operated from a new facility; the joint information center and media rooms were modern and state-of-the-art. The facility was used for multiple county, state, and utility functions, the joint information center was located on the first floor and comprised of two rooms – joint information center room and media room. Both rooms had tables, chairs, audio/visual equipment, workstations, laptops, printers, internet, whiteboards, televisions, and various other equipment and supplies necessary to adequately support emergency response operations. Press releases development and approval processes occurred outside of the joint information center, differing from the traditional process. This facility essentially served as a repository for public information that was used to develop talking points for news briefings. This process did not affect or hinder any response capabilities. Public information officers and spokespersons within the joint information center maintained communication with their counterparts in their county and state emergency operations centers or other emergency response facilities via cellular

telephone and electronic mail. As this was the first evaluated exercise in the new facility, a joint information procedure should be developed that outlines the purpose, roles/responsibilities, set-up, use/operation, organization charts, technology, logs/recording, etc., for use moving forward.

The Monroe County Emergency Management Public Information Officer developed one Emergency Alert System message and two news releases within the joint information center. While the Emergency Alert System message was developed in the joint information center, the activation was initiated at the county emergency operations center. County-specific information, either developed at the joint information center or at their respective emergency operations centers was shared at the joint information center for situational awareness. All press releases, regardless of where they were developed, were approved by their respective emergency management director prior to being released.

The utility joint information center manager scheduled two news briefings. An informal pre-caucus was held to determine speaking order, but criticality of information was not discussed when determining the speaking order. A suggestion to not mention the escalation to General Emergency, and to instead, focus on information associated with Site Area Emergency declared earlier in the day. This suggestion received push back and together the spokespersons agreed to briefly address the General Emergency declaration and then share other utility, county, and state emergency information. One briefing was successfully demonstrated and facilitated by the utility joint information center assistant manager and spokesperson following the General Emergency declaration. The exercise was terminated before the second news briefing was held.

The utility spokesperson opened the news briefing within two minutes of the scheduled time and provided the public and media with an overview of the current situation and plant status. The spokesperson requested the public to stay tuned to their television, radio, and official websites for emergency information. The utility spokesperson was followed by a Miami-Dade Police Department Spokesperson, Monroe County Emergency Management Spokesperson, and a Florida Division of Emergency Management Spokesperson. Each county and state spokesperson reviewed their respective precautionary actions, announced local and states of emergencies, and asked the public and media to stay tuned for additional emergency information.

Following their statements, the spokespersons fielded eight mock media questions, with one requiring a follow-up answer. Mock media was represented by utility public information staff. Four of the questions related to the attack on the power plant. The rest centered around public safety and availability of power. A post-caucus meeting did not occur; a post-caucus should be held to analyze the news briefing for accuracy, identification of unanswered questions, and identify improvements for the following briefing(s). The exercise ended before the answer to the follow-up question was pursued.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3.

3.3.1.2 Emergency Operations Facility – Decision Makers

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

The Miami-Dade Department of Emergency Management and Monroe County Emergency Management decision makers successfully demonstrated the appropriate elements of operational coordination in response to a simulated hostile action-based incident at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. Each agency representative pre-staged in the area, as approved in the extent-of-play agreement. Upon notification of the Site Area Emergency, they arrived at the utility's emergency operations facility, and established a unified and coordinated operational structure. All additional staffing requirements were conducted at the respective county emergency operations centers. The EOF was declared operational at 8:40 a.m.

Upon arrival to the facility, decision makers immediately assembled plans, procedures, and maps. They provided overall direction and control of the county response. They used a conference line to coordinate with their respective radiological planners at the county emergency operations centers, request additional resources, and assess the progress of county response. They received regular updates from the county planners throughout the incident. Radio communications were maintained throughout the exercise by law enforcement in the Miami-Dade County planning office and the incident command post.

Regular briefings, called recovery meetings, were held every hour by the utility to update decision makers on the utility's progress. The briefings were handled expeditiously and allowed state and county representatives to ask technical questions and discuss recommended protective actions, if applicable. At the conclusion of each briefing, the decision makers held coordination calls with their emergency operations center staff to determine protective action decisions. Precautionary and protective action decisions including monitor and prepare, exclusionary waterway alerts, in-place sheltering, and evacuations were made using information provided by the utility, dose assessment personnel, and field teams. During the coordination calls, considerations for individuals with access and functional needs was also discussed. Leadership coordinated siren sounding, route alerting activities, and the appropriate public messaging. This information was then shared with the public information officers at the county emergency operation centers and joint information center for distribution.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4.

3.3.1.3 Emergency Operations Facility – Joint Operations

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

The State Emergency Response Team representatives assigned to the utility's emergency operations facility effectively demonstrated elements of operational coordination in response to an incident at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. Emergency notifications from the plant were received at the Florida State Watch Office that, in turn, notified State Emergency Response Team, Bureau of Radiation Control and the emergency management agencies in the impacted risk counties, which in this case were Miami-Dade, and Monroe Counties.

To support the risk counties, the Florida Division of Emergency Management and Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control deployed personnel to the utility's emergency operations facility. This simulated deployment occurred at Site Area Emergency.

The Florida Division of Emergency Management deployed an all-hazards incident management team under the leadership of a senior state emergency response team manager. The team's incident commander was designated as the Governor's Authorized Representative. The Incident commander maintained regular communications with the offsite incident command post and the state emergency operations center in Tallahassee and kept them apprised of plant conditions, utility recommendations, and the protective actions decisions made by county representatives.

The Bureau of Radiation Control Operations Officer at the Emergency Operations Facility maintained overall direction and control of the bureau's response effort. The officer also provided sound technical advice and recommendations to the incident commander and to representatives from the risk counties. The Bureau of Radiation Control Operations Officer was directly supported by the dose assessment specialists and field team operations leaders. Bureau of Radiation Control field teams operated from the deployed mobile emergency radiological laboratory and along with utility field teams, collected data to validate the dose projections prepared by the state and the utility. The Bureau of Radiation Control Operations Officer provided technically sound assessments of the utility's protective action recommendation to the incident commander and to county decision makers in a clear, understandable manner.

Each of the risk counties each provide a designated decision maker to represent the county in the protective action decision process coordinated within the utility's emergency operations facility. For both Miami-Dade and Monroe Counties, the decision makers were senior members of the county's emergency management departments.

Throughout the exercise, county decision makers routinely discussed relevant issues with utility and state personnel, including security and plant conditions and protective action recommendations. They also discussed potential protective action decisions with their county emergency operations center staff. Upon concurrence by the counties' leadership, they informed the state and utility of the protective action decision, siren activation, and emergency alert message release. The decision makers were versed in their respective county plans and procedures and had immediate access to pertinent information. This information included demographic data, relocation and evacuation information, and shelter locations that facilitated the protective action decision process. The incident commander and his staff, along with staff at the incident command post provided substantive support to the decision makers during the protective action decision development and implementation process.

Overall, personnel from the Florida Division of Emergency Management, the Bureau of Radiation Control, and the two risk counties performed their duties in a professional manner, thereby ensuring that state and county decision makers were provided accurate and timely information.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.2, 1.3.

3.3.1.4 All Hazard Incident Management Team

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

The state all-hazards incident management team successfully demonstrated operational coordination of state resources in response to a simulated incident at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. The team was pre-staged in accordance with the extent-of-play agreement. At Site Area Emergency, the team was notified and responded to the utility's emergency operations facility, set up all necessary equipment, and were operational within thirty minutes of arrival. They were immediately self-sufficient, setting up multiple radio and satellite communications systems and their own computer network.

Once operational, leadership at the state emergency operations center transferred command and control of the state's response to the incident management team via phone call. The incident commander maintained consistent communication with the state emergency operations center, the incident command post and the effected counties. The incident management team-maintained awareness of plant conditions by attending regular briefings by the utility. Computer mapping systems provided situational awareness, including areas being evacuated and downwind areas that could be affected.

The all-hazards incident management team maintained communications with the Miami-Dade and Monroe Counties emergency management liaisons and participated in frequent utility briefings throughout the incident. The team provided support to the counties during the process, including monitoring and assisting the counties with unmet needs. The incident commander and the incident command post liaisons communicated real-time information to assist timely decisions. The incident commander was familiar with plans and procedures, demographic data, relocation and evacuation information, and shelter locations.

The all-hazards incident management team worked well together, communicated effectively, and displayed professionalism and cohesiveness throughout the response. The team provided the counties with accurate and timely information for making critical decision to protect the health and safety of the public.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 3.1.

3.3.2 State Jurisdiction

3.3.2.1 State of Florida – Emergency Operations Center

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

The state emergency response team officials in the alternate state emergency operations center successfully demonstrated the ability to respond to a hostile action-based radiological emergency at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. The state emergency response team members mobilized resources, provided direction and control of state operations, and participated in protective action decision making and implementation in accordance with plans and procedures. In addition, the state watch office and alternate state emergency operations center had sufficient equipment and communications capabilities for conducting operations and coordinating response actions with stakeholders.

The Florida State Watch Office received the emergency notification messages from the utility and disseminated the information to the appropriate state and local agencies. The watch office had a utility-provided dedicated phone system for nuclear power plant emergency notifications, with commercial phones used as a backup. The initial notification from the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant control room was received using the dedicated phone system. Subsequent calls were received via commercial lines as the utility emergency operations facility did not have an operable, dedicated phone line. Upon receiving the notification calls, the watch officers input the utility-provided information on emergency notification forms. When the calls were completed, they emailed notification forms to a predetermined list based on the emergency classification level. When notification calls came into the watch office on commercial lines, the watch officers used the same process. Subsequently, they provided the information to the counties and Bureau of Radiation Control on the dedicated phone system.

The alternate emergency operations center had redundant communications to connect with other agencies. The primary communications system in the alternate emergency operations center was hard-wire landline telephones, backed up by 800 megahertz radios, cell phones, email, and facsimile machines. All systems were fully functional and demonstrated during the exercise.

Upon receiving the initial notification from the utility, state watch officers notified and mobilized the state emergency response team using a commercial electronic mass communication system. Personnel from many state agencies staffed the alternate emergency operations center quickly and efficiently.

The state emergency response team chief, operations chief, and other emergency operations staff provided effective direction and control throughout the exercise. The state emergency response team chief, operations section chief, planning section chief, lawyer, finance section chief, and technical officer held regular update briefings with the response personnel and conference calls with stakeholders to maintain situation awareness. In addition, the state emergency response team chief facilitated conference calls with the regional coordinators in the risk counties and the all-hazards incident management team.

Once the team was established, the state emergency response team chief transferred forward command to the all-hazard incident management team incident commander via conference call. After the transfer of command, the state emergency operations center supported the incident management team. Three briefings were held following escalations of emergency classification levels and significant events to keep staff informed of response status. The technical officer provided updates following receipt of each notification to maintain situational awareness. Throughout the response, state leadership communicated effectively, made informed decisions, and followed plans and procedures.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 3.1.

3.3.2.2 Bureau of Radiation Control – Field Team Management

Environmental Response Health & Safety Capability Summary:

The Florida Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control's field team directors successfully demonstrated their ability to provide direction and control for field team operations during a radiological incident at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. They used

a collaborative exposure control decision-making process and managed field team radiation exposure ensuring appropriate measures were taken to protect the health and safety of the emergency workers. The field team directors managed field teams to ensure appropriate radiation survey data was collected for use by dose projection personnel. There were three field teams deployed; two were evaluated and one team participated for training purposes.

Two field team directors jointly managed the field teams and were supported by the operations officer. The radiation control team was notified of the site area emergency via cellular phone, text, and email. The licensee emergency notification form was emailed to the operations officer. The operations officer initiated the call roster for mobilization. The radiation control staff had personal "To Go" kits containing protective equipment, dosimetry, laptops, radios, and maps to expedite rapid response from any location and could nominally activate field teams within two hours. The operations officer explained how they were capable of 24-hour staffing using multiple state employees, civil support teams, and support from neighboring states. Field teams were initially managed by the mobile emergency radiological laboratory supervisor. State field team management transitioned to the field team directors when they arrived at the emergency operations facility.

The emergency operations facility was equipped with supplies, computers, 800 megahertz hand-held radios, satellite radio/phones, cellular telephones, landline telephones, and a printer/facsimile machine. Communications between the field team director and field teams was constant. Communication was verified via "repeat back" methods to ensure accurate transfer of information. There were no communication system failures or delays that impacted emergency operations; any disruptions were quickly rectified with alternate means. They also had maps, charts, procedure books, and use of an incident management software program for monitoring the field teams' radiation survey and air sample information.

Prior to the deployment of the field teams to field survey staging areas, the mobile emergency response laboratory supervisor issued dosimetry/survey instrumentation, provided a safety and exposure control briefing, and established radio communications with the field teams. The field team director used meteorological data characterizing the plume direction, edge, and centerline to determine the appropriate areas to pre-position the field teams. Three field teams were deployed to locations approximately four and five miles downwind at the projected plume centerline and both edges. There was no coordination with law enforcement on safety and security of field team personnel considering the hostile action events.

Radiation surveys were taken at assigned locations and the field team director requested air samples at locations that showed greater than two times a normal background radiation level. When surveys and air samples were complete, the field team director instructed teams to move to low background locations, purge iodine air sample media, then return to the mobile laboratory to transfer sample media for analysis. Ambient radiation measurements were inputted to the incident management software program that could be viewed by designated personnel.

The field team director immediately informed the operations officer of field survey measurements for use by dose assessment personnel. Field survey data was compared to projected dose assessments. The field team located at the plume centerline reported higher than anticipated radiation measurements. The operations officer and field team director questioned the variance and worked to resolve the discrepancy. The field team directors explained how they would adjust sampling plans as data results dictated. It was noted by the

field team director that the new facility had a different layout and they would work on how to best share field team information with licensee field team management personnel.

The field team director requested field team dosimetry readings to track their radiation exposure and ensured that the field teams were within administrative radiation exposure limits. The operations officer was able to explain the process for approving a worker to exceed their administrative radiation exposure limit. He also determined that potassium iodine ingestion was not warranted for the field team personnel based on the source term, low level of radioactive iodine in the spent fuel, and dose projections.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 4.1.

3.3.2.3 Bureau of Radiation Control – Dose Assessment

Situational Assessment Capability Summary:

The Florida Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control personnel demonstrated the ability to assess radiological, meteorological, and plant conditions in response to a hostile action-based radiological incident at Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. Team members responded promptly when notified of the Site Area Emergency, staffing necessary positions at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Operations Facility.

The dose assessment team brought the necessary equipment and reference materials to the facility. Laptop computers were loaded with the current version of dose projection software. The state dose assessment team worked closely with utility dose assessors as they were in the same room. There was a large, computerized screen with plant parameters and meteorological data in the dose assessment room. The utility dose assessors provided the state dose assessors with copies of their dose projections for each run. The emergency operations facility staff provided frequent briefings for the participants and extra briefings for state and county personnel.

The dose assessment team gathered the information for changing plant conditions to properly assess the radiological release. The radiological release was a result of a hostile action in the spent fuel pool building, with the gaseous effluent monitored through the spent fuel pool ventilation system. The dose projection program used by the state did not allow for modelling through the spent fuel pool ventilation system. The dose assessment team obtained specific information about the irradiated fuel from the utility, performed dose projections, and consulted frequently with the utility dose assessors. The state dose assessment team provided the dose projection results to the operations officer to aid in decision-making.

