



After Action Report

V.C. Summer Nuclear Station

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise

Exercise Date: March 2, 2021

May 10, 2021

FINAL



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Executive Summary

On March 2, 2021, the offsite response organizations of the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station 10-mile emergency planning zone participated in a plume exposure pathway exercise. FEMA Region IV Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program staff evaluated that exercise, which also included out-of-sequence activities conducted on January 12-14, 2021, January 20, 2021, and February 25, 2021. This report outlines that exercise and out-of-sequence activities.

The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of state and local preparedness in responding to an incident at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station. It was conducted in accordance with FEMA policies and guidance concerning the exercise of state and local radiological emergency response plans and procedures. The previous federally evaluated exercise was conducted on August 27, 2019. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on November 13, 1981.

Officials and representatives from participating agencies and organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures, and successfully implemented them during the exercise and out-of-sequence activities. All jurisdictions met their exercise objectives and successfully demonstrated the corresponding core capabilities identified in Section 2.2 of this report. FEMA staff did not identify any Level 1 or Level 2 Findings during this exercise.

During the exercise, South Carolina Emergency Management Division and Fairfield County resolved the previous level 2 findings assessed during the radiological emergency preparedness exercise conducted on August 27, 2019. The first finding concerned the lack of early coordination by Fairfield County. The second finding concerned inaccurate Emergency Alert System messages and information given to the public through the South Carolina Joint Information System.

It was apparent that a great deal of training and practice was conducted by the offsite response organizations to successfully demonstrate the ability to protect the health and safety of the public. They provided the necessary support and resources to respond to an incident at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated in the exercise and made it a success. The state of South Carolina and the counties of Fairfield, Lexington, Newberry, and Richland were among the first in the nation to complete an exercise during the public health emergency. As if response to the current pandemic was not enough, the state emergency operations center had also managed three other declarations (two tornados and severe weather) in 2020. Despite ongoing real-world response efforts, the professionalism and teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all phases of the exercise.

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Section 1: Exercise Overview

Exercise Name	2021 V.C. Summer Nuclear Station Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise	
Type of Exercise	Partial Participation Exercise	
Exercise Date	March 2, 2021	
Out of Sequence Dates	January 12 - 14, 2021, January 20, 2021, and February 25, 2021	
Program	Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program	
Mission Area	Response	
Scenario Type	Plume Phase Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise	
Participating Organizations	See Appendix C for the list of participating organizations	
Locations	See Appendix D for the extent of play agreement and exercise locations	
Points of Contact	Mr. John Fill Central Section Chief FEMA Region IV 3005 Chamblee-Tucker Road Atlanta, South Carolina 30341	Mr. Quintin Ivy V.C. Summer Site Specialist FEMA Region IV 3005 Chamblee-Tucker Road Atlanta, South Carolina 30341
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Section 2: Exercise Design Summary

2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design

FEMA administers the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program pursuant to the regulations found in Title 44 CFR parts 350, 351, 352, 353 and 354. Part 350 codifies 16 planning standards that form the basis for radiological emergency response planning for the licensee, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments impacted by the emergency planning zones established for each nuclear power plant site in the United States. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations also codify the 16 planning standards for the licensee. Part 350 sets forth the mechanisms for the formal review and approval of state, local, tribal, and territorial government radiological emergency response plans and procedures by FEMA. One of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program cornerstones established by these regulations is the biennial exercise of offsite response capabilities. During these exercises, affected state, local, tribal, and territorial governments demonstrate their abilities to implement their plans and procedures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological incident at a nuclear plant.

The results of this exercise, together with reviews of the radiological emergency response plans and verification of the periodic requirements set forth in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, the annual letter of certification, and staff assistance visits, enabled FEMA to provide a statement with the transmission of this final after action report to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This statement verifies that the affected state, local, tribal, and territorial plans and preparedness are: (1) adequate to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the nuclear power facility by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological incident; and (2) capable of being implemented.

The federal approval of the formal submission of the radiological emergency response procedures for the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station by the state of South Carolina was granted on November 13, 1981, and the qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on November 13, 1981.

2.2 Exercise Core Capabilities and Objectives

Core capabilities-based planning allows for exercise planning teams to develop exercise objectives and observe exercise outcomes through a framework of specific action items. Using the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program methodology, the exercise objectives meet Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program requirements and objectives. The capability targets to be demonstrated were negotiated with the state of South Carolina and risk counties. The core capabilities scheduled for demonstration during this exercise were:

- **Operational Coordination:** Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.
- **Situational Assessment:** Provide all decision makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response.
- **Public Information and Warning:** Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard, as well as the actions being taken and the assistance being made available, as appropriate.

- **Environmental Response/Health and Safety:** Conduct appropriate measures to ensure the protection of the health and safety of the public and workers, as well as the environment, from all-hazards in support of responder operations and the affected communities.
- **On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement:** Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas and also for response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.
- **Mass Care:** Provide life-sustaining and human services to the affected population, to include hydration, feeding, sheltering, temporary housing, evacuee support, reunification, and distribution of emergency supplies.
- **Critical Transportation:** Provide transportation (including infrastructure access and accessible transportation services) for response priority objectives, including the evacuation of people and animals, and the delivery of vital response personnel, equipment, and services into the affected areas.

These core capabilities, when successfully demonstrated, meet the exercise objectives. The objectives for this exercise were as follows:

- **Objective 1:** Emergency Operations Management: Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify, and mobilize response personnel and facilities; provide direction and control; make precautionary and protective action decisions; and implement those decisions.
- **Objective 2:** Exposure Control: Demonstrate the ability to manage radiological exposure and dose to emergency workers.
- **Objective 3:** Alert and Notification: Demonstrate the ability to activate the prompt alert and notification system and provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and news media in a timely manner.
- **Objective 4:** Detect, Measure, Sample, Analyze, and Assess: Demonstrate the ability to perform plume-phase dose analysis.
- **Objective 5:** Operate: Demonstrate the ability to establish appropriate traffic and access controls; monitor, decontaminate, shelter, and register evacuees; and monitor and decontaminate emergency workers and their equipment and vehicles.

2.3 Exercise Scenario

The following is a summary of the scenario developed by the Dominion Energy to drive exercise play.

Winds are from the north-northwest throughout the exercise. A tornado touches down inside the protected area of the plant. Later, alternate alternating-current power voltage goes to zero, followed shortly by grid instability affecting the 230-kilovolt line. Power is lost to balance-of-plant buses, and the reactor is tripped. Offsite power is lost to engineered-safety-function buses, and the “A” diesel generator fails to start. Later, the “B” diesel generator trips resulting in loss of all power to engineered-safety-function buses. The “B” diesel generator is repaired and started. However, the “B” diesel generator fails again, and the utility does not have an anticipated time for restoration. No radiological release occurs during the exercise.

Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities

3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results

This section contains the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the March 2, 2021, plume exposure pathway exercise and out-of-sequence activities on January 12-14, 2021, January 20, 2021, and February 25, 2021.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity were evaluated based on the demonstration of core capabilities, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program objectives, and capability targets as delineated in the FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual dated December 2019. Capability targets are listed by number and demonstration status.

3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation

The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program methodology is an analytical process used to assess the demonstration of specific capabilities during an exercise. A capability provides a means to perform one or more capability targets under specified conditions and to specific performance standards. Core capabilities form the foundation of the FEMA Region IV Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program evaluations. The core capability summaries below provide an overall combined assessment of state and local jurisdictions based upon their collective demonstrated performance as it relates to the specific core capability. Each jurisdiction's standalone capability summaries are provided below.

- **Operational Coordination:** The state direction and control officer and county emergency management directors established and maintained a unified and coordinated operational structure. The overall decision-making process integrated critical stakeholders and enabled protective action decisions to be made without undue delay. Due to the public health emergency, operational coordination could have been a real challenge (e.g., social distancing guidelines, virtual workforces, etc.); however, the state and counties innovatively and successfully integrated the use of technology to ensure sufficient support and response, while also protecting their workforces. The integration of virtual conference platforms not only facilitated a coordinated operational structure and integrated critical stakeholders into the decision-making process, but it demonstrated an enhanced capability within the state and risk counties.
- **Situational Assessment:** State dose assessment personnel provided decision makers relevant information regarding radiological and plant conditions. Personnel gathered information from changing plant and meteorological conditions to assess the radiological release. They performed dose projections and compared their results with utility dose projections and field team readings. This information allowed decision makers to understand the extent of the hazards, their cascading effects, and to make the appropriate protective action decisions.
- **Public Information and Warning:** Alert and notification of the public occurred via the outdoor warning system (simulated), Emergency Alert System messages (simulated), press releases, and press conferences. State and county public information officers and spokespersons developed and distributed timely and coordinated emergency information to the public and media.
- **Environmental Response/Health and Safety:** Fairfield County demonstrated the capability to setup monitoring and decontamination operations for emergency workers and the general public at a new facility. The facility was well laid out with sufficient signage and drainage.

Volunteers and emergency workers received a safety and situation briefing from the emergency management director. Vehicle monitoring, vehicle decontamination, and personnel monitoring were successfully demonstrated.

- **On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement:** State and local law enforcement agencies discussed the capability to ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people traveling within the emergency planning zone. The implementation of traffic and access control points was discussed during exercise play at the state emergency operations center and by risk county emergency operations center representatives who described the process by which traffic and access control points could be established in a timely manner. Discussion were conducted in person and virtually due to pandemic related restrictions from applicable jurisdictions.
- **Mass Care:** The Congregate Care Facility in Fairfield County provided life-sustaining services to the affected populations with a focus on hydration, feeding, sheltering, COVID -19 infection mitigation, and support for reunifying families. Fairfield County demonstrated that the centers had resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with planning guidelines. The Red Cross shelter managers demonstrated the procedures to assure that evacuees had been monitored for contamination, decontaminated, and COVID -19 symptoms, as appropriate, before entering the congregate care facilities
- **Critical Transportation:** Representatives from the Lexington/Richland School District 5, the Fairfield County School District, and the Newberry County School District effectively discussed implementation of protective actions for affected local schools. The sheltering and evacuation of students and staff; reunification center locations and activities; staff duties and responsibilities; security; equipment and communications; and transportation were successfully discussed during out-of-sequence activities. Discussions were held virtually due to pandemic related restrictions

3.3 Jurisdictional Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation

3.3.1 State Jurisdiction

3,3,1,1 State of South Carolina

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

South Carolina Emergency Management Division staff and emergency support function liaisons in the state emergency operations center successfully demonstrated the capability to establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process, to integrate critical stakeholders, and to support the response to a radiological incident at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station.

The Notification of Unusual Event declaration was received by the state warning point via dedicated telephone. The state warning point was located adjacent to the emergency operations center. State emergency operations center staff received telephone calls and emails with initial and subsequent notifications via an automated notification system.

The emergency operations center was well equipped with commercial telephones, facsimile machines, radios, computers, printers, monitors, smartboards, televisions, appropriate furniture, and office supplies. Current copies of plans, procedures, checklists, forms, phone lists, etc. were available. Commercial telephones, cellular phones, facsimile machines, and the internet were

utilized to communicate with risk counties and various state agencies. No communication failures were observed.

The chief of operations ensured State Emergency Response Team personnel were situationally aware and were completing appropriate tasks. The chief conducted regular emergency operations center briefings.

