

After Action Report

Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise

Exercise Date: February 10, 2021

May 7, 2021

FINAL

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Executive Summary

On February 10, 2021, the offsite response organizations of the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant 10-mile emergency planning zone participated in a plume exposure pathway exercise. FEMA Region IV Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program staff evaluated that exercise, which also included out of sequence activities conducted on January 14, 2021; February 9, 2021; and February 11, 2021. This report outlines that exercise and out of sequence activities.

The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of state and local preparedness in responding to an incident at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. It was conducted in accordance with FEMA policies and guidance concerning the exercise of state and local radiological emergency response plans and procedures. The previous federal evaluated exercise was conducted on February 20, 2019. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted February 10-12, 1982.

Officials and representatives from participating agencies and organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures, and successfully implemented them during the exercise and out of sequence activities. It was apparent that a great deal of training and coordination was conducted by the offsite response organizations to successfully demonstrate the ability to protect the health and safety of the public. They provided the necessary support and resources to respond to an incident at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. All jurisdictions met their exercise objectives and successfully demonstrated the corresponding core capabilities identified in Section 2.2 of this report. FEMA staff did not identify any level 1 or level 2 findings during this exercise or the out of sequence activities.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated in the exercise and made it a success. The state of Florida and Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant offsite response organizations were among the first in the nation to complete an exercise during the SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19 pandemic. As if response to the current pandemic was not enough, many of the agencies involved also managed three additional emergency declarations (hurricanes Sally, Isaias, and Eta) during the planning cycle for this exercise. Despite ongoing real-world response efforts, the professionalism and teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all phases of the exercise.

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Section 1: Exercise Overview

Exercise Name	2021 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise	
Type of Exercise	Partial Participation Exercise	
Exercise Date	February 10, 2021	
Out of Sequence Date	January 14, 2021, February 9, 2021, and February 11, 2021	
Program	Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program	
Mission Area	Response	
Scenario Type	Plume Exposure Pathway Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise	
Participating Organizations	See Appendix C for the list of participating organizations	
Locations	See Appendix D for the extent of play agreement and exercise locations	
Points of Contact	Mr. Robert Spence South Section Chief FEMA Region IV 3005 Chamblee-Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341	Mr. Nathan Nienhius Turkey Point Site Specialist FEMA Region IV 3005 Chamblee-Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341
	Ms. Kimberly Sharkey Lead REP Planner Florida Division of Emergency Management 255 Shumard Oak Blvd Tallahassee, Florida 32399	Mr. Niel Batista Miami-Dade County, Office of Emergency Management 9300 NW 41st St Miami, Florida 33178
	Ms. Mary Napoli Monroe County Emergency Management 490 63rd St (Ocean), Suite 150 Marathon, Florida 33050	

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Section 2: Exercise Design Summary

2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design

FEMA administers the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program pursuant to the regulations found in Title 44 CFR parts 350, 351, 352, 353 and 354. 44 CFR 350 codifies 16 planning standards that form the basis for radiological emergency response planning for the licensee, state, local, tribal and territorial governments impacted by the emergency planning zones established for each nuclear power plant site in the United States. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations also codify the 16 planning standards for the licensee. 44 CFR 350 sets forth the mechanisms for the formal review and approval of state, local, tribal, and territorial government radiological emergency response plans and procedures by FEMA. One of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program cornerstones established by these regulations is the biennial exercise of offsite response capabilities. During these exercises, affected state, local, tribal, and territorial governments demonstrate their abilities to implement their plans and procedures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological incident at a nuclear plant.

The results of this exercise, together with reviews of the radiological emergency response plans and verification of the periodic requirements set forth in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, the annual letter of certification, and staff assistance visits, enabled FEMA to provide a statement with the transmission of this final after action report to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This statement verifies that the affected state, local, tribal and territorial plans and preparedness are: (1) adequate to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the nuclear power facility by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological incident; and (2) capable of being implemented.

The State of Florida formally submitted the Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERP) for the Turkey Point NPP to FEMA Region IV on August 26, 1983. FEMA approved the plans pursuant to 44 CFR 350 on February 15, 1984. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on February 10, 11 and 12, 1982.

2.2 Exercise Core Capabilities and Objectives

Core capabilities-based planning allows for exercise planning teams to develop exercise objectives and observe exercise outcomes through a framework of specific action items. Using the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program methodology, the exercise objectives meet Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program requirements and objectives. The capability targets to be demonstrated were negotiated with the State of Florida and risk counties. The core capabilities scheduled for demonstration during this exercise were:

- Operational Coordination: Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

- Situational Assessment: Provide all decision makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response.

- Public Information and Warning: Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any

threat or hazard, as well as the actions being taken and the assistance being made available, as appropriate.

- Environmental Response/Health and Safety: Conduct appropriate measures to ensure the protection of the health and safety of the public and workers, as well as the environment, from all-hazards in support of responder operations and the affected communities.

- On Scene Security, Protection and Law Enforcement: Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within the affected areas and also for response personnel performing lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.

- Critical Transportation: Provide transportation (including infrastructure access and accessible transportation services) for response priority objectives, including the evacuation of people and animals, and the delivery of vital response personnel, equipment, and services into the affected areas.

These core capabilities, when successfully demonstrated, meet the exercise objectives. The objectives for this exercise were as follows:

- Objective 1: Demonstrate the ability to alert, activate, and mobilize staff in accordance with plans and procedures to support emergency operations; provide Direction and Control through the Counties' and State Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs).

- Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability to assess conditions and make protective action decisions for State and County emergency workers and the general public through exercise demonstration and discussions of plans and procedures.

- Objective 3: Demonstrate the ability to implement protective actions for State and County emergency workers and the general public through exercise demonstration and discussions of plans and procedures.

- Objective 4: Demonstrate the ability to activate the Primary Alert and Notification System, complemented by other systems, and demonstrate the back-up Alert and Notification System through exercise demonstration or discussions of plans and procedures.

- Objective 5: Demonstrate the effectiveness of plans, policies, and procedures within the joint information system for public and private sector emergency information communications.

- Objective 6: Demonstrate the ability to provide dose projections and protective action recommendations for the plume phase.

2.3 Exercise Scenario

Winds are from the south throughout the exercise. An explosion and fire in an intake cooling water pump occurs. Subsequently, a small reactor coolant system leak begins which increases over time. One charging pump malfunctions. Once the coolant leak increases to a point beyond the capacity of the two remaining charging pumps, the reactor is tripped, and safety injection is actuated. However, four control rods fail to insert.

Later, seals on containment purge exhaust valves deteriorate and begin to leak, resulting in a radiological release. When a plant vent radiation monitor exceeds a threshold level, the utility declares a General Emergency. The utility recommends that offsite response organizations evacuate all sectors 0-2 miles from the plant and downwind sectors from 2-5 miles; monitor and prepare in the remainder of the emergency planning zone; and consider issuance of potassium iodide.

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Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities

3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results

This section contains the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the February 10, 2021, plume exposure pathway exercise and out of sequence activities on January 14, 2021, February 9, 2021, and February 11, 2021.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated based on the demonstration of core capabilities, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program objectives, and capability targets as delineated in the FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual dated December 2019. Capability targets are listed by number and demonstration status.

3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation

The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program methodology is an analytical process used to assess the demonstration of specific capabilities during an exercise. A capability provides a means to perform one or more capability targets under specified conditions and to specific performance standards. Core capabilities form the foundation of the FEMA Region IV Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program evaluations. The core capability summaries below provide an overall combined assessment of state and local jurisdictions based upon their collective demonstrated performance as it relates to the specific core capability.

- Operational Coordination: State and county officials established and maintained a unified and coordinated operational structure. The overall decision-making process integrated critical stakeholders and enabled protective action decisions to be made without undue delay. Due to the SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19 pandemic, operational coordination could have been a real challenge (e.g., social distancing guidelines, virtual workforces, etc.); however, the state and counties innovatively and successfully integrated the use of technology to ensure sufficient support and response, while also protecting their workforces. The integration of virtual conferencing platforms not only facilitated a coordinated operational structure and integrated critical stakeholders into the decision-making process, but it demonstrated an enhanced capability within the state and risk counties.

- Situational Assessment: State dose assessment personnel provided decision makers with relevant information regarding radiological and plant conditions. Personnel gathered information from changing plant and meteorological conditions to assess the radiological release. They performed dose projections and compared their results with utility dose projections and field team readings. This information allowed decision makers to understand the extent of the hazards, their cascading effects, and to make the appropriate protective action decisions.

- Public Information and Warning: Alert and notification of the public occurred via the outdoor warning system (simulated), Emergency Alert System messages (simulated), route alerting (out of sequence), press releases, and virtual press conference. State and county public information officers and spokespersons developed and distributed timely and coordinated emergency information to the public and media. Information relevant to the threat, as well as actions being taken and assistance being made available, was provided to the media and public in a manner that was appropriate to cultural and linguistic needs.

- Environmental Response/Health and Safety: State public health officials managed field team operations and provided instructions to maintain exposure control for state emergency workers. Appropriate measures were taken to protect the health and safety of the public, emergency workers, and the environment.

- On Scene Security, Protection and Law Enforcement: Law enforcement agencies at all levels coordinated operations to establish traffic and access control points and conduct waterway warning and clearance. These operations were successfully validated through discussions with multiple law enforcement officers from various agencies. Officers interviewed displayed an understanding of plans and procedures for these operations by describing specific responsibilities, communications protocols, assigned personal protective equipment, and emergency worker exposure control.

- Critical Transportation: County emergency management officials provided assurance that school district plans and procedures were sufficient to protect the health and safety of the students and faculty in the event of a radiological emergency. Through interview, school officials displayed the knowledge to implement plans and procedures to safely shelter or evacuate students and faculty if directed.

3.3 Jurisdictional Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation

3.3.1 State Jurisdiction

3.3.1.1 Florida Division of Emergency Management

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

State Emergency Operations Center

The Florida Division of Emergency Management successfully demonstrated the capability to respond effectively in the event of a radiological emergency at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. Due to the ongoing response to the SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19 pandemic and in accordance with the extent of play agreement, the state emergency operations center was operating at Level 1 activation status at the beginning of the exercise. The normal process for alerting, notifying, and mobilizing state personnel was discussed per the appropriate current plans and procedures. During the exercise, personnel representing the state emergency operations center discussed the process of increased activation as plant conditions deteriorated to successfully meet requirements.

Communication with the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant; the two risk counties of Miami-Dade and Monroe; and other key response agency personnel began immediately and continued throughout the exercise. The supervisor and staff of the state watch office demonstrated excellent coordination and efficiency. The notional State Emergency Response Team Chief ensured the staff maintained situational awareness with operational information sharing, resource coordination, and communications. Coordination was maintained throughout the exercise with landline, cellphone, internet-based communication platforms, and an automated action tracker database. Effective communication ensured a smooth transition when direction and control was transferred to the Florida Division of Emergency Management All Hazards Incident Management Team.

All-Hazards Incident Management Team

Virtual coordination platforms were established by the Florida Division of Emergency Management's All Hazards Incident Management Team to maintain a unified operational structure that integrated all critical stakeholders during the response to a simulated incident at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. All state personnel were prepositioned at their alternate duty stations at the start of the exercise and were notified of the incident using automated notification software. Typically, the All Hazards Incident Management Team reports to the utility's emergency operations facility to coordinate response activities, but for this exercise, participants remained at their alternate duty stations and connected virtually. Appropriate communications capabilities were maintained throughout the exercise.

The deputy state coordinating officer lead the state response and filled the roles of the entire All Hazards Incident Management Team during this exercise. The deputy state coordinating officer maintained situational awareness of the incident and responded quickly to fulfill requests for personnel and resources from the risk counties. Incident support was coordinated through the state emergency operations center via incident management coordination software.