The dose assessment results for both the utility and the state were less than protective action guidelines. Therefore, the state dose projections supported the utility protective action recommendations, county protective action decisions for evacuation based on plant status, and the potassium iodide decision-making process. The Bureau of Radiation Control personnel were not responsible for precautionary protective actions or evacuation decisions for the general public. Based on dose projections less than protective action guidelines for child thyroid committed dose, the operations officer determined that there was no need for ingestion of potassium iodide by the general public or emergency workers. The potassium iodide decision to not authorize ingestion was transmitted verbally to state and county representatives. While the exercise was terminated prior to field team air sample

comparisons with dose projections, the dose assessment team demonstrated this capability after exercise termination to ensure that this objective was met.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.3, 1.4, 4.5.

3.3.2.4 Bureau of Radiation Control – Radiological Laboratory

Environmental Response Health & Safety Capability Summary:

During the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant hostile action-based exercise, the Florida Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control mobile emergency radiological laboratory personnel demonstrated efficient receipt, preparation, and analysis of field samples. Florida Bureau of Radiation Control personnel staffed all required functions at the mobile emergency radiological laboratory site located at the Princeton Substation in Homestead, Florida. The mobile laboratory, related equipment, and personnel were prepositioned in accordance with the extent-of-play agreement. Alert, notification, and mobilization were evaluated by interview, and in accordance with Bureau of Radiation Control procedures.

The mobile laboratory was adequately equipped for the assigned function to receive, prepare, and analyze field samples. The setup included a hot line for sample receipt, a vehicle to prepare samples for analysis, and the mobile laboratory to conduct gamma spectral analyses of prepared samples. The laboratory supervisor prepared one smear sample and one air sample with particulate and iodine cartridge filters. These sample were processed sample receipt, sample preparation, and sample analysis. Chain of custody paperwork for each sample was effectively utilized throughout the process. Equipment included contamination monitoring equipment, dose rate devices, portal monitors, gamma spectrometry systems, and an alpha/beta proportional counter. All equipment was within current calibration dates and was successfully operationally checked. There were ample stores of contamination monitors and dose rate devices available as backup equipment, as needed. Contamination control practices were used during all phases of sample processing to minimize the spread of radioactive contamination or cross-contamination of samples.

The mobile emergency radiological laboratory supervisor used a procedural checklist to provide a comprehensive briefing for laboratory staff and field monitoring team members. The briefing included plant status, emergency classification level, radiological release status, and meteorological conditions. In addition, the supervisor explained radiation exposure control and associated limits, contamination control measures, potassium iodide usage and related limits and precautions, communications systems, field monitoring practices and reporting, general safety precautions, and initial dispatch locations for three field teams.

Communications checks with primary and backup systems were successfully conducted with the field teams prior to their departure. Communications were consistently clear throughout the exercise using the primary handheld radio system. Cellular telephones and satellite radios were available as backups, as needed.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 2.2, 3.1, 4.4.

3.3.2.5 Bureau of Radiation Control – Field Monitoring Team

Environmental Response Health & Safety Capability Summary:

Personnel from the Florida Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control demonstrated the ability to mobilize in an effective manner, control radiological exposure to emergency workers, communicate effectively, and sample and measure a radiological plume associated with an incident at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. There were two field teams evaluated which were deployed from the Princeton Substation staging area. An additional team was deployed for training purposes and was not evaluated.

The evaluated field teams were designated as field team one and field team two. Each field team consisted of two field operations specialists from the Florida Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control. Both teams were supplied with adequate equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, potassium iodide, and other supplies to support emergency sampling operations. The detail, ease, and efficiency of the distribution of equipment, equipment operability checks, and organization of supplies and equipment was exceptional. Radiation control personnel issued appropriate electronic dosimetry, potassium iodide, and procedures which demonstrated the proper management of radiological exposure to emergency workers. Emergency workers read their dosimeters every 30 minutes, recorded the readings, and reported them to the field team director. All dosimetry, survey instruments, and air samplers were within calibration dates. Additional resources would be arranged by field team management.

The teams were prepositioned at the staging area in accordance with the extent-of-play agreement; however, they explained their notification and mobilization protocols. The teams had three communications systems, which were successfully used to maintain communications with the field team director, and the mobile emergency radiological laboratory supervisor. Field team personnel were equipped with 800-megahertz hand-held radios, cellular telephones, and satellite radio/phones. Repeat communication by three-way were verified. All three systems were demonstrated with no issues.

The mobile emergency radiological laboratory supervisor provided a briefing to the teams before they deployed. The briefing provided meteorological conditions, general safety precautions, radiation exposure limits, communications, personal protective equipment, and monitoring assignments. The teams were told that there was a hostile action event, but the briefing did not address the safety and security of the monitoring areas where the teams were deployed.

The teams were deployed to predetermined sampling locations based on the wind direction. Although potassium iodine was not recommended, they were able to describe the implementation, if necessary. Upon arrival, both field teams took ambient radiation measurements and recorded the results. When the plume was identified, radioiodine and particulate air samples were collected in accordance with procedures. Field team two was assigned to a location about four miles from the power plant near the centerline of the plume, and field team one was located four miles away at an off-centerline location. Ambient measurements were taken at the beginning, mid-point, and end of the air sampling collection period to verify that the sample was taken in the plume. All monitoring results were transmitted to the field team director via radio and incident management software.

There was a slight delay in moving to an area of low background radiation because both teams were expecting instruction to take a surface smear sample as required in their procedure. Instead of taking the smear sample, they waited for instruction from the field team director, thus delaying exit out of the plume area. The teams proceeded to the low background area to purge the samples before transporting them to the mobile laboratory for analysis. The samples were packaged, labeled correctly, and delivered to the sample receipt area using a proper chain of custody.

Both field teams demonstrated contamination control procedures throughout the exercise by changing gloves, checking hands for contamination, covering instruments, and separating clean and contaminated equipment. However, procedures instructed teams to place the air sample in the crate designated for contaminated materials. This could cause the sample bag to become unnecessarily contaminated.

Both teams returned to the staging area at the end of their mission. A sample receipt and monitoring and decontamination station was set up to receive the air samples for analysis by the mobile laboratory. A single team member was sent through decontamination and monitoring as part of the demonstration.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 2.2, 3.1, 4.2.

3.3.3 Risk Jurisdictions

3.3.3.1 Miami-Dade County – Emergency Operations Center

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

The Miami-Dade Emergency Operations Center personnel successfully demonstrated their ability to establish and maintain a coordinated operational process while collaborating with key stakeholders during the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant exercise.

At the start of the exercise, the documentation unit leader received a call on the utility's dedicated phone system, known as the hot ring down line, informing the emergency operations center of a Site Area Emergency at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. The planning section chief used a staffing roster to email principal and supporting emergency operations center staff and provided them a link to a virtual conference. The deputy director assumed command and simulated using the virtual meeting to inform, recall, and activate the emergency operations center. For this exercise a mass messaging system was used to alert, notify, and mobilize staff. The emergency operations center was declared operational once it was fully staffed. The deputy director used a conference bridge to connect with the utility emergency operations facility and Monroe County Emergency Management; this bridge remained opened throughout the exercise.

The primary alert and notification system used by the utility to notify offsite response organizations of a radiological incident was the hot ring down line. The state watch office received notification from the utility and notified the counties via the hot ring down line. All communications systems were functional and there were no communications systems failures identified during the exercise.

Following the Site Area Emergency declaration, the county notionally deployed radiological equipment and supply kits from a nearby warehouse to designated field locations. The kits included high and low range dosimeters, a thermoluminescent dosimeter, dosimeter charger, radiation exposure Record cards, a potassium iodide instruction card, and additional personal protective equipment. Adequate inventory of equipment and supplies, including calibration and expiration dates, were verified during the staff assistance visit conducted on December 13, 2022.

Following the General Emergency, the deputy director and planning section chief held a strategy meeting with liaisons from the Bureau of Radiation Control and Florida Power and Light to review the release data and protective action recommendation provided by the utility. The deputy director made the following protective action decision: shelter in place areas five, six, seven, eight, and nine; evacuate areas two, three, and four; and continue the marine exclusion out to the 10-miles. These decisions were coordinated with the Monroe County Emergency Management Director. Additionally, it was decided that potassium iodine ingestion was not necessary at that time. The decision-making process considered individuals with access and functional needs, including those at schools, scheduled public events, and individuals with transportation needs.

After receipt of each notification, the documentation unit leader used a blank emergency notification form to document the information shared via the hot ring down line. These forms were reviewed and cross referenced against the emergency notification forms received via electronic means for accuracy. Throughout the exercise, the operations section chief kept staff informed and promoted information sharing through frequent briefings.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1.

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

The public information section successfully coordinated timely press releases with other agencies, social media monitoring, vetted documents for accuracy, ensured consistent and complete content, and monitored the 3-1-1 Contact Center for current information to address rumors. The public information staff was pre-staged in another building in accordance with the extent of play agreement and responded when notified via call group over a mass notification system. The public information section reported through interview that they were operational by the receipt of the initial emergency notification.

Two of seven public information specialists-maintained communication links with the incident command post and the joint information center while three specialists developed and edited content for social media posts and created messages in English and Spanish languages. The remaining two specialists received the protective action decisions and managed the messaging process.

A public information specialist successfully demonstrated alert and notification twice in the Miami-Dade Fire Rescue 911 Center where the siren console is located. The specialist used the siren activation checklist in the two instances to conduct two silent siren tests. An exercise inject was input during the second siren demonstration indicating that siren #31 had failed. The public information specialist proceeded to the emergency operations center and notified the planning section chief, the public information officer, the Miami-Dade police,

the public safety branch director, and the operations section chief. Upon notifying the Miami-Dade police immediate action was taken to initiate route alerting for siren #31.

The initial message from Miami-Dade Emergency Operations Center to the public and news media identified the responsible organization and the official with authority for providing the alert and instructional message; the commercial nuclear plant was identified with a statement that an emergency exists; specific radiological emergency information was referenced via weblink; A stay tuned message was included in the closing statement asking that the affected and potentially affected population stay tuned for additional Information.

The emergency alert system process was accomplished in the public information work area which is a secluded breakout room off the Miami-Dade Emergency Operations Center main floor. The emergency alert system process occurred simultaneously with the siren activation conducted in the Miami-Dade Fire Rescue 911 Center and thus was not observed by this evaluator. An interview was conducted with the public information officer detailing the emergency alert system process. An emergency alert message template is selected and edited to reflect the protective action decision verbiage. The draft message was reviewed by the deputy incident commander and approved for public and news media release. Emergency alert system messages 2 and 3 were selected during the protective action recommendation process. Each message was faxed to the National Weather Service Miami for public broadcast. The message can also be emailed to the National Weather Service for transmittal to the public.

Over the course of the exercise, the documents created, reviewed, approved, and released (simulated) to the public and the news media were four social media posts, two protective action decisions, two emergency alert system messages, and one United State Coast Guard Marine Safety bulletin. The verbiage for a potassium iodide message (PAD-K1) was vetted by the Florida Department of Health Emergency Operations Center liaisons. Once vetted as accurate for the expected situation, the public information officer carried the draft copy into the planning room for consideration. After deliberation with the deputy incident commander, planning section chief, and the emergency operations facility, it was agreed upon to discard the draft script. No additional mention of potassium iodide occurred in the public information room prior to exercise termination.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 3.2, 3.3.

On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement Capability Summary:

The Miami-Dade Police Department officers validated, through interview, the capability to establish and staff traffic and access control points. The officers confirmed that Miami-Dade Police Department is the lead agency for emergency support function 16, Law Enforcement. There are 18 identified traffic control points requiring more than 114 officers from multiple agencies including three Miami-Dade Police Department districts (South, Kendall, and Midwest), two Florida Highway Patrol troops (E and K), Florida City Police Department, Cutler Bay Police Department, Homestead Police Department, and Palmetto Bay Police Department. At Site Area Emergency, law enforcement representatives at the emergency operations center coordinated the mobilization of traffic and access control point officers to retrieve emergency worker kits and report to designated staging locations. Following the General Emergency, officers were instructed to implement traffic control operations in support of the protective action decision to evacuate.

The Miami-Dade Police Department and supporting agencies utilized multiple redundant communication systems sufficient to support emergency operations. The officers described primary communications with supervisors via hand-held radios. Secondary and tertiary communications included cell phones (voice and text), email, and emergency information software platforms. Impediments were discussed and resolved as they occurred. If additional resources were needed, requests would be routed through the public safety branch within the county emergency operations center.

Emergency worker exposure control was discussed with Miami-Dade Police Department representatives at the emergency operations center. Law enforcement representatives described that emergency worker kits would be transported by Miami-Dade County Corrections & Rehabilitation officers to a designated location for distribution. Officers were knowledgeable of exposure reporting protocols and emergency worker monitoring and decontamination locations. In accordance with the extent-of-play agreement, dosimetry distribution and the associated just-in-time training was demonstrated at the incident command post. Inventory of supplies and equipment were verified during staff assistance visits on December 13, 2022.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 2.2, 3.1, 5.4.

3.3.3.2 Miami-Dade County – Incident Command Post

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

First responders successfully demonstrated the operational coordination core capability in response to a simulated hostile action-based incident at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. The response was a coordinated effort by multiple elements of the Miami-Dade Police Department and Florida Power and Light security personnel. The Monroe County Sherriff's Office, Miami-Dade Fire Rescue, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Florida Power and Light operations staff augmented the response.

Responders were pre-positioned in a staging area prior to the start of the exercise. Miami-Dade 911 dispatch received notification of the incident from plant security personnel. Dispatch quickly notified response forces and the near-site incident command post was established. The designated incident commander activated additional resources and supporting agencies through the shift commander. Staff began arriving and the incident command post was operational approximately 15 minutes following the initial notification.

The mobile incident command post had adequate resources to support and coordinate emergency response activities. Eight large screen televisions displayed maps and images to aid in situational awareness and tactical strategies. Multiple cellular telephones utilizing a variety of carriers provided redundant communications to incident command personnel. All were demonstrated to be receiving strong signals and functioning properly. Each agency representative was also equipped with at least one hand-held radio within the 800 megahertz or very high frequency broadcast range. These were used extensively throughout the exercise with no failures observed. Aviation and marine personnel stated that their assets did not have direct communications with the Turkey Point security assets. The marine personnel stated that they had the same issue with their watercraft. This was relayed to the Turkey Point security chief and an effective, temporary work around was established. Parties agreed that a permanent solution was a simple reprogramming of radio frequencies.

Effective strategies for establishing interoperable communications with outside agencies are in place and could be implemented if needed.

The Miami-Dade South District Commander, a lieutenant with the Miami-Dade Police Department, provided command and control of the incident command post. Two tactical operations chiefs, that were also lieutenants with the Miami-Dade Police Department, assisted the incident commander. The incident commander demonstrated overall command of the law enforcement response, making final decisions, and approving public messages, while the tactical operations chiefs compiled strategies and directed tactical operations at the scene of the incident. Briefings were not held on a consistent timeline, but information was continually shared with appropriate personnel throughout the exercise. Personnel within the incident command post understood the available resources and made requests for assistance as needed.