Lead by the chief, appropriate emergency operations center staff were included in the Governor's Situation Room protective action discussions along with the risk counties. All protective action decisions were made with concurrence from the state and counties. There were no protective action decisions for persons with access and functional needs and no recommendation to ingest potassium iodide. School actions were determined locally.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, and 3.1

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

Situational Assessment Capability Summary:

South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control personnel staffing emergency support function 10 demonstrated the ability to assess conditions and make recommendations to decision makers in response to a radiological incident at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station. Staff members were prepositioned near the state emergency operations center and responded quickly when notified of the emergency.

Throughout the exercise, the emergency response coordinator provided appropriate direction to the emergency support function ten team members. Two separate rooms were used for dose assessment functions to allow for social distancing to minimize the risk of coronavirus exposure. The emergency response coordinator, communicator, and utility technical liaison worked in a room near the main emergency operations center. Dose assessment staff set up in a nearby conference room. Additional South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control personnel responded as liaisons in the risk counties, virtually, and at the utility's emergency operations facility.

The dose assessment team effectively used a business communications platform that allowed team members in different locations to share information via a chat function and to have a record of their communication.

Precautionary actions were taken at Site Area Emergency based on risk county boundaries rather than the 10-mile emergency planning zone. Although the plant later escalated to a General Emergency, there was no release of radioactive material. The emergency response coordinator reviewed the utility protective action recommendation and understood that it was a default recommendation based on the emergency classification level. The emergency response coordinator concurred with implementing the utility protective action recommendations for evacuation and sheltering during a conference call with the four risk counties. Since there was no release of

radioactive material, the emergency response coordinator recommended that potassium iodide should not be ingested by the general public, institutionalized individuals, or emergency workers.

The dose assessment team continuously evaluated changing plant conditions and assessed various potential radiological release pathways. Because no radiological release occurred, actual dose projections were not performed. The dose assessment analyst performed several “what if” dose projections to demonstrate how to use the dose projection software. The dose assessment chief explained that they would do dose projection calculations and compare them with emergency notification forms and utility dose projections. If there was a significant difference in results between utility dose projections and those done by the state, they would work with the utility to resolve the differences.

Field teams did not participate in this exercise; however, the emergency response coordinator explained that in an actual incident, he would direct the dispatch of field teams to downwind areas so they would be prepositioned and could locate the plume if a release were to occur. The dose assessment chief demonstrated use of a spreadsheet that allowed for input of field monitoring team radiation survey and air sample data to calculate projected doses to the public. The doses calculated from field team surveys could be used to validate their dose assessment projections. This comparison could also be used to validate or modify protective action recommendations. For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 4.5.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

Public Information and Warning:

Waterway Warning

South Carolina Department of Natural Resources personnel successfully discussed the ability to notify the public and conduct lake clearing during a radiological emergency at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station. The discussion occurred virtually with a Department of Natural Resources lieutenant and first sergeant. The clearing of both Lake Monticello and the Par Reservoir is achieved using two boats and two officers for each location. Each boat is equipped 800 MHz radios, public address systems, and emergency lights/sirens used to notify civilians on the lake and disseminate instructions. Officers use the radios as well as cellular phones for communication with dispatch, command, and each other. Officers receive a radiological and safety brief at the primary staging prior to operation. The briefing was recited from the department standard operating procedure and included potassium iodide distribution and ingestion, exposure limits, self-reading dosimetry zeroing and reading, and dosimetry checks. Officers are also briefed on the current radiological situation within the 10-mile emergency planning zone. Officers deploy boats from the Lake Monticello West boat ramp and the Cannon Creek boat Ramp. Clearing and warning of Lake Monticello can be completed in 15 minutes; clearing of the Par Reservoir can be completed in approximately 40 minutes. Both officers demonstrated thorough knowledgeable of department plans and procedures and radiological safety

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.5, 2.2, and 3.1.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

3.3.2 Joint Operations

3.3.2.1 Joint information System/Center

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

South Carolina public information staff successfully demonstrated the ability to use a joint information system to alert and notify the news media and public concerning events involving the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station. Designated personnel and agencies were notified of the incident either by the state's electronic notification system, email, text message and/or telephone. The joint information system was operational for the duration of the exercise. The South Carolina Emergency Management Division's public information officers based their actions on experience from other events while following the guidance of the division's senior management. This permitted the rapid development, review, and dissemination of critical information. The primary communications link for the joint information system was the public information officer coordination line. Cellular telephones, text messages, and emails were also employed during the exercise. A virtual communications platform was used for the two broadcast press conferences. Notification of the public concerning events at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station was accomplished using the Emergency Alert System, and a series of news releases and press conferences. During the exercise, the state provided five news releases and conducted two virtual press conferences. All news releases were reviewed and approved by all jurisdictional public information officers within the joint information system and by senior management within South Carolina Emergency Management prior to release to the public. News releases were accurate, clear, and released in a timely manner. The public information officers identified no rumors that needed clarifying through additional news release or press conferences.

The above actions resulted in accurate information being provided to the public, therefore resolving the level 2 finding 61-19-5.b.1-L2-01 from the August 27, 2019, exercise.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 3.2 and 3.3.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** 61-19-5.b.1-L2-01

Condition: Incorrect information was disseminated to the public by the joint information system staff. After news release #2, Joint Information Center Activated, was released at 1044, staff discovered 5 minutes later that they identified the wrong nuclear plant in the news release. The

1044 version of news release #2 indicated at the end of the first paragraph: "...an Alert at the Robinson Nuclear Plant, located near Hartsville, S.C." The correction, issued at 1052, stated: "...an Alert at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station, located near Fairfield County."

At 1209, a second Emergency Alert System activation and message sequence approval process occurred for evacuation of zones A-0, A-1, E-1, E-2, F-1 and F-2. The sirens were activated at 1220 and the Emergency Alert System message was broadcast at 1223. The approved and transmitted Emergency Alert System message #2, however, erroneously indicated that Dutch Fork High School would serve as the reception center for evacuees from zones E-1, E-2, F-1 and F-2. Newberry High School should have been listed as the reception center. The State did not issue a corrected EAS message, news release #6, which gave the evacuation areas and the correct reception center locations, was distributed at 1231.

While each public inquiry was answered, there were at least three instances in which incorrect information was relayed to the caller.

Resolution: Information contained in Emergency Alert System messages and news releases was accurate. News release #1, issued at 0937, correctly stated that there was an "Alert at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station, located in Fairfield County, S.C.," and Emergency Alert System message #2 indicated the correct reception and congregate care centers for each county. There were no instances of incorrect information being delivered to public inquiries.

- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

3.3.2.2 Emergency Operations Facility

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

State liaisons to the Dominion Energy emergency operations facility from the South Carolina Emergency Management Division and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, Division of Environmental Response demonstrated the ability to enhance the coordinated response to an emergency at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station. The liaisons had adequate working space, equipment, and communications capabilities to support the emergency response effort. Several virtual platforms were used successfully to exchange information with various agencies.

The Emergency Management Division liaison was an integral part of the decision-line telephone calls, relaying information between the utility and state and county decision makers to ensure accurate situational awareness of both. The liaison also aided in coordinating siren activations.

The Department of Health and Environmental Control liaison described the process for dose assessment and field monitoring team information exchange. This process was evaluated by interview since no radiological release occurred.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met:
1.2

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

3.3.3 Risk Jurisdictions

3.3.3.1 Fairfield County

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

Fairfield County Emergency Management Division personnel established and maintained a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrated all critical stakeholders and supported the execution of core capabilities. The emergency management director, deputy director, radiological officer, and supporting staff demonstrated the ability to carry out the essential management functions of the radiological response effort. They made appropriate protective action decisions using available resources and information. While responding to the ongoing public health emergency, the leadership team prioritized the needs of the citizens of Fairfield County.

Initial and subsequent notifications of an event at the nuclear power plant occurred via the dedicated emergency management network telephone line. The plant submitted the emergency notification forms to the offsite response organizations via fax machine and a virtual response platform. The virtual platform was also utilized to facilitate inter-agency communication and the official archive of documents for the response. Response personnel were notified via a virtual alerting program, email, and phone calls to alert and mobilize for the incident as necessary. Plant status and classification levels were provided to response personnel within the emergency operation center through emergency notification forms and through briefings provided by a utility liaison and the emergency management director.

The emergency operations center manager conducted a partial activation of the emergency operations center after receiving the notification form showing an Alert had been declared. After receiving emergency notification form #3 and resolving a communications issue, the Fairfield County Emergency Manager participated in the initial state coordination call. These actions resolved the level 2 finding 61-19-2.b.2-L2-02 from the August 27, 2019, exercise.

Primary communication was accomplished using landline telephones, with back up communications via cellular telephones, a reverse calling system, the virtual response platform, various emergency services 800 MHz radio systems in use by first responders, and satellite phones. A brief interruption in communications systems affected internet-based capabilities during the exercise, but an alternative solution in the form of a mobile satellite internet system quickly restored communications. Position specific briefing books, supplies and equipment were readily available. Within the decision-making room, a computer-controlled wall mounted video monitor was used to display information concerning plant status, emergency classification level, emergency planning zone maps and other event related data. The larger emergency operations center was equipped with video projection systems, TVs, clocks, and messaging boards that displayed plant statuses.

Decision makers maintained situational awareness through frequent briefings from the director, as well as from representatives within the emergency operations center. Utilizing meteorological conditions, available plant data, and discussions with the state of South Carolina, Lexington, Newberry, and Richland counties, the county made appropriate protective actions decisions for emergency workers, schools and students, and the general public. Additional consideration and response capabilities were allocated to individuals with access and functional needs requiring assistance ahead of evacuation orders. Although it was not required by the scenario, the radiological officer discussed how the county public health department would provide potassium iodide for emergency workers and the general public and how radiation exposures of emergency workers would be monitored using dosimetry. The director and deputy director stated that resource shortages and

requests would be identified and routed to appropriate organizations via the virtual operations platform and that requests or situations exceeding county capabilities would be sent to neighboring counties or to the state for assistance.

Implementation of traffic and access control management, plus clearance of impediments to evacuation were demonstrated by the traffic management emergency support function decision maker. Staff demonstrated the ability to perform needed traffic control related to an event at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station, as well as the ability to clear a simulated traffic impediment that hindered evacuation. They also informed the public information officer of the impediment.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, and 5.4.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** 61-19-2.b.2-L2-02

Condition: Fairfield County Emergency Management did not fully activate their emergency operations center at the Alert emergency classification level in accordance with their plans and the extent of play. They did not assign staff to monitor the conference bridge line during the emergency operations center partial activation and therefore missed a coordinated decision call with the state and Lexington, Newberry and Richland Counties.

Resolution: Fairfield County Emergency Management received emergency notification form #2 indicating an Alert emergency classification level at 0854. The emergency operations center manager conducted a partial activation of the emergency operations center after receiving the completed notification form from the 911 dispatch operator. After receiving emergency notification form #3 and resolving a communications issue, The Fairfield County Emergency Manager participated in the initial state coordination call at 1010, and concurred precautionary actions at 1018.

- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

The county public information officer at the emergency operations center was consistent in providing informational messages to the public. The public information officer provided documentation to her supervisor for review and approval prior to releasing to the joint information center via the virtual joint information system. The informational messages that were distributed and press releases that were sent by the public information officer to the joint information center were uniform, timely and accurate. Silent tests of the emergency warning sirens in the 10-mile emergency planning zone were performed by staff at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station. The release of Emergency Alert System messages was conducted by the state. Back-up route alerting was discussed during the exercise and would have been accomplished by specific fire departments adjacent to the location of the siren failure; the county emergency operations center had readily accessible information showing specific fire departments and their corresponding routes.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 3.2 and 3.3.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement Capability Summary:

Fairfield County personnel successfully demonstrated the ability to establish and staff traffic control points in response to an incident at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station. The staff concerned were able to describe the roles of an emergency worker who would be dispatched to the county emergency operations center for purposes of staffing a traffic control point. The emergency workers at the traffic control points would provide written instructions to the evacuees showing them how to get to the reception and congregate care center for assistance. Communication would be via personal cell phones and two-way radios mounted in vehicles. They participated throughout the exercise, proactively planning for changes in plant conditions and county response capabilities. Personnel identified any shortfalls noted would be supplied by agencies in the county emergency operations center. This included providing dosimetry to those emergency workers who would have staffed a traffic and access control point.