All relevant state and local stakeholders participated in the Florida Power and Light Recovery Manager's briefings to maintain situational awareness of the incident at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. Subsequent discussions and coordination related to protective action decisions for emergency workers and the public was conducted by the risk counties without the inclusion of participating state agencies, to include the All Hazards Incident Management Team. The deputy state coordinating officer anticipated participating in those discussions and remained prepared to provide input and support over the dedicated virtual coordination platform.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 3.1, 5.4.

- Level 1 Finding: None
- Level 2 Finding: None
- Not Demonstrated: None
- Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved: None
- Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved: None

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

State Emergency Operations Center

Public information management was demonstrated at the state emergency operations center and provided necessary public messaging using a virtual joint information system until the emergency news center was activated. The public information officer used appropriate development and approval protocols and kept various agency representatives informed. She successfully performed media monitoring of radio, television, websites, and social media sites for awareness of any public emergency information needs. However, she could not speak during the virtual press conference due to technical difficulties. Although there was no state representation during the press conference, there were no negative impacts identified.

All-Hazards Incident Management Team

The Florida Division of Emergency Management's All Hazards Incident Management Team supported the capability to provide public information and warning by monitoring joint information system activities and press releases developed by the risk counties and the emergency news center. All public information was shared with the state emergency operations center public information officer through incident management software. The All Hazards Incident Management Team remained prepared to support any requests related to providing the public with timely and accurate information.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 3.1, 3.3, 5.4.

- Level 1 Finding: None
- Level 2 Finding: None
- Not Demonstrated: None
- Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved: None
- Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved: None

3.3.1.2 Florida Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control

Situational Assessment Capability Summary:

Florida Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control personnel successfully demonstrated the ability to assess radiological and plant conditions and to provide sound recommendations to decision makers in response to a radiological incident at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant.

Bureau of Radiation Control staff promptly responded to the utility's emergency operations facility after being notified that an emergency had been declared at the plant. They proactively gathered information on plant conditions and radiological release rates from utility personnel throughout the event. Dose assessors used this information to calculate projected doses at various distances downwind from the plant. They compared their results with utility calculations and field team measurements and found them to be consistent.

The Bureau of Radiation Control Operations Officer recommended appropriate protective actions to state and county decision makers based on the dose projection calculations. Following the declaration of General Emergency by plant staff, the operations officer concurred with the utility's evacuation recommendations. He also recommended that all emergency workers in the 10-mile emergency planning zone ingest potassium iodide. During a subsequent briefing with decision makers, based on increased thyroid dose projections, he recommended ingestion of potassium iodide by members of the public ordered to evacuate.

Due to the real-world public health emergency, and in accordance with the extent of play agreement, state and county emergency management personnel did not respond to the emergency operations facility. The operations officer and utility personnel communicated with decision makers using a communications software platform. While this platform allowed essential information to be shared, the operations officer could not be as involved in protective action discussions as if the state and county personnel had been at the facility.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.3, 1.4.

- Level 1 Finding: None
- Level 2 Finding: None
- Not Demonstrated: None
- Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved: None
- Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved: None

Environmental Response Health and Safety Capability Summary

Florida Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control personnel demonstrated the ability to provide overall management and direct movements of field monitoring teams to characterize the plume in response to a radiological incident at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. Staff members were prepositioned in accordance with the extent of play agreement. Two field team directors responded to the emergency operations facility in Miami, Florida. Two field monitoring teams, the mobile emergency radiological laboratory, and the sample preparation vehicle participated for training only.

Several communication methods were functional and continuously available. Message traffic to field teams was handled without delay and all messages were successfully transmitted and understood. The field team director demonstrated the necessary actions for emergency worker exposure control as appropriate for the exercise. The field team director was knowledgeable of exposure limits and kept track and recorded all dosimeter readings transmitted by the field teams.

The field team director instructed the field teams to appropriate downwind locations to obtain surveys and air samples. The field team director informed the field teams of emergency classification level changes and the onset of a radiological release. When authorized by the operations officer, the field team director informed the field teams to ingest potassium iodide. Upon the conclusion of air sample operations, the field team director instructed field teams to proceed to a low background area, purge the samples, and return samples to the mobile emergency radiological laboratory for analysis. The mobile emergency radiological laboratory was relocated (simulated) during the exercise due to the lab's location in a downwind area.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.3, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 4.1.

- Level 1 Finding: None
- Level 2 Finding: None
- Not Demonstrated: None
- Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved: None
- Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved: None

3.3.2 Joint Operations

3.3.2.1 Joint Information System/Center

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

In response to a simulated radiological incident at Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant, representatives from the counties of Miami-Dade and Monroe; the state of Florida; Florida Power and Light Company; and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission coordinated successfully to deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the affected populations through the use of a press conference and rumor control activities. Information was relayed to the media and public appropriate to cultural and linguistic needs and provided accurate actions being taken by the offsite response organizations.

Communication processes and systems were sufficient to support emergency operations. Staff within the emergency news center maintained constant communication with their respective agencies using phone, text, email, and web conference platforms. Wireless internet and printing capabilities posed a challenge for staff, though it did not hinder the ability to relay information to the public and media.

Emergency information and instructions provided to the public and news media were delivered from representatives within the utility's emergency news center through one press conference. News releases were disseminated from each respective agency and provided to its public information officer within the emergency news center. The information was shared among the emergency news center staff and used to properly formulate messaging for delivery to the public and media, along with information obtained from the adjoining utility emergency operations facility. Two impediments to evacuation routes were discussed among emergency news center staff and the respective counties; however, they did not necessitate inclusion in the press conference.

Public information officers from the affected offsite organizations, utility, and federal agency collaborated to conduct a virtual press conference via web conference platform to deliver accurate information to the media, consistent with protective actions following the declaration of a General Emergency by the utility. Public information officers within the emergency news center coordinated among themselves and with their respective agencies prior to addressing the media. During the press conference, the current emergency classification level was adequately explained; landmarks and boundaries were provided; and appropriate closing statements were made. One rumor regarding an explosion at the plant was addressed by Miami-Dade County. Messaging was provided in both English and Spanish as required for the linguistic population within the emergency planning zone. Questions posed by mock media were answered appropriately; technical expertise was provided by a subject matter expert from the utility. It is advised to ensure participation by at least one representative from the state; further, enhancement of processes to conduct virtual press conferences is recommended to ensure optimal and professional visual and audio delivery.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 3.1, 3.3, 5.4.

- Level 1 Finding: None
- Level 2 Finding: None
- Not Demonstrated: None
- Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved: None

- Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved: None

3.3.3 Risk Jurisdictions

3.3.3.1 Miami-Dade County

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

Miami-Dade Office of Emergency Management personnel successfully demonstrated this core capability by establishing and maintaining a coordinated operational structure in support of a simulated emergency at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. The planning chief assumed control with support from the Miami-Dade Emergency Operations Center staff. The incident commander simulated response by connecting virtually to the utility's Emergency Operations Facility and served as the liaison coordinating the response with the state All-Hazards Incident Management Team and Monroe County liaison. Miami-Dade Plans and Operations Chiefs played integral roles in the incident response. The incident commander delegated authority to the planning chief for decision making.

The emergency operations center is housed within the Miami-Dade Fire Rescue Headquarters. The site possessed multiple levels of security and was well equipped with redundant communications systems. The primary communications between the utility and responding jurisdictions was the 'Hot Ring Down' line. All communications systems were functional at the commencement of the exercise and there were no communications systems failures during the exercise.

Following the declaration of alert, activation and staffing of the emergency operations center was done in accordance with published plans and exercise agreements. Using a modified incident command structure, multiple agencies supported the response with the operations chief assuming the position as the emergency operations center manager.

After receiving notification that the utility had declared a Site Area Emergency, Miami-Dade made the decision to notionally disseminate radiological equipment and supplies to responding emergency workers. Emergency worker kits are staged and maintained at a nearby warehouse. The kits included high and low range dosimeters, a thermoluminescent dosimeter film badge, a dosimeter charger, Radiation Exposure Record cards, a potassium iodide instruction card, two 65 mg potassium iodide tablets, and additional personal protective equipment. Adequate inventory of equipment and supplies, including calibration and expiration dates, were verified during staff assistance visit on February 11, 2021.

Upon receiving the General Emergency notification and considering relevant factors, Miami-Dade's protective action decision concurred with the utility's evacuation recommendation with the addition of a shelter in place order for all remaining areas. These decisions were coordinated with Monroe County. Additionally, Miami-Dade concurred with the decision to require county emergency workers to ingest potassium iodine. The planning chief's actions were public centric and in concurrence with senior staff.

Throughout the exercise, the emergency operations center staff worked as a cohesive unit by regularly sharing information and providing frequent updates of actions being conducted. These engagements allowed for the staff to maintain situational awareness throughout the exercise. The planning section chief and staff performed all required actions and demonstrated that they are fully capable of responding to an emergency at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 5.4.

- Level 1 Finding: None
- Level 2 Finding: None
- Not Demonstrated: None
- Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved: None
- Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved: None

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

The Miami-Dade County Office of Emergency Management Lead Public Information Officer, Copywriter, Media Coordinator, Public Safety Social Media Coordinator, and Public Information Officer Assignment Desk staff successfully demonstrated the capability to develop and disseminate emergency information and instructions to the public.

Shortly after the start of the exercise, but before any emergency classification level declaration was made, the emergency operations center incident commander delegated authority to the planning section chief to review and approve all news releases, Emergency Alert System messages, and social media messages. The planning section chief relayed this delegation of authority to the lead public information officer and stated that all news releases and messages were to be disseminated from the emergency operations center and not the joint information center. The joint information center was provided a copy of all releases and messages, but original dissemination occurred at the emergency operations center.

When a news release, Emergency Alert System message, and/or social media message was required the lead public information officer asked the copywriter to tailor the pre-scripted release and/or message. Once tailored, the copywriter printed it in both English and Spanish for review and approval by the planning section chief. Once approved, the messages were saved, published, and disseminated as appropriate. This process was used for all news releases and Emergency Alert System messages. Social media messages followed nearly the same process, except instead of being published and disseminated, they were shared to a county social media account. In total, 11 news releases, Emergency Alert System messages, and social media messages were developed and disseminated (simulated) to the public.

Due to the SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19 pandemic, the public information team virtually demonstrated the capability to broadcast Emergency Alert System messages and activate the sirens to provide timely information and instructions to the public. Concurrent with broadcast of Emergency Alert System Message #2, the sirens were activated by the public safety social media coordinator. Following activation of the sirens, siren #35 self-reported as having failed. The public safety social media coordinator immediately notified the lead public information officer, who in turn, instructed the coordinator to notify the public safety branch director of the siren failure and number of the failed siren. The public safety branch director and emergency support function 16 liaison were interviewed on the implementation of back-up route alerting.

Media and public inquiries were injected during the exercise by a county controller. The public information team at the emergency operations center were not responsible for trend and/or rumor control. Capturing and addressing trends and/or rumors during the press conference was the responsibility of their counterparts at the joint information center.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 3.2, 3.3.

- Level 1 Finding: None
- Level 2 Finding: None
- Not Demonstrated: None
- Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved: None
- Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved: None

On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement Capability Summary:

The emergency support function 16 liaison, a Miami-Dade Police Department Lieutenant, successfully validated via interview the capability to establish appropriate traffic and access control and provide accurate instructions to traffic and access control officers. The interview occurred following the General Emergency declaration planning section chief's meeting in which the decision was made to initiate phase one of the traffic control plan.

The Miami-Dade Police Department was the lead agency for coordinating an evacuation of an emergency planning area(s) and staffing the appropriate traffic control points. Once the emergency operations center incident commander determined which emergency planning area(s) to evacuate, the areas were prioritized, and those closest to the plant were evacuated first. As traffic volume decreased, officers assigned to traffic control points within the evacuated area(s) were reassigned to areas of greater need.