There were no precautionary or protective action decisions made within the incident command post; however, they were communicated through the Homeland Security Bureau representative who coordinated with a liaison in the emergency operations center. Decisions concerning entry tactics and protective equipment for responders were made by the operations chiefs and approved by the incident commander.

The safety officer and logistics staff managed emergency worker exposure, provided radiation protection equipment, and identified procedures to monitor responder's exposure and dose during the incident. The Incident command post representatives requested radiation protection equipment from the Miami-Dade County Emergency Operations Center. Upon approval of the request, department of corrections officers transported the equipment to the staging area. Miami-Dade County logistics staff and hazardous materials personnel were responsible for verifying sufficient quantities of equipment, zeroing direct reading dosimeters, and providing just-in-time training on the proper use and reporting of radiation protection equipment, The just-in-time training also included instructions for emergency worker monitoring and decontamination. One dosimetry kit was observed during the exercise which included one low-range self-reading dosimeter, one high-range self-reading dosimeter, one simulated permanent record dosimeter, and one instruction and radiation exposure record card. Potassium iodide was not distributed during the exercise; however, sufficient quantities of available potassium iodide were verified during a staff assistance visit December 13, 2022.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 2.2, 3.1.

3.3.3.3 Miami-Dade County – Route Alerting and Waterway Warning

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

Personnel with the Miami-Dade Department of Emergency Management, Miami-Dade Police Department, Homestead Police Department, and Florida City Police Department participated in an interview and subsequent demonstration to validate the capability to implement backup route alerting protocols during out-of-sequence activities on November 1, 2022. Officers demonstrated the capability to disseminate emergency information using their vehicle's public address system along a designated route within a reasonable time and in accordance with plans and procedures. All participating personnel were knowledgeable of agency responsibilities, resources, and route alerting procedures in response to siren failure during an incident at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant.

Personnel with the Miami-Dade Department of Emergency Management, Miami-Dade Police Department- Marine Patrol, United States National Park Service, United States Coast Guard, and Florida Fish and Wildlife Commission participated in an interview and subsequent demonstration to validate the capability to implement waterway warning protocols during out-of-sequence activities on November 2, 2022. A National Park Ranger demonstrated the capability to navigate designated grid coordinates by boat and provide emergency information to mariners in accordance with plans and procedures. All participating personnel were knowledgeable of agency responsibilities, resources, and waterway warning procedures in response to an incident at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 3.2.

3.3.3.4 Miami-Dade County – Schools

Critical Transportation Capability Summary:

On January 10, 2023, Miami-Dade Public School District principals or designees from 16 institutions participated in interviews to validate the district's ability to protect the health and safety of students and faculty during a radiological emergency at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. The principals or designees discussed protocols for notification, transportation, and maintaining the safety and accountability of students, including those with special medical needs. All participating principals and staff were knowledgeable of district plans and procedures for communication, coordination, and implementation of protective actions as directed by school district and emergency management officials.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.5.

3.3.3.5 Miami-Dade County – Medical Services Drill

Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services Capability Summary:

On December 13, 2022, Baptist Hospital, Miami-Dade County, Monroe County, the State of Florida, and Florida Power and Light personnel participated in a Medical Services Drill on the Baptist Hospital campus, 8900 North Kendall Drive, Miami, Florida 33176. Participating agencies successfully demonstrated the capability to transport, receive, and treat contaminated, injured individuals while managing radiological exposure and contamination control in response to a simulated radiological emergency at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. All participating personnel demonstrated an understanding of protocols, roles, and responsibilities. Teamwork and professionalism were displayed throughout the drill.

Patient Transport

The Miami-Dade Fire and Rescue crew successfully demonstrated the capability to transport a potentially radiologically contaminated and injured person. In accordance with the extent-of-play agreement, the medical services drill began at the designated patient transfer location on the Baptist Hospital campus. The scenario provided that a radiological emergency had occurred at the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, resulting in the declaration of a general emergency. Prior notifications and response were simulated but discussed through interview. The Miami-Dade Fire and Rescue Chief provided a mock safety briefing to the crew

that included an update of the ongoing situation, appropriate personal protective equipment, dosimetry usage and placement, exposure limits, and the protocols for reading, recording, and reporting exposure from the field.

Through controller inject, the lead paramedic received a simulated call from Miami-Dade Fire Rescue dispatch that a member of the public had sustained injuries requiring medical attention while boating in a potentially contaminated area. Given this information, the paramedics donned their universal precautions, which included disposable, latex gloves, trauma sleeves, and a face mask. Each crewmember was issued a direct reading dosimeter (0-200 millirem per hour) and a simulated permanent record dosimeter; one paramedic wore an electronic personal radiation detector. Instruments were inspected and verified to be current in calibration by affixed sticker.

At the scene paramedics prepared a gurney for receipt of the contaminated, injured patient. In accordance with the extent-of-play agreement, the patient was received already cocooned in blankets (simulated), but as a precautionary measure, the paramedics used heavy-duty trauma blankets to protect the patient and crew. The crew paid special attention to prevent cross-contamination as they secured and transported the patient. The lead paramedic provided patient information, including vitals, injuries, and radiological survey readings, as well as an estimated time of arrival, to the hospital via radio. During transport, the paramedics described patient care protocols, including reassessment of vitals, pain management, and, if necessary, providing fluids or medication intravenously. The crew did not come into direct contact with the patient and did not require any glove changes.

Upon arrival at the hospital, the rescue team transferred the injured patient to hospital staff, and provided them with the patient information, vitals, and contaminated areas. After patient transfer was complete, the outside radiation safety officer discussed protocols for surveying and decontaminating the ambulance, if necessary. Through additional interviews, Miami-Dade Fire and Rescue personnel displayed knowledge and understanding of emergency worker decontamination locations, doffing protocols, dosimetry management, and monitoring and decontamination procedures for emergency workers or equipment, as needed.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 2.2, 5.3.

Hospital

Baptist Hospital staff successfully demonstrated the capability to receive and treat contaminated, injured individuals while managing radiological exposure and contamination control in accordance with plans and procedures. Staff displayed good communications, teamwork, and understanding of roles, responsibilities, and radiological protocols.

Hospital staff demonstrated the ability to receive notification from emergency medical transport teams, record patient information, and successfully mobilize medical staff essential to the response. Communications occurred without any issues.

The hospital had sufficient space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to monitor, decontaminate, and provide medical services to contaminated, injured individuals. The radiation emergency area was previously setup in accordance with the extent-of-play agreement. The components of the radiation emergency area included directional signs, stanchions, barriers, and radiation protective measures adequate to provide a high level of

contamination avoidance to the emergency workers. Security provided access control into the radiation control area.

The radiation safety officer properly setup and issued direct reading dosimeters to radiation emergency area staff. Permanent record dosimeters were simulated for all staff except those issued to radiation department employees for daily operations and duties. There was confusion about who would provide the additional permanent record dosimeters for remaining radiation emergency area staff, if required.

A safety briefing was provided to all drill participants. Donning of personal protective equipment occurred as outlined in the plan. Detailed signage and job aides were available to medical staff for reference in the ambulance bay. The staff were well trained on dosimetry usage and placement. The radiation safety officer survey kept detailed records of dosimetry issuance, the initial exposure readings, and recurring exposure readings every 30 minutes during the response by medical personnel. The radiation safety officer and both radiation technicians were issued survey meters. Operational checks were successfully completed with a check source and range of readings. All three survey meters were recently calibrated. Operators demonstrated appropriate survey meter speed and distance throughout the drill.

Receipt of each ambulance and the patient status briefing was accomplished from the emergency medical technicians to the radiation emergency area staff. The patient transfer process lends to cross contamination as it does not restrict movement within the hot zone. There was no clear demarcation point/line to prevent emergency medical technicians from potentially spreading contamination up to the decontamination room door. Creation of a demarcation line to restrict emergency medical technicians to the area closest to the ambulance and restrict radiation emergency area staff closest to the decontamination room would create a middle point (patient transfer point) for the patient transfer and prevent either group to cross paths. In the end, each patient was successfully transferred from the emergency medical technicians to the radiation emergency area staff.

Medical staff successfully triaged two patients and demonstrated precautions to minimize exposure to contamination. Throughout the drill, frequent glove changes by all members of the medical team were observed, whether they were in direct contact with the patient or not. Staff demonstrated that the medical needs of the patients took precedence over monitoring and decontamination. Medical personnel successfully mitigated all radiological contamination found on the patients through irrigation and the proper use of gauze. Once the patients' contamination levels were verified by a full-body scan to be below 300 counts per minute, the medical staff prepared the decontamination room for additional patients.

One radiation emergency area team member successfully demonstrated the safe removal of personal protective equipment, while the decontamination leader read the doffing instructions. Prior to exiting the area, a Florida Power and Light Radiation Protection Specialist performed a full-body survey of the individual without fault.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 2.2, 5.3.

3.3.3.6 Monroe County – Emergency Operations Center

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

Monroe County Emergency Operations Center staff successfully demonstrated the capability to coordinate operations to protect the general public in response to a hostile action-based radiological emergency at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant.

The Monroe County Emergency Operations Center, located at the Tavernier Fire Station was well equipped for radiological emergency response. The facility had sufficient emergency planning zone maps, displays, and plant diagrams. Emergency classifications levels and activity logs were posted and available to staff for reference. County plans and procedures, emergency alert level references, and staff checklists were also available and used during the exercise. Emergency support staff had enough office space to perform their duties. Redundant communications capabilities were available and demonstrated. The plant-provided notification system was not functional during the exercise; however, a backup system was used and was fully operational.

The state watch office alerted the Monroe County Sheriff's Office 911 Dispatch of a hostile action-based radiological emergency at the plant over the utility's dedicated notification system. The officer on duty verified the initial notification. Subsequent notifications occurred in the same manner throughout the exercise. After receiving the initial emergency declaration of a Site Area Emergency, the 911 dispatcher notified the Monroe County Senior Radiological Emergency Preparedness Planner, key emergency operations center staff, and county officials to report to the county emergency operations center. The county dispatch office used a call-down checklist for notifications. The emergency operations center was declared fully activated at 8:26 a.m. No additional resources were requested during the exercise; however, the county was prepared to initiate and log requests as required.

The Monroe County Emergency Management Director conducted protective action decision-making at the utility's emergency operations facility. Resource support and implementation of protective action decisions were coordinated and managed by the county emergency operations center staff. The emergency preparedness planner ensured that the emergency operations center staff maintained situational awareness by conducting update briefs after receipt of each emergency notification form and change in emergency classification level. The briefings included brief-backs from the staff, explanations of emergency alert levels, and technical briefings from the utility's liaison as required. Coordinated protective action decisions between the director and the emergency preparedness planner were conducted via cell phone, while external coordination of protective action decisions occurred at the emergency operations center and on the scheduled state and county conference calls.

The county leadership took precautionary actions and instructed the general public in area ten to "monitor and prepare." This precautionary action was taken because the ongoing release did not pose a direct threat to the public in area ten. This action was applicable to individuals with access and functional needs as well as students and teaching staff conducting activities within the area. A school district official was available in the emergency operations center to coordinate implementation or precautionary or protective action decisions. Coordination for the precautionary action was made between the county emergency management leadership in the emergency operations center and the emergency operations facility. Coordination for the potassium iodide decision was made at the emergency operations facility through coordination with the Bureau of Radiation Control and the Monroe County Department of Health; however, the decision did not directly affect the

Monroe County general public or emergency workers. No other precautionary or protective actions were made for Monroe County residents. If required, potassium iodide for the public would be issued at the county reception center. Potassium iodide, dosimetry, and survey equipment quantities and locations were verified during a staff assistance visit on December 1, 2022.

Monroe County Emergency Management staff managed inventory and distribution of emergency worker radiological equipment, supplies, potassium iodide, and related forms. The county can request additional quantities through the Bureau of Radiation Control or other risk and host counties in the state. The emergency preparedness planner briefed the emergency operations center staff on emergency worker exposure control, specifically emergency worker exposure limits, reporting requirements, and authorities for increased responder exposure and potassium iodide ingestion.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1.

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

The Monroe County Public Information Officers successfully demonstrated the capability to alert and notify the public and provide timely information during a radiological emergency at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. The Monroe County Public Information Officer in the joint information center communicated via email with the public information officer liaison in the Monroe County Emergency Operations Center. Public information messages were coordinated in the emergency operations facility by the Monroe County Public Information Officer, the Monroe County Emergency Management Director, and Miami-Dade County representatives.

Upon receiving approved messages from the joint information center, the liaison entered the approved messages into a web-based alert and notification system for distribution to the public. The messages were provided in English and Spanish. The public information officer liaison described other social media platforms and radio stations the county uses to distribute information to the public, given the high transient population.

Miami-Dade County was the lead agency for siren activation. Any siren failures in Monroe County would be identified on the siren feedback report received by Miami-Dade County. Miami-Dade would report failures to Monroe County and prompt backup route alerting in the area(s) identified. Additionally, the community of Ocean Reef in Monroe County does not have any audible sirens. The Monroe County Radiological Emergency Preparedness Senior Planner explained via interview that in the event of a protective action impacting Ocean Reef, route alerting would be the primary means of disseminating the emergency message. Monroe County would contact Ocean Reef Public Safety to prompt route alerting. If Ocean Reef Public Safety required assistance, they would request support from Monroe County.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 3.2, 3.3.

On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement Capability Summary:

The Monroe County Sheriff's Office successfully demonstrated the capability to manage emergency worker exposure control, access reliable communications systems, and establish traffic control points in response to a radiological emergency at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. Through an interview, a Monroe County Sheriff's Office deputy explained that sufficient staff was available to ensure traffic control for affected areas. Traffic control points are pre-designated in plans. If implemented, the emergency operations center representative would contact the sheriff's office to mobilize staff for traffic control management.

A sheriff's office deputy would retrieve and distribute emergency worker kits from the Tavernier Fire Station and provide briefings to emergency workers assigned to traffic control points. The sheriff's office deputy was knowledgeable in operating low-range and high-range dosimeters supplied in the kit, the call-in and turn-back values for emergency workers and completing the exposure card. Additionally, the deputy explained that the potassium iodide ingestion decision would be communicated to emergency workers through the sheriff's office. Calibration and inventory of direct reading dosimeters and permanent record dosimeters and potassium iodide were verified during a previous staff assistance visit.

The primary means of communication for the Monroe County Sheriff's Office is handheld radio, and the backup is the cell phone. Additional radio capabilities are available in Sheriff's Office vehicles. Further, the deputy explained that vehicles contain all equipment needed to manage traffic control points. Other resources could be requested from the Department of Transportation or the fire department.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 2.2, 3.1, 5.4.

3.3.3.7 Monroe County – Route Alerting

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

Ocean Reef Public Safety personnel successfully demonstrated route alerting capabilities for the Ocean Reef community in North Key Largo, Florida during out-of-sequence activities on November 30, 2022. Public Safety staff discussed their process of receiving an Emergency Alert System message from Monroe County, printing and disseminating the information to assigned personnel, and delivering the message to the residents, workers, and visitors on Ocean Reef property. Officers demonstrated notifications could be provided along designated routes within a reasonable time and in accordance with plans and procedures.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 3.2.

