After Action Report

St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise

Exercise Date: February 8, 2022

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Executive Summary

On February 8, 2022, the Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency Region 4 Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program staff evaluated a hostile action-based plume phase scenario exercise for the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. The plant is located on Hutchinson Island, approximately 4 miles east-northeast of the City of Port St. Lucie. This facility is owned and operated by the Florida Power & Light Company. Parts of St. Lucie and Martin counties lie within the 10-mile plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone and are considered risk counties. Indian River, Brevard, and Palm Beach counties serve as host jurisdictions for evacuees from the 10-mile emergency planning zone.

Federal Emergency Management Agency's overall objective of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in coordinating and responding to an emergency at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. The purpose of this report is to analyze exercise results, identify strengths to be maintained and built upon, identify potential areas for improvement, and support development of corrective actions.

This exercise was held in accordance with Federal Emergency Management Agency's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans and procedures. The evaluation team conducted this exercise using Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program methodology. The previous Federal evaluated exercise was conducted on November 17, 2020. The original qualifying joint emergency preparedness exercise was conducted March 20, 1991.

The evaluation of out of sequence events and activities that took place on August 18, 2021; December 14 and 15, 2021; January 12, 2022; and February 1 and 3, 2022 are included in this report. These activities included: school and traffic control interviews; reception centers; emergency worker monitor and decontamination and two Medical Services Drills.

Officials and representatives from the state of Florida; the risk counties of St. Lucie, and Martin; the host counties of Indian River, Brevard, and Palm Beach; Florida Power and Light; and numerous volunteers and other agencies participated in this exercise. These organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them. The jurisdictions met the joint exercise objectives and successfully demonstrated the corresponding Core Capabilities identified in Section 3 of this report. During the exercise no level 1or 2 findings were identified. Two outstanding Level 2 findings were resolved from the 2020 exercise by the St. Lucie County Fire District during the medical services drill with the Lawnwood Regional Medical Center & Heart Institute.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated in the exercise and made it a success. The state of Florida and St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant offsite response organizations were among the first in the nation to complete a hostile action-based exercise during the SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19 pandemic and leading the way into the 2022-2030 radiological emergency preparedness exercise cycle. The professionalism and teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all phases of the exercise.

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Section 1: Exercise Overview

Exercise Name	2022 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise	
Type of Exercise	Full Participation	
Exercise Date	February 8, 2022	
Out of Sequence Dates	August 18, 2021; December 14 and 15, 2021; January 12, 2022; and February 1 and 3, 2022	
Program	Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program	
Mission Area	Response	
Scenario Type	Hostile Action-Based Plume Phase Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise	
Participating Organizations	See Appendix C for the list of participating organizations	
Locations	See Appendix D for the extent of play agreement and exercise locations	
Points of Contact	Mr. Kevin Wells RAC Chairperson FEMA Region 4 3005 Chamblee-Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341	Mr. Robert Spence South Section Chief FEMA Region 4 3005 Chamblee-Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341
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Section 2: Exercise Design Summary

2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design

FEMA administers the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program pursuant to the regulations found in Title 44 CFR parts 350, 351, 352, 353 and 354. CFR 350 codifies 16 planning standards that form the basis for radiological emergency response planning for the licensee, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments impacted by the emergency planning zones established for each nuclear power plant site in the United States. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations also codify the 16 planning standards for the licensee. 44 CFR 350 sets forth the mechanisms for the formal review and approval of state, local, tribal, and territorial government radiological emergency response plans and procedures by FEMA. One of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program cornerstones established by these regulations is the biennial exercise of offsite response capabilities. During these exercises, affected state, local, tribal, and territorial governments demonstrate their abilities to implement their plans and procedures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological incident at a nuclear plant.

The results of this exercise, together with reviews of the radiological emergency response plans and verification of the periodic requirements set forth in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev 2, the annual letter of certification, and staff assistance visits, enabled FEMA to provide a statement with the transmission of this final after-action report to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This statement verifies that the affected state, local, tribal, and territorial plans and preparedness are: (1) adequate to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the nuclear power facility by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological incident; and (2) capable of being implemented.

2.2 Exercise Core Capabilities and Objectives

Core capabilities-based planning allows for exercise planning teams to develop exercise objectives and observe exercise outcomes through a framework of specific action items. Using the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program methodology, the exercise objectives meet Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program requirements and objectives. The capability targets to be demonstrated were negotiated with the state of Florida and risk counties. The core capabilities scheduled for demonstration during this exercise were:

- **Operational Coordination:** Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.
- **Situational Assessment:** Provide all decision makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response.
- **Public Information and Warning:** Deliver coordination, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

- **Environmental Response/Health and Safety:** Conduct appropriate measures to ensure the protection of the health and safety of the public and workers, as well as the environment, from all-hazards in support of responder operations and the affected communities.
- **On Scene Security, Protection and Law Enforcement:** Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas and also for response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.
- **Critical Transportation:** The capability to provide transportation (including infrastructure access and accessible transportation services) for response priority objectives, including the evacuation of people and animals, and the delivery of vital response personnel, equipment, and services into the affected areas.
- **Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services:** Provide lifesaving medical treatment via Emergency Medical Services and related operations and avoid additional disease and injury by providing targeted public health, medical and behavioral health support, and products to all affected populations.

These core capabilities, when successfully demonstrated, meet the exercise objectives. The objectives for this exercise were as follows:

- **Objective 1:** Demonstrate the ability to alert, activate and mobilize staff in accordance with plans and procedures to support emergency operations; provide Direction and Control through the Counties' and State Emergency Operations Centers.
- **Objective 2:** Demonstrate the ability to assess conditions and make protective action decisions for State and County emergency workers and the general public through exercise demonstration and discussions of plans and procedures.
- **Objective 3:** Demonstrate the ability to implement protective actions for State and County emergency workers and the general public through exercise demonstration and discussions of plans and procedures.
- **Objective 4:** Demonstrate the ability to activate the Primary Alert and Notification System, complemented by other systems, and demonstrate the back-up Alert and Notification System through exercise demonstration or discussions of plans and procedures.
- **Objective 5:** Demonstrate the effectiveness of plans, policies, and procedures within the joint information system for public and private sector emergency information communications.
- **Objective 6:** Demonstrate the ability to provide dose projections and protective action recommendations for the plume and ingestion phases.
- **Objective 7:** Demonstrate the ability to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to a contaminated injured individual(s).
- **Objective 8:** Demonstrate the ability to manage emergency workers radiological exposure and dose in accordance with the plans/procedures.

3.3 Exercise Scenario

The following is a summary of the scenario developed by the Florida Power & Light to drive exercise play.

The scenario included a radiological release from a hostile based action. The hostile action resulted in a release of radioactive material through a vent. The St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant security forces secured the facility and local law enforcement was requested to assist by performing a sweep of the owner-controlled area with the county bomb squad supporting this action. Due to the release, the vent radiation readings exceeded the emergency classification level for the declaration of a General Emergency. The protective action recommendation to the offsite response organizations was to evacuate all areas 0 to 2 miles and downwind areas 2 to 5 miles to include evacuation of areas 1, 2, 6, and 8.

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Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities

3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results

This section contains the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the exercise and associated out of sequence events. There were no Level 1 or 2 findings identified during these evaluations.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity were evaluated based on the demonstration of core capabilities, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program objectives, and capability targets as delineated in the FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual dated December 2019. Capability targets are listed by number and the demonstration status of those capability targets are indicated by the use of the following terms:

- **Met (M):** The jurisdiction or functional entity performed all activities under the objective/capability target to the level required per the work plan and/or the extent-of-play agreement, with no Level 1 or Level 2 Findings evaluated under that objective/capability target during the current activity and no unresolved prior Level 2 Finding(s).
- **Level 1 Finding (L1):** An observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance during an assessment activity that could cause a determination that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant.
- **Level 2 Finding (L2):** An observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance during an assessment activity that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health and safety.
- **Plan Issue (P):** An observed or identified inadequacy in the ORO's emergency plan/implementing procedures, rather than in that of the ORO's performance.
- **Not Demonstrated (N):** For a justifiable reason, the jurisdiction or functional entity did not perform assessment activities under the objective/capability target as specified in the extent-of-play agreement.

3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation

The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program methodology is an analytical process used to assess the demonstration of specific capabilities during an exercise. A capability provides a means to perform one or more capability targets under specified conditions and to specific performance standards. Core capabilities form the foundation of the FEMA Region 4 Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program evaluations. The core capability summaries below provide an overall combined assessment of state and local jurisdictions based upon their collective demonstrated performance as it relates to the specific core capability. Each jurisdiction's standalone core capability summaries are provided in section 3.

- **Operational Coordination:** The overall decision-making process integrated the St. Lucie County Incident Commander, St. Lucie County, and Martin County critical stakeholders and enabled protective action decisions without delay. Key support agencies established

and maintained a unified and coordinated operational structure, which provided effective direction and control.

- **Situational Assessment:** Florida Department of Health/Bureau of Radiation Control dose assessment personnel provided decision makers relevant information regarding radiological and plant conditions. Personnel gathered information from changing plant and meteorological conditions to assess the radiological release. They performed dose projections and compared their results with utility dose projections and field team readings. This information allowed decision makers to understand the extent of the hazards, their cascading effects, and to make the appropriate protective action decisions.
- **Public Information and Warning:** Alert and notification of the public was made using simulated siren activation and emergency alert system messages. This was followed by supplemental news releases, press releases, and press conferences. Through these processes, state and county public information staff prepared and delivered coordinated, prompt, and reliable information and instructions to the public and media.
- **Environmental Response/Health and Safety:** St. Lucie and Martin County successfully demonstrated the ability to perform radiological monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers, equipment, and vehicles at their assigned sites using local procedures. The Florida Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control field teams and mobile emergency response laboratory successfully demonstrated field response locating and characterizing the radiological plume during the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant Hostile Action-based exercise.
- **On Scene Security, Protection and Law Enforcement:** Local law enforcement agencies successfully coordinated the integration of assets with onsite operations. This included the establishment of traffic and access control points and waterway clearance in support of emergency protective actions. Interviews with officers during the exercise verified their knowledge and preparedness in implementing emergency procedures for the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant.
- **Critical Transportation:** Martin County school staff successfully demonstrated the capability to safeguard students and faculty. Interviews with the District Safety Officer and school principals verified their competence and preparedness in implementing emergency procedures in the event of an emergency at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant.
- **Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services:** St. Lucie and Martin Counties' emergency medical services successfully demonstrated their capability to transport a contaminated, injured individual to a medical facility for treatment and decontamination. The St. Lucie County Fire District also cleared two level 2 findings from the 2020 exercise. Lawnwood Regional Medical Center and Cleveland Clinic Martin North Hospital staff demonstrated their capability to treat and decontaminate contaminated injured individuals.