Miami-Dade Police Department utilized multiple redundant communication systems sufficient to support emergency operations. Miami-Dade Police Department vehicles were equipped with 800 MHz radio systems and public address systems. Officers would also be equipped with cellular phones and hand-held radios. These communication systems are in use daily and, should a failure occur, would be replaced promptly.

The Lieutenant explained that officers with the Miami-Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation Department were responsible for delivering radiation protection equipment to the three evacuation command posts. At these locations, Miami-Dade Police Department officers would collect the equipment (in bulk) and assign it to individual officers tasked with staffing traffic control points nearest the plant. Additional radiation protection equipment was requested by the emergency support function 16 liaison in the emergency operations center through a web-based incident management system. The traffic control policy and procedures contained dose and exposure control information, and as stated above, the public safety branch director and emergency support function 16 liaison were familiar with this information.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 2.2, 3.1, 5.4.

- Level 1 Finding: None
- Level 2 Finding: None
- Not Demonstrated: None
- Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved: None
- Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved: None

Critical Transportation Capability Summary:

Miami-Dade County emergency management officials successfully validated via interview the capability to protect the health and safety of students and faculty in the event of a radiological emergency. On February 9, 2021, FEMA evaluators interviewed representatives from the following schools: South Dade Center, Irving & Beatrice Peskoe K-8 Center, Redland Middle School. These schools are part of the Miami-Dade Public School System which is the only school district in the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant 10-mile emergency planning zone. The school officials demonstrated knowledge of, and preparedness to implement, written plans and procedures. They confirmed and described various aspects of their plans and procedures including the sheltering of students and faculty or the relocation of students to host schools, if directed by the district superintendent.

In the event of an emergency at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant, the schools would be notified by the school district via handheld radio, known as the district emergency communications network (DECON) radio. or telephone. The DECON radio is tested by the district two to three times per year; however, it is operationally checked and utilized daily. It is typically located in the main office of each school and multiple staff are trained to operate it. If the decision is made by district officials to relocate students, each school intends to move all students and faculty in one trip. School plans include the host schools and the maximum number of busses required. The school district is responsible for mobilizing and prioritizing transportation assets.

All students and their parents or guardians are provided with emergency information fliers annually. In the event of an emergency, parents are notified through various means including telephone, websites, and mass notification applications. If students are relocated, parents are instructed to go to designated host schools for reunification. Student tracking is accomplished via rosters maintained by teachers and administrative staff. Teachers accompany students until they are reunited with a family member or guardian. Student medical records are maintained and transported by teachers, nurses, or other designated faculty.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.5.

- Level 1 Finding: None
- Level 2 Finding: None
- Not Demonstrated: None
- Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved: None
- Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved: None

3.3.3.2 Monroe County

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

Monroe County staff successfully demonstrated the ability to identify, alert, and mobilize emergency operations center staff in a timely manner. The approved extent-of-play agreement allowed for the pre-positioning of staff. Staff reported to Monroe County's Tavernier Emergency Operations Center at Tavernier Fire Station and staff participating virtually used video conferencing platforms. A representative from Monroe County demonstrated the use of a mass notification system to alert and mobilize staff members. Through interview, the representative described how the levels of staffing would increase as the emergency operations center's activation level increased in response to escalating emergency classification levels. An incident action plan was published to demonstrate the capability to maintain staffing for 24-hour operations. Monroe County received initial notification of an incident at the plant through the 'Hot Ring Down' line. Subsequent changes to pertinent data and emergency classification levels were communicated in the same manner. The emergency operations center was formally declared activated at the Alert emergency classification level.

Direction and control of the overall response effort for Monroe County was successfully demonstrated and provided by the Incident Commander, with assistance from the Logistics Chief. Monroe County's Incident Commander operated from the emergency operations facility and maintained frequent communication with her staff operating in the joint information center and the county's emergency operations center. Situational awareness was maintained throughout the exercise with prompt and accurate communication of critical information and protective action decisions. Input was obtained from staff as needed to aid in decision-making. The Logistics Chief supported a coordinated response effort in the emergency operations center by facilitating frequent and thorough briefings, held on the video conferencing platform, to inform in-person and virtual players. Each support agency was also called on to brief 'around the room' on their current and completed response activities, and coordination occurred among the organizations as needed. Resource requests among support agencies were made by entering requests into the county's web-based emergency management system and escalated as needed to the state through the state's web-based emergency management system. Monroe County's Tavernier Emergency Operations Center is small, but adequate to support emergency response operations. All of the necessary equipment and resources were available to staff. The emergency operations center is located outside of the 10-mile emergency planning zone.

Monroe County successfully demonstrated the capability to utilize appropriate factors and necessary coordination to make protective action decisions for the public. The Monroe County Incident Commander held the authority to make protective action decisions for her county. Protective action recommendations from the utility were discussed on a video conferencing platform, which included Monroe County, Miami-Dade County, Florida Division of Emergency Management, and Florida Department of Health Bureau of Radiation Control. Following the discussion, which allowed time for coordination, questions, and concerns, the Monroe County Incident Commander and Miami-Dade Incident Commander held a second call to confirm any protective action decisions for their respective jurisdictions. A third call was held, which included representatives from Miami-Dade and key chief positions from Monroe County, to communicate any protective action decisions for their jurisdictions and to coordinate Emergency Alert System and press release messages, as well as sirens and route alerting. Relevant factors were considered in the protective action decision-making process. Monroe County emergency operations center staff demonstrated (using a simulation cell) the ability to contact residents with access and functional needs and, prompted by exercise inject, the capability to provide transportation to a resident who was not previously identified as having access and functional needs. School systems were notified at the Alert emergency classification

level to conduct early dismissal. The northward wind direction, blowing the plume away from Monroe County, factored into Monroe County's decision for emergency workers to be issued, but not ingest, potassium iodide. Monroe County residents were not issued potassium iodide. These decisions were made in coordination with Miami-Dade County.

The Monroe County Department of Health representative was knowledgeable of the Emergency Worker Exposure Control Decision-Making Process capability target. He explained appropriate dosimetry, potassium iodide, authority to increase exposure limits, and procedures to ensure safe radiological exposure of emergency workers performing route alerting, traffic control point and waterway clearance operations. The representative described procedures to implement protective actions to ensure the safety of emergency workers and coordination among deployed staff. He stated emergency workers would record exposures and doses on a county issued dose record which would be turned in with dosimetry at the end of each shift. He also stated the Incident Commander has authority to increase emergency worker exposure limits in excess of 500 mR after discussions with the Department of Health.

Monroe County successfully demonstrated the Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management capability target through related actions during the exercise. The decision to issue potassium iodide was based on escalating plant conditions and information as it became available. Upon reaching the General Emergency classification level, Monroe County emergency workers were issued radiological emergency worker kits. The emergency worker kits were maintained at the Tavernier Fire Station. The kits included high and low range dosimeters, a thermoluminescent dosimeter film badge, a dosimeter charger, a Radiation Exposure Record card, a Potassium Iodide information and consent form, two 65 mg Potassium Iodide tablets, and personal protective equipment. Monroe County emergency workers were directed not to ingest potassium iodide until specifically directed. Inventory and calibration of dosimeters and potassium iodide quantities and expiration dates were verified during staff assistance visits conducted on January 13-14, 2021.

The Communications capability target was successfully demonstrated. The emergency operations center utilized redundant means of communications, to include fax, high speed secure internet, satellite phones, 'Hot Ring Down' phone, commercial landlines, laptops, cell phones, email, conference bridge lines, virtual meeting platforms, and emergency management software systems. The primary means of communications was the 'Hot Ring Down' phone which operated without failure. Status calls and discussions among the risk counties concerning protective actions were coordinated on cellular phones. Sufficient equipment and supplies ensured emergency operations can be sustained or extended as required.

Traffic and Access Control was successfully accomplished through interview with a Monroe County Sheriff's Office Deputy. The deputy stated that at General Emergency, the emergency operations center operations officer provides the protective action decision to the emergency operation center Sheriff's Office liaison who then notifies the Monroe County Sheriff's Office to implement traffic control point procedures. The deputy receiving the implementation notification contacts on duty patrolmen and assigns traffic control points to be manned and monitor traffic along the evacuation route. If an impediment is reported by patrolmen, the deputy notifies the Florida Department of Transportation for assistance in removing impediments. The deputy also notifies the Sheriff's Office liaison in the emergency operations center with an update of the impediment and recommends an alternate route. The Sheriff's Office liaison provides updates through the emergency operations center operations officer to the incident commander and public information officer for further action.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 5.4.

- Level 1 Finding: None
- Level 2 Finding: None
- Not Demonstrated: None
- Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved: None
- Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved: None

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

Monroe County successfully demonstrated the capability to alert and notify the public in a timely manner. Following the incident commander's protective action decision to alert and notify the public, route alerting was initiated using pre-approved message templates. The Monroe County Public Information Officer at the emergency operations facility provided the Monroe County Public Information Liaison at the Tavernier Emergency Operations Center with an approved emergency alert system pre-scripted message. The liaison entered the information accurately into the public alert and warning system software and initiated the notification. All messages contained the four essential elements. No failures of the system were observed, and confirmation of successful message transmission and message content was provided. By interview, the public information liaison explained the process for the National Weather Service in Key Largo to activate the Emergency Alert System.

Accurate emergency information and instructions were provided to the public and the news media in a timely manner by Monroe County. Four news releases were coordinated, prepared, and released by Monroe County. Each news release contained prompt, reliable, and actionable information. Pre-scripted news release templates were selected by the Monroe County Incident Commander and coordinated with Miami-Dade County. The news release was modified by the public information officer in the joint information center and, once approved for release by the incident commander, forwarded to the Monroe County Public Information Liaison in the emergency operations center for distribution to the media and posted to the web-based emergency management system. All news releases contained appropriate cultural and linguistic considerations and were consistent with protective actions. Media and public inquiries were not managed from Monroe County's Tavernier Emergency Operations Center.

Ocean Reef Public Safety personnel successfully demonstrated route alerting capabilities for the Ocean Reef community during out of sequence activities on January 14, 2021. Public Safety personnel walked through their process of receiving an Emergency Alert System message from Monroe County, printing and disseminating the information to assigned personnel, and delivering the message to the workers and residents on Ocean Reef property. Officers provided escort along designated routes and explained processes in accordance with written plans and procedures.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 3.2, 3.3.

- Level 1 Finding: None
- Level 2 Finding: None
- Not Demonstrated: None

- Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved: None
- Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved: None

On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement Capability Summary:

Traffic Control

Monroe County representatives successfully demonstrated the Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management capability target through related actions during the exercise. Two deputies from the Monroe County Sheriff's Office were interviewed regarding implementation of exposure control for an incident at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. The Monroe County Sheriff's Office would provide deputies assigned to traffic control point duties with an emergency worker go-kit containing adequate numbers of high range and low range direct-read dosimetry with chargers, permanent-record dosimetry, potassium iodide pills, and the required maintenance support and training. The deputies were familiar with dosimetry and radiological exposure control procedures. They explained how to zero, read, and record dosimetry; proper wearing of direct-reading dosimeters; as well as an understanding of administrative limits, reporting, and turnback values. They accurately described procedures to consume potassium iodide only when directed. Inventory and calibration of dosimeters and potassium iodide quantities and expiration dates were verified during staff assistance visits conducted on January 13-14, 2021.

Monroe County has multiple redundant communication systems sufficient to support emergency operations. Monroe County Sheriff's Office vehicles were equipped with 800 MHz radio systems and public address systems. The deputies would also be equipped with cellular phones and hand-held radios. These communication systems are in use daily and, should a failure occur, would be replaced promptly.