3.3.3.8 Monroe County – Medical Services Drill

Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services Capability Summary:

Patient Transport

Ocean Reef Public Safety Emergency Medical Service's personnel successfully demonstrated their ability to transport a contaminated, injured individual during a radiological emergency at the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant. The Ocean Reef crew consisted of two paramedics and one

ambulance. They had sufficient dosimetry, potassium iodide, communications capabilities, personal protective equipment, and other supplies to respond to, assess, and transport a potentially contaminated, injured patient in accordance with written plans and procedures.

Ocean Reef Public Safety paramedics were pre-staged at a designated location on the Baptist Hospital campus in accordance with the extent-of-play agreement and received a simulated notification of a contaminated and injured individual from Monroe County Emergency Management 911 Dispatch via controller inject. They received a thorough situational, safety, and radiological briefing prior to responding to the emergency. Through interview, paramedics demonstrated their knowledge and training concerning the use and ingestion of potassium iodide, contamination control, exposure limits, call-back limits, and dosimetry reading and reporting requirements. The paramedics also demonstrated their ability to communicate with each other and with the hospital emergency room staff, providing patient vitals and other critical information as needed. The paramedics were knowledgeable of reception center and emergency worker decontamination locations, as well as protocols for monitoring and decontaminating themselves and equipment, as necessary. Ocean Reef Public Safety Emergency Medical Service's paramedics acted in a professional manner and demonstrated their thorough knowledge of applicable radiological plans and procedures.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 2.2 and 5.3.

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Section 4: Conclusion

Response organizations from the state of Florida and the counties of Miami-Dade and Monroe demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and their ability to implement them to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of an emergency involving the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. This exercise included a hostile action-based scenario and rapidly degrading plant conditions. It challenged the participants and exercised the integration of the incident command post and associated law enforcement component into the decision-making process. Participating agencies coordinated effectively and demonstrated an impressive, unified response throughout the exercise and associated activities.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated and made this exercise successful, and their commitment to protect the health and safety of the public in the vicinity of the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. Participating agencies used this exercise and associated out of sequence activities to validate plans and enhance their current level of preparedness. It was apparent that a great deal of training and practice was conducted by the offsite response organizations to successfully demonstrate their ability to protect public. The professionalism and teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all phases of the biennial exercise planning and implementation process.

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Appendix A: Exercise Timeline

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Time Utility Declared		Time That Notification Was Received or Action Was Taken						
			SEOC	Decision Makers/ AHIMT	Dose/ FTM	JIC*	Miami-Dade County	Incident Command Post	Monroe County
Unusual Event	N/A		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Alert	N/A		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Site Area Emergency	7:53 a.m.		7:56 a.m.	7:56 a.m./ 8:08 a.m.	8:14 a.m.	N/A	7:56 a.m.	8:03 a.m.	7:56 a.m.
General Emergency	10:20 a.m.		10:34 a.m.	10:34 a.m./ 10:22 a.m.	10:22 a.m.	10:28 a.m.	10:34 a.m.	10:25 a.m.	10:34 a.m.
Simulated Rad. Release Started	10:34 a.m.		10:34 a.m.	10:34 a.m.	10:43 a.m.	11:01 a.m.	10:34 a.m.	10:25 a.m.	10:34 a.m.
Simulated Rad. Release Ended	Ongoing		Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing
Facility Declared Operational	8:40 a.m.		8:40 a.m.	8:40 a.m./ 9:00 a.m.	8:30 a.m./ 9:24 a.m.	9:02 a.m.	8:30 a.m.	8:03 a.m.	8:26 a.m.
State of Emergency Declared	State		8:45 a.m.	8:45 a.m.	N/A	10:49 a.m.	N/A	N/A	8:45 a.m.
	Local	Miami-Dade	9:00 a.m.	8:40 a.m.	N/A	N/A	8:29 a.m.	9:29 a.m.	N/A
		Monroe				10:47 a.m.	N/A	N/A	9:14 a.m.
End Exercise	11:45 a.m.		11:48 a.m.	11:45 a.m.	12:00 p.m.	11:46 a.m.	11:47 a.m.	11:40 a.m.	11:44 a.m.
Precautionary Actions: Monitor and Prepare/Stay Tuned **Marine exclusionary			N/A	8:31 a.m.	N/A	10:48 a.m.	8:40 a.m.	8:31 a.m.	8:50 a.m.
							**9:20 a.m.		**9:20 a.m.
Protective Action Decision 1: Shelter: 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 Evacuation: 2, 3, 4			11:21 a.m.	11:21 a.m.	N/A	N/A	11:21 a.m.	11:21 a.m.	11:21 a.m.
1st Siren Activation/Route Alerting			8:42 a.m.	8:42 a.m.	N/A		8:42 a.m.	N/A	8:42 a.m.
1st EAS Message			8:40 a.m.	8:40 a.m.	N/A		8:40 a.m.	N/A	8:42 a.m.
2nd Siren Activation			11:27 a.m.	11:27 a.m.	N/A		11:27 a.m.	N/A	11:27 a.m.
2nd EAS Message:			11:25 a.m.	11:25 a.m.	N/A		11:25 a.m.	N/A	11:25 a.m.
KI Administration Decision: Decision to not administer KI			11:17 a.m.	11:17 a.m.	11:08 a.m.	N/A	11:17 a.m.	N/A	11:17 a.m.

*Denotes the time in which a decision was messaged from the joint information center.

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Appendix B: Evaluator Assignments

Location/Venue	Evaluation Team	Core Capability
State Emergency Operations Center	Robert Nash James Young	Operational Coordination
Emergency Operations Facility – Decision Makers	Vince Kalson Gerald McLemore	Operational Coordination
Emergency Operations Facility – Joint Operations	John Pelchat	Situational Assessment
Emergency Operations Facility – All Hazard Incident Management Team	DeShun Lowery Nathan Nienhius	Operational Coordination
Emergency Operations Facility – Joint Information Center	Erica Houghton Farrah Stewart P.J. Nied	Public Information and Warning
Bureau of Radiation Control – FTM	Marcy Campbell Debbie Cummings	Environmental Response Health & Safety
Bureau of Radiation Control – Dose	Jill Leatherman	Situational Assessment
Bureau of Radiation Control – Lab	Brad McRee	Environmental Response Health & Safety
Bureau of Radiation Control – Field Team 1/2	Bart Ray Deb Blunt	Environmental Response Health & Safety
Miami-Dade County – EOC	Gene Taylor Matt Webb George Odom	Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning
Miami-Dade County –Traffic Control Points	Matt Webb	On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement
Miami-Dade County – Incident Command Post	Matt Bradley Irvin Gibson Mark Dalton	Operational Coordination
Miami-Dade County – Route Alerting and Waterway Warning	Nathan Nienhius Gerald McLemore Vince Kalson	Public Information and Warning
Miami-Dade County – Schools	Nathan Nienhius Gerald McLemore	Critical Transportation
Monroe County – EOC	Quintin Ivy Randi Hendrix	Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning
Monroe County – EOC: Traffic Control Points	Randi Hendrix	On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement
Monroe County –Route Alerting and Waterway Warning	Nathan Nienhius Gerald McLemore Vince Kalson	Public Information and Warning

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Appendix C: Exercise Participants

Participating Organizations
State of Florida
Florida Commission on Community Service
Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services
Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation
Florida Department of Corrections
Florida Department of Economic Opportunity
Florida Department of Environmental Protection
Florida Department of Financial Services/Fire Marshall
Florida Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control
Florida Department of Law Enforcement
Florida Department of Management Services
Florida Department of Revenue
Florida Department of Transportation
Florida Digital Service
Florida Division of Emergency Management
Florida Fish and Wildlife Commission
Florida Highway Patrol
Florida National Guard
Florida Public Service Commission
Miami-Dade County
Florida City Police Department
Homestead Police Department
Miami-Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation

Participating Organizations
Miami-Dade County Public Schools Police
Miami-Dade Emergency Medical Services
Miami-Dade Fire Rescue
Miami-Dade Health Department
Miami-Dade County Department of Emergency Management
Miami-Dade Parks Service
Miami-Dade Police Department
Miami-Dade Public Schools
Miami-Dade Public Works
Miami-Dade Transit
Miami-Dade Water and Sewer
Monroe County
Florida Department of Health in Monroe County
Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority
Islamorada Fire Rescue
Key Largo Emergency Medical Services
Key Largo Fire Department
Key Largo Wastewater Treatment District
Monroe County Board of County Commissioners
Monroe County Department of Health
Monroe County Emergency Management
Monroe County Fire Rescue
Monroe County School District
Monroe County Sheriff's Office

Participating Organizations
Ocean Reef Community Association Public Safety
Private Sector
American Red Cross
Baptist Health Mariners Hospital
Baptist Hospital of Miami
Florida Power and Light
Greater Miami Convention and Visitors Bureau
Salvation Army
Federal
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service
United States Coast Guard
United States Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region 4
United States National Park Service
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II

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Appendix D: Extent of Play Agreement

Florida Department of Emergency Management

Core Capability: Operational Coordination

Definition: Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

Objective 1: Emergency Operations Management

Capability Target 1.1: Mobilization

Intent: The capability to alert, notify, and mobilize offsite response organizations to staff facilities in support of emergency operations. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 185

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Florida Division of Emergency Management (FDEM) at State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) & State All-Hazards Incident Management Team (AHIMT)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Alert, notify, and mobilize key personnel, to include a 24-hour staffing roster, and activate facilities in a timely manner.	SEOC: No Exception AHIMT: AHIMT will pre-stage in Miami-Dade County. Upon an alert, the AHIMT will be enroute to the Emergency Operations facility located at 10705 Quail Roost Dr. Cutler Bay, Florida.
Receive and verify notifications.	SEOC: No exception AHIMT: No exception
Identify and request additional resources, as needed.	SEOC: No exception AHIMT: No exception
Determine a facility is operational.	SEOC: No exception AHIMT: No exception

Capability Target 1.2: Direction and Control
Intent: The capability to provide overall direction and control of response efforts, commensurate with the responsibilities of leadership, as detailed in plans/procedures. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 186

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.1.c, A.2, A.3, A.5, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, D.4, E.1, H.6, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: FDEM & AHIMT

Assessment	Extent of Play
Support protective action decision-making.	SEOC: No exception AHIMT: No exception
Conduct briefings in a timely manner.	SEOC: No exception AHIMT: No exception
Maintain situational awareness.	SEOC: No exception AHIMT: No exception
Coordinate response activities with other organizations.	SEOC: No exception AHIMT: No exception
Obtain resources to support emergency operations.	SEOC: No exception AHIMT: No exception
Provide and maintain adequate facilities and equipment to support the emergency response.	SEOC: No exception AHIMT: The AHIMT will have sufficient equipment to support their mission. Dosimetry and potassium iodide have been made available for inspection at 2555 Shumard Oak Blvd on the 3rd floor and will not be transported. The REP Technical Specialist at the FPL Emergency Operations Facility will provide information related to the distribution of dosimeters and potassium iodide if asked.

Capability Target 1.3: Protective Action Recommendations:

Intent: The capability to use dose assessment and field data, compare this data to the PAGs, and choose among a range of protective actions those most appropriate in a given emergency. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 187

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (D.4, J.7, J.8, J.8.b, J.9, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: AHIMT

Assessment	Extent of Play
PLUME: Select and implement pre-planned precautionary protective actions.	The AHIMT will participate in a coordination role only with counties implementing pre-planned precautionary protective actions based on Licensee and Bureau of Radiation Control protective action recommendations and in accordance with the State Emergency Radiological Plan.
Utilize the methodology in plans/procedures to select among a range of protective actions most	The AHIMT will participate in a coordination role only with counties selecting and implementing

Assessment	Extent of Play
appropriate in a given emergency. This could also include the use of preplanned precautionary protective actions contained in plans/procedures.	protective actions based on Licensee and Bureau of Radiation Control protective action recommendations and in accordance with the State Emergency Radiological Plan.
Develop PARs.	The AHIMT will participate in the development of initial and subsequent protective action recommendations (state coordination role only with counties implementing) based on Licensee and Bureau of Radiation Control protective action recommendations and in accordance with the State Emergency Radiological Plan.
Transmit PARs in a timely manner.	The AHIMT will provide a coordination role only with counties implementing PARs based on Licensee and Bureau of Radiation Control protective action recommendations and in accordance with the State Emergency Radiological Plan.
POST-PLUME: Assess radiological consequences and provide appropriate PARs for the ingestion exposure pathway.	The AHIMT will participate in the development of initial and subsequent protective action recommendations (state coordination role only with counties implementing) based on Licensee and Bureau of Radiation Control protective action recommendations and in accordance with the State Emergency Radiological Plan.

Capability Target 1.4: Protective Action Decisions for the Plume Phase

Intent: The capability to utilize appropriate factors and necessary coordination in the decision-making process used to make protective action decisions for the public. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 188

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (D.1.b, D.4, J.6, J.7, J.8, J.8.b, J.10, J.10.a, J.10.b, J.11.c-g, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: FDEM & AHIMT

Assessment	Extent of Play
Coordinate and make PADs for members of the general public.	SEOC: Transfer of Command and Control will be demonstrated at the SEOC via conference call with the onsite AHIMT at FPL's EOF facility in Cutler Bay in accordance with the State Radiological Emergency Plan. AHIMT: The AHIMT will have a coordination role only with OROs in making PADs for members of the general public.
Coordinate and make PADs for those with access and functional needs.	SEOC: Transfer of Command and Control will be demonstrated at the SEOC via conference call with the onsite AHIMT at FPL's EOF facility in Cutler Bay in accordance with the State Radiological Emergency Plan. AHIMT: The AHIMT will have a coordination role only with OROs in making PADs for members of the general public.
Coordinate and make PADs for students at schools.	SEOC: Transfer of Command and Control will be demonstrated at the SEOC via conference call with the onsite AHIMT at FPL's EOF facility in Cutler Bay in accordance with the State Radiological Emergency Plan. AHIMT: The AHIMT will have a coordination role only with OROs in making PADs for members of the general public.
Coordinate and make subsequent or alternate PADs.	SEOC: Transfer of Command and Control will be demonstrated at the SEOC via conference call with the onsite AHIMT at FPL's EOF facility in Cutler Bay in accordance with the State Radiological Emergency Plan. AHIMT: The AHIMT will have a coordination role only with OROs in making PADs for members of the general public.
Coordinate and make decisions on the administration of KI (where applicable) for the public and institutionalized members of the population.	SEOC: Transfer of Command and Control will be demonstrated at the SEOC via conference call with the onsite AHIMT at FPL's EOF facility in Cutler Bay in accordance with the State Radiological Emergency Plan. AHIMT: The AHIMT will have a coordination role only with OROs in making PADs for members of the general public.