At the emergency operations center, personnel who would be assigned to this task would have a safety briefing, and if necessary, just-in-time training given to them. Two individuals, one from the Fairfield County Sheriff's Office and one from the South Carolina Highway Patrol, would be at each traffic control point that needed attending. The emergency workers knew to go to the emergency worker decontamination site when their mission or shift was complete. For this exercise, 54 traffic and access control points were simulated being prepared but were not requested to be activated due to the exercise scenario. A simulated impediment occurred along an evacuation route, but it was cleared prior to any evacuation being called. Staff identified how traffic would have been redirected onto a new route that had been planned if the impediment could not have been cleared. For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 2.2, 3.1, and 5.4.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

Critical Transportation Capability Summary:

Kelly Miller Elementary School

Staff from Kelly Miller Elementary School and the Fairfield County School District successfully discussed their ability to safeguard staff and students at Kelly Miller Elementary School in the event of an emergency at V.C. Summer Nuclear Station. The discussion was held virtually with the Kelly Miller Elementary School Principal, the Fairfield County Transportation Director, the school Safety Resource Officer, a Fairfield County School District representative, Fairfield County Emergency

Management Director and Deputy Director, and the South Carolina Emergency Management Division V.C. Summer Fixed Nuclear Facility Site Specialist.

The school had adequate plans and procedures in place to ensure the safety and accountability of students and staff in the event of an emergency at V.C. Summer Nuclear Station. The school is notified by V.C. Summer staff by way of tone alert radio; additional notification methods include sirens. Notification is verified through communication with Fairfield County Emergency Management. The school had enough transportation and security assets in place to relocate their student and staff population safely and efficiently in the event of an evacuation to the Fairfield Magnet School for Math and Science. Notification of shelter-in-place actions are announced via the school public address system. If required, the school has plans and procedures in place to ensure the safety of students and staff within their classrooms. Parents and guardians are notified by way of a messaging and automated call system managed from the elementary school and the district. The school has redundant communication capabilities which include landline phones, cellphones, and a county-wide radio system. Communication systems are tested on a daily and monthly basis, and all staff are trained to use those communication systems. All participants interviewed were knowledgeable on school and district plans and procedures, and their roles in the event of an emergency at V.C. Summer Nuclear Station

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.5.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

Mass Care Capability Summary:

The Fairfield County reception and congregate care center, located at the Fairfield Magnet School for Math and Science, was identified by the county to support their response to an incident involving the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station. Fairfield County was prepared to provide evacuees immediate shelter, security, food, water, sleeping space, sanitation facilities, and medical care. Fairfield County Emergency Management established the shelter for evacuees of the Fairfield portion of the 10-mile emergency planning zone at the Site Area Emergency emergency classification level. Fairfield County Emergency Management would prepare to open the shelters at the Alert emergency classification level. American Red Cross shelter managers and Fairfield Department of Social Service staff maintained written procedures describing shelter management and registration procedures. A schematic of the facility showing the overall layout and use of allotted space was available during a walkthrough provided for the evaluation team. The school was an American Red Cross-certified shelter with a capacity for approximately 200 evacuees. It had adequate space, resources, and utilities to support the assigned mission.

Emergency management mitigated the potential for contamination within the shelter by using a green-colored sticker distributed by the monitoring and decontamination staff. Only evacuees with green stickers who had processed through the monitoring station and reception desk were allowed inside the shelter facility under Fairfield County's plans. South Carolina Department Health and Environmental Control personnel were on hand to give potassium iodide to the evacuees if needed.

The American Red Cross shelter manager noted that the Fairfield County Department of Social Services has several staff members with an experience that spanned the social service spectrum who could be called on to support the American Red Cross in meeting various contingencies in the shelter. The shelter manager described how staff set up the shelter to include areas needed for evacuee needs, such as nurse care and mental health services. Meals and snacks would be made available by the American Red Cross upon site activation.

Shelter authorities do not permit pets to accompany evacuees to the shelter; however, the shelter would allow service animals.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met:
5.1

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

Environmental Response and Safety Capability Summary:

Fairfield County Emergency Management personnel demonstrated the ability to monitor and decontaminate members of the public, emergency workers, and vehicles, in response to an emergency at V.C. Summer Nuclear Station. The capability was demonstrated at the Fairfield Magnet School for Math and Science. Fairfield County Emergency Management had sufficient equipment, supplies, and personnel to support emergency response efforts. The emergency manager issued a safety and operations brief which covered equipment and equipment issue, assignments, wear of dosimetry, and the layout of the operation. The facility has sufficient security provided by Fairfield County Sheriff's Office personnel and sufficient signage, cones, and displays to control personnel and vehicle flow.

Vehicle monitoring and decontamination staff were well trained and knowledgeable on plans and procedures. Monitoring staff had proper personnel protective equipment and maintained copies of plans and procedures at their station. Personnel correctly placed survey equipment into operation and were knowledgeable on administrative turn back limits and potassium iodide use. General public and emergency personnel were properly documented and guided through the portal monitor. Vehicles that activated the portal monitor alarm were hand monitored and sent to either the contaminated lot or the clean lot as appropriate. Fairfield County Fire Service provided water for vehicle decontamination.

Initial personnel monitoring of both evacuees and emergency workers was accomplished at the portal monitor station. One portal monitor was set up for the drill, but two or three would be used during a real event. With all stations staffed and operating efficiently, the facility would be able to monitor the evacuee population expected at that location. Some modifications to the monitoring process were recommended to make it more efficient. The portal monitor station was operated by a three-person team consisting of a monitor operator, a recorder, and security. The team worked well with one another to monitor, record, and process all personnel arriving at the reception center while minimizing cross contamination. Additional training is recommended on the use of exposure control equipment and monitoring equipment. While it was obvious the monitor operator had been trained, some steps were overlooked during the instrument operability checks and the secondary monitoring

process. When discussing dosimetry, the team relied on the radiological officer to provide information.

Personnel Decontamination staff were well trained and aware of procedures for personnel decontamination. The supervisor accurately described the processes and assisted personnel requiring decontamination, while survey personnel were knowledgeable of the equipment, correctly operationally checked the instrument prior to placing it into service and understood measures to reduce contamination of the instrument. Staff were well versed in contamination control, replacing potentially contaminated personal protective equipment or monitoring potentially contaminated areas due to the normal operation of the decontamination facility and each were aware of the correct use of their dosimetry, knowledge of turn back limits, and the use of potassium iodide. Staff guided personnel requiring decontamination through each step of the process, providing them with modesty garments as necessary, while also maintaining control of contaminated materials and personnel documentation. Personnel were surveyed prior to leaving the decontamination location to ensure decontamination and were either returned for additional decontamination or provided with clean indicators and allowed into the reception center. Conversely, staff discussed individuals requiring additional decontamination after a second shower were to be assisted to an ambulance for transport to alternate facilities.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 2.1, 2.2, and 5.1.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

3.3.3.2 Lexington County

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

The director of Lexington County Public Safety, Emergency Management, and members of the emergency operations center staff successfully demonstrated the ability to respond to a radiological emergency at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station and ensure the safety of the general population and county emergency workers. A modified, partial, emergency operations center staffing plan was implemented to provide additional measures of health and safety during the current public health emergency. The modified plan reduced the number of staff participating in person and leveraged a variety of computer technologies to allow other staff members to participate virtually. A second shift schedule was created and discussed.

Exercise participants were pre-positioned in the area in accordance with the extent of play agreement and reported to duty stations upon receipt of an automated notification system message to report to the emergency operation center. The emergency operation center had adequate space, office furnishings, lighting, ventilation, and restrooms available. Backup power was provided by a backup generator with diesel fuel for emergency use. Multiple methods of communication were available and used. The state incident management system was utilized to document and share county-specific information via online electronic message boards created and utilized by all the participating jurisdictions for the exercise.

Emergency management command staff worked effectively together to gather emergency information after each notification of an increase in emergency conditions at the plant. Information was analyzed and presented to the staff during the periodic emergency operations center briefings. Briefings kept the staff informed of emergency conditions and plant status and included updates from activated agencies of their current priorities, activities, and any unmet needs.

The assistant director ensured all response activities were coordinated between appropriate agencies as authorized in a timely manner with a constant public health and safety emphasis. The assistant director participated in all decision-line conference calls and briefed the director and appropriate staff. Based on available information from the utility liaison and recommendations from state personnel, the director provided county concurrence for all protective action decisions and media messaging.

Staff adequately described methods for equipping emergency workers with appropriate potassium iodide and radiation dosimetry. Agency representatives were knowledgeable of appropriate dosimetry, potassium iodide, and radiological protection procedures. During interview discussion, a representative from the Lexington County Health Department explained how potassium iodide is available to the general public residing within the 10-mile emergency planning zone at the reception center.

Emergency operations center staff described their ability to provide transportation and implement protective actions for people with access/functional needs and schools within their area of the 10-mile emergency planning zone. A current list of access/functional needs population was available for review.

The director of safety for Lexington County Schools discussed school relocation and methods for parent notification. He explained that a precautionary early dismissal of students would have been implemented at Site Area Emergency. Due to the current public health emergency, schools are only at 50% capacity each day of the week, which would help reduce the time needed to dismiss or relocate students if required.

A Lexington County Sheriff's Department representative described procedure to establish traffic and access control, and to respond appropriately and safely to impediments on evacuation routes within their jurisdiction. Staff members were knowledgeable of control points and procedures and capable of ensuring the safety of the public and emergency workers during traffic and access control activities.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, and 5.4.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

Lexington County personnel demonstrated the ability to effectively coordinate reliable public alerts and warnings, while providing prompt, action-oriented information to the public in a timely manner using a variety of systems, including sirens and a mass-notification system. An Emergency Alert System message that included information and instructions for the public was coordinated for release by the joint information center at the first siren sounding.

Through interview with a representative of the Lexington County Sheriff's Department it was adequately explained how backup notifications would be accomplished in areas where a siren failed. Planning for notifications in the area was discussed and would be accomplished, within a reasonable time, following failure of any or all parts of primary alert and notification systems.

Frequent communication between the county public information officer and counterparts in the joint information system using a continuously monitored coordination bridge line ensured all were updated on both anticipated and approved public information. The open bridge line aided in the timely flow of public information development and messaging. Three Lexington County news releases were produced.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 3.2, 3.3.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement Capability Summary:

A Lexington County Sheriff's Department representative described procedure to establish traffic and access control, and to respond appropriately and safely to impediments on evacuation routes within their jurisdiction. The representative stated that sufficient equipment and communications were available to support traffic management activities and additional support for the movement of impediments to evacuation could be coordinated with county emergency management. Deputies would receive required dosimeters, potassium iodide, and instructions prior to deployment. Staff members were knowledgeable of control points and procedures and capable of ensuring the safety of the public and emergency workers during traffic and access control activities.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 2.2, 3.1, and 5.4

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

Critical Transportation Capability Summary:

Chapin High School

Lexington County School District 5 personnel successfully discussed their ability to protect their students and staff in the event of a radiological emergency at V.C. Summer Nuclear Station. The discussion was conducted virtually with the Chapin High School principal and assistant principal, the district transportation director, and the district safety team.