3.3 Jurisdictional Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation

3.3.1 State Jurisdiction

3.3.1.1 State of Florida Emergency Operations Center

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

The Florida Division of Emergency Management state warning point staff successfully demonstrated the ability to alert, notify, and mobilize key stakeholders. State warning point staff demonstrated their competency to follow set protocols in support of the St. Lucie nuclear power plant.

The participating staff of the state warning point consisted of the watch officer, operations chief, duty chief, operations section planner, and meteorologist. A student from Florida State University conducting an internship also participated. Several operators assisted in the response operations at the state warning point. The staff managed their real-world duties while participating in the exercise and worked 10-hour shifts as part of their 24-hour staffing roster. The facility was considered operational upon receipt of the initial St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant emergency notification.

The warning point was well equipped to support their role in the response. Operator workstations were fully equipped with multi-display computer systems. Several digital displays were located throughout the facility, displaying feeds from their log and situational awareness software (including wind direction, affected areas, area populations, duty boards, and other relevant information). The staff also used manual displays, including a specific checklist for each emergency notification form and the duty board for the current shift.

The primary communication method between the St. Lucie emergency operations facility and the Bureau of Radiation Control, St. Lucie County, and Martin County was a dedicated phone line. The dedicated line was independent of commercial phone systems. The facility had a primary, backup, and tertiary dedicated phone line available. Additional methods of communication included cellular phones, email, and facsimile. The facility had both wireless and ethernet internet capabilities. All available communications systems remained fully functional and continuously available throughout the exercise. The facility also retained several means of redundant communication. The staff used facsimile machines to send St. Lucie County and Bureau of Radiation Control personnel emergency notification forms and messages when they experienced communication challenges at their locations. There were no communication systems failures identified within the state warning point.

The process of receiving the initial notification from the emergency operations facility was the same for subsequent notifications. Upon receiving notification from the emergency operations facility on the dedicated line and notified of the message type, the designated operator, using a script, conducted a roll call of all offsite participants. After the roll call, the call was handed back over to the emergency operations facility to relay the information concerning the emergency notification form. A designated operator transcribed the information from the emergency operations facility on a digital Florida nuclear plant emergency notification form. Upon completing the form, it was disseminated to all key individuals using mass communication software that sends recipients a verbal, text, and email emergency notification message. Once the emergency operations facility

representative completed the oral reading of the emergency notification form, receipt of the information was verified by the operator's name.

The call was then handed back over to the warning point operator to address questions from the participants concerning the notification; then, the call was ended. Operators ensured that all parties validated, transmitted, received, and understood emergency information before ending alert and notification calls.

A transfer of command occurred from the state emergency operations center to the All-Hazards Incident Management Team. Transfer of command was conducted by the State Emergency Response Team chief and the All-Hazards Incident Management Team chief via cellular phone.

The state warning point operator identified several requests for additional resources required to stand up the All-Hazards Incident Management Team. The requests were made and logged with the Florida Division of Emergency Management's situation and incident logistics software. Requests for additional resources were assigned and managed through their completion and included contact information for all key individuals involved in assigning and receiving the requests.

The state warning point did not coordinate response activities with any of the other organizations; however, it did ensure emergency information from the St. Lucie incident was documented and disseminated to key response personnel and emergency response decision-makers.

The Florida Division of Emergency Management state warning point staff were knowledgeable and well-equipped to support emergency response efforts during an incident at St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.1, 1.2, 1.5, 3.1.

3.3.1.2 State of Florida Bureau of Radiation Control Dose Assessment

Situational Assessment Capability Summary:

The Florida Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control personnel demonstrated the ability to provide staff and to assess radiological, meteorological, and plant conditions in response to a hostile action and radiological incident at St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. Team members responded promptly when notified of the Site Area Emergency, staffing necessary positions at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Operations Facility.

The dose assessment team brought the necessary equipment and reference materials with them to the facility. Laptop computers were loaded with the current version of dose projection software. The state dose assessment team worked closely with utility dose assessors as they were in the same room. The team was frequently briefed on plant conditions and meteorological data. The dose assessment team gathered the information for changing plant conditions to properly assess the radiological release. The radiological release was produced in the fuel handling building, with the gaseous effluent diverted to the unit vent as a monitored and filtered release. The dose assessment team obtained specific information about the irradiated fuel, performed accurate dose projections, and consulted frequently with the utility dose assessors. The state dose assessment team promptly provided the dose projection results to the operations officer. The dose assessment results

compared closely with utility dose projections and field team results. The state dose projections supported the utility protective action recommendations, county protective action decisions for evacuation, and the decision for emergency workers to ingest potassium iodide.

The Bureau of Radiation Control personnel did not determine precautionary protective actions, evacuations, or sheltering of the general public. The operations officer concurred with county officials on the decision for emergency workers to ingest potassium iodide. The operations officer promptly notified the field team director to instruct field team members to ingest potassium iodide. The potassium iodide ingestion decision was transmitted verbally to state and county representatives. The dose assessment team and operations officer evaluated the child thyroid dose projections and determined that there was no need to authorize potassium iodide to the general public.

The Florida Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control training records, facilities, equipment, dosimetry, and potassium iodide inventories were verified in a December 2021 staff assistance visit. No discrepancies were noted.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 2.1.

3.3.1.3 State of Florida Bureau of Radiation Control Laboratory

Environmental Response Health & Safety Capability Summary:

During the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant hostile action-based exercise, the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control mobile environmental laboratory personnel demonstrated proper sample processing and analysis activities, while reducing possible spread of radioactive contamination. The team successfully produced the needed sample analysis results using gamma spectroscopy techniques. Due to the logistics associated with movement and setup of the mobile environmental radiological laboratory, all equipment and staff were prepositioned adjacent to the St. Lucie County emergency operations center in accordance with the extent of play agreement. The alerting and notification process would have normally followed the method outlined in applicable procedures.

To ensure proper management of emergency worker radiation exposure, the mobile environmental radiological laboratory supervisor briefed field team members prior to deploying them to monitoring locations within the emergency planning zone surrounding the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. The supervisor informed them of the exposure limits and reminded them to always keep their monitoring instruments on and report when they experienced radiation levels of twice background or more. The use of potassium iodide for thyroid dose protection was not covered during this briefing but was later handled per procedure by the field team director, who was in the St. Lucie emergency operations facility. Communications with the field monitoring teams via handheld radios was consistently clear and effective throughout the exercise. Cellular telephones were available as backup, however, there were no failures of radio communications that warranted use of the backup method.

The mobile environmental radiological laboratory was comprised of three components: a hot line for sample receipt, a sample preparation vehicle for sample pre-analysis activities, and the mobile laboratory itself where gamma spectral analyses of field samples were performed. The three components worked in a sequential manner to ensure that contamination level and exposure rate of field samples and the production of sample analysis results was

performed in a manner that helped ensure workers' safety. The team produced the correct analytical results and maintained sample integrity through chain of custody controls.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.1, 2.1, 3.1, 4.4.

3.3.1.4 State of Florida Bureau of Radiation Control Field Team Management

Environmental Response Health & Safety Capability Summary:

The Florida Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control personnel successfully demonstrated the capability to mobilize, staff, and manage field monitoring teams to help characterize the radiological release. Two field team directors worked together to direct field teams to locate and track the airborne radiological plume and control field team emergency worker exposure. Field team directors managed field team assignments from the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant emergency operations facility. Three field monitoring teams were deployed from the mobile laboratory.

Field team directors were verbally notified of the Site Area Emergency and quickly responded to the licensee's emergency operations facility. They were able to explain the notification process, how they would mobilize, and how 24-hour staffing would be arranged and managed. The field team directors arrived with laptop computers, communications equipment, and copies of standard operating procedures. Field teams were briefed by the field team supervisor at the mobile environmental laboratory prior to being deployed into the field. Communication with the three Florida Bureau of Radiation Control field teams was by radio, with cellular telephone as backup.

The licensee was unable to quickly deploy field teams as their onsite field team personnel were sheltered in place for safety because of the hostile action. As a result, state field teams conducted initial offsite radiation monitoring and air sampling. The licensee field team coordinator worked closely with the state field team directors strategizing the best deployment plan to obtain offsite radiation survey information. Once the licensee arranged for backup field team personnel and equipment, they worked with the state field team directors to provide relief to the state field teams.

Field teams were dispatched by the field team director using meteorological information provided by the licensee field team manager. The teams were positioned at predesignated sample locations four to five miles downwind from the plant. Because the event was related to hostile actions, the field team director consulted with licensee staff regarding the safety and security of teams nearing the site to conduct radiation surveys. The licensee worked with incident command to establish security controls for field teams.

The state teams were able to locate the plume. They obtained timely radiation survey and air sample information needed to validate dose projections. Two teams took air samples. After plume edges and centerline were located and surveys obtained, the three field teams were re-positioned. One team was instructed to do a field count on the air sample. Air sample results were promptly communicated to the field team director. Communications to the field teams were clear and concise. Critical information was repeated back using three-way communications. All survey and air sample information reported to the field team director was provided to state dose assessors, the operations officer, and the licensee field team coordinator.

The field team director contacted the three field teams at thirty-minute intervals to obtain their accrued radiation exposure. All radiation exposures reported by the field teams were consistent with what was expected based on reported radiation exposure rates and were below their daily administrative limit. The process for reviewing and approving exposures above various exposure limits was discussed by interview. Field team directors would attempt to replace a worker rather than authorize higher limits; however, they explained that it might be necessary to exceed the daily administrative limit to obtain critical survey data. The operations officer had approval authority for all increased radiation exposure limits.

Potassium iodide was authorized for field team members shortly after a verified release of radioactive material from the plant vent. The potassium iodide recommendation was a protective measure since field team members were being deployed to near site downwind locations during a release of radioactive material. The field teams ingested potassium iodide when directed and confirmed ingestion with the field team director. The field team director recorded the ingestion on a log sheet.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.1, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 4.1.