Capability Target 1.5: Protective Action Decision Implementation for the Plume Phase

Intent: The capability to implement precautionary protective action and/or PADs, including evacuation and/or sheltering, for all populations within the plume and ingestion exposure pathway EPZs. The populations include those with access and functional needs, students, and institutionalized individuals. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 189

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.4, C.2.a, G.1, J.11, J.11.a, J.11.b, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.g, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: FDEM & AHIMT

Assessment	Extent of Play
Implement PADs, ensuring communication and coordination with all appropriate jurisdictions.	SEOC: The State will participate in a coordination role only with counties implementing protective actions in accordance with the State Emergency Radiological Plan. AHIMT: The AHIMT will participate in a coordination role only with counties implementing protective actions in accordance with the State Emergency Radiological Plan.
Assist those with access and functional needs during the implementation of PADs.	SEOC: The State will participate in a coordination role only with counties implementing protective actions in accordance with the State Emergency Radiological Plan. AHIMT: The AHIMT will participate in a coordination role only with counties implementing protective actions in accordance with the State Emergency Radiological Plan.
Communicate, coordinate, and implement protective actions for schools.	SEOC: The State will participate in a coordination role only with counties implementing protective actions in accordance with the State Emergency Radiological Plan. AHIMT: The AHIMT will participate in a coordination role only with counties implementing protective actions in accordance with the State Emergency Radiological Plan.
Communicate with transportation officials.	SEOC: The State will participate in a coordination role only with counties implementing protective actions in accordance with the State Emergency Radiological Plan. AHIMT: The AHIMT will participate in a coordination role only with counties implementing protective actions in accordance with the State Emergency Radiological Plan.

Assessment	Extent of Play
Identify evacuation routes for the general public.	SEOC: The State will participate in a coordination role only with counties implementing protective actions in accordance with the State Emergency Radiological Plan. AHIMT: The AHIMT will participate in a coordination role only with counties implementing protective actions in accordance with the State Emergency Radiological Plan.
Make KI available to both institutionalized persons and the general public, in accordance with plans and procedures.	SEOC: The State will participate in a coordination role only with counties implementing protective actions in accordance with the State Emergency Radiological Plan. AHIMT: The AHIMT will participate in a coordination role only with counties implementing protective actions in accordance with the State Emergency Radiological Plan.

Capability Target 3.1: Communications

Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 200

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: FDEM & AHIMT

Assessment	Extent of Play
Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.	SEOC: No exception AHIMT: No exception
Maintain periodic test results and corrective actions on a real time basis.	SEOC: No Exception AHIMT: N/A
Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.	SEOC: No exception AHIMT: No exception
Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.	SEOC: No exception AHIMT: N/A
Identify and address any failures of the systems.	SEOC: No exception AHIMT: N/A

Assessment	Extent of Play
Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., "content check").	SEOC: No exception AHIMT: No exception

Core Capability: Public Information and Warning

Definition: Deliver coordination, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

Capability Target 1.1: Mobilization

Intent: The capability to alert, notify, and mobilize OROs to staff facilities in support of emergency operations. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 185

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: FDEM and/or AHIMT representatives in JIC/JIS

Assessment	Extent of Play
Alert, notify, and mobilize key personnel, to include a 24-hour staffing roster, and activate facilities in a timely manner.	No exception
Receive and verify notifications.	No exception
Identify and request additional resources, as needed.	No exception
Determine a facility is operational.	No exception

Capability Target 3.1: Communications

Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 200

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: FDEM and/or AHIMT representatives in JIC/JIS

Assessment	Extent of Play
Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.	No exception

Assessment	Extent of Play
Maintain periodic test results and corrective actions on a real time basis.	No exception
Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.	No exception
Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.	No exception
Identify and address any failures of the systems.	No exception
Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., "content check").	No exception

Capability Target 3.2: Alert and Notification of the Public

Intent: The capability to provide instructions to the public. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 201

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.2, E.4, E.5, F.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: FDEM and/or AHIMT representatives in JIC/JIS

Assessment	Extent of Play
<u>ALERT AND NOTIFICATION SYSTEM:</u> Sequentially provide an alert signal followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas.	No exception
Alert and notify the general public.	No exception
Identify and address any failures of the system(s) or portion of a system(s).	No exception
Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at an agreed-upon location.	No exception
<u>EAS:</u> Identify the process to activate the EAS.	No exception
Ensure that updated emergency information is disseminated in a timely manner.	No exception
Ensure that current emergency information is repeated at pre-established intervals.	No exception

Assessment	Extent of Play
<u>EAS/NWS STATION:</u> Identify the process to activate the EAS, to include the process to receive and then broadcast updated information/messages and verification of the message, if applicable.	No exception
Broadcast the message on a 24-hour basis.	No exception
<u>ROUTE/ALTERNATE ALERTING:</u> Complete route alerting, whether because of failure for system/portion of a system or for exception areas, as needed to demonstrate all routes are capable of being run in allotted time. Emphasis on the most challenging routes and demonstration of these routes will be varied from assessment activity to assessment activity. Challenging routes are Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual 203 defined as those that may be difficult to accomplish, such as those that are lengthy or with conditions (physical or otherwise) that may affect the speed and accuracy with which the route can be completed (e.g., traffic patterns and/or capacity, road conditions, etc.).	No exception

Capability Target 3.3: Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and News Media

Intent: The capability to disseminate emergency information and instructions to the public during all phases of an incident. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 203

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.2, E.4, E.5, G.1, G.2, G.3, G.3.a, G.4, G.5, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: FDEM and/or AHIMT representatives in JIC/JIS

Assessment	Extent of Play
<u>PLUME PHASE:</u> Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information in a timely manner.	No exception
Provide clear, concise, accessible messaging using plain language.	No exception
Messaging addresses appropriate cultural and linguistic considerations.	No exception

Assessment	Extent of Play
Ensure subsequent messaging is consistent with protective actions.	No exception
Update information as the incident progresses, to include validating previously identified protective areas and clearly identifying any new protective action areas, any information that is no longer valid, and any changes to previously provided information (e.g., rerouting of evacuation routes due to impediments, etc.).	No exception
Respond to media and public inquiries.	No exception

Florida Bureau of Radiation Control

Core Capability: Situational Assessment

Definition: Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

Capability Target 1.3: Protective Action Recommendations:

Intent: The capability to use dose assessment and field data, compare this data to the PAGs, and choose among a range of protective actions those most appropriate in a given emergency. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 187

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (D.4, J.7, J.8, J.8.b, J.9, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: BRC (Dose Assessment)

Assessment	Extent of Play
PLUME: Select and implement pre-planned precautionary protective actions.	No exception.
Utilize the methodology in plans/procedures to select among a range of protective actions most appropriate in a given emergency. This could also include the use of preplanned precautionary protective actions contained in plans/procedures.	No exception.
Develop PARs.	No exception.
Transmit PARs in a timely manner.	No exception.
POST-PLUME:	N/A

Assess radiological consequences and provide appropriate PARs for the ingestion exposure pathway.	

Capability Target 1.4: Protective Action Decisions for the Plume Phase

Intent: The capability to utilize appropriate factors and necessary coordination in the decision-making process used to make protective action decisions for the public. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 188

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (D.1.b, D.4, J.6, J.7, J.8, J.8.b, J.10, J.10.a, J.10.b, J.11.c-g, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: BRC (Dose Assessment) makes recommendations to decision makers.

Assessment	Extent of Play
Coordinate and make PADs for members of the general public.	No exception
Coordinate and make PADs for those with access and functional needs.	No exception
Coordinate and make PADs for students at schools.	No exception
Coordinate and make subsequent or alternate PADs.	No exception
Coordinate and make decisions on the administration of KI (where applicable) for the public and institutionalized members of the population.	No exception

Capability Target 4.5: Plume Phase Analysis and Dose Assessment

Intent: The capability to collect data, project doses to members of the public and emergency workers, and analyze and communicate the results. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 212

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.3, H.13, I.6, I.8, I.10, K.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: BRC (Dose Assessment)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Obtain adequate data to make dose projections.	No exception.
Use software and/or other methods (e.g., manual calculations) to make dose projections for members of the public (both TED and thyroid dose) based on plant data.	No exception.

Assessment	Extent of Play
Compare dose projections to members of the public to EPA PAGs.	No exception.
Compare dose projections to the public with those of the licensee and discuss differences greater than a factor of ten with the licensee and explain reasons for the difference.	No exception.
Make initial PARs based on recommendations of the licensee, release data, meteorological data, and other pertinent information.	No exception.
Promptly communicate PARs to decision-makers.	No exception.
Receive ambient exposure rates from FMTs and compare to model projections.	No exception.
Calculate Iodine and particulate concentrations from FMT air samples.	No exception.
Calculate plume ratios of noble gas, iodines, and particulates, and compare to model projections,	No exception.
Adjust PARs, as necessary, based on analysis of field data.	No exception.
Calculate an incident-specific correction factor for emergency workers inside the plume exposure pathway EPZ.	No exception.

Core Capability: Environmental Response/Health and Safety

Definition: Conduct appropriate measures to ensure the protection of the health and safety of the public and workers, as well as the environment, from all-hazards in support of responder operations and the affected communities

Objective 1: Emergency Operations Management

Capability Target 1.1: Mobilization
Intent: The capability to alert, notify, and mobilize OROs to staff facilities in support of emergency operations. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 185

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: BRC [Field Team Management (FTM), Field Monitoring Teams (FMTs), and Laboratory (Lab)]

Assessment	Extent of Play
Alert, notify, and mobilize key personnel, to include a 24-hour staffing roster, and activate facilities in a timely manner.	FTM: No exception. FMTs: N/A Lab: N/A
Receive and verify notifications.	FTM: No exception. FMTs: No exception. Lab: No exception.
Identify and request additional resources, as needed.	FTM: No exception. FMTs: No exception. Lab: No exception.
Determine a facility is operational.	FTM: No exception. FMTs: N/A Lab: No exception.

Capability Target 2.1: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Decision-Making Process

Intent: The capability to assess and control the radiation exposure and dose received by emergency workers and utilize a decision-making chain to authorize emergency worker exposure limits to be exceeded for specific missions. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 196

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, K.2, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, M.8, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: BRC (Field Team Management)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Control emergency workers' exposure and dose, including offsite workers performing duties onsite.	No exception.
Maintain record of dose as a result of exposure.	No exception.
Authorize exposures and dose in excess of identified limits.	No exception.
Process for considering occupational exposures and to authorize individuals to receive doses in excess of occupational dose limits.	No exception.
Determine a correction factor for DRD-based isotopic release mixture.	N/A

Assessment	Extent of Play
Control exposure and dose for temporary reentry of emergency workers, or members of the public, to restricted areas.	N/A
Determine the need to authorize radioprotective drugs using projected thyroid doses and field measurements. Projections are compared to previously established PAGs.	No exception.
Adequately protect members of the public from radiological exposure and control dose for those who are authorized to temporarily reenter a restricted area.	N/A

Capability Target 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management

Intent: The capability of emergency workers to manage dose and exposure, use equipment (e.g., dosimetry, radio protective drugs), and identify procedures to monitor their exposure and dose, including following procedures to obtain authorization to receive emergency exposures in excess of the PAGs. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 198

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: BRC [Field Team Management (FTM), Field Monitoring Teams (FMTs), and Laboratory (Lab)]

Assessment	Extent of Play
Maintain an appropriate inventory of DRDs that are leak-tested or current in calibration.	Inventory verified during SAV. DRDs used for drill will be randomly inspected.
Maintain an appropriate inventory of PRDs.	Inventory verified during SAV; further assessment not required.
Retain an adequate supply of radioprotective drugs.	Inventory verified during SAV; further assessment not required.
Adequately distribute appropriate DRDs and PRDs.	PRDs may be simulated; electronic personal dosimeters (EPDs) only for lab & FMT staff.
Adequately distribute radioprotective drugs to emergency workers.	Assessment via discussion.
Record and report exposures in the field.	No exception.
Implement decisions to administer radioprotective drugs.	Assessment via discussion.
Report to individual responsible for managing exposure and dose when limits are reached.	No exception.

Implement exposure control decisions to members of the public from radiological exposure and control dose for those who are authorized to temporarily reenter a restricted area.	N/A

Objective 3: Alert and Notification

Capability Target 3.1: Communications

Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 200

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: BRC (Field Team Management, Field Monitoring Teams, and Laboratory)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.	No exception
Maintain periodic test results and corrective actions on a real time basis.	No exception
Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.	No exception
Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.	No exception
Identify and address any failures of the systems.	No exception
Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., “content check”).	No exception

Capability Target 4.1: Field Monitoring Teams Management

Intent: The capability to provide overall management of FMTs to direct movements and measurements to characterize the plume and its impacts. Pg 206

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (H.11, H.13, I.5, I.6, I.9, I.10, M.7, M.8, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: BRC [Field Team Management (FTM)]

Assessment	Extent of Play
Brief FMTs on predicted plume location and direction, plume travel speed, equipment operational checks, background measurement, and exposure control procedures before deployment.	No exception
Direct the FMTs to monitoring locations, predesignated points or otherwise, at times and locations sufficient to characterize the plume.	No exception
Obtain peak plume measurements from FMTs.	No exception
Direct FMTs to collect air samples at locations and times sufficient to characterize the plume.	No exception
Keep Incident Command informed of FMTs activities and location(s) during a HAB incident or other instances when an ICP or other may be in use.	No exception
Coordinate and share information amongst all FMTs (licensee, Federal, state, and local).	No exception
Coordinate sample analysis from field to those responsible for assessing radiological data.	No exception
Coordinate transfer of sample media to locations and organizations responsible for assessing radiological data.	No exception
Assist with development and modification of sampling plans, as appropriate.	No exception

Capability Target 4.2: Plume Phase Measurements and Sampling

Intent: The capability to make and report measurements of ambient radiation. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 207

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (H.9, H.11, H.11.a, H.11.b, H.12, H.13, I.2, I.5, I.6, I.7, I.8, I.9, I.10, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: BRC [Field Monitoring Teams (FMTs)]

Assessment	Extent of Play
Maintain emergency equipment including calibration and operational checks according to manufacturer's specifications or per national standards.	No exception

Assessment	Extent of Play
Maintain inventory for emergency kits.	No exception
Operate and monitor radiation survey instruments to detect changes in radiation exposure rate while moving and in stationary positions.	No exception
Use appropriate contamination control and PPE.	No exception
Be in location(s) at the appropriate time(s) to detect and characterize the active release (plume).	No exception
Obtain peak plume measurements either directly or from licensee field teams.	No exception
Correctly interpret survey instrument readings to determine submersion in the active plume.	No exception
Collect representative air samples in the active plume on particulate media (e.g., glass or paper filter) and iodine selective media (e.g., silver zeolite cartridge).	No exception
Handle sample media and equipment to avoid sample cross-contamination, contamination of equipment and personnel contamination.	No exception
Determine an appropriate low background location to count sample media.	No exception
Count iodine and particulate media using appropriate and effective instrumentation and counting geometries or have samples analyzed by a supporting laboratory within four hours.	No exception
Report to field monitoring team manager all survey and counting results in format and units suitable for use by the organization's dose assessor.	No exception
Procedures, qualified collection and counting efficiencies, and calculations are capable of detecting airborne radioactive iodine concentrations as low as 10^{-7} µCi/cc.	No exception
Preparation of packaging, sample identification, and chain-of-custody forms ensures integrity of samples throughout transportation and transfer.	No exception

Capability Target 4.4: Laboratory Operations

Intent: The capability to perform laboratory analyses of radioactivity in environmental, food, and drinking water samples to support decision-making. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 210

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.4, H.11, H.11.b, H.13, I.2, I.6, M.7, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: BRC [Laboratory (Lab)]