Chapin High School had 1552 students and a staff of 244. Thirty-five school buses including one wheelchair accessible bus, would be required to transport the students and staff of Chapin High School in the event of an evacuation.

The school district would receive notification of an emergency from V.C. Summer Nuclear Station via tone alert radios and text messages. Chapin High School also had tone alert radios in the main office of the facility. Once notification of an emergency is received, the information would be verified through the county emergency operations center. Additional emergency communication includes a digital radio system that allows for communications between school buses and district vehicles.

In the event of an order to shelter in place, the safety office would notify the school and verify the notice with county emergency management. Chapin High School staff would be notified over the public address system, and all heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems would be placed offline. Parents would be notified by the school district through email, text, and messaging software. Upon receiving the order to shelter, teachers would take proper actions to gather and maintain accountability of all students and to secure the building.

Buses were located at the Chapin Transportation Office and the Dutch Fork Transportation Office in the event of an evacuation order. Students and staff would be evacuated by classroom onto the designated buses with no students driving themselves. Buses would depart from the school in a convoy to optimize law enforcement assistance.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met:
1.5

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

3.3.3.3 Newberry County

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

The Newberry County Emergency Management Division successfully demonstrated the ability to activate and operate their emergency operations center in the event of an emergency at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station. The emergency operations center staff was able to successfully alert and notify staff members to activate the facility quickly to coordinate emergency response actions. The

modern facility had sufficient space, supplies, and equipment to accommodate and sustain a full activation. Primary and backup communications equipment operated without fail.

The emergency management director competently directed emergency response actions throughout the exercise. The director effectively gathered pertinent information from staff and other sources, analyzed it, and made appropriate decisions. Overall direction and control led to effective discussion and decision making to conduct operations. The Dominion Energy liaison provided timely input during periodic staff briefings which kept the staff informed of emergency conditions and plant status. The geographic information systems officer demonstrated extensive technical knowledge of data bases, and the variety of maps and aerial photos on overhead displays maintained situational awareness during staff discussions throughout the exercise.

Appropriate measures were taken to ensure all emergency operations center staff and agency emergency workers had enough dosimetry, potassium iodide, monitors, and procedures. Binders containing instructions were available to all staff. Radiological exposure management used effective communications methods to receive instructions for emergency workers and the emergency alert systems messages for the general public.

Protective actions were implemented by school officials for early release of schools. Persons with access or functional needs were identified by registry and would follow local county decisions, as discussed with a Department of Social Services representative. Additional resources could have been obtained through coordination with the South Carolina Emergency Management Division and American Red Cross liaisons if needed.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, and 5.4.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

The Newberry County Emergency Operations Center staff successfully demonstrated their ability to protect the health and safety of the public by providing prompt, reliable, and accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the media in a timely fashion. On two conference calls hosted by the South Carolina Emergency Management Division, the Newberry County Emergency Management Director concurred with other stakeholders on protective actions. The conference calls were used to coordinate precautionary actions, protective action decisions, siren activation times, and Emergency Alert System message selections throughout the exercise.

Early in the exercise, utility staff at the V.C. Summer emergency operations facility conducted a silent test of the alert and notification system. All sirens were operational, but in the event of a failure, Newberry County had multiple redundant alert systems available to notify the entire county or specific regions of the county. Systems included but were not limited to use of various vehicles for route alerting, reverse calling software, and social media.

The emergency operations center staff provided accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. The public information officer prepared three Newberry County press releases. Each was reviewed by the emergency management director before being released. The public information officer also reviewed joint information center press releases and provided input regarding county actions.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement Capability Summary:

Protecting the health and safety of the public was accomplished through placing well trained emergency workers in the field, maintaining a diverse assortment of properly maintained communications equipment, and staffing traffic and access control points. Traffic and access control point management was demonstrated by interview. Traffic and access control points were staffed when called upon to direct traffic away from the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station toward safety and shelter.

Emergency worker equipment, to include dosimetry and traffic control documents, would be issued for each traffic control point, showing location, operational phases, communication methods, exposure limits, potassium iodide information, and dosimetry record keeping information. Radio equipment included high frequency band, very high frequency band, and ultra-high frequency bands, including the Amateur Radio Emergency Services, and satellite radio. The public safety answering point located within the 911 center can cross-connect the very high frequency and ultra-high frequency radios throughout the county.

The interview included an impediment discussion. Law enforcement officers were knowledgeable of the evacuation routes and were fully capable of identifying and resolving any impediments as necessary.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 2.1, 3.1, and 5.4.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

Critical Transportation Capability Summary:

Pomaria-Garmany Elementary School

Newberry County School District and Pomaria-Garmany Elementary School officials successfully discussed their ability to protect students and staff in the event of a radiological emergency at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station. The discussion was conducted virtually with the Pomaria-Garmany principal, the district transportation director, the Newberry County Emergency Management Director, the Key Services Officer, and the Newberry County School District Assistant Superintendent for Operations.

Pomaria-Garmany Elementary School has 290 children and a total staff of 55. Three buses would be required to move the entire school in the event of an evacuation, and they are maintained at the school during the day.

Both the school district and Pomaria-Garmany would be notified of an emergency at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station through the tone alert radios located in the district and school main office. The tone alert radios for the district are tested once a year, and both the principal and the office secretary are trained in its operation. Sirens notifications can be heard from the school. Once notification of an emergency is received, the information would be verified through the county emergency operations center. Emergency information would be provided to the staff through the walkie talkies maintained by each staff member. Pomaria-Garmany would also use messaging and information applications to notify the staff. Additionally, the staff would use an app that allows for a virtual panic button to be activated to inform parties as necessary.

Parents would be notified of school protective actions using a mobile system that sends texts and alert messages. Both the school district and the elementary school can send messages to the parents.

In the event of an order to shelter in place, the Pomaria-Garmany would go into “lock down” mode. In lock down mode, students are pulled into classrooms and rooms designated as “safe zones”. Rooms are locked and secured, and windows and gaps are sealed from outside air using available material. The heating and air system for the school is centralized and controlled at the district.

All participants were knowledgeable of district and school specific plans and procedures.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.5.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

3.3.3.4 Richland County

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

Richland County emergency services personnel and county agencies' staff demonstrated the ability to establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrated all critical stakeholders. The emergency services director/incident commander and staff-maintained communications and coordination with the other counties and the state and made protective actions to protect county residents.

The incident commander and deputy incident commander were in charge of direction and control in Richland County. They maintained a proactive approach to managing the incident and included support staff on discussions about response actions. Position-specific procedures and checklists were used to guide discussions with personnel about actions that should be taken if conditions worsened. Richland County emergency services used effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. The director demonstrated how their reverse calling system worked and discussed backup procedures. The county had multiple communication systems available. No communications failures were observed during the exercise. The emergency operations center had enough space, supplies, and equipment to support operations. Each staff position maintained a log of actions taken during the exercise. Staff did a good job performing their tasks in accordance with procedures for each emergency classification level.

Appropriate and timely protective action decisions were made as a group within the unified command. The unified command consisted of the four risk counties and South Carolina Emergency Management Division. Discussions among the risk counties and state concerning protective actions were coordinated and then concurred upon using the decision line. The deputy incident commander provided frequent virtual briefings to staff to keep them informed of emergency information and protective actions. The briefings were followed by round table discussions with emergency support functions to identify actions they were taking and to encourage proactive planning. The incident commander participated in all protective action decision coordination conference calls with stakeholders.

Traffic control points were managed by the Richland County Sheriff's Department Traffic Incident Manager. Following the Site Area Emergency declaration appropriate traffic control points were established in pre-identified locations.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1,1.2,1.4, 1.5, 5.4.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

Public information officers with the Richland County Public Information Office and Richland County Emergency Services Department successfully discussed the capability to provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. The physical demonstration of public information-related processes as outlined in the Richland County Emergency Services Department, Emergency Management Division Annex 25 C, were not observed due to the virtual evaluation. Two public information officers played in the exercise via a cloud-based video conferencing platform due to the real-world public health emergency. The evaluation of their response to a simulated radiological incident occurred through video conference and public information officer coordination line discussions, and a supplemental interview.

The South Carolina Emergency Management Division Public Information Director developed all new releases related to the radiological incident while the Richland County public information officers developed county-specific news releases – ex., activation of the county emergency operations center. The Richland County Public Information Officers developed and disseminated one county-specific news release. Through interview the Richland County Emergency Services Department Public Information Officer explained the internal and external development, review, and approval process. Following internal and external review and approval the Richland County Emergency Services Department Public Information Officer disseminated via email the news release to a pre-identified media distribution list.

The Richland County Public Information Officers participated in two press conferences. The Richland County Emergency Services Department Public Information Officer served as the spokesperson for the county and briefed on topics like the operational condition of the emergency operations center, county-specific protective actions, and that county executives were ready to respond, as necessary.

In accordance with South Carolina Operational Radiological Emergency Response Plan, Annex 3 Public Information, the South Carolina Emergency Management Division Emergency Support Function 15 coordinated responses to requests for public information and gathered and responded to rumors. The capability to respond to media and public inquiries was not demonstrated or evaluated within the Richland County Emergency Operations Center.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 3.3.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement Capability Summary:

The establishment of traffic control points was discussed through interview with a Richland County Sheriff's Department Lieutenant following the Site Area Emergency declaration. The lieutenant explained that the Richland County Sheriff's Department was the lead law enforcement agency in Richland County, and responsible for the establishment of traffic control points within zone D-1. There were nine pre-identified traffic control points in the county.

Once tasked to establish traffic control points, the deputies were directed to report to a pre-identified staging area. A radiological safety briefing and remedial dosimetry training was also provided at the staging area. It was explained that the briefing and training helped to ensure each deputy understood how to wear and read their dosimetry, and when and where to report their readings. Deputies were then assigned to one of the pre-identified traffic control points.

Communication between the deputies, lieutenant, and traffic incident manager occurred via radio. Any known impediments or issues at the traffic control point or on the evacuation route would be reported via radio to the traffic incident manager. The traffic incident manager would consult the Richland County Emergency Services Department Director to resolve the impediment. The resolution would be communicated and potentially implemented by deputy at the traffic control point, as appropriate. Other personnel and resources would be used as needed to resolve the impediment.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 2.1, 3.1, and 5.4.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

Critical Transportation Capability Summary:

Academy for Success/Spring Hill High School

School Officials and staff from District Five of Lexington and Richland County successfully discussed implementation of protective actions for students and staff of Spring Hill High School and the Academy for Success. Officials from District Five, Spring Hill High School and the Academy for Success attended the virtual interview. Safety officers from each affected school explained how notification of an emergency would be received by their school and how emergency information would be disseminated to parents. School officials discussed early release, shelter in place, and evacuation procedures thoroughly and specified staff and agency responsibilities during the implementation. Communication and transportation assets and capabilities were outlined by the District Five Transportation Director. School officials also discussed care for functional and access needs children during implementation, mass calling and web-based communication systems, and reintegration locations. School and district officials were knowledgeable on the district nuclear emergency plans and procedures.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.5.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

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Section 4: Conclusion

FEMA assesses offsite response organization preparedness on an ongoing basis which meets the intent of the 44 CFR 350 planning standards and, through the assessment of selected core capabilities, the National Preparedness Goal. This report is used to document biennial demonstration-based assessment activities and will be used to inform the Biennial Preparedness Report in December 2022.