3.3.1.5 State of Florida Bureau of Radiation Control Field Monitoring Teams

Environmental Response Health & Safety Capability Summary:

The State of Florida Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control staff successfully demonstrated the capability to perform field radiation measurements and collect air samples. Those samples were used to calculate projected radiation doses and make protective action recommendations associated with an incident at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. Three field monitoring teams were deployed from the St. Lucie County Emergency Management Agency, where the mobile environmental radiological laboratory was located. Two field monitoring teams were evaluated.

Emergency workers were pre-positioned but would normally be notified by phone from their supervisor to report to the staging area. When field monitoring teams arrived, they were issued dosimetry and potassium iodide, radios, radiological equipment, field sampling kits, and copies of standard operating procedures. Teams were provided with a vehicle that was appropriate for field monitoring. The field team supervisor performed radiological instrument checks. Each team inventoried their equipment kit to ensure that all necessary equipment and supplies for field sampling were available. An operability check of the air pump was not conducted.

The mobile environmental radiological laboratory supervisor provided a briefing to the teams before they deployed. The briefing stated that a Site Area Emergency was declared at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant due to a hostile action event. The briefing provided meteorological conditions, general safety precautions, radiation exposure limits, communications, personal protective equipment, and initial monitoring assignments. The briefing did not include information on the use of potassium iodide.

Field monitoring team personnel demonstrated the capability to monitor and manage their radiation dose, to use dosimetry equipment and radioprotective drugs, and explain the procedures to obtain authorization to receive emergency exposures above their administrative limits. Team members read and reported dosimeter readings at approximately thirty-minute intervals throughout the exercise. Team members were knowledgeable of the

procedures for the use of potassium iodide. When directed, they simulated ingesting potassium iodide and reported the ingestion to the field team director.

Redundant communication systems were in place to communicate and transmit data. The field teams utilized radios as the primary means of communication with cellular telephone and satellite telephone as backup. Radio checks were done prior to departing the staging area. In addition, the teams utilized a software tool to log and transmit radiation monitoring data when connectivity allowed them to transmit the data. Teams repeated information relayed to confirm understanding of each message. Communications were continuous and without interruption or delay for the entire exercise.

Field monitoring teams made, recorded, and reported measurements of ambient radiation to the field team director, and one evaluated team successfully collected a radioiodine and particulate air sample, and performed a gross count of the filter and cartridge. A fixed geometry for counting the samples was not included in the standard operating procedure. Field teams used appropriate contamination control techniques, and protected radiation survey instrumentation from contamination.

Field monitoring teams were dispatched to predesignated sampling points. Team one was deployed to the easternmost edge of the plume. While enroute, the team detected elevated radiation levels approximately four miles south of the plant on Florida Route 1A and notified the field team director. The team was instructed to take radiation readings and take an air sample at this location. Due to a faulty air sampling pump, the team was unable to perform an air sample. The team reported the issue to the field team director who arranged for an operational air pump to be delivered. Through interview and demonstration, the team was able to show proper sampling technique, packaging, and record keeping in accordance with their plans and procedures.

Team three was deployed to a predesignated downwind location at the projected plume centerline, approximately four and a half miles south of the plant. The team notified the field team director when they started to detect elevated radiation readings. The team was instructed to take an air sample from this location. Radiation measurements were collected during the air sample collection period to ensure that the plume had not shifted during collection period. The team moved to a background location to purge and count the filter and radioiodine cartridge. Samples were packaged and delivered to the hot line at the mobile environmental radiological laboratory.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.1, 2.2, 3.1, 4.2.

3.4 Joint Operations

3.4.1 Emergency Operations Facility: Decision Makers

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

The risk counties' decision makers (St. Lucie County Assistant Public Safety Director/Senior Radiological Coordinator and the Martin County Bureau Chief/Radiation Safety Officer) effectively collaborated with the incident commander to formulate protective action decisions and communicate those to the risk and host counties in a timely manner for implementation. They coordinated siren activation times, selected appropriate messages to be broadcast to the public, and concurred with the Florida Health Department's Bureau of Radiation Control

for potassium iodide to be distributed to and ingested by emergency workers. The decision makers met with the State's All Hazard Incident Management Team and utility representatives to maintain a high level of situational awareness. They participated in periodic state briefings and provided information via the decision line to risk and host counties' emergency operations centers. During this emergency, there were no requests for additional resources. St. Lucie County was able to respond effectively and react in accordance with their procedures. The initial failure of the primary phone line did not delay the counties notification and response. Secondary systems work as designed and the county responded and activated in a timely manner.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.2, 1.3, 1.4.

3.4.2 All Hazards Incident Management Team

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

Florida's Division of Emergency Management All-Hazards Incident Management Team deployed to the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Operations Facility upon receipt of an emergency notification of a Site Area Emergency Classification Level.

The All-Hazards Incident Management Team leader served as the designated Florida State Coordinating Officer and the Governor's Authorized Representative after the Governor's Declaration of Emergency for the St. Lucie hostile action emergency. The state team provided logistical and operational coordination support to the local county response agencies. They provided substantive support, coordination, and communications throughout the exercise, especially coordinating assistance fulfilling unmet needs and helping to align state assets.

The Florida State Watch Office provided a St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Notification Form reporting declaration of a Site Area Emergency Classification. Staff was prepositioned in the local area in accordance with the extent of play agreement and upon receipt of the emergency notification they deploy to the emergency operations facility.

Upon arrival, staff signed in and proceeded to assigned areas. The team checked all communications and proceeded to review plans/procedures. With the All-Hazards Incident Management Team in place, the facility was declared fully operational.

The emergency operations facility recovery manager briefed staff on the situation at the plant. Throughout this emergency, numerous briefings were presented with new information as the emergency situation unfolded. Each briefing was followed by analysis of impact to populations in the risk counties and then coordinated with the incident command post and the public information section. All communications were posted in the state and county system of record, the mass notification system, and sent via computer electronic mail so that all staff and participating agencies maintained situational awareness.

After a radiological release was detected, a precautionary recommendation from Florida Bureau of Radiation Control to issue potassium iodide to emergency workers in St. Lucie and Martin counties was made. That was quickly followed by a recommendation for emergency workers to ingest potassium iodide. Due to field radiological dose measurements, the general public was not recommended to ingest potassium iodide.

After the escalation to General Emergency, the counties met and made a protective action decision to activate sirens to announce the evacuation of areas 1, 6, 7, 8, and to shelter areas 2, 3, 4, and 5. The decision was communicated to all staff and agencies.

Standing by with full authorization of the Florida Governor to provide any support requested, the All-Hazards Incident Management Team coordinated the states response and censured no unmet needs were left unfilled.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.1, 1.2, 1.5, 3.1.

3.4.3 Joint Information Center

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

The joint information center public information officers from St. Lucie County Public Safety, Martin County Emergency Management, the Florida Division of Emergency Management, and Florida Power & Light successfully demonstrated the ability to communicate emergency information to the public and media.

Each public information officer was notified and mobilized to the joint information center by their respective agency. Each officer arrived at the joint information center upon notification; the joint information center was co-located with the utility's emergency operations facility. The co-location of an onsite and offsite facility was unusual and not traditionally seen within FEMA Region 4. The public information officers themselves noted the current physical location of the joint information center would not actually be used during a real-world radiological incident. The facility location and parking proximity to an electrical switchyard posed challenges and danger to public information officers, spokespersons, and media representatives.

Despite the joint information center location, the communications systems within the facility were sufficient to support emergency operations. State and county public information officers-maintained contact with their respective agencies by cellular telephone, electronic mail, and a tele- and video-conferencing platform. Internet access and print capabilities were also available and used. There were two communications failures; both were quickly overcome through use of a secondary communications system and system troubleshooting.

This joint information center served one purpose: it was a single facility in which utility, state, and county spokespersons prepared for press conferences. Development, review, approval, and dissemination of public information occurred at emergency operations centers and other emergency response facilities, and not jointly at the joint information center. Once press releases and/or emergency information was disseminated a courtesy copy was faxed and/or emailed to the joint information center. Public information officers within the joint information center printed and posted the press releases and other published emergency information on a board in the workroom. New information was clearly identified in subsequent releases or emergency information, including emergency alerting system follow-on messaging; road closures; and early precautionary and protective actions.

One press conference was conducted to deliver emergency information and instructions to the public and media. In preparation for their press conference, the spokespersons reviewed the printed press releases and other emergency information to ensure critical information was prioritized. They also gathered more current information by contacting their respective

agencies and the incident command post public information officer. Additionally, a pre-caucus was held prior to the press conference to further deconflict and prioritize critical information. The press conference occurred about 1.5 hours after a General Emergency was declared ensuring timely, accurate, and relevant information was shared. This also afforded the public information officers time to seek clarification and prevent mis-, mal-, and disinformation from being relayed to the public and media.

The press conference was conducted from the workroom, not the designated press conference room, for the other joint information center public information officers. The press conference was not broadcast via the tele- and video-conferencing platform to other utility, state, and county partners. There was also no mock media present due to COVID-19 precautions. Information provided during the press conference included the emergency classification level declaration timeline; supplemental special news broadcast information; affected areas and boundaries; and approved incident-related information.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 5.4.

3.5 Risk Jurisdictions

3.5.1 St. Lucie County Emergency Operations Center

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

St. Lucie County Emergency Operations Center demonstrated establishment of a unified and coordinated operational system while integrating key stakeholders by mobilizing staff, facilitating direction and control, and implementing protective action decisions as directed by decision makers. The emergency operations center staff were pre-positioned in the beginning of this exercise and did not participate until official notification was received.