Assessment	Extent of Play
Prepare analytical equipment for use, including performing calibrations, quality control checks, and background counts, as appropriate.	No exception
Receive and track samples, including completing chain-of-custody records.	No exception
Prepare and process each type of sample necessary to assess the ingestion plume exposure pathway and to support reentry, relocation, and return decisions.	N/A
Analyze samples to determine the concentration of each radionuclide in each sample. Minimum detection limits (MDLs) for various radionuclides must be low enough to support ORO decisions.	No exception
Provide analysis results to the appropriate organization.	No exception
If the laboratory is used to count air samples during the early phase of an incident and prepare, process, and analyze air filters and cartridges, provide analysis results in a timely manner to support ORO decisions.	No exception

Miami-Dade County

Core Capability: Operational Coordination

Definition: Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

Capability Target 1.1: Mobilization

Intent: The capability to alert, notify, and mobilize offsite response organizations to staff facilities in support of emergency operations. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 185

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Miami-Dade County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) & Incident Command Post (ICP)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Alert, notify, and mobilize key personnel, to include a 24-hour staffing roster, and activate facilities in a timely manner.	EOC: Exercise participants will be pre-staged; assessment via discussion. The EOC Director (or his designee) and support will report to the EOF on a real time basis. ICP: Exercise participants will be pre-staged; assessment via discussion and observation.
Receive and verify notifications.	EOC: No exception ICP: No exception
Identify and request additional resources, as needed.	EOC: Assessment by scenario driven discussion. No deployment of resources. ICP: Assessment by scenario driven discussion. with plans and procedures. No deployment of resources.
Determine a facility is operational.	EOC: No exception ICP: No exception

Capability Target 1.2: Direction and Control

Intent: The capability to provide overall direction and control of response efforts, commensurate with the responsibilities of leadership, as detailed in plans/procedures. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 186

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.1.c, A.2, A.3, A.5, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, D.4, E.1, H.6, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Miami-Dade County EOC & ICP

Assessment	Extent of Play
Support protective action decision-making.	EOC: No exception ICP: No exception
Conduct briefings in a timely manner.	EOC: No exception ICP: No exception
Maintain situational awareness.	EOC: No exception ICP: No exception
Coordinate response activities with other organizations.	EOC: No exception ICP: No exception
Obtain resources to support emergency operations.	EOC: Assessment by scenario driven discussion. No deployment of field resources. ICP: Assessment by scenario driven discussion. No deployment of field resources.
Provide and maintain adequate facilities and equipment to support the emergency response.	EOC: No exception ICP: No exception

Capability Target 1.3: Protective Action Recommendations:

Intent: The capability to use dose assessment and field data, compare this data to the PAGs, and choose among a range of protective actions those most appropriate in a given emergency. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 187

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (D.4, J.7, J.8, J.8.b, J.9, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Miami-Dade County EOC & ICP

Assessment	Extent of Play
PLUME Select and implement pre-planned precautionary protective actions.	EOC: Assessment by scenario driven discussion. ICP: N/A
Utilize the methodology in plans/procedures to select among a range of protective actions most appropriate in a given emergency. This could also include the use of preplanned precautionary protective actions contained in plans/procedures.	EOC: Assessment by scenario driven discussion. ICP: Assessment by scenario driven discussion.
Develop PARs.	EOC: N/A ICP: N/A

Assessment	Extent of Play
Transmit PARs in a timely manner.	EOC: N/A ICP: N/A

Capability Target 1.4: Protective Action Decisions for the Plume Phase

Intent: The capability to utilize appropriate factors and necessary coordination in the decision-making process used to make protective action decisions for the public. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 188

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (D.1.b, D.4, J.6, J.7, J.8, J.8.b, J.10, J.10.a, J.10.b, J.11.c-g, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Miami-Dade County EOC & ICP

Assessment	Extent of Play
Coordinate and make PADs for members of the general public.	EOC: Assessment by scenario driven discussion. ICP: N/A
Coordinate and make PADs for those with access and functional needs.	EOC: Assessment by scenario driven discussion. ICP: N/A
Coordinate and make PADs for students at schools.	EOC: Assessment by scenario driven discussion. ICP: N/A
Coordinate and make subsequent or alternate PADs.	EOC: Assessment by scenario driven discussion. ICP: N/A
Coordinate and make decisions on the administration of KI (where applicable) for the public and institutionalized members of the population.	EOC: Assessment by scenario driven discussion. ICP: N/A

Capability Target 1.5: Protective Action Decision Implementation for the Plume Phase

Intent: The capability to implement precautionary protective action and/or PADs, including evacuation and/or sheltering, for all populations within the plume and ingestion exposure pathway EPZs. The populations include those with access and functional needs, students, and institutionalized individuals. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 189

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.4, C.2.a, G.1, J.11, J.11.a, J.11.b, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.g, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Miami-Dade County EOC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Implement PADs, ensuring communication and coordination with all appropriate jurisdictions.	No exception
Assist those with access and functional needs during the implementation of PADs.	Protective action decision-making for special populations groups will be demonstrated through discussion at the EOC. Special population lists may be inspected but protected information may not be copied or otherwise shared with agencies outside of Miami-Dade Office of Emergency Management (OEM). Persons on the Emergency Evacuation Assistance Program (EEAP) registry will not be called, transported, or participate in the exercise in any way.
Communicate, coordinate, and implement protective actions for schools.	School officials in the EOC will discuss protective decision-making and actions pursuant to the scenario and recommended actions. No schools will be contacted during the exercise and all actions related to school protective actions will be simulated.
Communicate with transportation officials.	No exception
Identify evacuation routes for the general public.	No exception
Make KI available to both institutionalized persons and the general public, in accordance with plans and procedures.	The distribution process will be discussed at the County EOC during the exercise.

Capability Target 2.1: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Decision-Making Process

Intent: The capability to assess and control the radiation exposure and dose received by emergency workers and utilize a decision-making chain to authorize emergency worker exposure limits to be exceeded for specific missions. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 196

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, K.2, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, M.8, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Miami-Dade County

Assessment	Extent of Play
Control emergency workers' exposure and dose, including offsite workers performing duties onsite.	By interview or observation via scenario.

Assessment	Extent of Play
Maintain record of dose as a result of exposure.	Assessment by interview or observation via scenario.
Authorize exposures and dose in excess of identified limits.	Assessment by interview or observation via scenario.
Process for considering occupational exposures and to authorize individuals to receive doses in excess of occupational dose limits.	Assessment by interview or observation via scenario.

Capability Target 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management

Intent: The capability of emergency workers to manage dose and exposure, use equipment (e.g., dosimetry, radio protective drugs), and identify procedures to monitor their exposure and dose, including following procedures to obtain authorization to receive emergency exposures in excess of the PAGs. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 198

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Miami-Dade County EOC and ICP

Assessment	Extent of Play
Maintain an appropriate inventory of DRDs that are leak-tested or current in calibration.	EOC: Inventory verified during scheduled SAV at OEM. ICP: N/A
Maintain an appropriate inventory of PRDs.	EOC: Inventory verified during scheduled SAV at OEM. ICP: N/A
Retain an adequate supply of radioprotective drugs.	EOC: Inventory verified during scheduled SAV at OEM. ICP: N/A
Adequately distribute appropriate DRDs and PRDs.	EOC: Assessment by interview/discussion ICP: Assessment by interview/discussion
Adequately distribute radioprotective drugs to emergency workers.	EOC: Assessment by interview/discussion ICP: Assessment by interview/discussion
Record and report exposures in the field.	EOC: Assessment by interview/discussion ICP: Assessment by interview/discussion

Assessment	Extent of Play
Implement decisions to administer radioprotective drugs.	EOC: Assessment by interview or observation via scenario. ICP: Assessment by interview or observation via scenario.
Report to individual responsible for managing exposure and dose when limits are reached.	EOC: Assessment by interview/discussion ICP: Assessment by interview/discussion
Implement exposure control decisions to members of the public from radiological exposure and control dose for those who are authorized to temporarily reenter a restricted area.	EOC: N/A ICP: N/A

Capability Target 3.1: Communications

Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 200

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Miami-Dade County EOC & ICP

Assessment	Extent of Play
Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.	EOC: No exception ICP: No exception
Maintain periodic test results and corrective actions on a real time basis.	EOC: No Exception ICP: N/A
Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.	EOC: No Exception ICP: No Exception
Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.	EOC: No Exception ICP: Communications with EOC will occur via normal resources and communication with field response coordination may occur through a SimCell as necessary.
Identify and address any failures of the systems.	EOC: No Exception ICP: No exception

Assessment	Extent of Play
Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., "content check").	EOC: No exception ICP: No Exception

Core Capability: Public Information and Warning

[Route alerting and waterway warning demonstrated OOS, November 1-2, 2022]

Definition: Deliver coordination, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

Capability Target 1.1: Mobilization

Intent: The capability to alert, notify, and mobilize OROs to staff facilities in support of emergency operations. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 185

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Miami-Dade County Joint Information System (JIS)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Alert, notify, and mobilize key personnel, to include a 24-hour staffing roster, and activate facilities in a timely manner.	JIS: Exercise participants will be pre-staged; assessment via discussion.
Receive and verify notifications.	JIS: No Exception
Identify and request additional resources, as needed.	JIS: No Exception
Determine a facility is operational.	JIS: No Exception

Capability Target 3.1: Communications

Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 200

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Miami-Dade County JIS, RA, and WW

Assessment	Extent of Play
Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.	JIS: No Exception
Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.	JIS: No Exception
Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.	JIS: No Exception
Identify and address any failures of the systems.	JIS: No Exception
Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., "content check").	JIS: No Exception

Capability Target 3.2: Alert and Notification of the Public

Intent: The capability to provide instructions to the public. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 201

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.2, E.4, E.5, F.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Miami-Dade County EOC, JIS, RA, and WW

Assessment	Extent of Play
<u>ALERT AND NOTIFICATION SYSTEM</u> Sequentially provide an alert signal followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas.	EOC: Conduct Silent test – assessed during demonstration of virtual platform JIS: No Exception (EAS Message) RA: Demonstrate/discuss OOS up to point of transmission WW: Demonstrate/discuss OOS up to point of transmission
Alert and notify the general public.	EOC: Siren will only be activated in silent test mode. JIS: No Exception RA: Demonstrate/discuss OOS WW: Demonstrate/discuss OOS

Assessment	Extent of Play
Identify and address any failures of the system(s) or portion of a system(s).	EOC: No Exception JIS: No Exception RA: Demonstrate/discuss OOS WW: Demonstrate/discuss OOS
Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at an agreed-upon location.	EOC: N/A JIS: N/A RA: Demonstrate/discuss OOS. WW: Demonstrate/discuss OOS.
<u>EAS</u> Identify the process to activate the EAS.	EOC: No Exception JIS: No Exception (demonstrate up to the point before dissemination) RA: N/A WW: N/A
Ensure that updated emergency information is disseminated in a timely manner.	EOC: No Exception JIS: No Exception RA: N/A WW: N/A
Ensure that current emergency information is repeated at pre-established intervals.	EOC: Done via discussion JIS: No Exception RA: N/A WW: N/A
<u>EAS/NWS STATION</u> Identify the process to activate the EAS, to include the process to receive and then broadcast updated information/messages and verification of the message, if applicable.	EOC: Done via discussion JIS: Done via discussion RA: N/A WW: N/A
Broadcast the message on a 24-hour basis.	EOC: Done via discussion JIS: Done via discussion RA: N/A WW: N/A

Assessment	Extent of Play
ROUTE/ALTERNATE ALERTING Complete route alerting, whether because of failure for system/portion of a system or for exception areas, as needed to demonstrate all routes are capable of being run in allotted time. Emphasis on the most challenging routes and demonstration of these routes will be varied from assessment activity to assessment activity. Challenging routes are defined as those that may be difficult to accomplish, such as those that are lengthy or with conditions (physical or otherwise) that may affect the speed and accuracy with which the route can be completed (e.g., traffic patterns and/or capacity, road conditions, etc.).	EOC: If siren failure occurs, process will be discussed. JIS: N/A RA: Demonstrate/discuss OOS WW: N/A

Capability Target 3.3: Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and News Media

Intent: The capability to disseminate emergency information and instructions to the public during all phases of an incident. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 203

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.2, E.4, E.5, G.1, G.2, G.3, G.3.a, G.4, G.5, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Miami-Dade County EOC and JIS

Assessment	Extent of Play
PLUME PHASE Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information in a timely manner.	EOC: Demonstrate/discuss up to point of transmission JIS: Demonstrate/discuss up to point of transmission
Provide clear, concise, accessible messaging using plain language.	EOC: No Exception JIS: No Exception
Messaging addresses appropriate cultural and linguistic considerations.	EOC: No Exception JIS: No Exception
Ensure subsequent messaging is consistent with protective actions.	EOC: No Exception JIS: No Exception

Assessment	Extent of Play
Update information as the incident progresses, to include validating previously identified protective areas and clearly identifying any new protective action areas, any information that is no longer valid, and any changes to previously provided information (e.g., rerouting of evacuation routes due to impediments, etc.).	EOC: No Exception JIS: No Exception
Respond to media and public inquiries.	EOC: N/A JIS: At least one press conference conducted at the JIC.

Core Capability: Environmental Response/Health and Safety

[To be demonstrated out-of-sequence, date TBD (Spring 2023)]

Definition: Conduct appropriate measures to ensure the protection of the health and safety of the public and workers, as well as the environment, from all-hazards in support of responder operations and the affected communities

Capability Target 1.1: Mobilization

Intent: The capability to alert, notify, and mobilize OROs to staff facilities in support of emergency operations. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 185

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Miami-Dade County Marine Reception Center (MRC)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Alert, notify, and mobilize key personnel, to include a 24-hour staffing roster, and activate facilities in a timely manner.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Receive and verify notifications.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Identify and request additional resources, as needed.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Determine a facility is operational.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)

Capability Target 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management

Intent: The capability of emergency workers to manage dose and exposure, use equipment (e.g., dosimetry, radio protective drugs), and identify procedures to monitor their exposure and dose, including following procedures to obtain authorization to receive emergency exposures in excess of the PAGs. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 198

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Miami-Dade County MRC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Maintain an appropriate inventory of DRDs that are leak-tested or current in calibration.	Inventory verified during SAV; demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Maintain an appropriate inventory of PRDs.	Inventory verified during SAV; demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Retain an adequate supply of radioprotective drugs.	Inventory verified during SAV; demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Adequately distribute appropriate DRDs and PRDs.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Adequately distribute radioprotective drugs to emergency workers.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Record and report exposures in the field.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Implement decisions to administer radioprotective drugs.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Report to individual responsible for managing exposure and dose when limits are reached.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Implement exposure control decisions to members of the public from radiological exposure and control dose for those who are authorized to temporarily reenter a restricted area.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)

Capability Target 3.1: Communications

Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 200

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Miami-Dade County MRC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Maintain periodic test results and corrective actions on a real time basis.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Identify and address any failures of the systems.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., "content check").	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)

Capability Target 5.1: Monitoring, Decontamination, Sheltering, and Registration of Evacuees

Intent: The capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees, and to identify, register, temporarily shelter, and provide congregate care for evacuees at reception centers. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 215

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (J.11.d, J.13, K.4, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Miami-Dade County MRC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Set-up operations.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Operationally check instruments and equipment.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
<u>Monitoring</u> Attain and sustain the overall monitoring productivity rate per hour needed to monitor 20 percent of the plume exposure pathway EPZ population, including transients, within a 12-hour period at each facility. The monitoring productivity rate per hour is the number of evacuees that can be monitored, per hour, per location, by the total complement of monitors using an appropriate procedure.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Monitor evacuees, service animals, pets, vehicles, and possessions.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Utilize trigger/action levels for determining the need for decontamination.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
<u>Decontamination</u> Decontaminate evacuees, and personal belongings, while limiting the spread of contamination.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Follow-up with any evacuee(s) who cannot be appropriately decontaminated for assessment; ensure the capability to provide evacuee-referrals.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
<u>Vehicles</u> Monitor and decontaminate vehicles.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Provide adequate, separate space for both contaminated and non-contaminated vehicles.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Monitor emergency worker personnel and their equipment and vehicles for contamination.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Decontaminate evacuee vehicles based on trigger/action levels.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
<u>Sheltering & Congregate Care</u> Coordinate for incoming evacuees who have been monitored and, if necessary, decontaminated.	Under Core Capability: Mass Care Services
Establish shelter operations.	Under Core Capability: Mass Care Services
Congregate care centers and operations in host/support jurisdictions are sufficient to support the expected number of evacuees.	Under Core Capability: Mass Care Services
<u>Registration</u> Register evacuees.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Ensure the registration area is clean and controlled.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)

Core Capability: On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement

[Interview with TCP officers at EOC during exercise]

Definition: Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas and also for response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.