The Traffic and Access Control capability target was successfully accomplished through interview with two deputies from the Monroe County Sheriff's Office. Traffic control points are pre-identified in plans and emergency operations center staff would communicate the selected traffic control points to be established by the Monroe County Sheriff's Office. An adequate number of vehicles are available in the fleet to support traffic control, with additional vehicles and barricades available through the local fire department and the Florida Department of Transportation. The vehicles are equipped with traffic cones, flares, reflective vests, and gloves for directing traffic. If additional equipment were needed, they stated they would make a request through their dispatch. Prior to deployment, deputies would receive an emergency worker briefing. The deputies interviewed were aware of the locations of the reception center, emergency worker monitoring and decontamination center, and where to report at the end of their shift. If an impediment should arise, such as a disabled vehicle that a deputy cannot move to the side of the road, they stated deputies on-scene are required to call in a contracted wrecker to remove the vehicle. If the impediment is too large for a wrecker to handle, or if the obstacle is an immovable object or obstruction, deputies are instructed to reroute traffic in the most efficient possible manner. Additional resources to remove impediments are coordinated between the Monroe County Sheriff's Office, Florida Highway Patrol, the Public Works Department, and the Department of Transportation. Impediments to evacuation are communicated to dispatch to be raised to emergency operations center staff and the joint information center.

Waterway Warning

Waterway warning and clearance was successfully demonstrated through interview with representatives from the Monroe County Sheriff's Office, Florida Fish and Wildlife Commission, and United States Coast Guard. Florida Fish and Wildlife is the lead agency for coordinating waterway warning as well as evacuation and clearing of low water areas. The United States Coast Guard is the lead agency to clear Biscayne Bay.

The Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission stated emergency workers would receive a radiation safety briefing prior to issuance of dosimetry and potassium iodide, along with instructions for use of dosimetry, potassium iodide, and reading and recording information on exposure record cards. The safety briefing would cover exposure limits, when to ingest potassium iodide, and contraindications for potassium iodide.

Multiple and redundant communication systems are available to support emergency operations. As described, the Coast Guard utilizes radio for broadcasting emergency messages over marine radio channels. Additionally, public address systems on equipped boats and flyover aircraft are used to sweep the area. These communication systems are frequently in use and, should a failure occur, would be replaced promptly.

Waterway warning and clearance is a coordinated effort among the Monroe County Sheriff's Office, the Florida Fish and Wildlife Commission, and United States Coast Guard to clear Biscayne Bay and low water areas. These agencies are notified at the Alert emergency classification level. An emergency message is developed and approved to be broadcast over marine radio channels and public address systems. By interview, the stated process to implement waterway warning involved identifying whether boaters are in the bay by conducting a flyover. More than adequate numbers of boats are available among these agencies to clear the area within 45 minutes. Using the marine channel radio, public address systems on flyover aircraft, and clearance boats, boaters are advised to clear the bay. The emergency message is repeated every 15 minutes.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 2.2, 3.1, 5.4.

- Level 1 Finding: None
- Level 2 Finding: None
- Not Demonstrated: None
- Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved: None
- Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved: None

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Section 4: Conclusion

FEMA assesses offsite response organization preparedness on an ongoing basis which meets the intent of the 44 CFR 350 planning standards and, through the assessment of selected core capabilities, the National Preparedness Goal. This report is used to document biennial demonstration-based assessment activities and will be used to inform the Biennial Preparedness Report in December 2022.

The analysis of capabilities sections above described the offsite response capabilities of the state of Florida and the counties of Miami-Dade and Monroe. Overall, the exercise was a success. The demonstration-based assessment activities evaluated by core capabilities, objectives, and capability targets were successfully demonstrated, and no level 1 or level 2 findings were identified. All offsite response organizations validated their emergency response plans and procedures, and successfully demonstrated the ability to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of an incident involving the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant.

In addition, the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant offsite response organizations were among the first to complete an exercise during the SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19 pandemic. The state and counties innovatively and successfully implemented and used technology to ensure sufficient support and response, while also protecting their workforces. The integration of virtual conferencing platforms allowed more players to participate safely, while enhancing the operational communication capability within the state. The lessons learned and best practices gained through the implementation and use of new technology should be documented in emergency response plans and procedures and used to supplement future in-person exercise participation and evaluation.

Based on the results of this exercise and FEMA's review of the 2020 annual letter of certification submitted by the state of Florida, the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness of the state of Florida and the affected local jurisdictions site-specific to the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant can be implemented. They are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of an emergency at the site. The Title 44 CFR, Part 350 approval of the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness site-specific to the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant granted on February 15, 1984, will remain in effect.

Despite the current pandemic and other ongoing real-world response efforts, the professionalism and teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all phases of the exercise. FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated and made this exercise a success.

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Appendix A: Exercise Timeline

Emergency Classification Level or Event		Time Utility Declared	Time That Notification Was Received or Action Was Taken					
			FDEM SEOC	FDEM AHIMT	FLDOH BRC	MIAMI-DADE COUNTY EOC	MONROE COUNTY EOC	JIC
Unusual Event		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Alert		0825	0833	0845	0844	0833	0833	N/A
Site Area Emergency		1002	1008	1002	1003	1008	1008	1005
General Emergency		1047	1053	1047	1048	1053	1053	1055 / 1121*
Simulated Rad. Release Started		1030	1033	1033	1033	1033	1033	1035 / 1121*
Simulated Rad. Release Ended		Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing
Facility Declared Operational		0904	0925	N/A	0904	0900	0923	0940
State of Emergency Declared		State	0955	0955	-	-	-	-
		Local	-	-	-	1050	1002	-
End Exercise		1202	1202	1202	1203	1220	1200	1203
Precautionary Actions: Monroe: Early dismissal of schools in area 10			-	-	-	-	0848	-
1st Siren Activation: Stay Tuned			-	-	-	1050	-	1050
1st Route Alerting: Stay Tuned			-	-	-	-	1050	-
1st EAS Message: Stay Tuned			-	-	-	1050	1059	1050
Protective Action Decision 1: All boat traffic diverted within 10-mile EPZ Relocate schools in area 4; school lockdown for areas 5, 6, 7 Miami-Dade: Evacuate: Areas 2 and 4 Miami-Dade: Shelter in Place: Areas 3, 5, 6, 7, 8			-	-	-	1117	1117	1121*
2nd Siren Activation			-	-	-	1130	-	1130
2nd Route Alerting			-	-	-	-	1130	-
2nd EAS Message			-	-	-	1130	1139	1130
KI Ingestion Decision:	Emergency Workers: Ingest Miami-Dade only		-	-	-	1117	-	-
	General Public: Ingest Miami-Dade only		-	-	-	1205	-	-

*Denotes the time in which a decision was messaged from the joint information center

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Appendix B: Evaluator Assignments

Location/Venue	Evaluation Team	Core Capability
State Emergency Operations Center	Michael Dolder	Operational Coordination Public Information & Warning
All Hazards Incident Management Team	Matthew Bradley Michael Dolder	Operational Coordination Public Information & Warning
Dose Assessment & Field Team Management	John Fill Jill Leatherman	Situational Assessment Environmental Response Health & Safety
Mobile Rad Lab and Field Teams – TRAINING ONLY	Deb Blunt Brad McCree	Environmental Response Health & Safety
Joint Information Center/Joint Information System	Elisabeth Adkins Paul Nied	Public Information & Warning
Florida Power and Light Emergency Operations Facility	John Fill	Situational Assessment
Miami- Dade County Emergency Operations Center	Dave Ortman Erica Houghton Farrah Stewart (OJT) Russell Bergmann	Operational Coordination On Scene Security Protection Public Information & Warning
Miami- Dade County School Interviews and Staff Assistance Visit	Nathan Nienhius	Critical Transportation Verification of 2020 ALC submission
Monroe County Emergency Operations Center	Glenda Bryson Gerald McLemore Robert Nash	Operational Coordination Public Information & Warning On Scene Security Protection

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Appendix C: Exercise Participants

Participating Organizations
State of Florida
Agency for Health Care Administration
Florida Department of Children and Family
Florida Department of Environmental Protection
Florida Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control
Florida Department of Law Enforcement
Florida Department of Transportation
Florida Division of Emergency Management
Florida Fish and Wildlife Commission
Florida Highway Patrol
South Florida Water Management District
Miami-Dade County
Cutler Bay (Municipality)
Florida City (Municipality)
Homestead (Municipality)
Homestead Air Reserve Base (Municipality)
Miami-Dade Animal Services
Miami-Dade Community Action and Human Services
Miami-Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation
Miami-Dade County Public Schools Police
Miami-Dade Fire Rescue
Miami-Dade Department of Health

Participating Organizations
Miami-Dade Office of Emergency Management
Miami-Dade Police Department
Miami-Dade Public Housing and Community Development
Miami-Dade Public Schools
Miami-Dade Public Works
Miami-Dade Regulatory and Economic Resources
Miami-Dade Solid Waste Management
Miami-Dade Transit
Miami-Dade Water and Sewer
Parks, Recreation, and Open Spaces
Monroe County
Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority
Islamorada Fire Rescue
Key Largo Fire Department and Emergency Medical Services
Key Largo Wastewater Treatment District
Monroe County Board of County Commissioners
Monroe County Department of Health
Monroe County Emergency Management
Monroe County Fire Rescue
Monroe County School District
Monroe County Sheriff's Office
Ocean Reef Community Association Public Safety Department
Tavernier Volunteer Fire Department

Participating Organizations
Private Sector
American Red Cross
Florida Power and Light Company
Mariners Hospital
National Weather Service, Key West
Salvation Army
Federal
National Park Service (Biscayne)
United States Coast Guard
United States Department of Homeland Security, FEMA Region IV
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II

Appendix D: Extent of Play Agreements

NOTE: Once complete, convert to this document to PDF and add EOPAs (PDF Version)

Turkey Point NPP Evaluated Exercise
February 10, 2021

EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT

Florida Division of Emergency Management

FULL PARTICIPATION RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY

PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE

All activities will be demonstrated fully in accordance with respective plans as they would be in an actual emergency. This Extent of Play agreement is written by exception. If it is not listed as an exception it will be demonstrated as described in the plans, standard operating guides or procedures. Any issue or discrepancy arising during exercise play may be demonstrated if allowed by the RAC Chair or as listed herein. This allowance may be granted if it is not disruptive to exercise play and is mutually agreed to by the ORO controller and FEMA evaluator FEMA evaluator.

Core Capability: Operational Coordination

Definition: Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

OBJECTIVE 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGMENT

Capability Target 1:1 Mobilization: The capability to alert, notify, and mobilize ORO's to staff facilities in support of emergency operations.

Florida Division of Emergency Management: All Hazards Incident Management Team (AHIMT) personnel will be en route to the Emergency Operations Facility located at 9250 West Flagler Street, Miami, FL when an Alert has been declared in anticipation of that facility being declared operational at a Site Area Emergency. The State Emergency Operations Center located at 2575 Shumard Oak Blvd. in Tallahassee, will also begin to monitor in accordance with the State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan.

Capability Target 1.2: Direction and Control: The capability to provide overall direction and control of response efforts, commensurate with the responsibilities of leadership.

Florida Division of Emergency Management: Transfer of Command and Control will be demonstrated at the State Emergency Operations Center located at 2575 Shumard Oak Blvd, Tallahassee, Fl via conference call with the onsite All Hazards Incident Management Team (AHMIT) at 9250 West Flagler Street, Miami, Florida in accordance with the State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan.

Capability Target 1.4 Protective Action Decisions for the Plume Phase: The capability to utilize appropriate factors and necessary coordination in the decision-making process used to make PADS for the public.

Florida Division of Emergency Management: The All Hazards Incident Management Team (AHIMT) personnel will coolaborate in the development of initial and subsequent protective action decisions (State coordination only with counties implementing) based on Licensee and Bureau of Radiation Control protective action recommendations and in accordance with the State Emergency Radiological Plan.