The initial notification of Site Area Emergency was received by the St. Lucie Public Safety Deputy Director through land line and email distribution from the state watch office. The initial notification was expected to be received through the emergency operations centers' hot ring down line. However, it was noted that the hot ring down Line was not operational due to technical issues. In accordance with plans, a commercial telephone backup method was used as redundancy to the Hot Ring Down line. The technical specialist shared a dedicated land line number with the state watch office, which was used for the remainder of all notifications. Information received was verified by email receipt and the land line confirmation of receipt. There were seven emergency notification forms received by email and fax distribution at the St. Lucie Emergency Operations Center. Due to the severity level of the initial notification, the deputy director immediately signed a local Declaration of State of Emergency and transferred authority to the emergency operations centers' incident commander. The deputy director then relocated to the emergency operations facility located at a designated satellite location. The emergency operations center was then activated to a level 1, full activation. Using a 24-hour staffing roster, the emergency operations manager began the process of alerting and notifying key personnel to be mobilized to the emergency operations center. This action of alerting was simulated, but clearly verbalized as it would have occurred. The facility was declared operational by the emergency operations manager after an appropriate amount of time for personnel to report in. The emergency classification escalated to a General Emergency mid-exercise due to an explosion triggered by hostile actions that eventually led to an on-going release at the utility.

The incident commander was able to provide direction and control to the emergency operations center staff by conducting six situational awareness briefings scheduled approximately every hour, and/or as needed, while maintaining an adequate facility and equipment needed for operations. Information in each briefing contained current operational information, St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant conditions, and the current emergency classification level. During the third briefing, each emergency support function additionally briefed their own on-going actions. The staff briefing was driven by the conference bridge line calls held by the state. During the conference bridge line calls, each emergency notification form was discussed. Participants of the bridge line were state partners, risk counties, and host counties. In the St. Lucie Emergency Operations Center, the incident commander invited the Florida Division of Emergency Management, Bureau of Radiation Control, the county public information officer, technical specialist, and Florida Power and Light representatives to actively listen in. This allowed for coordination for information to be timely presented to the public and timely discussion and support decisions for protective actions.

Additionally, coordination with law enforcement, the Department of Public Health, and St. Lucie Public Schools occurred throughout the exercise. The incident commander discussed and requested through the Department of Public Health representative to prepare their hospitals in advance and possibilities of mass casualty sites. Law enforcement coordination occurred between the incident commander for dive teams, barricades, and road closures due to a bridge collapse. St. Lucie Public Schools were able to prepare their school buses and have them on standby for future evacuation.

The incident commander, with the assistance from Florida Power and Light, Bureau of Radiation Control, and the technical specialist were able to use dose assessment data provided by either field teams or the utility to ensure the most reasonable protective actions were made. Precautionary actions of water way clearance, railways, parks, beach closures, and special considerations for access and functional needs persons were taken before any recommendation from the utility occurred. During the fifth emergency notification, the utility recommended protective action “Papa 3” which included various evacuation, sheltering, and monitor and prepare actions for various sectors ranging from one to eight. The incident commander methodically used the county plan, maps, and key staff to reasonably concur on the recommendations, ultimately leading to a decision to follow the recommended actions. Without undue delay, the incident commander received the protective actions, discussed them with key leadership in the emergency operations center, and concurred with them. Among discussions, access and functional needs considerations took place and were contacted (simulated) in order to assess evacuation needs. Though the incident occurred when typical schools were not in session, 150 personnel in attendance at schools within the county were moved to the county fairgrounds as a reunification site. Potassium Iodide was issued to all emergency workers at the initial Site Area Emergency notification. Emergency workers did not ingest unless entering the affected area and were issued an order to ingest.

Law enforcement personnel utilized a decision-making chain for authorization of emergency workers to receive emergency exposures in excess of the protective action guides. Law enforcement coordinated with the Bureau of Radiation Control and the incident commander in order to assist the field monitoring teams in sampling data collection. During an interview with law enforcement, it was noted that all emergency workers entering an affected area would be given just in time refresher training and a briefing by the on-scene team lead, which included exposure recording and reporting, radiological monitor familiarization, and authorized exposure limits. The law enforcement representative clearly defined the reporting and recording procedure from the on-site team to reporting to the incident commander and

Bureau of Radiation Control. There were no exposures authorized in excess of the identified limits. As the Bureau of Radiation Control gave orders to ingest potassium iodide, the incident commander too, concurred and issued orders for other emergency workers entering the affected areas to ingest. Through interview and verified during staff assistance visits, confirmation of an adequate supply of radioprotective drugs and dosimeters, both direct and permanent reading, were able to be distributed to all emergency workers.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 2.1, 3.1.

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

St. Lucie County public information officers demonstrated the capability to develop and disseminate reliable and timely information to the public and press during a simulated hostile act and radiological incident at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. Methods to alert and notify the public included an outdoor warning system, Emergency Alert System; press releases; press conferences; and social media campaigns (simulated).

Upon receipt of the Site Area Emergency notification, the deputy director transferred the management of the emergency operations center to the incident commander and relocated to the emergency operations facility. Activation of the St. Lucie Emergency Operations Center notification was made to the public information team and one public information officer was directed to the emergency operations facility to support the joint information center coordination with the emergency operations center.

The activation of sirens and broadcast of emergency alert messages were coordinated with the county and state emergency management directors via the decision line. During the Site Area Emergency, the emergency operations center incident commander requested the public information officer develop joint press release # J-1 and activate the Emergency Alert System in issuance of message code: Site Area Emergency – No Protective Actions. The public information officer drafted the messages; the emergency operations center incident commander reviewed each message for content and signed off for approval. The public information officer faxed the approved messages using a predesignated distribution list and loaded each message into the electronic tracking system. This process was followed for each additional emergency alert system message, county news release, and/or joint information system message.

Sirens were activated during the Site Area Emergency without fail. Coordination and discussion occurred between the St. Lucie County deputy director and the Martin County Fire Rescue Chief during the initial conference bridge call. It was determined that the sirens and Emergency Alert System would be completed together at a mutually agreed upon time. It was explained that the startup process takes approximately seven minutes to complete. The St. Lucie County Technical Specialist demonstrated the process for sounding sirens only to the point of activation. A simulated siren failure was injected to test backup alerting procedures. The St. Lucie Sheriff's Office lieutenant explained, through interview, the process for determining which area(s) were not covered by the siren failures and how officers would be dispatched to drive the area(s) to provide mobile alerting using a pre-scripted message read over the public alert system. The Sheriff's Office would also request the St. Lucie County Emergency Operations Center activate the "Alert St. Lucie" site to dispatch the message for the members of the public that were registered for notifications.

Three St. Lucie County News Releases, including Local State of Emergency, St. Lucie County public information line activates, beach and park closing, were drafted, reviewed, approved, and disseminated from the county. In coordination with the joint information center public information officer, Joint new release # J-2 and emergency alert system message code: General A-1 Evacuate/Shelter was released following the same approval process. The county's ability to use several mediums for the dissemination of emergency public information demonstrated their ability to keep the public promptly informed.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 5.4.

Environmental Response Health & Safety Capability Summary:

St. Lucie County Fire District, Station 17 and Station 6 personnel successfully demonstrated emergency worker decontamination at the South County Sports Complex, 560 Northwest University Boulevard, Port St Lucie Florida. The complex and the area designated for personnel monitoring was sufficient with available space to process emergency workers. Many of the participants were from the Special Operations Team and were trained in the use and operation of handheld and fixed monitors, as well as the emergency worker kits, they received during the initial emergency worker briefing.

A safety briefing was conducted upon initiation of the drill. Topics addressed were weather, hydration, caution while traversing the area, and no smoking or eating while operating within the area. The radiological officer discussed personal protective equipment such as protective gowns, double gloves, eye protection, awareness for contamination avoidance, avoid cross contamination, use the chain of command for reporting, and the rehabilitation location for emergency workers. No booties/foot covers were utilized due to low supplies and difficulties restocking supplies during the COVID-19 Pandemic.

The radiological officer issued dosimetry kits to each emergency worker. Emergency worker kits contained high-range (0-5 roentgen) and low-range (0-200 milliroentgen) direct reading dosimeters, potassium iodide tablets (simulated with sheet of paper), emergency worker cards for tracking readings, emergency worker informational cards, and a thermoluminescent dosimeter (simulated). Equipment and monitors were adequate to accomplish personnel monitoring. Monitoring personnel were equipped with N95 face masks, eye protection, plastic coveralls, and wore double-layered gloves. Boot covers would ordinarily be worn but were simulated due to supply shortages. The Radiological Officer discussed procedures for accidental contact, glove change and the use of meters to confirm non-contamination during operations, communications channels, and 30-minute dosimeter checks.

A handheld survey meter was properly put into operation and used to determine the background level. The calibration due date was June 17, 2022. The state baseline for contamination is 300 counts per minute. Adding the contamination baseline to the background level (17) equals the threshold, which if exceeded through detection, should be considered contaminated. The contamination threshold was established at 317 counts per minute and shared among the emergency worker staff located at the personnel survey station. Due to the distance of other stations, a different contamination threshold would be established.

Upon entering the complex, signage and cones directed the emergency workers toward the vehicle wash down area. The vehicle wash down area was manned by six personnel, each

outfitted with a protective suit, latex gloves (two sets), N95 particulate mask, safety glasses, rubber boots, and assigned dosimetry. Protective shoe coverings were simulated to save resources. The vehicle wash down team leader stopped the vehicles at a designated staging area marked by signage and cones, then directed them to one of two available wash stations. Each washing station was equipped with a wash down apparatus made of plastic piping designed to provide consistent flow of water to the top and sides of a vehicle as it passed through. One of the apparatuses was specially designed for taller vehicles. At the wash station a two-person decontamination team received each vehicle, directed it to stop just prior to the wash down apparatus, and performed an initial decontamination rinse of the wheel welds, grill, and bumpers using garden hoses with extended brass nozzles and long-handled brushes. Another team member observed the decontamination process to ensure all procedures were followed and then assisted with directing each vehicle through the wash down process to the monitoring area. In accordance with the extent-of-play agreement, two emergency worker vehicles were used to demonstrate this process.

The vehicle monitoring station was staffed by eight personnel, each outfitted with protective gowns, latex gloves (two sets), N95 particulate masks, and assigned dosimetry. Four personnel utilized electronic handheld survey meters to scan each vehicle methodically and efficiently. A recorder documented monitoring results on a designated form while the team leader observed all monitoring operations to ensure procedures were followed and exposure was minimized. Proper frisking techniques and contamination control were demonstrated and observed throughout the vehicle monitoring process. Contamination above the action level of 300 counts per minute above background was identified on both emergency worker vehicles. Upon identification of external contamination, another monitor re-scanned the areas of contamination, confirmed the results, and the vehicles were directed to impoundment. Two members of the vehicle monitoring team escorted the dirty vehicles to the impoundment area in a golf cart.