Capability Target 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management:

Intent: The capability of emergency workers to manage dose and exposure, use equipment (e.g., dosimetry, radio protective drugs), and identify procedures to monitor their exposure and dose, including following procedures to obtain authorization to receive emergency exposures in excess of the PAGs. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 198

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Miami-Dade County Traffic Control Points (TCPs)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Maintain an appropriate inventory of DRDs that are leak-tested or current in calibration.	Inventory verified during scheduled SAV at OEM.
Maintain an appropriate inventory of PRDs.	Inventory verified during scheduled SAV at OEM.
Retain an adequate supply of radioprotective drugs.	Inventory verified during scheduled SAV at OEM.
Adequately distribute appropriate DRDs and PRDs.	Assessment by interview/discussion.
Adequately distribute radioprotective drugs to emergency workers.	Assessment by interview/discussion.
Record and report exposures in the field.	Assessment by interview/discussion.
Implement decisions to administer radioprotective drugs.	Assessment by interview/discussion.
Report to individual responsible for managing exposure and dose when limits are reached.	Assessment by interview/discussion.
Implement exposure control decisions to members of the public from radiological exposure and control dose for those who are authorized to temporarily reenter a restricted area.	Assessment by interview/discussion.

Capability Target 3.1: Communications

Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 200

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Miami-Dade County TCPs

Assessment	Extent of Play
Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.	Assessment by interview/discussion.
Maintain periodic test results and corrective actions on a real time basis.	Assessment by interview/discussion.
Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.	Assessment by interview/discussion.
Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.	Assessment by interview/discussion.
Identify and address any failures of the systems.	Assessment by interview/discussion.
Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., "content check").	Assessment by interview/discussion.

Capability Target 5.4: Traffic and Access Control

Intent: The capability to select, establish, and staff traffic and access control points and removing impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 222

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (H.12, J.8, J.8.b, J.10, J.10.a, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.f, J.14.d, J.14.e, M.1.b, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Miami-Dade County TCPs

Assessment	Extent of Play
Select, establish, and staff appropriate TCP/ACPs, consistent with current conditions and PADs (e.g., evacuating, sheltering, and relocation), in a timely manner.	Assessment by interview/discussion.
Provide instructions to TAC staff on actions to take, including when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.	Assessment by interview/discussion.
Contact the state or Federal agencies that have the authority for the different transportation modes (e.g., rail, water, and air traffic).	Assessment by interview/discussion.

Assessment	Extent of Play
Identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments that affect the evacuation and evacuation routes.	Assessment by interview/discussion.
Make the decision to re-route traffic and coordinate with key decision-makers and the JIC to ensure the alternate route information is appropriately communicated to evacuees.	Assessment by interview/discussion.
Establish procedures to control access to and monitor people and vehicles from the evacuated and restricted areas.	Assessment by interview/discussion.

Core Capability: Mass Care Services

[Recommend: To be demonstrated with ERC out-of-sequence, date TBD (Spring 2023)]

Definition: Provide life-sustaining and human services to the affected population, to include hydration, feeding, sheltering, temporary housing, evacuee support, reunification, and distribution of

Capability Target 5.1: Monitoring, Decontamination, Sheltering, and Registration of Evacuees

Intent: The capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees, and to identify, register, temporarily shelter, and provide congregate care for evacuees at reception centers. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 215

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (J.11.d, J.13, K.4, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Miami-Dade County

Assessment	Extent of Play
Coordinate for incoming evacuees who have been monitored and, if necessary, decontaminated.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Establish shelter operations.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Congregate care centers and operations in host/support jurisdictions are sufficient to support the expected number of evacuees.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)

Core Capability: Critical Transportation (Schools)

[Interview with school officials out-of-sequence, January 10, 2023]

Definition: Provide transportation (including infrastructure access and accessible transportation services) for response priority objectives, including the evacuation of people and animals, and the delivery of vital response personnel, equipment, and services into the affected areas.

Capability Target 1.5: Protective Action Decision Implementation for the Plume Phase

Intent: The capability to implement precautionary protective action and/or PADs, including evacuation and/or sheltering, for all populations within the plume and ingestion exposure pathway EPZs. The populations include those with access and functional needs, students, and institutionalized individuals. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 189

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.4, C.2.a, G.1, J.11, J.11.a, J.11.b, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.g, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Miami-Dade County Schools

Assessment	Extent of Play
Implement PADs, ensuring communication and coordination with all appropriate jurisdictions.	Assessment by interview/discussion.
Assist those with access and functional needs during the implementation of PADs.	Assessment by interview/discussion.
Communicate, coordinate, and implement protective actions for schools.	Assessment by interview/discussion.
Communicate with transportation officials.	Assessment by interview/discussion.
Identify evacuation routes for the general public.	Assessment by interview/discussion.
Make KI available to both institutionalized persons and the general public, in accordance with plans and procedures.	Assessment by interview/discussion.

Core Capability: Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services

[To be demonstrated out-of-sequence, December 14, 2022]

Definition: Provide lifesaving medical treatment via Emergency Medical Services and related operations and avoid additional disease and injury by providing targeted public health, medical and behavioral health support, and products to all affected populations.

Capability Target 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management

Intent: The capability of emergency workers to manage dose and exposure, use equipment (e.g., dosimetry, radio protective drugs), and identify procedures to monitor their exposure and dose, including following procedures to obtain authorization to receive emergency exposures in excess of the PAGs. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 198

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Miami-Dade County and Baptist Hospital

Assessment	Extent of Play
Maintain an appropriate inventory of DRDs that are leak-tested or current in calibration.	EMS: Inventory verified during scheduled SAV at OEM. DRDs used for drill will be randomly inspected. Hospital: DRDs used for drill will be randomly inspected.
Maintain an appropriate inventory of PRDs.	EMS: Inventory verified during scheduled SAV at OEM. Hospital: Inventory verified during exercise. PRDs for drill participants will be simulated by ID cards/badges.
Retain an adequate supply of radioprotective drugs.	EMS: Inventory verified during scheduled SAV at OEM. Hospital: N/A
Adequately distribute appropriate DRDs and PRDs.	EMS: No Exception (handled during the safety briefing) Hospital: No Exception (handled during safety briefing)
Record and report exposures in the field.	EMS: N/A Hospital: No Exception

Capability Target 5.3: Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated, Injured Individuals

Intent: The capability to provide medical transport and treatment services to contaminated, injured individuals. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 219

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.d, F.2, H.11, H.12, J.2, K.3, K.4, L.1, L.3, L.4, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Miami-Dade County and Baptist Hospital

Assessment	Extent of Play
TRANSPORTATION Transport contaminated, injured individuals to medical facilities.	Miami-Dade Fire Rescue (MDFR) is the participating transportation providers. MDFR staff PPE will be limited to universal precautions and direct reading dosimeters. The transportation units will be staged on the hospital grounds. Non-HAZMAT units will not survey or decontaminate patients. Patients will be cocooned and transported as is. The transport crew will be provided with patient contamination readings as part of a simulated hand-off prior to the start of the exercise. The drill will be paused for a moment after the first patient is handed off to hospital staff, and the Rescue Unit will be moved. MDFR staff and the Rescue Unit will be surveyed at the new location.
Maintain communications between the medical transportation provider and the receiving medical facility.	A MEDCOMM radio test, including "content check," will be conducted between the transportation vehicle and the hospital prior to or near the start of the exercise.
MEDICAL FACILITY Operationally check instruments and equipment.	No exception for hospital owned meters. FPL owned or provided meters will adhere to the FPL policy for meter management. Each meter will be operationally checked prior to the start of the exercise.
Set-up, activate, and operate an REA.	The hospital will set up the facility to receive contaminated injured patients prior to the start of the exercise. Medical personnel will verbalize plan of care and direct treatment team. Hospital staff will dress out in personal protective equipment upon notification that the exercise is starting. Each emergency worker will demonstrate one change of gloves that is observed by FEMA. Afterward, they may announce to the FEMA Evaluator that they are changing gloves and, once acknowledged, simulate a glove change.

Assessment	Extent of Play
Monitor and decontaminate the individual, equipment, and other items.	Patient clothing will be simulated by coveralls or other external attire. The individual is considered "unclothed" when they are down to the clothing worn under the external attire. MDFR personnel and unit will only be surveyed for contamination, by FPL Radiation Protection (RP) staff, after transferring their first patient to the hospital. Decontamination of MDFR personnel, should it be necessary, shall be simulated. Patient and incident information will be provided to the participants by a controller. If hospital staff determines that a shower is needed to accomplish decontamination, water flow will be simulated. FPL shall provide RP staff to support hospital personnel during radiological survey and decontamination activities, as requested. FPL staff PPE is limited to gloves and shoe covers. Patient actors may have low level radiation sources placed on them or controllers may provide count-rate information during the surveys. One hospital staff will undergo radiological survey and contamination control area clearance at the conclusion of all patient care. The medical management of 2 patient actors will be evaluated; any other patient actors are for training only. Utilization of materials that cannot be reused (e.g., gloves, swabs, wipes, absorbent pads, etc.) may be verbalized to reduce waste.

Monroe County

Core Capability: Operational Coordination

Definition: Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

Capability Target 1.1: Mobilization

Intent: The capability to alert, notify, and mobilize offsite response organizations to staff facilities in support of emergency operations. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 185

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Monroe County Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Alert, notify, and mobilize key personnel, to include a 24-hour staffing roster, and activate facilities in a timely manner.	Exercise participants will be pre-staged at the EOC, assessment via discussion.
Receive and verify notifications.	No exception
Identify and request additional resources, as needed.	No exception
Determine a facility is operational.	No exception

Capability Target 1.2: Direction and Control

Intent: The capability to provide overall direction and control of response efforts, commensurate with the responsibilities of leadership, as detailed in plans/procedures. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 186

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.1.c, A.2, A.3, A.5, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, D.4, E.1, H.6, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Monroe County EOC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Support protective action decision-making.	No exception
Conduct briefings in a timely manner.	No exception

Assessment	Extent of Play
Maintain situational awareness.	No exception
Coordinate response activities with other organizations.	No exception
Obtain resources to support emergency operations.	Movement of resources other than EOC and EOF personnel will be simulated and assessed via discussion.
Provide and maintain adequate facilities and equipment to support the emergency response.	Activation of other facilities such as an ERC may be simulated and assessed via discussion.

Capability Target 1.3: Protective Action Recommendations:

Intent: The capability to use dose assessment and field data, compare this data to the PAGs, and choose among a range of protective actions those most appropriate in a given emergency. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 187

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (D.4, J.7, J.8, J.8.b, J.9, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Monroe County EOC

Assessment	Extent of Play
<u>PLUME</u> Select and implement pre-planned precautionary protective actions.	No exception
Utilize the methodology in plans/procedures to select among a range of protective actions most appropriate in a given emergency. This could also include the use of preplanned precautionary protective actions contained in plans/procedures.	No exception

Capability Target 1.4: Protective Action Decisions for the Plume Phase

Intent: The capability to utilize appropriate factors and necessary coordination in the decision-making process used to make protective action decisions for the public. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 188

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (D.1.b, D.4, J.6, J.7, J.8, J.8.b, J.10, J.10.a, J.10.b, J.11.c-g, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Monroe County EOC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Coordinate and make PADs for members of the general public.	No exception
Coordinate and make PADs for those with access and functional needs.	No exception
Coordinate and make PADs for students at schools.	No exception
Coordinate and make subsequent or alternate PADs.	No exception
Coordinate and make decisions on the administration of KI (where applicable) for the public and institutionalized members of the population.	No exception

Capability Target 1.5: Protective Action Decision Implementation for the Plume Phase

Intent: The capability to implement precautionary protective action and/or PADs, including evacuation and/or sheltering, for all populations within the plume and ingestion exposure pathway EPZs. The populations include those with access and functional needs, students, and institutionalized individuals. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 189

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.4, C.2.a, G.1, J.11, J.11.a, J.11.b, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.g, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Monroe County EOC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Implement PADs, ensuring communication and coordination with all appropriate jurisdictions.	No exception
Assist those with access and functional needs during the implementation of PADs.	Monroe County Special Needs Registry records are confidential; no personal information will be shared. Assessment will be via discussion.
Communicate, coordinate, and implement protective actions for schools.	No exception
Communicate with transportation officials.	No exception
Identify evacuation routes for the general public.	No exception

Assessment	Extent of Play
Make KI available to both institutionalized persons and the general public, in accordance with plans and procedures.	Locations, quantities, and expiration of KI supplies verified during SAV

Capability Target 2.1: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Decision-Making Process

Intent: The capability to assess and control the radiation exposure and dose received by emergency workers and utilize a decision-making chain to authorize emergency worker exposure limits to be exceeded for specific missions. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 196

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, K.2, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, M.8, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Monroe County

Assessment	Extent of Play
Control emergency workers' exposure and dose, including offsite workers performing duties onsite.	Assessment via discussion.
Maintain record of dose as a result of exposure.	Assessment via discussion.
Authorize exposures and dose in excess of identified limits.	No exception
Process for considering occupational exposures and to authorize individuals to receive doses in excess of occupational dose limits.	No exception

Capability Target 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management

Intent: The capability of emergency workers to manage dose and exposure, use equipment (e.g., dosimetry, radio protective drugs), and identify procedures to monitor their exposure and dose, including following procedures to obtain authorization to receive emergency exposures in excess of the PAGs. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 198

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Monroe County EOC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Maintain an appropriate inventory of DRDs that are leak-tested or current in calibration.	Inventory verified during SAV

Maintain an appropriate inventory of PRDs.	Inventory verified during SAV
Retain an adequate supply of radioprotective drugs.	Locations, quantities, and expiration of KI supplies verified during SAV
Adequately distribute appropriate DRDs and PRDs.	Assessment via discussion.
Adequately distribute radioprotective drugs to emergency workers.	Assessment via discussion.
Record and report exposures in the field.	Assessment via discussion.
Implement decisions to administer radioprotective drugs.	Assessment via discussion.
Report to individual responsible for managing exposure and dose when limits are reached.	Assessment via discussion.
Implement exposure control decisions to members of the public from radiological exposure and control dose for those who are authorized to temporarily reenter a restricted area.	Assessment via discussion.