Objective 3: ALERT AND NOTIFICATION

Capability Target 3.1: Communications: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel.

Florida Division of Emergency Management: One primary and one secondary communications system between the All Hazards Incident Management Team (AHIMT) personnel at the FPL Emergency Operations Center in Miami and the State Emergency Operations Center in Tallahassee will be demonstrated. Should an actual failure of the Hot Ring Down system occur during the exercise, the secondary communications system will be demonstrated at the State Emergency Operations Center. Should no actual failure occur, this objective will be demonstrated through discussion.

OBJECTIVE 5: OPERATE

Capability Target 5.4: Traffic and Access Control: The capability to select, establish, and staff traffic and access control points and removing impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic.

Florida Division of Emergency Management: The State Emergency Operations located at 2575 Shumard Oaks Blvd, Tallahassee, Fl will support only if the counties request law enforcement.

Core Capability: Public Information and Warning

Definition: Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

OBJECTIVE 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Capability 1.1 Mobilization The capability to alert, notify, and mobilize OROs to staff facilities in support of emergency operations.

Florida Division of Emergency Management: The SERT Chief at the State Emergency Operations Center located at 2575 Shumard Oaks Blvd, Tallahassee, FL will instruct the SWO to send out an Everbridge notification to notify all 18 ESF's to report to the SEOC and provide 24-hour staffing.

OBJECTIVE 3: ALERT AND NOTIFICATION

Capability Target 3.1: Communications: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel.

Florida Division of Emergency Management: THE SEOC and AHIMT will communicate through Everbridge, WebEOC and emails.

Capability Target 3.2: Alert and Notification of the Public: Provide instructions to the public.

Florida Division of Emergency Management: The All Hazards Incident Management Team (AHIMT) will play a coordination role only. The All Hazards Incident Management Team will not be responsible for the actual sounding of sirens, the broadcast of Emergency Alert System messages or route alerting.

Capability Target 3.3 Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and News Media: The capability to disseminate emergency information an instruction to the public during all phases of an incident.

Florida Division of Emergency Management: This will be demonstrated at the State of Emergency Operations Center located at 2575 Shumard Oaks Blvd, Tallahassee, Fl within the Emergency Support Function 14 (Public Information) and will be demonstrated at the Joint Information Center located at the FPL Emergency Operations Facility in Miami, Fl in accordance with the State Radiological Emergency Plan.

OBJECTIVE 5: OPERATE

Capability Target 5.4: Traffic and Access Control: The capability to select, establish, and staff traffic and access control points and removing impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic.

Florida Division of Emergency Management: The State Emergency Operations located at 2575 Shumard Oaks Blvd, Tallahassee, Fl will support only if the counties request law enforcement.

Submitted by:

Margaret Giani

Margaret Giani
11/18/20
Radiological Emergency Planner
Division of Emergency
Management

Signed by:

FEMA Rac Chair

EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT

Turkey Point Nuclear Plant: **FLBRC** (Dose Assessment, Field Teams, Field Team Management, Fixed/Mobile Laboratory), Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

Exercise Date: February 10, 2021

PLUME PHASE PARTIAL PARTICIPATION RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE

All activities will be demonstrated fully in accordance with respective plans and procedures as they would be in an actual emergency (FEMA must receive these plans, guides and procedures NLT 60 days before the exercise). This Extent of Play agreement is written by exception. If it is not listed as an exception it will be demonstrated as described in the plans, standard operating guides (SOGs) and/or procedures (SOPs). Any issue or discrepancy arising during exercise play may be redemonstrated, if allowed by the RAC Chair, or as listed herein. This allowance may be granted if it is not disruptive to exercise play and is mutually agreed to by the ORO controller and FEMA evaluator.

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Core Capability: Situational Assessment

Definition: Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

OBJECTIVE 1: Emergency Operations Management

Capability Target 1.3: Protective Action Recommendations:

Intent: The capability to use dose assessment and field data, compare this data to the PAGs, and choose among a range of protective actions those most appropriate in a given emergency. Pg 187

Responsible Jurisdictions: FLBRC, EOF

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (D.4, J.7, J.8, J.8.b, J.9, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
PLUME: Select and implement pre-planned precautionary protective actions.	Dose Assessment (DA): no exceptions Field Team Management (FTM): no exceptions Emergency Operations Facility Liaison (EOF LNO): no exceptions
PLUME: Utilize the methodology in plans/procedures to select among a range of protective actions most appropriate in a given emergency. This could also include the use of preplanned precautionary protective actions contained in plans/procedures.	DA: no exceptions FTM: no exceptions EOF LNO: no exceptions
PLUME: Develop PARs.	DA: no exceptions FTM: no exceptions EOF LNO: no exceptions
PLUME: Transmit PARs in a timely manner.	DA: no exceptions FTM: no exceptions EOF LNO: no exceptions

Capability Target 1.4: Protective Action Decisions for the Plume Phase:

Intent: The capability to utilize appropriate factors and necessary coordination in the decision-making process used to make PADs for the public. Pg 188

Responsible Jurisdictions: EOF

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (D.1.b, D.4, J.6, J.7, J.8, J.8.b, J.10, J.10.a, J.10.b, J.11.c-g, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
Coordinate and make PADs for members of the general public.	EOF LNO: no exceptions
Coordinate and make PADs for those with access and functional needs.	EOF LNO: N/A
Coordinate and make PADs for students at schools.	EOF LNO: N/A
Coordinate and make subsequent or alternate PADs.	EOF LNO: no exceptions
Coordinate and make decisions on the administration of KI (where applicable) for the public and institutionalized members of the population.	EOF LNO: no exceptions

Core Capability: Environmental Response/Health and Safety

Definition: Conduct appropriate measures to ensure the protection of the health and safety of the public and workers, as well as the environment, from all-hazards in support of responder operations and the affected communities

OBJECTIVE 1: Emergency Operations Management

Capability Target 1.1: Mobilization:

Intent: The capability to alert, notify, and mobilize OROs to staff facilities in support of emergency operations. Pg 185

Responsible Jurisdictions: FLBRC

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
Alert, notify, and mobilize key personnel, to include a 24-hour staffing roster, and activate facilities in a timely manner.	DA: Exercise participants will be staged at utility EOF. FTM: Exercise participants will be staged at utility EOF. Field Monitoring Teams (FMTs): **TRAINING ONLY** Mobile Rad Lab (MERL): **TRAINING ONLY**
Receive and verify notifications.	DA: no exceptions FTM: no exceptions FMTs: **TRAINING ONLY** MERL: **TRAINING ONLY**
Identify and request additional resources, as needed.	DA: N/A FTM: N/A FMTs: **TRAINING ONLY** MERL: **TRAINING ONLY**
Determine a facility is operational.	DA: no exceptions FTM: no exceptions FMTs: N/A MERL: **TRAINING ONLY**

OBJECTIVE 2: Exposure Control

Capability Target 2.1: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Decision-Making Process:

Intent: The capability to assess and control the radiation exposure and dose received by emergency workers and utilize a decision-making chain to authorize emergency worker exposure limits to be exceeded for specific missions. Pg 196

Responsible Jurisdictions: FLBRC

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, K.2, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, M.8, and O.1)

Assessment	**Extent of Play**
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
Control emergency workers' exposure and dose, including offsite workers performing duties onsite.	FTM: demonstrated via discussion FMTs: N/A MERL: N/A
Maintain record of dose as a result of exposure.	FTM: no exceptions FMTs: N/A MERL: N/A
Authorize exposures and dose in excess of identified limits.	FTM: demonstrated via discussion FMTs: N/A MERL: N/A
Process for considering occupational exposures and to authorize individuals to receive doses in excess of occupational dose limits.	FTM: demonstrated via discussion FMTs: N/A MERL: N/A
Determine a correction factor for DRD-based isotopic release mixture.	FTM: no exceptions FMTs: N/A MERL: N/A
Determine the need to authorize radioprotective drugs using projected thyroid doses and field measurements. Projections are compared to previously established PAGs.	FTM: demonstrated via discussion FMTs: N/A MERL: N/A
Adequately protect members of the public from radiological exposure and control dose for those who are authorized to temporarily reenter a restricted area.	FTM: N/A if not doing re-entry FMTs: N/A MERL: N/A

Capability Target 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management:

Intent: The capability of emergency workers to manage dose and exposure, use equipment (e.g., dosimetry, radio protective drugs), and identify procedures to monitor their exposure and dose, including following procedures to obtain authorization to receive emergency exposures in excess of the PAGs. Pg 198

Responsible Jurisdictions: FLBRC

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
Maintain an appropriate inventory of DRDs that are leak-tested or current in calibration.	FTM: Demonstrated via discussion with Communicator at EOF; Inventory verified during SAV FMTs: N/A MERL: **TRAINING ONLY**
Maintain an appropriate inventory of PRDs.	FTM: Demonstrated via discussion with Communicator at EOF; Inventory verified during SAV FMTs: N/A MERL: **TRAINING ONLY**
Retain an adequate supply of radioprotective drugs.	FTM: Demonstrated via discussion with Communicator at EOF; Inventory verified during SAV FMTs: N/A MERL: **TRAINING ONLY**
Adequately distribute appropriate DRDs and PRDs.	FTM: Demonstrated via discussion with Communicator at EOF FMTs: N/A MERL: **TRAINING ONLY**
Adequately distribute radioprotective drugs to emergency workers.	FTM: Demonstrated via discussion with Communicator at EOF FMTs: N/A MERL: **TRAINING ONLY**
Record and report exposures in the field.	FTM: no exceptions FMTs: **TRAINING ONLY** MERL: **TRAINING ONLY**
Implement decisions to administer radioprotective drugs.	FTM: no exceptions FMTs: **TRAINING ONLY** MERL: **TRAINING ONLY**
Report to individual responsible for managing exposure and dose when limits are reached.	FTM: no exceptions FMTs: **TRAINING ONLY** MERL: N/A

OBJECTIVE 3: Alert and Notification

Capability Target 3.1: Communications:

Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel. Pg 200

Responsible Jurisdictions: FLBRC

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.	FTM: no exceptions FMTs: **TRAINING ONLY**
Maintain periodic test results and corrective actions on a real time basis.	FTM: no exceptions FMTs: **TRAINING ONLY**
Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.	FTM: no exceptions FMTs: **TRAINING ONLY**
Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.	FTM: no exceptions FMTs: **TRAINING ONLY**
Identify and address any failures of the systems.	FTM: no exceptions FMTs: **TRAINING ONLY**
Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., "content check").	FTM: no exception FMTs: **TRAINING ONLY**

OBJECTIVE 4: Detect, Measure, Sample, Analyze, and Assess

Capability Target 4.1: Field Monitoring Teams Management:

Intent: The capability to provide overall management of FMTs to direct movements and measurements to characterize the plume and its impacts**.** Pg 206

Responsible Jurisdictions: FLBRC

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (H.11, H.13, I.5, I.6, I.9, I.10, M.7, M.8, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
Brief FMTs on predicted plume location and direction, plume travel speed, equipment operational checks, background measurement, and exposure control procedures before deployment.	FTM: Demonstrated via discussion with Field Team Director at EOF
Direct the FMTs to monitoring locations, predesignated points or otherwise, at times and locations sufficient to characterize the plume.	FTM: no exceptions
Obtain peak plume measurements from FMTs.	FTM: no exceptions
Direct FMTs to collect air samples at locations and times sufficient to characterize the plume.	FTM: no exceptions
Coordinate sample analysis from field to those responsible for assessing radiological data.	FTM: no exceptions
Coordinate transfer of sample media to locations and organizations responsible for assessing radiological data.	FTM: Demonstrated via discussion

Capability Target 4.2: Plume Phase Measurements and Sampling:

Intent: The capability to make and report measurements of ambient radiation**.** Pg 207

Responsible Jurisdictions: FLBRC

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (H.9, H.11, H.11.a, H.11.b, H.12, H.13, I.2, I.5, I.6, I.7, I.8, I.9, I.10, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
Maintain emergency equipment including calibration and operational checks according to manufacturer's specifications or per national standards.	FMTs: **TRAINING ONLY**
Maintain inventory for emergency kits.	FMTs: **TRAINING ONLY**
Operate and monitor radiation survey instruments to detect changes in radiation exposure rate while moving and in stationary positions.	FMTs: **TRAINING ONLY**.
Use appropriate contamination control and PPE.	FMTs: **TRAINING ONLY**
Be in location(s) at the appropriate time(s) to detect and characterize the active release (plume).	FMTs: **TRAINING ONLY**
Obtain peak plume measurements either directly or from licensee field teams.	FMTs **TRAINING ONLY**
Correctly interpret survey instrument readings to determine submersion in the active plume.	FMTs: **TRAINING ONLY**
Collect representative air samples in the active plume on particulate media (e.g., glass or paper filter) and iodine selective media (e.g., silver zeolite cartridge).	FMTs: **TRAINING ONLY**
Handle sample media and equipment to avoid sample cross-contamination, contamination of equipment and personnel contamination.	FMTs: **TRAINING ONLY**
Determine an appropriate low background location to count sample media.	FMTs: **TRAINING ONLY**
Count iodine and particulate media using appropriate and effective instrumentation and counting geometries or have samples analyzed by a supporting laboratory within four hours.	FMTs: **TRAINING ONLY**
Report to field monitoring team manager all survey and counting results in format and	FMTs: **TRAINING ONLY**

units suitable for use by the organization's dose assessor.	
Procedures, qualified collection and counting efficiencies, and calculations are capable of detecting airborne radioactive iodine concentrations as low as 10-7 µCi/cc.	FMTs: **TRAINING ONLY**
Preparation of packaging, sample identification, and chain-of-custody forms ensures integrity of samples throughout transportation and transfer.	FMTs: **TRAINING ONLY**

Capability Target 4.4: Laboratory Operations:

Intent: The capability to perform laboratory analyses of radioactivity in environmental, food, and drinking water samples to support decision-making. Pg 210

Responsible Jurisdictions: FLBRC

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.4, H.11, H.11.b, H.13, I.2, I.6, M.7, and O.1))

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
Prepare analytical equipment for use, including performing calibrations, quality control checks, and background counts, as appropriate.	MERL: **TRAINING ONLY**
Receive and track samples, including completing chain-of-custody records.	MERL: **TRAINING ONLY**
Analyze samples to determine the concentration of each radionuclide in each sample. Minimum detection limits (MDLs) for various radionuclides must be low enough to support ORO decisions.	MERL: **TRAINING ONLY**
Provide analysis results to the appropriate organization.	MERL: **TRAINING ONLY**
If the laboratory is used to count air samples during the early phase of an incident and prepare, process, and analyze air filters and cartridges, provide analysis results in a timely manner to support ORO decisions.	MERL: **TRAINING ONLY**

X Mark Seidensticker 1/5/2021

State or County Signature Block / Date

X

FEMA RAC Signature Block

EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT

Turkey Point Nuclear Plant: **Miami-Dade County**

Exercise Date: February 10, 2021

PLUME PHASE PARTIAL PARTICIPATION RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE

All activities will be demonstrated fully in accordance with respective plans and procedures as they would be in an actual emergency (FEMA must receive these plans, guides and procedures NLT 60 days before the exercise). This Extent of Play agreement is written by exception. If it is not listed as an exception it will be demonstrated as described in the plans, standard operating guides (SOGs) and/or procedures (SOPs). Any issue or discrepancy arising during exercise play may be redemonstrated, if allowed by the RAC Chair, or as listed herein. This allowance may be granted if it is not disruptive to exercise play and is mutually agreed to by the ORO controller and FEMA evaluator.

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CORE CAPABILITY: OPERATIONAL COORDINATION

Definition: Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

OBJECTIVE 1: Emergency Operations Management

Capability Target 1.1: Mobilization: (EOC)

Intent: The capability to alert, notify, and mobilize OROs to staff facilities in support of emergency operations. Pg 185

Responsible Jurisdictions: Miami-Dade County

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
Alert, notify, and mobilize key personnel, to include a 24-hour staffing roster, and activate facilities in a timely manner.	EOC: Exercise participants will be staged at the EOC at 08:30. Demonstration will be via discussion.
Receive and verify notifications.	EOC: No exception
Identify and request additional resources, as needed.	EOC: No exception
Determine a facility is operational.	EOC: No exception

Capability Target 1.2: Direction and Control: (EOC)

Intent: The capability to provide overall direction and control of response efforts, commensurate with the responsibilities of leadership, as detailed in plans/procedures. Pg 186

Responsible Jurisdictions: Miami-Dade County

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.1.c, A.2, A.3, A.5, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, D.4, E.1, H.6, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
Support protective action decision-making.	EOC: No exception
Conduct briefings in a timely manner.	EOC: No exception
Maintain situational awareness.	EOC: No exception
Coordinate response activities with other organizations.	EOC: No exception

Obtain resources to support emergency operations.	EOC: Other than EOC and EOF personnel, no other resources will be moved. Demonstration will be via discussion.
Provide and maintain adequate facilities and equipment to support the emergency response.	EOC: Activation of other facilities (e.g., ERC) may be simulated and demonstrated via discussion.

Capability Target 1.5: Protective Action Decision Implementation for the Plume Phase: (EOC)

Intent: The capability to implement precautionary protective action and/or PADs, including evacuation and/or sheltering, for all populations within the plume and ingestion exposure pathway EPZs. The populations include those with access and functional needs, students, and institutionalized individuals. Pg 189

Responsible Jurisdictions: Miami-Dade County

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.4, C.2.a, G.1, J.11, J.11.a, J.11.b, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.g, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
Implement PADs, ensuring communication and coordination with all appropriate jurisdictions.	EOC: No exception
Assist those with access and functional needs during the implementation of PADs.	EOC: Emergency & Evacuation Assistance Program (EEAP) records are confidential; no personal information will be shared. Demonstration will be via discussion.
Communicate, coordinate, and implement protective actions for schools.	EOC: No exception
Communicate with transportation officials.	EOC: No exception
Identify evacuation routes for the general public.	EOC: No exception
Make KI available to both institutionalized persons and the general public, in accordance with plans and procedures.	EOC: Locations, quantities, and expiration of KI supplies to be verified during SAV on February 11, 2021.

OBJECTIVE 2: Exposure Control

Capability Target 2.1: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Decision-Making Process: (EOC)

Intent: The capability to assess and control the radiation exposure and dose received by emergency workers and utilize a decision-making chain to authorize emergency worker exposure limits to be exceeded for specific missions. Pg 196

Responsible Jurisdictions: Miami-Dade County

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, K.2, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, M.8, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
Control emergency workers' exposure and dose, including offsite workers performing duties onsite.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion.
Maintain record of dose as a result of exposure.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion.
Authorize exposures and dose in excess of identified limits.	EOC: No exception
Process for considering occupational exposures and to authorize individuals to receive doses in excess of occupational dose limits.	EOC: No exception
Determine the need to authorize radioprotective drugs using projected thyroid doses and field measurements. Projections are compared to previously established PAGs.	EOC: No exception

Capability Target 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management: (EOC)

Intent: The capability of emergency workers to manage dose and exposure, use equipment (e.g., dosimetry, radio protective drugs), and identify procedures to monitor their exposure and dose, including following procedures to obtain authorization to receive emergency exposures in excess of the PAGs. Pg 198

Responsible Jurisdictions: Miami-Dade County

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, and O.1)

Assessment	**Extent of Play**
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
Maintain an appropriate inventory of DRDs that are leak-tested or current in calibration.	SAV (OOS): Inventory to be verified on February 11, 2021.
Maintain an appropriate inventory of PRDs.	SAV (OOS): Inventory to be verified on February 11, 2021.
Retain an adequate supply of radioprotective drugs.	SAV (OOS): Locations, quantities, and expiration of KI supplies to be verified on February 11, 2021.
Adequately distribute appropriate DRDs and PRDs.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion
Adequately distribute radioprotective drugs to emergency workers.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion
Record and report exposures in the field.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion
Implement decisions to administer radioprotective drugs.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion
Report to individual responsible for managing exposure and dose when limits are reached.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion

OBJECTIVE 3: Alert and Notification

Capability Target 3.1: Communications: (EOC)

Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel. Pg 200

Responsible Jurisdictions: Miami-Dade County

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.	EOC: No exception
Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.	EOC: No exception
Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.	EOC: No exception
Identify and address any failures of the systems.	EOC: No exception
Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., "content check").	EOC: No exception

OBJECTIVE 5: Operate

Capability Target 5.4: Traffic and Access Control: (EOC)

Intent: The capability to select, establish, and staff traffic and access control points and removing impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic. Pg 222

Responsible Jurisdictions: Miami-Dade County

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (H.12, J.8, J.8.b, J.10, J.10.a, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.f, J.14.d, J.14.e, M.1.b, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
Select, establish, and staff appropriate TCP/ACPs, consistent with current conditions and PADs (e.g., evacuating, sheltering, and relocation), in a timely manner.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion
Provide instructions to TAC staff on actions to take, including when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion
Contact the state or Federal agencies that have the authority for the different transportation modes (e.g., rail, water, and air traffic).	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion
Identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments that affect the evacuation and evacuation routes.	EOC: No exception
Make the decision to re-route traffic and coordinate with key decision-makers and the JIC to ensure the alternate route information is appropriately communicated to evacuees.	EOC: No exception
Establish procedures to control access to and monitor people and vehicles from the evacuated and restricted areas.	EOC: No exception

CORE CAPABILITY: PUBLIC INFORMATION AND WARNING

Definition: Deliver coordination, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

OBJECTIVE 3: Alert and Notification

Capability Target 3.2: Alert and Notification of the Public: *(EOC/JIC)*

Intent: The capability to provide instructions to the public. Pg 201

Responsible Jurisdictions: Miami-Dade

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.2, E.4, E.5, F.3, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
ALERT AND NOTIFICATION SYSTEM: Sequentially provide an alert signal followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion or virtual platform. JIS: No exception
ALERT AND NOTIFICATION SYSTEM: Alert and notify the general public.	EOC: The siren system will only be activated in silent test mode. JIS: No exception
ALERT AND NOTIFICATION SYSTEM: Identify and address any failures of the system(s) or portion of a system(s).	EOC: No exception, contingent on silent test outcome or inject.
ALERT AND NOTIFICATION SYSTEM: Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at an agreed-upon location.	EOC: Route alerting and waterway warning will be demonstrated via discussion.
The EAS: Identify the process to activate the EAS.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion or virtual platform.
EAS: Ensure that updated emergency information is disseminated in a timely manner.	EOC: No exception
EAS: Ensure that current emergency information is repeated at pre-established intervals.	EOC: No exception
EAS/NWS STATION: Identify the process to activate the EAS, to include the process to receive and then broadcast updated information/messages and verification of the message, if applicable.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion or virtual platform.

EAS/NWS STATION: Broadcast the message on a 24-hour basis.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion or virtual platform.
ROUTE/ALTERNATE ALERTING: Complete route alerting, whether because of failure for system/portion of a system or for exception areas, as needed to demonstrate all routes are capable of being run in allotted time. Emphasis on the most challenging routes and demonstration of these routes will be varied from assessment activity to assessment activity. Challenging routes are Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual 203 defined as those that may be difficult to accomplish, such as those that are lengthy or with conditions (physical or otherwise) that may affect the speed and accuracy with which the route can be completed (e.g., traffic patterns and/or capacity, road conditions, etc.).	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion if required due to actual or virtual (i.e., by inject) siren failure.