The site layout provided appropriate space and a logical flow for emergency worker vehicle monitoring and decontamination activities. Use of signage and cones sufficiently aided the flow. The personnel were well-trained and in sufficient numbers to perform their assigned duties efficiently and effectively. Procedures were affixed to clipboards and available at multiple stations, if needed. Contamination control was maintained throughout the vehicle monitoring and decontamination process. Water run-off was appropriately directed to self-contained culverts that surround the property. Each station utilized marked receptacles for hazardous materials. Team leaders employed effective communications and guidance to ensure procedures and contamination control measures were followed.

Following exterior monitoring of the first emergency worker vehicle contamination of greater than 300 counts per minute was detected and the vehicle was placed in emergency worker contaminated parking. A site worker instructed the driver and passenger to open their doors and remain seated inside the vehicle. Two site workers then monitored the inside door grips, floorboards or mats, the driver’s and passenger's shoes, including the outsoles, their lower legs, steering wheel, and their hands. Once monitored, and regardless of whether contamination was found, the driver and passenger were asked to don shoe covers, gloves, and a mask. Both the driver and passenger were instructed to exit the vehicle and sit on the back seat of a golf cart. The driver and passenger were then driven to the portal monitor area for additional monitoring.

A portal monitor was set-up on a sidewalk properly and faced the correct direction. The portal monitor was turned on and self-diagnostic routines checked the detectors and counted

background. While a one microcurie cesium-137 source was contained within the portal monitor box, the source was not used to detect radioactivity at several points along a vertical line centered between the two side columns of the portal monitor. This however was discussed through interview and the two site workers assigned to the portal monitor area were knowledgeable of how, when, and why a centerline measurement should be taken prior to use of the portal monitor. Additionally, it was recommended this step be included in their procedures to ensure it is not missed in the future.

Following set-up, the entire portal monitor was wrapped with a single layer of plastic wrap and a sheet of butcher paper was laid across the bottom of the portal monitor. Both of these measures were used to prevent contamination of the equipment itself. The portal monitor area was then marked with cones to funnel emergency workers correctly through the portal monitor and to prevent contamination or cross-contamination. Two site workers staffed the portal monitor area. One worker was responsible for reading the display and monitoring or replacing the plastic wrap and butcher paper. The other site worker was responsible for escorting non-contaminated emergency workers to the command vehicle or contaminated emergency workers to the decontamination area. This site worker was also responsible for starting the St. Lucie County Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Form; the form was then passed off to the appropriate decontamination site worker for completion.

The driver and passenger from the first emergency worker vehicle were dropped off at the portal monitor area and directed along the sidewalk towards the portal monitor. The driver walked through the portal monitor first and was not contaminated; the driver was escorted to the command vehicle. The passenger walked through the portal monitor and was found to be contaminated. The passengers name and other personal information were used to begin filling out the St. Lucie County Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Form. Additionally, the quadrant where contamination was found and counts per minute were recorded on the form. The passenger was then escorted to the decontamination area.

A third emergency worker was brought to the portal monitor area, found to be contaminated, and escorted to the decontamination area. The same process outlined above was used. While the same process was used consistently, it was noted that the initial monitoring of emergency workers in the vehicle impound area was duplicative and unnecessary. During the demonstration the assumption was made and used that if the vehicle was contaminated the occupants inside were also presumed to be contaminated. Based on this assumption the occupants could have simply donned shoe covers, gloves, and masks and been escorted via golf cart to the portal monitor area. The initial survey served no real purpose in this instance and only tied up resources, both personnel and equipment, that could be better utilized elsewhere. The recommendation was made that St. Lucie County Fire District firefighters re-evaluate the layout and steps associated with monitoring emergency workers and consider streamlining the process based on their planning assumptions.

The monitoring and decontamination area was in a complex locker room, the entrance was a short walk from the portal monitor station to the entrance at the rear of the complex. The locker room had designated dirty and clean areas with directional signage to guide emergency workers. There were seven personnel for the monitoring and decontamination area. There were two calibrated survey meters for monitoring, a radiation area monitor, and sufficient equipment and supplies. The area monitor provided an additional level of protection along with the self-reading dosimeters for emergency worker exposure level detection (100 milliroentgen reporting and 500 milliroentgen turn back). The background

reading for the survey meters in the locker room was 20 counts per minute with an action level of 300 counts per minute plus the background, 320.

The first emergency worker was escorted to the locker room with the St. Lucie County Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Form. Personal items and dosimetry were collected and documented for security. The emergency worker was monitored from head to toe, front and back, and feet at a consistent one-inch distance and speed. The left knee was 520 counts per minute. Clothing was removed and the left knee decontaminated with a wet wipe. The reading remained at 520 counts per minute. The emergency worker was directed to shower (simulated), then provided a Tyvek suit, the contamination remained at 520 counts per minute. A second shower was completed, and the contamination was still present. The emergency worker was then taken to the hospital for additional treatment, consistent with the plans and procedure.

The second emergency worker was escorted in and processed using the same process as the first. Personnel items and dosimetry were collected and documented, and she was then monitored with a survey meter. She had contamination on her right shoulder, 920 counts per minute. After clothing removal and decontamination with a wet wipe, the right shoulder was less than background. The emergency worker was documented as decontaminated and ready to return for the next shift.

One emergency worker successfully demonstrated the personal protective equipment doffing process as directed in the procedures. First the outer layer of latex gloves was removed and placed in the waste container. Dosimetry was removed and collected; the final reading of the self-reading dosimeter was zero. Safety glasses and mask were removed then the hood was rolled back inside and removed. The Tyvek was carefully turned inside and rolled down to the feet and then removed. The second set of latex gloves were removed, and the emergency worker was monitored, all readings were less than background. Contamination control was practiced, and glove changes were demonstrated once, then verbalized throughout the remainder of the drill.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.1, 2.2, 3.1, 5.2.

On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement Capability Summary:

Traffic and access control of waterways was handled by a combination of agencies; United States Coast Guard handling ocean waters, while the St. Lucie County Sheriff's Office and Port St. Lucie Police Department handle everything west of the barrier islands. The sheriff's office is equipped with two 35-foot boats powered by twin 250 horsepower motors and a smaller 18-foot boat powered by a 90-horsepower motor for shallower waters. When in use all waterborne craft were staffed by two officers. The simulated use of all three vessels occurred during this exercise.

Radiological equipment is stored at the St. Lucie County Emergency Operations Center and distributed from there as needed. The county maintains 80 pre-packed dosimeter kits. Each kit contained a 0-500 milliroentgen direct read dosimeter, medium-high range dosimeter, information sheet on potassium iodide, and exposure record keeping cards. According to the county's radiological coordinator the thermoluminescent dosimeters are stored in a light proof box and would be added to the kits when issued. A package of potassium iodide tablets (65 milligrams each) would also be added to the kits when issued to emergency workers. The county maintains an inventory of 10 and one-half cases of potassium iodide,

each case containing 160 boxes all within the labeled shelf-life date. The technical specialist stated that a just-in-time radiological briefing would be given to the individual participating agency's safety officer when the dosimetry kits are issued. The safety officers would be instructed to then brief their agency's personnel. This action was simulated during this exercise. The radiological coordinator told the law enforcement lead that reporting limits for responders was 100 milliroentgen and that at 500 milliroentgen personnel should rotate off duty. Whole body exposure should not exceed 25 roentgen equivalent man except as a volunteer on a lifesaving mission.

Additional quantities of radiation monitoring kits consisting of survey meters and personal dosimetry are stored at the St Lucie emergency operations center. Fifteen of these kits are permanently assigned to the designated fire stations and one to the St. Lucie County bomb squad.

The St. Lucie County Fire District representative stated that they have two units available for emergency worker decontamination if needed and that extra personnel had been called in for relief.

The county's 911 communication center handles the initial intake of calls requesting emergency services. Primary communications with emergency services agencies are via 800-megahertz radio and internet computer aided dispatch, with agency issued cellular telephones being the backup communication link. All participating first responders in the emergency operations center checked their radio communications and mobile telephones at the beginning of their shift. All agency communications links remained operational without interruption for the duration of the exercise. The law enforcement lead was notified by inject that a bridge over the St. Lucie River on West Midway Road had collapsed between Oleander Avenue and South 25 Street. The law enforcement liaison immediately dispatched sheriff's office deputies and Port St. Lucie police officers to block the road and create a detour. St. Lucie County Fire District representative in the emergency operations center was notified in person by the law enforcement lead and requested rescue units to be dispatched to the scene. The law enforcement liaison also requested the sheriff's office's small marine unit be sent to the site. The law enforcement lead notified the county's public information officer in the emergency operation center of the incident and that a detour was being created. The law enforcement liaison requested St. Lucie County Road and Bridge Department set up concrete barricades on West Midway Road at Oleander Avenue and South 25th Street; thus, freeing up assigned law enforcement personnel for other assignments. Electronic sign boards were also requested to help direct traffic around the closure.

The emergency operations facility requested the sheriff departments two large marine units be sent to the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. The law enforcement liaison concurred with the request. The law enforcement liaison-initiated action to close US-A1A at a point two miles north and two miles south of the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. The Fort Pierce Police Department assigned to handle the north end traffic control point, while the St. Lucie County Sheriff's Office handled the southern traffic control point. The St. Lucie County Fire District reported that the St. Lucie County Fire District's confined space special operations team had been deployed to the collapsed bridge site.

In response to the decision to evacuate areas 1, 6, 7, and 8, the St. Lucie County Sheriff's Office and the Port St. Lucie Police Department activated their predetermined traffic control points in accordance with established plans and procedures. Law enforcement representatives in the emergency operation center determined that the number of personnel

on duty was sufficient to initiate the required traffic control points. The law enforcement liaison stated that should additional personnel be needed police officers and sheriff deputies off duty would be recalled, and/or mutual aid assistance requested.

St. Lucie County Sheriff's Deputies were interviewed at the emergency worker decontamination station location concerning the operations of traffic control points supporting the St. Lucie County emergency worker decontamination site. The deputies discussed actions for notification, dispatch location, equipment, operation, and demobilization. The deputies were well versed in traffic control operations and confident of their abilities to manage such an event to include contamination control measures.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 2.2, 3.1, 5.4.

Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services Capability Summary:

St. Lucie County Fire District successfully demonstrated the capability to manage emergency worker exposure control while transporting and treating a potentially contaminated, injured individual in support of a radiological incident at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. They had sufficient resources, equipment, and trained personnel to monitor, provide medical services, and transport of a contaminated, injured patient to Lawnwood Regional Medical Center & Heart Institute.

A Battalion Chief with Station #2 arrived on-scene and was briefed by the controller on the drill scenario and assumptions and artificialities. Upon receiving the scenario briefing the chief radioed back to station #2 firefighters and briefed the crew on the current situation. Within a few minutes an ambulance and engine crew arrived on-scene. The same assumptions and artificialities were relayed to the crew members, including those associated with establishment of the cold, warm, and hot zones, and that the injured patient may be contaminated due to a radiological incident at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant.

Two firefighters entered the hot zone with a stretcher and backpack of medical equipment. The firefighters were dressed in traditional bunker gear, wore two pairs of gloves, a mask, as well as a direct reading dosimeter. Upon approaching the patient one firefighter began asking the patient for personal information like name, date of birth, allergies, etc., while the other assessed the patient's physical condition. Following the assessment, the firefighter began cutting off (simulated) the patient's clothes to better assess the open left leg wound. Once the patient's clothes were removed and it was clear the patient had not sustained any life-threatening injuries, the patient was placed on a patient transfer aid and then on the stretcher. The stretcher was covered with two sheets, once the patient was placed on stretcher the two sheets were pulled up, over, and tucked around effectively cocooning the patient. Both firefighters changed their top pair of gloves multiple times throughout the assessment and stretcher transfer to prevent or minimize the spread of contamination or cross-contamination. The patient's clothes and the firefighter's disposed gloves were placed in a biohazard bag. For drill purposes the bag was placed in the ambulance, but during a real-world radiological incident disposal of the hazardous waste would be coordinated through the St. Lucie County Emergency Operations Center with Florida Power & Light.

The firefighters rolled the stretcher and patient to the back of the ambulance. While outside the ambulance the patient was unbuckled and asked to remain on the stretcher. One firefighter, using a handheld survey meter, began surveying the patient. The firefighter started at the top of the patient's head and surveyed in a "z" pattern at approximately 1 inch

per second. The firefighter surveyed the front of the patient until reaching their feet. The left knee was found to be contaminated and read 1,000 counts per minute. The patient was then rolled onto their side and the back of the patient was surveyed using the same method. The back right calf was found to be contaminated and read 500 counts per minute.

Following a whole-body survey, the firefighters shielded those areas identified as contaminated and packaged the patient for transport. The readings were relayed by the Battalion Chief to the communications unit and special operations team via radio. The communications unit was responsible for notifying the hospital of the status of the contaminated, injured patient, as well as the readings and areas of contamination. The hazardous materials special operations team received the same information from the Battalion Chief and were positioned at the hospital to survey and decontaminate the two firefighters who had treated, and been in contact with the contaminated, injured patient. Both firefighters were considered contaminated and rode in the back of the ambulance with the patient. A firefighter who remained in the cold zone and was considered not contaminated drove the ambulance to the hospital.

Prior to the start of the drill a radiological safety briefing and instrument operability checks were completed at station #2. The briefing and checks were not observed by the evaluator, however, through interview both were discussed with the firefighters who treated the patient, as well as the Battalion Chief. The firefighters explained they wore a 1-500 milliroentgen direct reading dosimeter on the outside of their bunker gear. They were instructed to read the dosimeter every 30 minutes and report their readings to the Battalion Chief on-scene. If they obtained a reading of greater than 100 milliroentgen they would consult their supervisor and if they obtained a reading greater than 500 milliroentgen they would turnback and leave the radiological environment. Neither firefighter wore a permanent record dosimeter, nor were they aware they should be wearing one as this was not relayed to them during the radiological safety briefing. They were also not told for drill purposes that a permanent record dosimeter was being simulated. Additionally, the kits stored at their station and/or in the Battalion Chief's vehicle did not contain permanent record dosimeters or potassium iodide. The controller explained that following a Site Area Emergency, a firefighter would be dispatched from station #2 to the St. Lucie County Emergency Operations Center to obtain a comprehensive radiological safety briefing, as well as additional equipment including permanent record dosimeters and potassium iodide.

The controller conducted just in time training with a supervisor that would deliver emergency worker kits to field personnel. The kit contained high-range (0-5 roentgen) and low-range (0-200 milliroentgen) direct reading dosimeters, potassium iodide tablets (simulated with sheet of paper), emergency worker cards for tracking readings, emergency worker informational cards, and a thermoluminescent dosimeter (simulated). Two kits were opened and examined by the technicians with just in time training for operations. The supervisor then provided a safety briefing to conduct 30-minute dosimeter checks, turn-back values, proper dosimeter placement, where to turn in dosimeters upon event termination and issued the kits to the emergency medical technicians. The supervisor zeroed each low/high range dosimeter prior to issuing to the technicians. The emergency medical technicians demonstrated the knowledge and ability to adequately implement emergency worker exposure control measures and successfully resolved Level 2 findings 055-20-1.e.1-L2-01 and 055-20-3.a.1-L2-02.

Through interview with the Battalion Chief operability checks and use of the handheld survey meter were explained. The chief started by explaining when and why the one microcurie

cesium-137 source affixed to the inside of the kit lid was used. After installing the meter batteries, the chief then explained and demonstrated how a background reading was obtained. The chief noted that the background reading would be added to the 300 counts per minute contamination threshold. In this instance the background reading was 51, therefore, the firefighters on-scene would use a threshold of 351 counts per minute to determine whether a patient was contaminated. While the firefighters used sound survey techniques during the drill, and the chief reaffirmed through interview that their firefighters were trained to survey approximately 1 inch per second. Training for firefighters was conducted frequently, and for those assigned a kit like the Battalion Chief, weekly and monthly equipment checks must be performed to ensure equipment operability. The survey meters used were within calibration and contained the appropriate range of reading stickers.

Lawnwood Regional Medical Center & Heart Institute radiation emergency area staff successfully demonstrated the ability to care for a simulated contaminated injured patient during a medical services drill.

The radiation emergency area is located under an unmarked vestibule adjacent to the emergency room main entrance. The physical space is 30 feet by 30 feet in dimensions. There are two storage rooms connected to the vestibule containing radiation emergency area supplies. The maintenance staff and security staff established the radiation emergency area. A yellow plastic tarp was taped to the concrete surface covering the drive thru. Each of the entryways to the vestibule was blocked with yellow tape, radiological caution signs, and safety cones. Step off pads, ropes, stanchions, contaminated waste bins, scrub brushes, a gurney, and a patient decontamination tray composed items placed within the warm zone. All of the materials and supplies utilized for the hospital's radiological emergency response, except for the survey instruments and dosimetry, were maintained in two locked storage rooms adjacent to the radiation emergency area and directly across from the entrance to the emergency room. There was one clearly marked patient transfer point from hot zone to warm zone, one patient exit point into the hospital (warm to cold) and a second warm zone exit into the cold zone for decontaminated radiation emergency area staff.

The decontamination room was 20 feet by 8 feet in size. The room was located just off the hospital's emergency room. Upon exiting the room, yellow plastic tarp material was secured to the floor for transition into the hospital. Upon successful decontamination, the patient would be transferred to a gurney and moved into emergency room #8 for further treatment based on medical injuries.

The medical transport notified the emergency room that the patient was enroute to medical center. The charge nurse then notified the radiation emergency staff that a 22-year-old contaminated female with non-life-threatening injuries would arrive in five minutes. The patient's contamination readings were 1000 counts per minute on the left leg and 500 counts per minute on right leg. The charge nurse stated, he would usually announce Code Orange R (radiation event) over the hospital speaker system to implement the radiation emergency area setup and personnel response. Upon official notification of Code Orange R, the radiation emergency area staff began donning personal protective equipment. Personal protective equipment included eye/nose/mouth protection, Tyvek suit with booties with splatter apron over upper torso, rubber boot covers, and double gloved. All open seams were taped for complete encapsulation. An electronic dosimeter was placed at the neck of each staff member. The radiation emergency area staff was still donning personal protective equipment upon arrival of the emergency medical team. The lead staff member asked the emergency medical team to stand-by while they completed donning.

The St. Lucie County Hazardous Materials Team was on-scene and prepared to decontaminate the emergency medical technicians. They immediately surveyed the ambulance driver upon vehicle exit and detected no contamination. At this point the hazardous materials team and the emergency medical technicians were interviewed detailing safety and decontamination protocols for personnel and equipment (vehicles). Each team of personnel were very knowledgeable of procedures and duties. They readily displayed survey meters and demonstrated proper survey methods.

The contaminated patient was removed from the ambulance and positioned at the transfer point awaiting radiation emergency area staff to complete donning personal protective equipment. Moments later, the lead emergency medical technician briefed the hospital radiation emergency area staff. They positioned the gurneys side-by-side and used a fabric lifting device to successfully transfer the patient to the radiation emergency area gurney. The radiologist began the survey while a glove change occurred and then the patient was moved to the decontamination room. The radiologist confirmed the contamination readings of 1000 counts per minute on the left leg and 500 counts per minute on right leg (controller inject). The radiation emergency area staff leader directed a log roll of the patient to allow for a full body survey. At this point, the staff leader rolled the lifting device and cut away clothes (simulated) to contain any contamination. The staff leader changed gloves and began rinsing and wiping the rear left back and legs of the patient, allowing any loose contamination to be trapped onto the now wet and removed (simulated) clothes. The patient was laid flat, and a glove change occurred for all staff. To preserve materials, this was the last real world glove change; all other glove changes were simulated and verbalized. The contamination on both legs was reduced to 400 counts per minute after the first wash through controller inject. The patient was log rolled to the right for another rinse and wipe. A survey was conducted, and the contamination levels dropped to background levels. A final full body survey was conducted and confirmed levels at background. A nurse requested everyone to conduct a 30-minute dosimeter check. After the dosimeter check, the patient was transferred to a clean gurney and moved to emergency room #8 for further treatment as needed. The team demonstrated excellent monitoring technique and contamination control throughout the process. Multiple glove changes were observed, as well as disposal of potentially contaminated materials into designated receptacles. The need for additional receptacles inside the decontamination room was self-identified by medical staff.