The analysis of capabilities section above described the state and county jurisdictions' offsite response capabilities. Overall, the exercise was a success. The demonstration-based assessment activities evaluated by core capabilities, objectives, and capability targets were successfully demonstrated, and no level 1 or level 2 findings were identified. All offsite response organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures, and successfully demonstrated the ability to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of an incident involving the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station.

In addition, the state of South Carolina and the counties of Fairfield, Lexington, Newberry, and Richland were among the first in the nation to complete an exercise during the public health emergency. The state and counties innovatively and successfully implemented and used technology to ensure sufficient support and response, while also protecting their workforces. The integration of virtual conferencing not only allowed all players to participate but enhanced the operational communication capabilities within the state. The lessons learned and best practices gained through the implementation and use of new technology should be documented in emergency response plans and procedures and used to supplement future in-person exercise participation and evaluation.

Based on the results of this exercise and FEMA's review of the 2020 annual letter of certification submitted by South Carolina, the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness of the state of South Carolina and the affected local jurisdictions site-specific to the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station can be implemented. They are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of an emergency at the site. The Title 44 CFR, Part 350 approval of the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness site-specific to the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station granted on November 13, 1981, will remain in effect.

Despite the current pandemic and other ongoing real-world response efforts, the professionalism and teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all phases of the exercise. FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated and made this exercise a success.

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Appendix A: Exercise Timeline

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Time Utility Declared	Time That Notification Was Received or Action Was Taken						
		SEOC/ DOSE	EOF	FAIRFIELD COUNTY	LEXINGTON COUNTY	RICHLAND COUNTY	NEWBERRY COUNTY	JIC/JIS
Unusual Event	0821	0837	-	0839	0839	0839	0839	0837
Alert	0900	0928	0925	0917	0928	0945	0927	0928
Site Area Emergency	1032	1047	1034	1042	1038	1045	1042	1047
General Emergency	1227	1235	1230	1230	1232	1233	1235	1235
Simulated Rad. Release Started	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Simulated Rad. Release Ended	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Facility Declared Operational	0938	1010	0940	0956	0945	0935	0935	0930
State of Emergency Declared	State	1234	1234	1234	1234	1234	1234	1300*
	Local	-	-	-	1312	1245	1230	-
End Exercise		1336	1337	1340	1331	1343	1340	1342
Precautionary Actions: Clear waterways/hunting and fishing ban in the 10-mile EPZ		1019	1019	1019	1019	1019	1019	1044*
Protective Action Decision 1: Animals on stored feed and water county- wide for all four counties		1113	1113	1113	1113	1113	1113	1126*
Siren Activation		1125	1125	1125	1125	1125	1125	1125
EAS Message: Stay Tuned		1125	1125	1125	1125	1125	1125	1125
Protective Action Decision 2: Evacuate Zones: A-0, C-1, E-1 Shelter Zones: C-2, D-1, D-2		1300	1300	1300	1300	1300	1300	1317*
Siren Activation		1315	1315	1315	1315	1315	1315	1315
EAS Message: Evacuate/Shelter- in-Place		1315	1315	1315	1315	1315	1315	1315

*Denotes the time in which a decision was messaged from the joint information center.

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Appendix B: Evaluator Assignments

Location/Venue	Evaluation Team	Core Capability
State Emergency Operations Center	Jim Greer	Public Information and Warning
Emergency Operations Facility	Jill Leatherman	Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning
Dose Assessment	Marcy Campbell	Operational Coordination
Waterway Warning	Quintin Ivy	Situational Assessment
Joint Information Center/ Joint Information System	Tom Hegele Meg Swearingen	Public Information and Warning
Fairfield County Emergency Operations Center	Russell Bergmann Danny Loomis	Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement
Fairfield County Schools – Kelly Miller Elementary School	Quintin Ivy	Critical Transportation
Fairfield County Reception Center/Congregate Care Emergency Worker Decontamination	Quintin Ivy Matthew Bradley Russell Bergmann Robert Nash	Environmental Response Health/Safety Mass Care
Lexington County Emergency Operations Center	PJ Nied Roy Smith	Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement
Lexington County Schools – Chapin High School	Quintin Ivy	Critical Transportation
Newberry County Emergency Operations Center	Mike Dolder Doc Burriss	Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement
Newberry County Schools – Pomaria-Garmany Elementary School	Quintin Ivy	Critical Transportation

Richland County Emergency Operations Center	Robert Nash Glenda Bryson	Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement
Richland County Schools – Academy for Success/Spring Hill High School	Quintin Ivy	Critical Transportation

Appendix C: Exercise Participants

Participating Organizations
State of South Carolina
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control
South Carolina Department of Natural Resources
South Carolina Department of Public Safety
South Carolina Department of Social Services
South Carolina Department of Transportation
South Carolina Emergency Management Division
South Carolina Law Enforcement Division
Fairfield County
Fairfield County Department of Social Services
Fairfield County Emergency Management Division
Fairfield County Emergency Medical Services
Fairfield County Fire Service
Fairfield County Public Works
Fairfield County School District
Fairfield County Sheriff's Office
Lexington County
Lexington County 911 Communications
Lexington County Administrator
Lexington County Department of Planning and GIS
Lexington Social Services
Lexington Emergency Management
Lexington Emergency Services

Participating Organizations
Lexington Emergency Medical Services
Lexington Fire Services
Lexington Planning and GIS
Lexington Public Affairs
Lexington Sheriff's Department
Lexington/Richland Schools
Newberry County
City of Newberry Fire Department
Newberry County Administration
Newberry County Animal Control
Newberry County Board of Rescue
Newberry County Coroner
Newberry County Emergency Services
Newberry County GIS
Newberry County Health Department
Newberry County Sheriff's Office
Newberry County Tax Assessor
Richland County
Lexington/Richland Schools
Richland County Department of Social Services
Richland County Emergency Services
Richland County Planning Department
Richland County Public Information Office
Richland County Sheriff's Department

Participating Organizations
Private Sector
American Red Cross
Dominion Energy
Federal
FEMA Region IV
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II

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Appendix D: Extent of Play Agreement

Extent of Play Agreement

Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station 2021 Partial Participation Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Exercise

Unless otherwise noted, all activities will be fully demonstrated in accordance with respective plans and procedures, as they would be in an actual emergency. South Carolina Emergency Management Division (SCEMD) must provide these plans, guides and procedures to Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) NLT 60 days before the exercise. If an activity is not listed as an exception, it will be demonstrated as described in the plans, standard operating guides (SOGs) and/or standard operating procedures (SOPs). In some cases, a task may be listed as “demonstrate/discuss” to indicate that actions may be completed or discussed via interview as the scenario dictates. Any activity to be evaluated out-of-sequence (OOS), during staff assistance visits (SAVs), and/or by discussion will be clearly identified. Any issue or discrepancy arising during exercise play may be re-demonstrated, if allowed by the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) Chair or as listed herein. This allowance may be granted if it is not disruptive to exercise play and is mutually agreed to by the Offsite Response Organization (ORO) Controller and FEMA Evaluator.

Temperature checks will be conducted on all personnel entering evaluated facilities.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC)

Core Capability: Operational Coordination

Definition: Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

Capability Target: 1.1: Mobilization

Individuals with roles in support of emergency operations are identified, alerted, and mobilized in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, O.1).

South Carolina Emergency Management Division (SCEMD) will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to receive notification of an incident from the licensees; verify the notification; contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner.
- The ability to staff and maintain 24-hour operations.
- The activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel upon their arrival.
- The ability to identify and request additional resources or identify compensatory measures.

Exception: Personnel cannot be at their duty station but may be pre-positioned in the area prior to notification.

Capability Target: 1.2: Direction and Control

Individuals in leadership roles provide direction and control to the portion of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.1.c, A.2, A.3, A.5, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, D.4, E.1, H.6, O.1).

State Emergency Response Team (SERT) members at the SEOC will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The availability of facilities to support emergency operations.
- The ability to carry out the essential management functions of the response effort.
- The ability to prioritize resource tasking and replace/supplement resources.

Exception: All coordination telephone calls should occur in accordance with plans and procedures. However, the simcell may substitute for non-participating agencies.

Capability Target: 1.4: Protective Action Decisions for the Plume Phase

Appropriate PADS are based on available information for the plume phase. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: D.1.b, D.4, J.6, J.7, J.8, J.8.b, J.10, J.10.a, J.10.b, J.11.c-g, O.1).

The SERT will demonstrate/discuss the following Critical Tasks:

- The ability to conduct the decision-making process taking those with disabilities and access/functional needs (e.g., nursing homes, correctional facilities, licensed day cares, mobility-impaired individuals, and transportation-dependent individuals) into account.
- The capability to make prompt decisions on protective actions for students.
- The capability to make both initial and subsequent precautionary and/or protective action decisions in a timely manner appropriate to the incident.
- The capability to change protective actions based on the combination of the following factors: subsequent dose projections, field monitoring data, or information on plant conditions, magnitude of ongoing threat, the response, and/or site conditions.
- The capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI to supplement sheltering and evacuation.
- The capability to communicate the results of decisions to all the affected locations.

Capability Target: 3.1: Communications

Communication processes, systems, and equipment are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, O.1).

SCEMD will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- A primary system and at least one backup system are fully functional at all times.
- The capability to manage the communications systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.
- That the SEOC has sufficient equipment, maps and displays to perform the assigned role.

Exception or Note: (comms system if different than site specific plans, i.e., conference bridge line)

Core Capability: Public Information and Warning

Definition: Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

Capability Target: 3.2: Alert and Notification of the Public

Alert and notification of the public is completed in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA- REP-1, Rev. 2: E.2, E.4, E.5, F.3, O.1).

The SERT will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- A primary system and at least one backup system are fully functional at all times.
- The capability to coordinate siren activation followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ. The procedures to broadcast the message will be fully demonstrated as they would in an actual emergency up to the point of transmission.
- The backup alert and notification procedures utilized in the event of a siren failure.

Exception: All siren soundings will be conducted via silent test.

Dose Assessment

Core Capability: Situational Assessment

Definition: Provide all decision-makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response.

Capability Target: 1.1: Mobilization

Individuals with roles in support of emergency operations are identified, alerted, and mobilized in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, O.1).

South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to receive notification of an incident from the licensees; verify the notification; contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner.
- The ability to staff and maintain 24-hour operations.
- The activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel upon their arrival.
- The ability to identify and request additional resources or identify compensatory measures.

Exception: Personnel cannot be at their duty station but may be pre-positioned in the area prior to notification.

Capability Target: 1.2: Direction and Control

Individuals in leadership roles provide direction and control to the portion of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.1.c, A.2, A.3, A.5, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, D.4, E.1, H.6, O.1).

SCDHEC will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The availability of facilities to support emergency operations.
- The ability to carry out the essential management functions of the response effort.
- The ability to prioritize resource tasking and replace/supplement resources.

Exception: All coordination telephone calls should occur in accordance with plans and procedures. However, the simcell may substitute for non-participating agencies.

Capability Target: 1.3: Protective Action Recommendations

Appropriate PARs are selected based on available information and other factors. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: D.4, J.7, J.8, J.8.b, J.9, O.1).

SCDHEC will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to develop PARs for decision-makers based on available information and recommendations provided by the licensee, as well as field monitoring data if available.
- The capability to independently validate dose projections.
- The capability to use any additional data to refine projected doses and exposure rates and revise the associated PARs.

Capability Target: 4.5: Plume Phase Analysis and Dose Assessment

Dose Assessment considers all available information including plant conditions, environmental conditions, field monitoring data, sample analysis results, and dose projection calculations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: A.3, H.13, I.6, I.8, I.10, K.3, O.1).