Capability Target 3.1: Communications

Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 200

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Monroe County EOC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.	No exception
Maintain periodic test results and corrective actions on a real time basis.	No exception
Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.	No exception
Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.	No exception

Assessment	Extent of Play
Identify and address any failures of the systems.	No exception
Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., "content check").	No exception

Core Capability: Public Information and Warning

[Route alerting demonstrated OOS, November 30, 2022; waterway warning TBD]

Definition: Deliver coordination, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

Capability Target 1.1: Mobilization

Intent: The capability to alert, notify, and mobilize OROs to staff facilities in support of emergency operations. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 185

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Monroe County Joint Information System (JIS)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Alert, notify, and mobilize key personnel, to include a 24-hour staffing roster, and activate facilities in a timely manner.	JIS: Exercise participants will be pre-staged; assessment via discussion.
Receive and verify notifications.	JIS: No exception.
Identify and request additional resources, as needed.	JIS: No exception.
Determine a facility is operational.	JIS: No exception.

Capability Target 3.1: Communications

Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 200

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Monroe County JIS

Assessment	Extent of Play
Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.	JIS: No Exception
Maintain periodic test results and corrective actions on a real time basis.	JIS: N/A
Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.	JIS: No Exception
Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.	JIS: No Exception
Identify and address any failures of the systems.	JIS: No Exception
Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., "content check").	JIS: No Exception

Capability Target 3.2: Alert and Notification of the Public

Intent: The capability to provide instructions to the public. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 201

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.2, E.4, E.5, F.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Monroe County EOC, Route Alerting (RA) & Waterway Warning (WW)

Assessment	Extent of Play
<u>ALERT AND NOTIFICATION SYSTEM</u> Sequentially provide an alert signal followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas.	EOC: Silent test conducted by Miami-Dade. RA: Demonstrate/discuss OOS up to point of transmission. WW: Demonstrate/discuss OOS up to point of transmission.

Assessment	Extent of Play
Alert and notify the general public.	EOC: Assessment via discussion. RA: Demonstrate/discuss OOS WW: Demonstrate/discuss OOS
Identify and address any failures of the system(s) or portion of a system(s).	EOC: Assessment via discussion. RA: Demonstrate/discuss OOS WW: Demonstrate/discuss OOS
Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at an agreed-upon location.	EOC: N/A RA: Demonstrate/discuss OOS. WW: Demonstrate/discuss OOS.
<u>EAS</u> Identify the process to activate the EAS.	EOC: Assessment via discussion. RA: N/A WW: N/A
Ensure that updated emergency information is disseminated in a timely manner.	EOC: Assessment via discussion. RA: N/A WW: N/A
Ensure that current emergency information is repeated at pre-established intervals.	EOC: Assessment via discussion. RA: N/A WW: N/A
<u>EAS/NWS STATION</u> Identify the process to activate the EAS, to include the process to receive and then broadcast updated information/messages and verification of the message, if applicable.	EOC: No exception. RA: N/A WW: N/A
Broadcast the message on a 24-hour basis.	EOC: Assessment via discussion. RA: N/A WW: N/A

Assessment	Extent of Play
ROUTE/ALTERNATE ALERTING Complete route alerting, whether because of failure for system/portion of a system or for exception areas, as needed to demonstrate all routes are capable of being run in allotted time. Emphasis on the most challenging routes and demonstration of these routes will be varied from assessment activity to assessment activity. Challenging routes are defined as those that may be difficult to accomplish, such as those that are lengthy or with conditions (physical or otherwise) that may affect the speed and accuracy with which the route can be completed (e.g., traffic patterns and/or capacity, road conditions, etc.).	EOC: If siren failure occurs, process will be discussed. RA: Demonstrate/discuss OOS WW: N/A

Capability Target 3.3: Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and News Media

Intent: The capability to disseminate emergency information and instructions to the public during all phases of an incident. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 203

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.2, E.4, E.5, G.1, G.2, G.3, G.3.a, G.4, G.5, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Monroe County EOC and JIS

Assessment	Extent of Play
PLUME PHASE Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information in a timely manner.	EOC: Demonstrate/discuss up to point of transmission. JIS: Demonstrate/discuss up to point of transmission.
Provide clear, concise, accessible messaging using plain language.	EOC: No exception. JIS: No exception.
Messaging addresses appropriate cultural and linguistic considerations.	EOC: No exception. JIS: No exception.
Ensure subsequent messaging is consistent with protective actions.	EOC: No exception. JIS: No exception.

Assessment	Extent of Play
Update information as the incident progresses, to include validating previously identified protective areas and clearly identifying any new protective action areas, any information that is no longer valid, and any changes to previously provided information (e.g., rerouting of evacuation routes due to impediments, etc.).	EOC: No Exception JIS: No Exception
Respond to media and public inquiries.	EOC: N/A JIS: At least one press conference conducted at the JIC.

Core Capability: Environmental Response/Health and Safety

[To be demonstrated out-of-sequence, date TBD (Spring 2023)]

Definition: Conduct appropriate measures to ensure the protection of the health and safety of the public and workers, as well as the environment, from all-hazards in support of responder operations and the affected communities

Capability Target 1.1: Mobilization

Intent: The capability to alert, notify, and mobilize OROs to staff facilities in support of emergency operations. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 185

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Monroe County Emergency Reception Center (ERC)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Alert, notify, and mobilize key personnel, to include a 24-hour staffing roster, and activate facilities in a timely manner.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Receive and verify notifications.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Identify and request additional resources, as needed.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Determine a facility is operational.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)

Capability Target 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management

Intent: The capability of emergency workers to manage dose and exposure, use equipment (e.g., dosimetry, radio protective drugs), and identify procedures to monitor their exposure and dose, including following procedures to obtain authorization to receive emergency exposures in excess of the PAGs. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 198

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Monroe County ERC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Maintain an appropriate inventory of DRDs that are leak-tested or current in calibration.	Inventory verified during SAV; demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Maintain an appropriate inventory of PRDs.	Inventory verified during SAV; demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Retain an adequate supply of radioprotective drugs.	Inventory verified during SAV; demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Adequately distribute appropriate DRDs and PRDs.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Adequately distribute radioprotective drugs to emergency workers.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Record and report exposures in the field.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Implement decisions to administer radioprotective drugs.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Report to individual responsible for managing exposure and dose when limits are reached.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)

Capability Target 3.1: Communications

Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 200

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Monroe County ERC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Maintain periodic test results and corrective actions on a real time basis.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Identify and address any failures of the systems.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., "content check").	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)

Capability Target 5.1: Monitoring, Decontamination, Sheltering, and Registration of Evacuees

Intent: The capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees, and to identify, register, temporarily shelter, and provide congregate care for evacuees at reception centers. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 215

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (J.11.d, J.13, K.4, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Monroe County ERC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Set-up operations.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Operationally check instruments and equipment.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
<u>Monitoring</u> Attain and sustain the overall monitoring productivity rate per hour needed to monitor 20 percent of the plume exposure pathway EPZ population, including transients, within a 12-hour period at each facility. The monitoring productivity rate per hour is the number of evacuees that can be monitored, per hour, per location, by the total complement of monitors using an appropriate procedure.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Monitor evacuees, service animals, pets, vehicles, and possessions.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Utilize trigger/action levels for determining the need for decontamination.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)

Assessment	Extent of Play
<u>Decontamination</u> Decontaminate evacuees, and personal belongings, while limiting the spread of contamination.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Follow-up with any evacuee(s) who cannot be appropriately decontaminated for assessment; ensure the capability to provide evacuee-referrals.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
<u>Vehicles</u> Monitor and decontaminate vehicles.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Provide adequate, separate space for both contaminated and non-contaminated vehicles.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Monitor emergency worker personnel and their equipment and vehicles for contamination.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Decontaminate evacuee vehicles based on trigger/action levels.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
<u>Sheltering & Congregate Care</u> Coordinate for incoming evacuees who have been monitored and, if necessary, decontaminated.	Under Core Capability: Mass Care Services ERC: Assessment via discussion.
Establish shelter operations.	Under Core Capability: Mass Care Services ERC: Assessment via discussion.
Congregate care centers and operations in host/support jurisdictions are sufficient to support the expected number of evacuees.	Under Core Capability: Mass Care Services ERC: Assessment via discussion.
<u>Registration</u> Register evacuees.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Ensure the registration area is clean and controlled.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)

Core Capability: On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement

[Interview with TCP officers at EOC during exercise]

Definition: Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas and also for response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.

Capability Target 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management:

Intent: The capability of emergency workers to manage dose and exposure, use equipment (e.g., dosimetry, radio protective drugs), and identify procedures to monitor their exposure and dose, including following procedures to obtain authorization to receive emergency exposures in excess of the PAGs. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 198

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Monroe County Traffic Control Points (TCPs)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Maintain an appropriate inventory of DRDs that are leak-tested or current in calibration.	Inventory verified during SAV
Maintain an appropriate inventory of PRDs.	Inventory verified during SAV
Retain an adequate supply of radioprotective drugs.	Inventory verified during SAV
Adequately distribute appropriate DRDs and PRDs.	Assessment via discussion.
Adequately distribute radioprotective drugs to emergency workers.	Assessment via discussion.
Record and report exposures in the field.	Assessment via discussion.
Implement decisions to administer radioprotective drugs.	Assessment via discussion.
Report to individual responsible for managing exposure and dose when limits are reached.	Assessment via discussion.
Implement exposure control decisions to members of the public from radiological exposure and control dose for those who are authorized to temporarily reenter a restricted area.	Assessment via discussion.

Capability Target 3.1: Communications

Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 200

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Monroe County TCPs

Assessment	Extent of Play
Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.	Assessment via discussion.
Maintain periodic test results and corrective actions on a real time basis.	Assessment via discussion.
Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.	Assessment via discussion.
Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.	Assessment via discussion.
Identify and address any failures of the systems.	Assessment via discussion.
Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., "content check").	Assessment via discussion.

Capability Target 5.4: Traffic and Access Control

Intent: The capability to select, establish, and staff traffic and access control points and removing impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 222

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (H.12, J.8, J.8.b, J.10, J.10.a, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.f, J.14.d, J.14.e, M.1.b, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Monroe County TCPs

Assessment	Extent of Play
Select, establish, and staff appropriate TCP/ACPs, consistent with current conditions and PADs (e.g., evacuating, sheltering, and relocation), in a timely manner.	Assessment via discussion.
Provide instructions to TAC staff on actions to take, including when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.	Assessment via discussion.
Contact the state or Federal agencies that have the authority for the different transportation modes (e.g., rail, water, and air traffic).	Assessment via discussion.

Assessment	Extent of Play
Identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments that affect the evacuation and evacuation routes.	Assessment via discussion.
Make the decision to re-route traffic and coordinate with key decision-makers and the JIC to ensure the alternate route information is appropriately communicated to evacuees.	Assessment via discussion.
Establish procedures to control access to and monitor people and vehicles from the evacuated and restricted areas.	Assessment via discussion.

Core Capability: Mass Care Services

[Recommend: To be demonstrated with ERC out-of-sequence, date TBD (Spring 2023)]

Definition: Provide life-sustaining and human services to the affected population, to include hydration, feeding, sheltering, temporary housing, evacuee support, reunification, and distribution of emergency supplies.

Capability Target 5.1: Monitoring, Decontamination, Sheltering, and Registration of Evacuees
Intent: The capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees, and to identify, register, temporarily shelter, and provide congregate care for evacuees at reception centers.
RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 215

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (J.11.d, J.13, K.4, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Monroe County

Assessment	Extent of Play
Coordinate for incoming evacuees who have been monitored and, if necessary, decontaminated.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Establish shelter operations.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)
Congregate care centers and operations in host/support jurisdictions are sufficient to support the expected number of evacuees.	Demonstrated OOS (Spring 2023)

Core Capability: Critical Transportation (Schools)

[Interview with school officials out-of-sequence, date TBD]

Definition: Provide transportation (including infrastructure access and accessible transportation services) for response priority objectives, including the evacuation of people and animals, and the delivery of vital response personnel, equipment, and services into the affected areas.

Capability Target 1.5: Protective Action Decision Implementation for the Plume Phase

Intent: The capability to implement precautionary protective action and/or PADs, including evacuation and/or sheltering, for all populations within the plume and ingestion exposure pathway EPZs. The populations include those with access and functional needs, students, and institutionalized individuals. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 189

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.4, C.2.a, G.1, J.11, J.11.a, J.11.b, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.g, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Monroe County Schools

Assessment	Extent of Play
Implement PADs, ensuring communication and coordination with all appropriate jurisdictions.	Assessment via discussion.
Assist those with access and functional needs during the implementation of PADs.	Assessment via discussion.
Communicate, coordinate, and implement protective actions for schools.	Assessment via discussion.
Communicate with transportation officials.	Assessment via discussion.
Identify evacuation routes for the general public.	Assessment via discussion.
Make KI available to both institutionalized persons and the general public, in accordance with plans and procedures.	Assessment via discussion.

Core Capability: Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services

[To be demonstrated out-of-sequence, December 14, 2022]

Definition: Provide lifesaving medical treatment via Emergency Medical Services and related operations and avoid additional disease and injury by providing targeted public health, medical and behavioral health support, and products to all affected populations.

Capability Target 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management

Intent: The capability of emergency workers to manage dose and exposure, use equipment (e.g., dosimetry, radio protective drugs), and identify procedures to monitor their exposure and dose,

including following procedures to obtain authorization to receive emergency exposures in excess of the PAGs. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 198

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Monroe County & Ocean Reef EMS

Assessment	Extent of Play
Maintain an appropriate inventory of DRDs that are leak-tested or current in calibration.	EMS: Inventory verified during SAV. DRDs used for drill will be randomly inspected.
Maintain an appropriate inventory of PRDs.	EMS: Inventory verified during SAV. TLDs will be simulated with badge clips
Retain an adequate supply of radioprotective drugs.	EMS: Locations, quantities, and expiration of KI supplies verified during SAV.
Adequately distribute appropriate DRDs and PRDs.	EMS: Assessment via discussion.

Capability Target 5.3: Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated, Injured Individuals

Intent: The capability to provide medical transport and treatment services to contaminated, injured individuals. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 219

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.d, F.2, H.11, H.12, J.2, K.3, K.4, L.1, L.3, L.4, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Ocean Reef EMS

Assessment	Extent of Play
<u>TRANSPORTATION</u> Transport contaminated, injured individuals to medical facilities.	Ocean Reef EMS will simulate transporting one contaminated, injured patient to hospital. Ocean Reef EMS will be provided with patient contamination readings when the simulated patient transfer occurs. Ocean Reef EMS will not survey or decontaminate patient. Patient will be cocooned and transported as is. Medical interventions will be verbalized. If necessary, EMS personnel will demonstrate one change of gloves that is observed by FEMA. Afterward, they may announce to the FEMA evaluator that they are changing gloves and, once acknowledged, simulate a glove change. PPE will be two pairs of gloves, Tyvek sleeves, boot covers, face shield and N95 mask.
Maintain communications between the medical transportation provider and the receiving medical facility.	A radio test, including “content check,” will be conducted between the ambulance and the hospital once the patient is prepared for simulated transport.