Two radiation emergency area staff members were observed doffing their personal protective equipment. In each instance, they removed tape, face protection, outer pair of gloves, boot covers, and rolled the Tyvek suit to their ankles. She received assistance with the Tyvek removal and stepped onto a step off pad. She then received a full body radiological survey. Appropriate monitoring techniques were demonstrated each instance.

A member from the radiology staff successfully demonstrated an operability check on a survey instrument. All instruments utilized were observed to have affixed stickers indicating they were within the appropriate calibration dates.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 2.2, 5.3.

3.5.2 St. Lucie County Incident Command Post

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

The St. Lucie County Sheriff's Office was responsible for the establishment of the incident command post. All personnel were pre-positioned at the incident command post in accordance with the extent of play agreement. In an actual event, notification from onsite to offsite of the hostile action would follow pre-established procedures and agreements. This process was not demonstrated during the exercise due to the pre-positioning of participants. It should be noted that onsite responders were not pre-positioned as stated; the onsite plant personnel responded in "real time" as outlined in the plant's exercise master scenario event list. Notification of the hostile action involving the plant was made in person by the plant security manager upon arrival at the incident command post. Follow on notifications of Sheriff's Office personnel would be made in accordance with procedures and as directed by the incident commander. For this exercise, a major with the St. Lucie County Sheriff's Office served as the incident commander.

The incident commander's direction and control of the event was limited to the response and support of the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. The incident commander kept the county decision makers informed of all actions taken by tactical response teams through personal cellular phone to the emergency operations manager and Sheriff's Office representative. Regular briefings were made which kept all participants abreast of the situation at the plant; briefings were concise and contained pertinent information as needed. The mission was well defined and specific goals were established for each section. All activities were well coordinated with outside agencies as necessary and outside resources were requested as the need presented. All offsite response in support of the plant was thoroughly coordinated with plant security. When conditions elevated to the point that it was deemed advantageous, the incident commander split the unified command structure to appoint a deputy incident commander. This deputy commander was assigned to handle all activities other than the response to the plant involving the hostile action. The deputy incident commander took over all traffic control, traffic impediment, suspicious person sightings, and numerous other law enforcement functions that were extraneous to the central hostile action.

A request was made early in the exercise for sufficient dosimetry and potassium iodide to be delivered to the incident command post from the St. Lucie County emergency operations center. Before deployment, all members of special response teams were issued, by simulation, adequate dosimetry, and potassium iodide to allow them to effectively limit their radiological exposure to acceptable limits. Those members deploying from other locations would receive their dosimetry and potassium iodide from radiological officers at the staging areas before transiting into the area of a possible radiological release. Response personnel would receive just in time training on all issued equipment and instructed to return all radiological equipment to the issuing entity. Documentation of exposures was emphasized to all responding personnel. It should be noted that no personnel were deployed; all physical response maneuvers were simulated.

The incident command post was well equipped with communications equipment. Sufficient displays, maps and supplies were available to support the assigned mission. The system allowed clear communications with all emergency response agencies in several county areas; to include fire, emergency medical services, police, highway patrol, and public works. All communications systems were used throughout the exercise with no failures noted.

The incident commander established a link through the public information officer to the St. Lucie County emergency operations center. This link was maintained throughout the exercise and monitored all outgoing public messages before their release. The decision line used to maintain situational awareness, and same was monitored in the incident command post throughout the exercise. As actions relative to the offsite response to support the plant were performed or steps taken that needed to be addressed in a public forum, the incident commander dictated same to the public information officer. In turn, these actions were provided to the county emergency operations center by the public information officer for inclusion in county press releases. The incident commander assigned personnel to monitor social media to identify negative or false information being spread. Incident command post personnel were prepared to address developing trends and harmful rumors; however, social media was not in play for this exercise.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 2.2, 3.1, 3.3.

3.5.3 Martin County Emergency Operations Center

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

The Martin County Fire Rescue Division of Emergency Management staff successfully met this core capability by establishing a coordinated response to an emergency at the St Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. The Martin County incident commander and division of emergency management director in coordination with the Martin County administrator and deputy administrator demonstrated timely and efficient protective action decisions in response to the simulated incident.

For this event, emergency operations center and support staff functions were prepositioned at the start of the exercise. The incident commander explained the process of notification by the state warning point to Martin County watch point using a dedicated phone system. The initial notification received declared an emergency classification level of Site Area Emergency, bypassing the Notification of Unusual Event and classification Alert emergency levels. The emergency management coordinator explained through discussion that the Site Area Emergency prompted a full emergency operations center activation and mobilization of the support staff. The staff demonstrated use of a mass notification system that sends out text messages, emails, and telephone calls to mobilize emergency operations center staff. Alternate methods of mobilization would be cellphone or telephone calls using a recall roster.

The Chief of Martin County Fire Rescue acted as the incident commander and provided overall direction and control for the duration of the incident. The incident commander had the authority to establish county-level objectives, including precautionary actions of waterway, beach, and park clearances in addition to evacuation of the special needs population prior to protective action decisions made by the decision makers at the Emergency Operations Facility. The incident commander, with support from the division of emergency management director and staff, ensured that the emergency support functions were given timely briefings as objectives were developed and situation updates were

received. Coordinating conference bridge line calls were periodically held between Martin County, St. Lucie County, the St. Lucie County Incident Command Post, the host counties, and the emergency operations facility to provide situational updates and allow the counties to coordinate, ask clarifying questions, and request resources.

Primary responsibility for developing protective action recommendations fell to the decision makers at the emergency operating facility. In accordance with the Martin County Radiological Emergency Response Plan, July 2021, Martin County Fire Rescue dispatched a representative to the emergency operations facility to assist in development of protective action recommendations and decisions. Prior to issuance of protective action decisions over the emergency operations facility conference bridge line, the incident commander implemented precautionary actions of clearing the waterways, beaches, and parks, as well as beginning evacuation of those with special needs. Additionally, when the recommendation was issued from the emergency operations facility for state emergency workers to ingest potassium iodide in the affected areas, the incident commander directed the emergency support functions to notify county emergency workers to ingest potassium iodide at that time.

As decision makers at the emergency operations facility established protective action decisions, they were issued over the conference bridge line. The first protective action decision was to activate the sirens. Martin County sirens were activated by the St. Lucie County emergency operations center, although Martin County can activate them if needed. Additionally, if any siren failures were reported the emergency management coordinator noted that they would activate back-up route alerting. The second protective action decision was to evacuate and shelter-in-place areas of the public. Areas 7 and 8 of Martin County were to be evacuated, and no other area in Martin County was affected by the protective action decision. Schools were not evacuated as there were no classes that day (simulated Saturday event), and the emergency management director coordinated with the school district representative to ensure no weekend activities were taking place. The incident commander coordinated with the host counties over the potential numbers of evacuees that may need to be issued potassium iodide upon arrival to radiological emergency reception centers. Martin County issues potassium iodide only to emergency workers and rely on the host counties to provide initial doses to members of the public at the radiological emergency reception centers.

The incident commander directed the logistics emergency support function to ensure emergency workers were issued appropriate dosimetry, potassium iodide tablets, and exposure cards if working in areas affected by the plume. Emergency worker kits are kept and maintained at the Martin County emergency operations center for distribution during a radiological event. During the precautionary evacuation of special needs populations, the incident commander coordinated with the transportation liaison to ensure bus drivers were issued kits as well.

Martin County utilized several communications systems to ensure communication was continuously available and reliable. Emergency operations center staff used a web-based situational awareness tool allowing them to check-in/out of their respective functions and post and view documents or updates. A dedicated phone line at the command table in the emergency operations center was amplified to allow emergency support function members to listen to emergency notifications received from St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. A mass notification system was also used to distribute emergency notification alerts and forms through email. The conference bridge line held between the counties and emergency

operations facility was attended by the incident commander, the deputy fire rescue chief, county administrator, deputy county administrator, county sheriff, the emergency management director, and the emergency management coordinator in a designated incident command room.

Traffic and access control point interviews were accomplished with emergency support function liaisons in the emergency operations center. The Martin County Sheriff's Office, the Stuart Police Department, and Martin County Fire Rescue discussed traffic and access control point procedures as the hostile action-based event unfolded. The sheriff's office and police department liaisons responded to the Martin County Incident Commander's directions to implement the traffic and access control points once early precautionary actions were made to close rails, parks, beaches, waterways, and the commencement of special needs evacuation planning. Deputies and officers would have been dispatched to control traffic along evacuation routes. If there wasn't time to pick up potassium iodide, the fire department liaison would have managed delivery of potassium to each deputy and officer posted on evacuation routes.

The Martin County Fire Rescue, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program training records, facilities, equipment, dosimetry, and potassium iodide inventories were verified in an August 2021 staff assistance visit. No discrepancies were noted.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 2.1, 3.1.

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

Martin County Emergency Management staff successfully demonstrated the ability to alert and provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public. The staff utilized the integrated public alert and warning system to send out notifications.

The public information officer was notified by the mass notification system to report to the Martin County emergency operations center. The public information officers in the Martin County emergency operations center communicated with public information officers dispatched to the joint information center by telephone, cellphone, email, and the web-based situational awareness tool.

After the declaration of a Site Area Emergency, the Martin County incident commander, in coordination with St. Lucie County, made the decision for St. Lucie County to sound the sirens. Martin County had the capability to take over from St. Lucie County to sound the sirens if necessary. The counties activated the emergency alert system and issued the joint emergency alert system message "Site A – Site Area Emergency – No Protective Actions". The emergency alert system message contained the four required elements within the initial message. The Martin County public information officer prepared several news releases and social media posts that were issued using the emergency alert system that the public and local media outlets can sign up for online to receive alerts. The messages were clear, accurate, and correctly reflected the protective action decisions. The public information officer followed the same procedure when the sirens were sounded (simulated) by St. Lucie County at the General Emergency. All sirens sounded successfully. If one or more of the sirens in Martin County failed, the county emergency operations center command staff was prepared to dispatch personnel to provide backup notification. The public information officer conferred with the United States Coast Guard, who had primary responsibility for water clearing and marine zone security, on actions regarding clearing the waterways. The public

information officer included the United Stated Coast Guard representative's precautionary advisory in the press release for vessels to clear the area around the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant at the Site Area Emergency.

The public information officer, with the approval of the Martin County Administrator, issued three press releases. The press releases were written in English and the process for Spanish language translations were discussed only. The public information staff published all information on all Martin County social media accounts as well as Martin County website.