SCDHEC will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to develop PARs for decision-makers based on available information and recommendations provided by the licensee, as well as field monitoring data if available.
- The capability to independently validate dose projections.
- The capability to use any additional data to refine projected doses and exposure rates and revise the associated PARs.

Joint Operations

Joint Information System (JIS)

Core Capability: Public Information and Warning

Definition: Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

Capability Target: 1.1: Mobilization

Individuals with roles in support of emergency operations are identified, alerted, and mobilized in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, O.1).

ESF-15 (Public Information) will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to receive notification of an incident from the licensees; verify the notification; contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner.
- The ability to staff and maintain 24-hour operations.
- The activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel upon their arrival.
- The ability to identify and request additional resources or identify compensatory measures.

Exception: Personnel cannot be at their duty station but may be pre-positioned in the area prior to notification.

Note: The equipment and supplies at the near-site JIC in 2021 will not be evaluated.

Capability Target: 1.2: Direction and Control

Individuals in leadership roles provide direction and control to the portion of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.1.c, A.2, A.3, A.5, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, D.4, E.1, H.6, O.1).

ESF-15 (Public Information) will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The availability of facilities to support emergency operations.
- The ability to carry out the essential management functions of the response effort.
- The ability to prioritize resource tasking and replace/supplement resources.

Capability Target: 3.1: Communications

Communication processes, systems, and equipment are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, O.1).

ESF-15 (Public Information) will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- A primary system and at least one backup system are fully functional at all times.
- The capability to manage the communications systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.
- That the SEOC has sufficient equipment, maps and displays to perform the assigned role.

Exception or Note: (comms system if different than site specific plans, i.e., conference bridge line)

Capability Target: 3.2: Alert and Notification of the Public

Alert and notification of the public is completed in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA- REP-1, Rev. 2: E.2, E.4, E.5, F.3, O.1).

ESF-15 (Public Information) will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- A primary system and at least one backup system are fully functional at all times.
- The capability to c
- coordinate siren activation followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ. The procedures to broadcast the message will be fully demonstrated as they would in an actual emergency up to the point of transmission.
- The backup alert and notification procedures utilized in the event of a siren failure.

Exception: All siren soundings will be conducted via silent test.

Capability Target: 3.3: Emergency Information and Instructions for Public and News Media Accurate emergency information and instructions are provided to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: E.2, E.4, E.5, G.1, G.2, G.3, G.3.a, G.4, G.5, O.1).

ESF-15 (Public Information) will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The ability to provide emergency information and instructions to the public and media in a timely manner following the initial alert and notification (not subject to specific time requirements).
- The capability to ensure that emergency information that is no longer valid is rescinded and not repeated by broadcast media.
- The capability to ensure that current emergency information is repeated at pre-established intervals.
- The capability to provide timely, accurate, concise, and coordinated information to the news media for subsequent dissemination to the public.
- The capability to respond appropriately to inquiries from the news media.
- The capability to deal with calls received via the public inquiry hotline.
- The capability to provide or obtain accurate information for public inquiry callers or make appropriate referrals.

- The capability to ensure that emergency information and instructions are consistent with PADs made by appropriate officials.
- The capability to ensure that emergency information contains all necessary and applicable instructions to assist the public in carrying out the PADs provided.
- The capability to conduct timely and pertinent media briefings and distribute media releases as the incident warrants.

Emergency Operations Facility/Liaison Core Capability: Operational Coordination

Definition: Provide all decision-makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response.

Capability Target: 1.2: Direction and Control

Individuals in leadership roles provide direction and control to the portion of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.1.c, A.2, A.3, A.5, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, D.4, E.1, H.6, O.1).

Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Liaison will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The availability of facilities to support emergency operations.
- The ability to carry out the essential management functions of the response effort.
- The ability to prioritize resource tasking and replace/supplement resources.

Waterway Clearance

Note: Waterway Clearance is an out of sequence discussion to be held on 20 January 2021

Core Capability: Public Information and Warning

Definition: Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

Capability Target: 1.5: Protective Action Decision Implementation for the Plume Phase Implement decisions for those populations and areas subject to plume phase protective actions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: A.4, C.2.a, G.1, J.11, J.11.a, J.11.b, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.g, O.1).

SCDNR will discuss the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to make KI available to institutionalized individuals and members of the general public.
- The capability to accomplish distribution of KI consistent with decisions made.
- The capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take it.
- The capability to alert and notify persons with disabilities and access/functional needs, including hospitals/medical facilities, licensed daycares, nursing homes, correctional facilities and mobility-impaired and transportation-dependent individuals.
- The capability to provide for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs.
- The ability to implement precautionary and/or protective action decisions for students.
- The capability to develop and provide timely information to OROs for use in messages to parents, the general public, and the media on the status of protective actions for schools.

Capability Target: 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management Emergency workers manage radiological exposure and dose in accordance with the plans/procedures. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, O.1).

SCDNR will discuss the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to provide DNR emergency workers (including supplemental resources) with the appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, KI, and instructions on the use of these items.
- The capability to determine whether to replace DNR workers, authorize DNR workers to incur additional exposures, or other actions related to exposure limits.
- The capability to accomplish distribution of KI to DNR emergency workers consistent with decisions made.
- The capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take.

Capability Target: 3.1: Communications

Communication processes, systems, and equipment are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, O.1).

SCDNR will discuss the following Critical Tasks:

- A primary system and at least one backup system are fully functional at all times.
- The capability to manage the communications systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.
- That the SEOC has sufficient equipment, maps and displays to perform the assigned role.

Exception or Note: (comms system if different than site specific plans, i.e., conference bridge line)

RISK COUNTIES

Fairfield, Lexington, Newberry, and Richland Counties EOC

Core Capability: Operational Coordination

Definition: Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

Capability Target: 1.1: Mobilization

Individuals with roles in support of emergency operations are identified, alerted, and mobilized in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, O.1).

Fairfield, Lexington, Newberry and Richland Counties will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to receive notification of an incident from the licensees; verify the notification; contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner.
- The ability to staff and maintain 24-hour operations.
- The activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel upon their arrival.
- The ability to identify and request additional resources or identify compensatory measures.

Exception: Personnel cannot be at their duty station but may be pre-positioned in the area prior to notification.

Fairfield County Exception: Due to THE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY Fairfield County will have ESFs 1, 2, 4/9, 5/7, 6, 8 (EMS), 8 (DHEC), 10, 12, 13, 14, and 15 in the EOC. In the event that ESFs must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Lexington County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Lexington County will have one representative from ESF 2 (Lexington County Emergency Communications/911), ESF 4 & 9 (Lexington County Fire Service), ESF 6 & 11 (Local/LCDSS & SCDSS), ESF 8 (SCDHEC & Local/LCDHEC & LCEMS), ESF 10 (SC/LCDHEC), ESF 12 (Dominion

Energy/V.C. Summer Nuclear Station Liaison), ESF 13 (Lexington County Sheriff's Department), ESF 15 (Lexington County Public Information Officer) in the EOC. Any state agency represented in the above ESFs will participate virtually. There will be no restrictions on personnel for ESF 5 and 14 from Lexington County. Additional departments represented in the EOC will include one SCEMD REM and one SCEMD Fixed Nuclear Facility Coordinator (who will act as a controller). ESFs 1, 3, 7, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 24 will be participating virtually and will be available for questions during the exercise upon request. Additionally, any other Volunteer, municipal, Lexington County, South Carolina, or Federal departments and/or organizations not listed above will be participating virtually and will be available for questions during the exercise. In the event that physically present ESFs must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Newberry County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Newberry County will have ESFs 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 in the EOC. In the event that ESFs must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Richland County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Richland County will have all ESFs and County Administration Executive Group participate virtually, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Capability Target: 1.2: Direction and Control

Individuals in leadership roles provide direction and control to the portion of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.1.c, A.2, A.3, A.5, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, D.4, E.1, H.6, O.1).

Fairfield, Lexington, Newberry and Richland Counties will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The availability of facilities to support emergency operations.
- The ability to carry out the essential management functions of the response effort.
- The ability to prioritize resource tasking and replace/supplement resources.

Exception: All coordination telephone calls should occur in accordance with plans and procedures. However, the simcell may substitute for non-participating agencies.

Fairfield County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Fairfield County will have ESFs 1, 2, 4/9, 5/7, 6, 8 (EMS), 8 (DHEC), 10, 12, 13, 14, and 15 in the EOC. In the event that ESFs must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Lexington County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Lexington County will have one representative from ESF 2 (Lexington County Emergency Communications/911), ESF 4 & 9 (Lexington County Fire Service), ESF 6 & 11 (Local/LCDSS & SCDSS), ESF 8 (SCDHEC & Local/LCDHEC & LCEMS), ESF 10 (SC/LCDHEC), ESF 12 (Dominion

Energy/V.C. Summer Nuclear Station Liaison), ESF 13 (Lexington County Sheriff's Department), ESF 15 (Lexington County Public Information Officer) in the EOC. Any state agency represented in the above ESFs will participate virtually. There will be no restrictions on personnel for ESF 5 and 14 from Lexington County. Additional departments represented in the EOC will include one SCEMD REM and one SCEMD Fixed Nuclear Facility Coordinator (who will act as a controller). ESFs 1, 3, 7, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 24 will be participating virtually and will be available for questions during the exercise upon request. Additionally, any other Volunteer, municipal, Lexington County, South Carolina, or Federal departments and/or organizations not listed above will be participating virtually and will be available for questions during the exercise. In the event that physically present ESFs must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Newberry County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Newberry County will have ESFs 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 in the EOC. In the event that ESFs must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Richland County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Richland County will have all ESFs and County Administration Executive Group participate virtually, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Capability Target: 1.4: Protective Action Decisions for the Plume Phase

Appropriate PADs are based on available information for the plume phase. (NUREG- 0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: D.1.b, D.4, J.6, J.7, J.8, J.8.b, J.10, J.10.a, J.10.b, J.11.c-g, O.1).

Fairfield, Lexington, Newberry and Richland Counties will discuss the following Critical Tasks:

- The ability to conduct the decision-making process taking those with disabilities and access/functional needs (e.g., nursing homes, correctional facilities, licensed day cares, mobility-impaired individuals, and transportation-dependent individuals) into account.
- The capability to make prompt decisions on protective actions for students.
- The capability to make both initial and subsequent precautionary and/or protective action decisions in a timely manner appropriate to the incident.
- The capability to change protective actions based on the combination of the following factors: subsequent dose projections, field monitoring data, or information on plant conditions, magnitude of ongoing threat, the response, and/or site conditions.
- The capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI to supplement sheltering and evacuation.
- The capability to communicate the results of decisions to all the affected locations.

Fairfield County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Fairfield County will have ESFs 1, 2, 4/9, 5/7, 6, 8 (EMS), 8 (DHEC), 10, 12, 13, 14, and 15 in the EOC. In the event that ESFs must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Lexington County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Lexington County will have one representative from ESF 2 (Lexington County Emergency Communications/911), ESF 4 & 9 (Lexington County Fire Service), ESF 6 & 11 (Local/LCDSS & SCDSS), ESF 8 (SCDHEC & Local/LCDHEC & LCEMS), ESF 10 (SC/LCDHEC), ESF 12 (Dominion

Energy/V. C. Summer Nuclear Station Liaison), ESF 13 (Lexington County Sheriff's Department), ESF 15 (Lexington County Public Information Officer) in the EOC. Any state agency represented in the above ESFs will participate virtually. There will be no restrictions on personnel for ESF 5 and 14 from Lexington County. Additional departments represented in the EOC will include one SCEMD REM and one SCEMD Fixed Nuclear Facility Coordinator (who will act as a controller). ESFs 1, 3, 7, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 24 will be participating virtually and will be available for questions during the exercise upon request. Additionally, any other Volunteer, municipal, Lexington County, South Carolina, or Federal departments and/or organizations not listed above will be participating virtually and will be available for questions during the exercise. In the event that physically present ESFs must change to virtual

participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Newberry County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Newberry County will have ESFs 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 in the EOC. In the event that ESFs must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Richland County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Richland County will have all ESFs and County Administration Executive Group participate virtually, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Capability Target: 1.5: Protective Action Decision Implementation for the Plume Phase Implement decisions for those populations and areas subject to plume phase protective actions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: A.4, C.2.a, G.1, J.11, J.11.a, J.11.b, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.g, O.1).