Capability Target 3.3: Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and News Media: *(EOC/JIC)*

Intent: The capability to disseminate emergency information and instructions to the public during all phases of an incident. Pg 203

Responsible Jurisdictions: Miami-Dade County

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.2, E.4, E.5, G.1, G.2, G.3, G.3.a, G.4, G.5, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
PLUME PHASE: Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information in a timely manner.	EOC: No exception JIS: No exception
PLUME PHASE: Provide clear, concise, accessible messaging using plain language.	EOC: No exception JIS: No exception
PLUME PHASE: Messaging addresses appropriate cultural and linguistic considerations.	EOC: No exception JIS: No exception
PLUME PHASE: Ensure subsequent messaging is consistent with protective actions.	EOC: No exception JIS: No exception
PLUME PHASE: Update information as the incident progresses, to include validating	EOC: No exception JIS: No exception

previously identified protective areas and clearly identifying any new protective action areas, any information that is no longer valid, and any changes to previously provided information (e.g., rerouting of evacuation routes due to impediments, etc.).	
PLUME PHASE: Respond to media and public inquiries.	EOC: No exception, contingent on injects. JIS: At least one press conference conducted via virtual platform.

CORE CAPABILITY: ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE/HEALTH AND SAFETY

Definition: Conduct appropriate measures to ensure the protection of the health and safety of the public and workers, as well as the environment, from all-hazards in support of responder operations and the affected communities

OBJECTIVE 2: Exposure Control

Capability Target 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management: *(EWD OOS)*

Intent: The capability of emergency workers to manage dose and exposure, use equipment (e.g., dosimetry, radio protective drugs), and identify procedures to monitor their exposure and dose, including following procedures to obtain authorization to receive emergency exposures in excess of the PAGs. Pg 198

Responsible Jurisdictions: Miami-Dade County

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, and O.1)

EMERGENCY WORKER DECONTAMINATION ACTVITIES ARE POSTPONED UNTIL AFTER APRIL 2021 (DATE TBD), CONTINGENT ON COVID-19 DEVELOPMENTS.

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
Maintain an appropriate inventory of DRDs that are leak-tested or current in calibration.	SAV (OOS): Inventory to be verified on February 11, 2021.
Maintain an appropriate inventory of PRDs.	SAV (OOS): Inventory to be verified on February 11, 2021.
Retain an adequate supply of radioprotective drugs.	SAV (OOS): Locations, quantities, and expiration of KI supplies to be verified on February 11, 2021.
Adequately distribute appropriate DRDs and PRDs.	EWD (OOS): No exception
Adequately distribute radioprotective drugs to emergency workers.	EWD (OOS): Demonstrated via discussion

Record and report exposures in the field.	EWD (OOS): No exception
Implement decisions to administer radioprotective drugs.	EWD (OOS): Demonstrated via discussion
Report to individual responsible for managing exposure and dose when limits are reached.	EWD (OOS): Demonstrated via discussion

OBJECTIVE 5: Operate

Capability Target 5.2: Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers, Equipment, and Vehicles: *(EWD OOS)*

Intent: The capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers, equipment, and vehicles. Pg 218

Responsible Jurisdictions: Miami-Dade County

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (K.4 and O.1)

EMERGENCY WORKER DECONTAMINATION ACTVITIES ARE POSTPONED UNTIL AFTER APRIL 2021 (DATE TBD), CONTINGENT ON COVID-19 DEVELOPMENTS.

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
Set-up operations.	EWD (OOS): The monitoring and decontamination stations will be set up prior to exercise commencement.
Operationally check instruments and equipment.	EWD (OOS): No exception
Monitor emergency worker personnel and their equipment and vehicles for contamination.	EWD (OOS): No exception
Decontaminate emergency worker personnel and their equipment and vehicles based on trigger/action levels.	EWD (OOS): Water will flow for vehicle decontamination. Personnel decontamination will be demonstrated via discussion. The decontamination shower will flow water for purposes of demonstrating its operability.
Control the spread of contamination.	EWD (OOS): No exception
Create and maintain a record of monitoring and decontaminating workers upon completion of monitoring and decontamination activities.	EWD (OOS): No exception

CORE CAPABILITY: ON-SCENE SECURITY, PROTECTION, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

Definition: Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas and also for response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.

OBJECTIVE 2: Exposure Control

Capability Target 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management: *(EOC)*

Intent: The capability of emergency workers to manage dose and exposure, use equipment (e.g., dosimetry, radio protective drugs), and identify procedures to monitor their exposure and dose, including following procedures to obtain authorization to receive emergency exposures in excess of the PAGs. Pg 198

Responsible Jurisdictions: Miami-Dade County

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
Maintain an appropriate inventory of DRDs that are leak-tested or current in calibration.	SAV (OOS): Inventory to be verified on February 11, 2021.
Maintain an appropriate inventory of PRDs.	SAV (OOS): Inventory to be verified on February 11, 2021.
Retain an adequate supply of radioprotective drugs.	SAV (OOS): Locations, quantities, and expiration of KI supplies to be verified on February 11, 2021.
Adequately distribute appropriate DRDs and PRDs.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion
Adequately distribute radioprotective drugs to emergency workers.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion
Record and report exposures in the field.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion
Implement decisions to administer radioprotective drugs.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion
Report to individual responsible for managing exposure and dose when limits are reached.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion

OBJECTIVE 3: Alert and Notification

Capability Target 3.1: Communications: *(EOC)*

Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel. Pg 200

Responsible Jurisdictions: Miami-Dade County

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion
Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion
Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion
Identify and address any failures of the systems.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion
Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., "content check").	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion

OBJECTIVE 5: Operate

Capability Target 5.4: Traffic and Access Control: *(EOC)*

Intent: The capability to select, establish, and staff traffic and access control points and removing impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic. Pg 222

Responsible Jurisdictions: Miami-Dade County

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (H.12, J.8, J.8.b, J.10, J.10.a, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.f, J.14.d, J.14.e, M.1.b, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
Select, establish, and staff appropriate TCP/ACPs, consistent with current conditions and PADs (e.g., evacuating, sheltering, and relocation), in a timely manner.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion
Provide instructions to TAC staff on actions to take, including when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion
Contact the state or Federal agencies that have the authority for the different transportation modes (e.g., rail, water, and air traffic).	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion
Identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments that affect the evacuation and evacuation routes.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion
Make the decision to re-route traffic and coordinate with key decision-makers and the JIC to ensure the alternate route information is appropriately communicated to evacuees.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion
Establish procedures to control access to and monitor people and vehicles from the evacuated and restricted areas.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion

CORE CAPABILITY: CRITICAL TRANSPORTATION

Definition: Provide transportation (including infrastructure access and accessible transportation services) for response priority objectives, including the evacuation of people and animals, and the delivery of vital response personnel, equipment, and services into the affected areas.

OBJECTIVE 1: Emergency Operations Management

Capability Target 1.4: Protective Action Decisions for the Plume Phase: *(Schools OOS)*

Intent: The capability to utilize appropriate factors and necessary coordination in the decision-making process used to make PADs for the public. Pg 188

Responsible Jurisdictions: Miami-Dade County

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (D.1.b, D.4, J.6, J.7, J.8, J.8.b, J.10, J.10.a, J.10.b, J.11.c-g, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
Coordinate and make PADs for those with access and functional needs.	Schools (OOS): School interviews for the following schools will be conducted at a date/time to be negotiated with the school board: Irving and Beatrice Peskoe K-8 Center. Redland Middle. South Dade Center.
Coordinate and make PADs for students at schools.	Schools (OOS): School interviews for the following schools will be conducted at a date/time to be negotiated with the school board: Irving and Beatrice Peskoe K-8 Center. Redland Middle. South Dade Center.
Coordinate and make subsequent or alternate PADs.	Schools (OOS): School interviews for the following schools will be conducted at a date/time to be negotiated with the school board: Irving and Beatrice Peskoe K-8 Center. Redland Middle. South Dade Center.
Coordinate and make decisions on the administration of KI (where applicable) for the public and institutionalized members of the population.	Schools (OOS): School interviews for the following schools will be conducted at a date/time to be negotiated with the school board: Irving and Beatrice Peskoe K-8 Center.

	Redland Middle. South Dade Center.

X 1/7/2021

State or County Signature Block / Date

X

FEMA RAC Signature Block / Date

EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT

Turkey Point Nuclear Plant: **Monroe County**

Exercise Date: February 10, 2021

PLUME PHASE PARTIAL PARTICIPATION RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE

All activities will be demonstrated fully in accordance with respective plans and procedures as they would be in an actual emergency (FEMA must receive these plans, guides and procedures NLT 60 days before the exercise). This Extent of Play agreement is written by exception. If it is not listed as an exception it will be demonstrated as described in the plans, standard operating guides (SOGs) and/or procedures (SOPs). Any issue or discrepancy arising during exercise play may be redemonstrated, if allowed by the RAC Chair, or as listed herein. This allowance may be granted if it is not disruptive to exercise play and is mutually agreed to by the ORO controller and FEMA evaluator.

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Core Capability: Operational Coordination

Definition: Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

OBJECTIVE 1: Emergency Operations Management

Capability Target 1.1: Mobilization:

Intent: The capability to alert, notify, and mobilize OROs to staff facilities in support of emergency operations. Pg 185

Responsible Jurisdictions: Monroe County

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
Alert, notify, and mobilize key personnel, to include a 24-hour staffing roster, and activate facilities in a timely manner.	EOC: Exercise participants will be staged at the EOC at 08:30. Demonstration will be via discussion.
Receive and verify notifications.	EOC: No exception
Identify and request additional resources, as needed.	EOC: No exception
Determine a facility is operational.	EOC: No exception

Capability Target 1.2: Direction and Control:

Intent: The capability to provide overall direction and control of response efforts, commensurate with the responsibilities of leadership, as detailed in plans/procedures. Pg 186

Responsible Jurisdictions: Monroe County

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.1.c, A.2, A.3, A.5, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, D.4, E.1, H.6, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
Support protective action decision-making.	EOC: No exception
Conduct briefings in a timely manner.	EOC: No exception
Maintain situational awareness.	EOC: No exception
Coordinate response activities with other organizations.	EOC: No exception

Obtain resources to support emergency operations.	EOC: Other than EOC and EOF personnel, movement of resources will be simulated and demonstrated via discussion.
Provide and maintain adequate facilities and equipment to support the emergency response.	EOC: Activation of other facilities (e.g., ERC) may be simulated and demonstrated via discussion.

Capability Target 1.5: Protective Action Decision Implementation for the Plume Phase:

Intent: The capability to implement precautionary protective action and/or PADs, including evacuation and/or sheltering, for all populations within the plume and ingestion exposure pathway EPZs. The populations include those with access and functional needs, students, and institutionalized individuals. Pg 189

Responsible Jurisdictions: Monroe County

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.4, C.2.a, G.1, J.11, J.11.a, J.11.b, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.g, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
Implement PADs, ensuring communication and coordination with all appropriate jurisdictions.	EOC: No exception
Assist those with access and functional needs during the implementation of PADs.	EOC: Monroe County Special Needs Registry records are confidential; no personal information will be shared. Demonstration will be via discussion.
Communicate, coordinate, and implement protective actions for schools.	EOC: No exception
Communicate with transportation officials.	EOC: No exception
Identify evacuation routes for the general public.	EOC: No exception
Make KI available to both institutionalized persons and the general public, in accordance with plans and procedures.	EOC: Locations, quantities, and expiration of KI supplies verified during SAV on January 13-14, 2021.