Fairfield, Lexington, Newberry and Richland Counties will discuss/demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to make KI available to institutionalized individuals and members of the general public.
- The capability to accomplish distribution of KI consistent with decisions made.
- The capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take it.
- The capability to alert and notify persons with disabilities and access/functional needs, including hospitals/medical facilities, licensed daycares, nursing homes, correctional facilities and mobility-impaired and transportation-dependent individuals.
- The capability to provide for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs.
- The ability to implement precautionary and/or protective action decisions for students.
- The capability to develop and provide timely information to OROs for use in messages to parents, the general public, and the media on the status of protective actions for schools.

Fairfield County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Fairfield County will have ESFs 1, 2, 4/9, 5/7, 6, 8 (EMS), 8 (DHEC), 10, 12, 13, 14, and 15 in the EOC. In the event that ESFs must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Lexington County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Lexington County will have one representative from ESF 2 (Lexington County Emergency Communications/911), ESF 4 & 9 (Lexington County Fire Service), ESF 6 & 11 (Local/LCDSS & SCDSS), ESF 8 (SCDHEC & Local/LCDHEC & LCEMS), ESF 10 (SC/LCDHEC), ESF 12 (Dominion

Energy/V. C. Summer Nuclear Station Liaison), ESF 13 (Lexington County Sheriff's Department), ESF 15 (Lexington County Public Information Officer) in the EOC. Any state agency represented in the above ESFs will participate virtually. There will be no restrictions on personnel for ESF 5 and 14 from Lexington County. Additional departments represented in the EOC will include one SCEMD REM and one SCEMD Fixed Nuclear Facility Coordinator (who will act as a controller). ESFs 1, 3, 7, 16, 17, 18,

19, and 24 will be participating virtually and will be available for questions during the exercise upon request. Additionally, any other Volunteer, municipal, Lexington County, South Carolina, or Federal departments and/or organizations not listed above will be participating virtually and will be available for questions during the exercise. In the event that physically present ESFs must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Newberry County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Newberry County will have ESFs 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 in the EOC. In the event that ESFs must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Richland County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Richland County will have all ESFs and County Administration Executive Group participate virtually, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Capability Target: 2.1: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Decision-Making Process A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to ensure that an exposure control system is in place for emergency workers, and includes the use of radio protective drugs and procedures to authorize emergency exposures in excess of the PAGs. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: C.2.c, H.11, K.2, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, M.8, O.1).

Fairfield, Lexington, Newberry and Richland Counties will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to comply with county emergency worker exposure limits.
- The capability to make decisions concerning authorization of exposure levels in excess of pre-authorized levels and the number of county emergency workers receiving radiation doses above pre-authorized levels.
- The capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure for county emergency workers based on the established PAGs for KI administration.

Fairfield County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Fairfield County will have ESFs 1, 2, 4/9, 5/7, 6, 8 (EMS), 8 (DHEC), 10, 12, 13, 14, and 15 in the EOC. In the event that ESFs must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Lexington County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Lexington County will have one representative from ESF 2 (Lexington County Emergency Communications/911), ESF 4 & 9 (Lexington County Fire Service), ESF 6 & 11 (Local/LCDSS & SCDSS), ESF 8 (SCDHEC & Local/LCDHEC & LCEMS), ESF 10 (SC/LCDHEC), ESF 12 (Dominion

Energy/V.C. Summer Nuclear Station Liaison), ESF 13 (Lexington County Sheriff's Department), ESF 15 (Lexington County Public Information Officer) in the EOC. Any state agency represented in the above ESFs will participate virtually. There will be no restrictions on personnel for ESF 5 and 14 from Lexington County. Additional departments represented in the EOC will include one SCEMD REM and one SCEMD Fixed Nuclear Facility Coordinator (who will act as a controller). ESFs 1, 3, 7, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 24 will be participating virtually and will be available for questions during the exercise upon request. Additionally, any other Volunteer, municipal, Lexington County, South Carolina, or Federal departments and/or organizations not listed above will be participating virtually and will be available for questions during the exercise. In the event that physically present ESFs must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Newberry County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Newberry County will have ESFs 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 in the EOC. In the event that ESFs must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Richland County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Richland County will have all ESFs and County Administration Executive Group participate virtually, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Capability Target: 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management Emergency workers manage radiological exposure and dose in accordance with the plans/procedures. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, O.1).

Fairfield, Lexington, Newberry and Richland Counties will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to provide county emergency workers (including supplemental resources) with the appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, KI, and instructions on the use of these items.
- The capability to determine whether to replace workers, authorize workers to incur additional exposures, or other actions related to exposure limits.
- The capability to accomplish distribution of KI to county emergency workers consistent with decisions made.
- The capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take.

Fairfield County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Fairfield County will have ESFs 1, 2, 4/9, 5/7, 6, 8 (EMS), 8 (DHEC), 10, 12, 13, 14, and 15 in the EOC. In the event that ESFs must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Lexington County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Lexington County will have one representative from ESF 2 (Lexington County Emergency Communications/911), ESF 4 & 9 (Lexington County Fire Service), ESF 6 & 11 (Local/LCDSS & SCDSS), ESF 8 (SCDHEC & Local/LCDHEC & LCEMS), ESF 10 (SC/LCDHEC), ESF 12 (Dominion

Energy/V.C. Summer Nuclear Station Liaison), ESF 13 (Lexington County Sheriff's Department), ESF 15 (Lexington County Public Information Officer) in the EOC. Any state agency represented in the above ESFs will participate virtually. There will be no restrictions on personnel for ESF 5 and 14 from Lexington County. Additional departments represented in the EOC will include one SCEMD REM and one SCEMD Fixed Nuclear Facility Coordinator (who will act as a controller). ESFs 1, 3, 7, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 24 will be participating virtually and will be available for questions during the exercise upon request. Additionally, any other Volunteer, municipal, Lexington County, South Carolina, or Federal departments and/or organizations not listed above will be participating virtually and will be available for questions during the exercise. In the event that physically present ESFs must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

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Richland County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Richland County will have all ESFs and County Administration Executive Group participate virtually, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Capability Target: 3.1: Communications

Communication processes, systems, and equipment are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, O.1).

Fairfield, Lexington, Newberry and Richland Counties will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- A primary system and at least one backup system are fully functional at all times.
- The capability to manage the communications systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.
- That the counties EOC's have sufficient equipment, maps and displays to perform the assigned role.

Exception or Note: (comms system if different than site specific plans, i.e., conference bridge line)

Fairfield County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Fairfield County will have ESFs 1, 2, 4/9, 5/7, 6, 8 (EMS), 8 (DHEC), 10, 12, 13, 14, and 15 in the EOC. In the event that ESFs must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Lexington County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Lexington County will have one representative from ESF 2 (Lexington County Emergency Communications/911), ESF 4 & 9 (Lexington County Fire Service), ESF 6 & 11 (Local/LCDSS & SCDSS), ESF 8 (SCDHEC & Local/LCDHEC & LCEMS), ESF 10 (SC/LCDHEC), ESF 12 (Dominion

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Newberry County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Newberry County will have ESFs 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 in the EOC. In the event that ESFs must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Richland County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Richland County will have all ESFs and County Administration Executive Group participate virtually, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Capability Target: 5.4: Traffic and Access Control

Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev.2: H.12, J.8, J.8.b, J.10, J.10.a, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.f, J.14.d, J.14.e, M.1.b, O.1).

Fairfield, Lexington, Newberry and Richland Counties will discuss/demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to select, establish, and staff appropriate traffic control points and access control points consistent with current conditions and PADs (e.g., evacuating, sheltering, and relocation) in a timely manner.
- The capability to provide instructions to access control staff on actions to take when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.
- Accurate knowledge of their roles and responsibilities including verifying emergency worker identification and access authorization to the affected areas.
- The capability to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation, including re-routing of traffic and coordination with the JIS to communicate alternate routes to evacuees, as appropriate.

Fairfield County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Fairfield County will have ESFs 1, 2, 4/9, 5/7, 6, 8 (EMS), 8 (DHEC), 10, 12, 13, 14, and 15 in the EOC. In the event that ESFs must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Lexington County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Lexington County will have one representative from ESF 2 (Lexington County Emergency Communications/911), ESF 4 & 9 (Lexington County Fire Service), ESF 6 & 11 (Local/LCDSS & SCDSS), ESF 8 (SCDHEC & Local/LCDHEC & LCEMS), ESF 10 (SC/LCDHEC), ESF 12 (Dominion

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Richland County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Richland County will have all ESFs and County Administration Executive Group participate virtually, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Core Capability: Public Information and Warning

Definition: Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

Capability Target: 3.2: Alert and Notification of the Public

Alert and notification of the public is completed in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA- REP-1, Rev. 2: E.2, E.4, E.5, F.3, O.1).

Fairfield, Lexington, Newberry and Richland Counties will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- A primary system and at least one backup system are fully functional at all times.
- The capability to coordinate siren activation followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ. The procedures to broadcast the message will be fully demonstrated as they would in an actual emergency up to the point of transmission.
- The backup alert and notification procedures utilized in the event of a siren failure.

Fairfield County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Fairfield County will have ESFs 1, 2, 4/9, 5/7, 6, 8 (EMS), 8 (DHEC), 10, 12, 13, 14, and 15 in the EOC. In the event that ESFs must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Lexington County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Lexington County will have one representative from ESF 2 (Lexington County Emergency Communications/911), ESF 4 & 9 (Lexington County Fire Service), ESF 6 & 11 (Local/LCDSS & SCDSS), ESF 8 (SCDHEC & Local/LCDHEC & LCEMS), ESF 10 (SC/LCDHEC), ESF 12 (Dominion

Energy/V.C. Summer Nuclear Station Liaison), ESF 13 (Lexington County Sheriff's Department), ESF 15 (Lexington County Public Information Officer) in the EOC. Any state agency represented in the above ESFs will participate virtually. There will be no restrictions on personnel for ESF 5 and 14 from Lexington County. Additional departments represented in the EOC will include one SCEMD REM and one SCEMD Fixed Nuclear Facility Coordinator (who will act as a controller). ESFs 1, 3, 7, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 24 will be participating virtually and will be available for questions during the exercise upon request. Additionally, any other Volunteer, municipal, Lexington County, South Carolina, or Federal departments and/or organizations not listed above will be participating virtually and will be available for questions during the exercise. In the event that physically present ESFs must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Newberry County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Newberry County will have ESFs 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 in the EOC. In the event that ESFs must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Richland County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Richland County will have all ESFs and County Administration Executive Group participate virtually, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Capability Target: 3.3: Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and News Media
Accurate emergency information and instructions are provided to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: E.2, E.4, E.5, G.1, G.2, G.3, G.3.a, G.4, G.5, O.1)

Fairfield, Lexington, Newberry and Richland Counties will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The ability to provide emergency information and instructions to the public and media in a timely manner following the initial alert and notification (not subject to specific time requirements).
- The capability to ensure that emergency information that is no longer valid is rescinded and not repeated by broadcast media.
- The capability to ensure that current emergency information is repeated at pre-established intervals.
- The capability to provide timely, accurate, concise, and coordinated information to the news media for subsequent dissemination to the public.
- The capability to respond appropriately to inquiries from the news media.
- The capability to deal with calls received via the public inquiry hotline.

- The capability to provide or obtain accurate information for public inquiry callers or make appropriate referrals.
- The capability to ensure that emergency information and instructions are consistent with PADs made by appropriate officials.
- The capability to ensure that emergency information contains all necessary and applicable instructions to assist the public in carrying out the PADs provided.
- The capability to conduct timely and pertinent media briefings and distribute media releases as the incident warrants.

Fairfield County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Fairfield County will have ESFs 1, 2, 4/9, 5/7, 6, 8 (EMS), 8 (DHEC), 10, 12, 13, 14, and 15 in the EOC. In the event that ESFs must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Lexington County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Lexington County will have one representative from ESF 2 (Lexington County Emergency Communications/911), ESF 4 & 9 (Lexington County Fire Service), ESF 6 & 11 (Local/LCDSS & SCDSS), ESF 8 (SCDHEC & Local/LCDHEC & LCEMS), ESF 10 (SC/LCDHEC), ESF 12 (Dominion

Energy/V.C. Summer Nuclear Station Liaison), ESF 13 (Lexington County Sheriff's Department), ESF 15 (Lexington County Public Information Officer) in the EOC. Any state agency represented in the above ESFs will participate virtually. There will be no restrictions on personnel for ESF 5 and 14 from Lexington County. Additional departments represented in the EOC will include one SCEMD REM and one SCEMD Fixed Nuclear Facility Coordinator (who will act as a controller). ESFs 1, 3, 7, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 24 will be participating virtually and will be available for questions during the exercise upon request. Additionally, any other Volunteer, municipal, Lexington County, South Carolina, or Federal departments and/or organizations not listed above will be participating virtually and will be available for questions during the exercise. In the event that physically present ESFs must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Newberry County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Newberry County will have ESFs 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 in the EOC. In the event that ESFs must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Richland County Exception: Due to the public health emergency Richland County will have all ESFs and County Administration Executive Group participate virtually, they will be available for questions during the exercise. ESD HQs internal staff will be physically present in the EOC. In the event that internal staff must change to virtual participation, they will be available for questions during the exercise.

Schools

School interviews will be conducted out of sequence virtually at the following times:

Date & Time	County	School
Tues 12 Jan 2021 @ 1000 - 1100	Fairfield	Kelly Miller
Wed 13 Jan 2021 @ 1425 - 1500 (SHHS) @ 1500 - 1600 (Academy)	Richland	Spring Hill HS Academy for Success
Thurs 14 Jan 2021 @ 1000 - 1100	Newberry	Pomaria-Garmany ES
Wed 20 Jan 2021 @ 1000 - 1100	Lexington	Chapin HS

Core Capability: Critical Transportation

Definition: Provide transportation (including infrastructure access and accessible transportation services) for response priority objectives, including the evacuation of people and animals, and the delivery of vital response personnel, equipment, and services into the affected areas.

Capability Target: 1.5: Protective Action Decision Implementation for the Plume Phase Implement decisions for those populations and areas subject to plume phase protective actions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: A.4, C.2.a, G.1, J.11, J.11.a, J.11.b, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.g, O.1).

Fairfield, Lexington, Newberry and Richland Counties will discuss/demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to make KI available to institutionalized individuals and members of the general public.
- The capability to accomplish distribution of KI consistent with decisions made.
- The capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take it.
- The capability to alert and notify persons with disabilities and access/functional needs, including hospitals/medical facilities, licensed daycares, nursing homes, correctional facilities and mobility-impaired and transportation-dependent individuals.
- The capability to provide for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs.
- The ability to implement precautionary and/or protective action decisions for students.
- The capability to develop and provide timely information to OROs for use in messages to parents, the general public, and the media on the status of protective actions for schools.

Traffic Control Points (TCPs)

Core Capability: On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement

Definition: Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas and also for all traditional and atypical response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.

Capability Target: 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management Emergency workers manage radiological exposure and dose in accordance with the plans/procedures. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, O.1).

Fairfield, Lexington, Newberry and Richland Counties will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to provide county emergency workers (including supplemental resources) with the appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, KI, and instructions on the use of these items.
- The capability to determine whether to replace workers, authorize workers to incur additional exposures, or other actions related to exposure limits.
- The capability to accomplish distribution of KI to county emergency workers consistent with decisions made.
- The capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take.

Capability Target: 3.1: Communications

Communication processes, systems, and equipment are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, O.1).

Fairfield, Lexington, Newberry, and Richland Counties will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- A primary system and at least one backup system are fully functional at all times.
- The capability to manage the communications systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.
- That the counties EOC's have sufficient equipment, maps and displays to perform the assigned role.

Exception or Note: (comms system if different than site specific plans, i.e., conference bridge line)

Capability Target: 5.4: Traffic and Access Control

Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: H.12, J.8, J.8.b, J.10, J.10.a, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.f, J.14.d, J.14.e, M.1.b, O.1).

Fairfield, Lexington, Newberry and Richland Counties will discuss the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to select, establish, and staff appropriate traffic control points and access control points consistent with current conditions and PADs (e.g., evacuating, sheltering, and relocation) in a timely manner.
- The capability to provide instructions to access control staff on actions to take when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.
- Accurate knowledge of their roles and responsibilities including verifying emergency worker identification and access authorization to the affected areas.
- The capability to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation, including re-routing of traffic and coordination with the JIS to communicate alternate routes to evacuees, as appropriate.

Emergency Worker Decontamination (EWD)

EWD for Fairfield County will be conducted out of sequence at the following time and location:

Date & Time	County	Facility
February 25, 2021 @ 1800 - 2100	Fairfield	Fairfield Magnet School for Math and Science

Core Capability: Environmental Response/Health and Safety

Definition: Ensure the availability of guidance and resources to address all hazards including hazardous materials, acts of terrorism, and natural disasters in support of the responder operations and the affected communities.

Capability Target: 3.1: Communications

Communication processes, systems, and equipment are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, O.1).

Fairfield County will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- A primary system and at least one backup system are fully functional at all times.
- The capability to manage the communications systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.
- That the counties EOC's have sufficient equipment, maps and displays to perform the assigned role.

Exception or Note: comms system if different than site specific plans, i.e., conference bridge line)

Capability Target: 5.2: Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers, Equipment, and Vehicles

Facilities, equipment, and procedures are in place and utilized to provide monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and their equipment and vehicles. (NUREG- 0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev.2: K.4, O.1).

Fairfield County will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to monitor emergency worker personnel and their equipment and vehicles for contamination.
- The capability to make decisions on the need for decontamination of personnel, equipment, and vehicles based on trigger/action levels and procedures.
- The process of checking the instruments for proper operation before use.
- Monitoring procedures for a minimum of two emergency workers, their equipment, and one vehicle.
- Provisions for separate showering and same-sex decontamination.
- Provisions for limiting the spread of contamination.
- Provisions to separate contaminated and uncontaminated individuals, provide changes of clothing for those with contaminated clothing, and store contaminated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further contamination of emergency workers or facilities.
- The capability to register emergency workers upon completion of the monitoring and decontamination activities.

Exception: Decontamination of emergency workers will be simulated.

Reception Center

RC/CC facility for Fairfield County to be evaluated will be conducted out of sequence at the following time and location:

Date & Time	County	Facility
February 25, 2021 @ 1800 - 2100	Fairfield	Fairfield Magnet School for Math and Science

Core Capability: Environmental Response/Health and Safety

Definition: Ensure the availability of guidance and resources to address all hazards including hazardous materials, acts of terrorism, and natural disasters in support of the responder operations and the affected communities.

Capability Target: 2.1: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Decision-Making Process A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to ensure that an exposure control system is in place for emergency workers, and includes the use of radio protective drugs and procedures to authorize emergency exposures in excess of the PAGs. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: C.2.c, H.11, K.2, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, M.8, O.1).

Fairfield County will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to comply with county emergency worker exposure limits.
- The capability to make decisions concerning authorization of exposure levels in excess of pre-authorized levels and the number of county emergency workers receiving radiation doses above pre-authorized levels.
- The capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure for county emergency workers based on the established PAGs for KI administration.

Capability Target: 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management Emergency workers manage radiological exposure and dose in accordance with the plans/procedures. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, O.1).

Fairfield County will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to provide county emergency workers (including supplemental resources) with the appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, KI, and instructions on the use of these items.
- The capability to determine whether to replace workers, authorize workers to incur additional exposures, or other actions related to exposure limits.
- The capability to accomplish distribution of KI to county emergency workers consistent with decisions made.
- The capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take.

Capability Target: 5.1: Monitoring, Decontamination, Sheltering and Registration of Evacuees Facilities, equipment, and procedures are in place and utilized to provide monitoring, decontamination, identification, temporary shelter, congregate care, and registration of evacuees. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: J.11.d, J.13, K.4, O.1).

Fairfield County will discuss/demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The process of checking the instruments for proper operation before use.
- Radiological monitoring and decontamination, for evacuees utilizing at least one-third of the resources available at the facilities as necessary to monitor 20% of the population within a 12-hour period. A minimum of six evacuees must be monitored per station.

- The capability to register evacuees upon completion of the monitoring and decontamination activities.
- Provisions for limiting the spread of contaminations
- Provisions to separate contaminated and uncontaminated evacuees, provide changes of clothing for those with contaminated clothing, and store contaminated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further contamination of evacuees or facilities.
- The capability to provide care services to simulated evacuees.
- The capability to ensure that evacuees, service animals, and vehicles have been monitored for contamination, decontaminated as appropriate, and registered before registering and entering the facility.
- The availability of supplies (e.g. cots, blankets, and food supplies) and verify by providing a list of sources for such items and estimated quantities.

Exception: Decontamination of evacuees will be simulated Congregate Care

Core Capability: Mass Care

Definition: Provide life-sustaining services to the affected population with a focus on hydration, feeding and sheltering to those who have the most need as well as support for reunifying families.

Capability Target: 5.1: Monitoring, Decontamination, Sheltering and Registration of Evacuees Facilities, equipment, and procedures are in place and utilized to provide monitoring, decontamination, identification, temporary shelter, congregate care, and registration of evacuees. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: J.11.d, J.13, K.4, O.1).

Fairfield County will discuss/demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to coordinate evacuees who have been monitored and, if necessary, decontaminated.
- The capability to establish shelter operations.
- The capability of congregate care centers and operations in host/support jurisdictions are sufficient to support the expected number of evacuees.
- The capability to register evacuees upon completion of the monitoring and decontamination activities.
- The capability to ensure the registration area is clean and controlled, with provisions for limiting the spread of contaminations. Provisions to separate contaminated and uncontaminated evacuees, provide changes of clothing for those with contaminated clothing, and store contaminated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further contamination of evacuees or facilities.
- The capability to provide care services to simulated evacuees.
- The capability to ensure that evacuees, service animals, and vehicles have been monitored for contamination, decontaminated as appropriate, and registered before registering and entering the facility.
- The availability of supplies (e.g. cots, blankets, and food supplies) and verify by providing a list of sources for such items and estimated quantities.

Exception: Decontamination of evacuees will be simulated