OBJECTIVE 2: Exposure Control

Capability Target 2.1: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Decision-Making Process:

Intent: The capability to assess and control the radiation exposure and dose received by emergency workers and utilize a decision-making chain to authorize emergency worker exposure limits to be exceeded for specific missions. Pg 196

Responsible Jurisdictions: Monroe County

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, K.2, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, M.8, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
Control emergency workers' exposure and dose, including offsite workers performing duties onsite.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion.
Maintain record of dose as a result of exposure.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion.
Authorize exposures and dose in excess of identified limits.	EOC: No exception
Process for considering occupational exposures and to authorize individuals to receive doses in excess of occupational dose limits.	EOC: No exception
Determine the need to authorize radioprotective drugs using projected thyroid doses and field measurements. Projections are compared to previously established PAGs.	EOC: No exception

Capability Target 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management:

Intent: The capability of emergency workers to manage dose and exposure, use equipment (e.g., dosimetry, radio protective drugs), and identify procedures to monitor their exposure and dose, including following procedures to obtain authorization to receive emergency exposures in excess of the PAGs. Pg 198

Responsible Jurisdictions: Monroe County

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
Maintain an appropriate inventory of DRDs that are leak-tested or current in calibration.	SAV (OOS): Inventory verified on January 13-14, 2021.
Maintain an appropriate inventory of PRDs.	SAV (OOS): Inventory verified on January 13-14, 2021.
Retain an adequate supply of radioprotective drugs.	SAV (OOS): Locations, quantities, and expiration of KI supplies verified during SAV on January 13-14, 2021.
Adequately distribute appropriate DRDs and PRDs.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion
Adequately distribute radioprotective drugs to emergency workers.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion
Record and report exposures in the field.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion
Implement decisions to administer radioprotective drugs.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion
Report to individual responsible for managing exposure and dose when limits are reached.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion

OBJECTIVE 3: Alert and Notification

Capability Target 3.1: Communications:

Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel. Pg 200

Responsible Jurisdictions: Monroe County

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.	EOC: No exception
Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.	EOC: No exception
Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.	EOC: No exception
Identify and address any failures of the systems.	EOC: No exception
Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., "content check").	EOC: No exception

OBJECTIVE 5: Operate

Capability Target 5.4: Traffic and Access Control:

Intent: The capability to select, establish, and staff traffic and access control points and removing impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic. Pg 222

Responsible Jurisdictions: Monroe County

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (H.12, J.8, J.8.b, J.10, J.10.a, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.f, J.14.d, J.14.e, M.1.b, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
Select, establish, and staff appropriate TCP/ACPs, consistent with current conditions and PADs (e.g., evacuating, sheltering, and relocation), in a timely manner.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion
Provide instructions to TAC staff on actions to take, including when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion
Contact the state or Federal agencies that have the authority for the different transportation modes (e.g., rail, water, and air traffic).	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion
Identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments that affect the evacuation and evacuation routes.	EOC: No exception
Make the decision to re-route traffic and coordinate with key decision-makers and the JIC to ensure the alternate route information is appropriately communicated to evacuees.	EOC: No exception
Establish procedures to control access to and monitor people and vehicles from the evacuated and restricted areas.	EOC: No exception

Core Capability: Public Information and Warning

Definition: Deliver coordination, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

OBJECTIVE 3: Alert and Notification

Capability Target 3.2: Alert and Notification of the Public:

Intent: The capability to provide instructions to the public. Pg 201

Responsible Jurisdictions: Monroe County

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.2, E.4, E.5, F.3, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
ANS: Sequentially provide an alert signal followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas.	EOC: No exception JIS: No exception
ANS: Alert and notify the general public.	EOC: The siren system at Ocean Reef Pubic Safety Dispatch will only be activated in silent test mode. JIS: No exception SAV (OOS): Route alerting demonstration on January 14, 2021.
ANS: Identify and address any failures of the system(s) or portion of a system(s).	EOC: No exception, contingent on silent test outcome or inject.
ANS: Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at an agreed-upon location.	EOC: Waterway warning demonstrated via discussion. SAV (OOS): Route alerting demonstration on January 14, 2021.
EAS: Identify the process to activate the EAS.	EOC: No exception
EAS: Ensure that updated emergency information is disseminated in a timely manner.	EOC: No exception
EAS: Ensure that current emergency information is repeated at pre-established intervals.	EOC: No exception
EAS/NWS STATION: Identify the process to activate the EAS, to include the process to receive and then broadcast updated information/messages and verification of the message, if applicable.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion.

EAS/NWS STATION: Broadcast the message on a 24-hour basis.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion.
ROUTE/ALTERNATE ALERTING: Complete route alerting, whether because of failure for system/portion of a system or for exception areas, as needed to demonstrate all routes are capable of being run in allotted time. Emphasis on the most challenging routes and demonstration of these routes will be varied from assessment activity to assessment activity. Challenging routes are Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual 203 defined as those that may be difficult to accomplish, such as those that are lengthy or with conditions (physical or otherwise) that may affect the speed and accuracy with which the route can be completed (e.g., traffic patterns and/or capacity, road conditions, etc.).	SAV (OOS): Route alerting demonstration on January 14, 2021.

Capability Target 3.3: Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and News Media:

Intent: The capability to disseminate emergency information and instructions to the public during all phases of an incident. Pg 203

Responsible Jurisdictions: Monroe County

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.2, E.4, E.5, G.1, G.2, G.3, G.3.a, G.4, G.5, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
PLUME PHASE: Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information in a timely manner.	EOC: No exception JIS: No exception
PLUME PHASE: Provide clear, concise, accessible messaging using plain language.	EOC: No exception JIS: No exception
PLUME PHASE: Messaging addresses appropriate cultural and linguistic considerations.	EOC: No exception JIS: No exception
PLUME PHASE: Ensure subsequent messaging is consistent with protective actions.	EOC: No exception JIS: No exception
PLUME PHASE: Update information as the incident progresses, to include validating	EOC: No exception JIS: No exception

previously identified protective areas and clearly identifying any new protective action areas, any information that is no longer valid, and any changes to previously provided information (e.g., rerouting of evacuation routes due to impediments, etc.).	
PLUME PHASE: Respond to media and public inquiries.	EOC: No exception, contingent on injects. JIS: At least one press conference conducted via virtual platform.

Core Capability: Environmental Response/Health and Safety

Definition: Conduct appropriate measures to ensure the protection of the health and safety of the public and workers, as well as the environment, from all-hazards in support of responder operations and the affected communities

OBJECTIVE 2: Exposure Control

Capability Target 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management:

Intent: The capability of emergency workers to manage dose and exposure, use equipment (e.g., dosimetry, radio protective drugs), and identify procedures to monitor their exposure and dose, including following procedures to obtain authorization to receive emergency exposures in excess of the PAGs. Pg 198

Responsible Jurisdictions: Monroe County

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, and O.1)

EMERGENCY WORKER DECONTAMINATION ACTVITIES ARE POSTPONED UNTIL AFTER APRIL 2021 (DATE TBD), CONTINGENT ON COVID-19 DEVELOPMENTS.

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
Maintain an appropriate inventory of DRDs that are leak-tested or current in calibration.	SAV (OOS): Inventory verified on January 13-14, 2021.
Maintain an appropriate inventory of PRDs.	SAV (OOS): Inventory verified on January 13-14, 2021.
Retain an adequate supply of radioprotective drugs.	SAV (OOS): Locations, quantities, and expiration of KI supplies verified during SAV on January 13-14, 2021.
Adequately distribute appropriate DRDs and PRDs.	EWD (OOS): No exception
Adequately distribute radioprotective drugs to emergency workers.	EWD (OOS): Demonstrated via discussion

Record and report exposures in the field.	EWD (OOS): No exception
Implement decisions to administer radioprotective drugs.	EWD (OOS): Demonstrated via discussion
Report to individual responsible for managing exposure and dose when limits are reached.	EWD (OOS): Demonstrated via discussion

OBJECTIVE 5: Operate

Capability Target 5.2: Monitoring and Decontamination of EWs, Equipment, and Vehicles

Intent: The capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers, equipment, and vehicles. Pg 218

Responsible Jurisdictions: Monroe County

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (K.4 and O.1)

EMERGENCY WORKER DECONTAMINATION ACTVITIES ARE POSTPONED UNTIL AFTER APRIL 2021 (DATE TBD), CONTINGENT ON COVID-19 DEVELOPMENTS.

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
Set-up operations.	EWD (OOS): The monitoring and decontamination stations may be set up prior to exercise commencement.
Operationally check instruments and equipment.	EWD (OOS): No exceptions
Monitor emergency worker personnel and their equipment and vehicles for contamination.	EWD (OOS): No exceptions
Decontaminate emergency worker personnel and their equipment and vehicles based on trigger/action levels.	EWD (OOS): Personnel decontamination will be demonstrated via discussion.
Control the spread of contamination.	EWD (OOS): No exceptions
Create and maintain a record of monitoring and decontaminating workers upon completion of monitoring and decontamination activities.	EWD (OOS): No exceptions

Core Capability: On Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement

Definition: The capability to ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within the affected areas and also for response personnel performing lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.

OBJECTIVE 2: Exposure Control

Capability Target 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management:

Intent: The capability of emergency workers to manage dose and exposure, use equipment (e.g., dosimetry, radio protective drugs), and identify procedures to monitor their exposure and dose, including following procedures to obtain authorization to receive emergency exposures in excess of the PAGs. Pg 198

Responsible Jurisdictions: Monroe County

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
Maintain an appropriate inventory of DRDs that are leak-tested or current in calibration.	SAV (OOS): Inventory verified on January 13-14, 2021.
Maintain an appropriate inventory of PRDs.	SAV (OOS): Inventory verified on January 13-14, 2021.
Retain an adequate supply of radioprotective drugs.	SAV (OOS): Locations, quantities, and expiration of KI supplies verified during SAV on January 13-14, 2021.
Adequately distribute appropriate DRDs and PRDs.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion with supervisor or designee.
Adequately distribute radioprotective drugs to emergency workers.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion with supervisor or designee.
Record and report exposures in the field.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion with supervisor or designee.
Implement decisions to administer radioprotective drugs.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion with supervisor or designee.
Report to individual responsible for managing exposure and dose when limits are reached.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion with supervisor or designee.

OBJECTIVE 3: Alert and Notification

Capability Target 3.1: Communications:

Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel. Pg 200

Responsible Jurisdictions: Monroe County

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion with supervisor or designee.
Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion with supervisor or designee.
Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion with supervisor or designee.
Identify and address any failures of the systems.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion with supervisor or designee.

OBJECTIVE 5: Operate

Capability Target 5.4: Traffic and Access Control:

Intent: The capability to select, establish, and staff traffic and access control points and removing impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic. Pg 222

Responsible Jurisdictions: Monroe County

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (H.12, J.8, J.8.b, J.10, J.10.a, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.f, J.14.d, J.14.e, M.1.b, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:	**Expected responses:**
Select, establish, and staff appropriate TCP/ACPs, consistent with current conditions and PADs (e.g., evacuating, sheltering, and relocation), in a timely manner.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion with supervisor or designee.
Provide instructions to TAC staff on actions to take, including when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion with supervisor or designee.
Contact the state or Federal agencies that have the authority for the different transportation modes (e.g., rail, water, and air traffic).	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion with supervisor or designee.
Identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments that affect the evacuation and evacuation routes.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion with supervisor or designee.
Make the decision to re-route traffic and coordinate with key decision-makers and the JIC to ensure the alternate route information is appropriately communicated to evacuees.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion with supervisor or designee.
Establish procedures to control access to and monitor people and vehicles from the evacuated and restricted areas.	EOC: Demonstrated via discussion with supervisor or designee.

X _____

State or County Signature Block / Date

X _____

FEMA RAC Signature Block / Date