The public information officer at Martin County kept the public information officer at the Joint Information Center up to date with actions being taken. The Martin County public information officer monitored two virtual media briefings held at the Joint Information Center.

The public information officer also coordinated with the personnel operating the Community Information Center public inquiry telephone center. The public information officer ensured the Community Information Center staff had updated information.

A United States Coast Guard representative in the Martin County Emergency Operations Center stated that the Coast Guard had primary responsibility for water clearing and marine security around the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. The Coast Guard representative stated that the Martin County law enforcement supported the Coast Guard. The staff was notified by Martin County Emergency Management Agency over an internal mass notification system message to report to the Martin County Emergency Operations Center. The Coast Guard's primary communications with water vessels were over marine very high frequency radio channels. Cellular telephone was the primary communications between Coast Guard personnel on land. Law enforcement communications included 800 megahertz radios and cellular telephones. Both the Coast Guard and the law enforcement personnel stated there was sufficient resources to clear the waterways in a reasonable time. The law enforcement boats had maps of their area and a scripted message to deliver to boaters and individuals in the water. The Coast Guard representative stated that water vessels were contacted over marine very high frequency radio channels. The representative also stated that the local Coast Guard auxiliary was available for additional resources.

The Coast Guard representative issued a marine/watercraft advisory at the Site Area Emergency to advise vessels in the Atlantic waters, vessels in the Indian River Intracoastal Waterway in the vicinity of the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant and vessels in the St. Lucie River and the North Fork of the St. Lucie River to clear the waterways. This information was included in the Martin County News Release Number 1 and Martin County News Release Number 3.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 5.4.

Environmental Response Health & Safety Capability Summary:

Martin County Fire Rescue established and operated an emergency worker decontamination station collocated at Martin County Fire Rescue Station 14, 801 Northeast Ocean Boulevard, Stuart, Florida. Following a simulated incident at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, they successfully demonstrated the survey and decontamination process for Martin County emergency workers leaving a contaminated area.

An emergency worker safety briefing was given to staff and that included assignment of personnel, hydration requirements, dosimetry, potassium iodide, dose limits, vehicle procedures, and information recording. There was sufficient radiological monitoring equipment, dosimetry, personal protective equipment, and decontamination supplies. Following the briefing, emergency workers began donning their personal protective equipment. The protective ensemble that each crew member received included a non-permeable protective suit, two disposable gloves, boot covers, and a facemask. Assistance was given by a dedicated team member in donning the gear and taping the boot covers and the gloves to the suit. Once completed, the safety officer issued dosimetry kits which included dosimeters, exposure record card, dose number card, potassium iodide, and pen. Certain individuals received additional equipment including three electronic dosimeters, six survey meters, eight low range direct reading dosimeters, and one radio. Each piece of equipment issued was checked for operability and accuracy as they were distributed by the safety officer. Potassium iodide would be distributed in accordance with plans and procedures and ingested only upon issuance of an order. It was noted that there was enough county-maintained equipment, including potassium iodide, to be distributed to emergency worker decontamination staff.

Group dosimetry was utilized at the emergency worker decontamination station. The team leads read their dosimetry and reported results over radio every 30 minutes. Emergency workers interviewed demonstrated knowledge of radiological exposure control limits, dosimetry usage and placement, frequency of reading dosimetry, administrative limits and turn back values, dose, and potassium iodide record management.

The decontamination system was set up in a line of separate stations along the driveway into the fire station. There was adequate signage to direct emergency workers and their vehicles. There were ample parking spaces for both clean and contaminated vehicles. Each station had notices which listed the dosimetry exposure limits and they divided into a hot, warm, and cold zone layout. Communications was done via handheld radios. The dosimetry utilized was appropriate to provide the measuring the exposure limits of 100 milliroentgen and turn-back values of 500 milliroentgen.

Equipment, displays, signs, and other supplies were sufficient to support emergency operations. Radio was the primary communication system used, with no failures observed. Multiple and redundant communication systems were available inside the Martin County Fire Rescue Station 14 building.

Equipment used for the initial set up of the vehicle decontamination greeting and shower station was a modular vehicle decontamination shower, two tables, a tent, cones, and two signs which indicated where the decontamination line began. The modular shower system used was connected to a tank and pump located on the fire crews' truck or would be connected to a fire hydrant. The station also had ample supplies, which included disposable gloves, pens, vehicle incident logs, vehicle decontamination forms, and the greeter questionnaire forms.

A total of four vehicles and their drivers were monitored and processed through the vehicle decontamination station. The exercise began with a vehicle approaching the vehicle greeter's station. At the greeter's station, an attendant directed vehicle 1 to stop and used a questionnaire to interview the driver. Any additional vehicle occupants would also be interviewed. Questions asked included information on where vehicle 1 had traveled within the simulated contaminated area, if driver 1 exited the vehicle in the contaminated area, if

driver 1 touched anything outside of vehicle 1, if the windows were down while driving, or if there were any stops made. Upon completion of the questionnaire, vehicle 1 was directed to slowly drive through the shower system at an approximate 1-2 inches per second. Two attendants, one in front of the vehicle and one adjacent to the driver side window, assisted in directing vehicle 1 forward. Once the shower process was completed, vehicle 1 was logged using the incident vehicle log, which recorded tag numbers, type (make/model) of vehicle, color, agency, contact name, and phone number. Four attendants were directed to monitor vehicle 1 using survey meters for any radiological contamination by dividing the vehicle into quadrants. The monitoring team used a direct and sufficient method to monitor the vehicle covering the front grill, hood, windshield, tires, wheel welds, doors, door handles, roof, trunk or bed, and reachable undercarriage areas. Concluding the exterior monitoring, driver 1 was asked to roll down the windows and both sides of the driver's hands were monitored.

If contamination was found on a vehicle, the team lead would inform the incident commander by radio, the vehicle would be parked in a designated parking lot, and further annotated on the vehicle incident log sheet. Once parked, the driver and occupants would then be escorted to the personnel decontamination line. The escort would explain to the vehicle occupants what was happening, the why, and what to expect at the next station. If contamination was not found on the vehicle or occupants, the vehicle would then proceed forward to be cleared at the following station. This process was demonstrated for vehicle 1 and repeated for vehicles 2, 3, and 4.

Vehicle 1 was noted to have two locations where contamination was found to be at 52 counts per minute, which was twice background on the monitoring instrument. After monitoring, a team member kneeled on the ground to find the disengaging lever to move the law enforcement vehicle into a parking spot. Although not recommended, this was a necessary action to continue processing vehicles. The team lead noted that personnel who knelt on the ground would be visually assessed for damage to personal protective equipment, monitored for contamination, and sent to personnel decontamination if needed. The team lead also mentioned that a request for an additional person would be sent to the incident commander to backfill the position. Vehicle 2 was not found to have any radiological contamination by the monitoring team. Vehicle 3 was found to have contamination on the interior door handle at 300 counts per minute and on the steering wheel at 700 counts per minute. Vehicle 4 was found to have contamination above the exterior, driver's side mirror at 300 counts per minute and the exterior driver's side, rear wheel weld at 117 counts per minute. Each vehicle occupant was escorted to the personnel monitoring and decontamination station.

Barrier cones and tape were used to delineate a clean vehicle lane and a potentially contaminated pedestrian lane, going from the vehicle wash station to the personnel monitoring and decontamination station. The personnel monitoring and decontamination station included an initial and secondary personnel survey station, a decontamination shower tent, and an equipment decontamination table.

A total of three emergency workers were processed through the personnel monitoring and decontamination station. (One exercise player was used to drive two vehicles through the wash station and came through personnel monitoring and decontamination once.) Handheld survey instruments were used to monitor emergency workers for contamination and staff directed decontamination efforts as needed. Proper survey and contamination-control techniques were used throughout the demonstration, with frequent glove changes to limit the spread of contamination. Two emergency workers, one male (emergency worker 1) and

one female (emergency worker 3), were found to be free of contamination and released from the decontamination station. One female (emergency worker 3) was found to have contamination levels above twice background. Two dry decontamination attempts were made to remove contamination from emergency worker 2, being resurveyed after each attempt. Contamination was still found above twice background levels after each attempt, prompting a full shower decontamination. Emergency worker 3 was resurveyed, with contamination still found above twice background levels, requiring a second shower decontamination. The emergency worker was found to be below background levels following the second shower decontamination and subsequently released from the decontamination station. Appropriate decontamination supplies, instructions, and disposable replacement clothing were provided to the emergency worker requiring decontamination. Records of monitoring and decontamination were completed on the Martin County Hazmat Incident Patient Decontamination Form.

Doffing of personal protective equipment was demonstrated by two staff emergency workers. At the initial survey station, staffs' hands and equipment were monitored first. No contamination was detected, and the equipment was dropped into a clean bin. Clear instructions were given to remove all the tape that was used to seal the seams of their protective suits, roll down their hoods, and unzip the protective suit. A clean attendant from the personnel decontamination team assisted the doffing individuals by maneuvering the suit down their arms. Once manageable by the doffing individuals, the first pair of gloves were removed. Seated in a provided chair, the suit and boot covers were then removed altogether. The individuals removed their masks, followed by their inner-most pair of gloves. Concluding the doffing procedures, the protective suit was picked up and placed into a trash receptacle. The individuals were then monitored from both front and back, in a smooth and controlled motion. Areas monitored were the front and back of the head, arms, hands, torso, legs, and feet. At the conclusion of monitoring, the individuals proceeded forward to exit the decontamination station.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.1, 2.2, 3.1, 5.2.

On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement Capability Summary:

The capability was successfully accomplished by interview with emergency support function liaisons in the Martin County Emergency Operations Center. The Martin County Sheriff's Office, the Stuart Police Department liaisons discussed the traffic and access control point procedures. Each deputy and officer's vehicles are equipped with dosimetry and hazard cones. Law enforcement communications included 800 megahertz radios and cellular telephones as primary and alternate communications. Deputies and officers can request additional hazard cones, signs, and electronic sign boards from the Martin County Public Works as the needs developed. A traffic control procedure is located within each vehicle with an exposure control briefing, use of dosimetry, potassium iodide ingestion instructions, and position instructions. The deputies and officers would be instructed to radio in every thirty minutes and report incidents which affected the flow of traffic. The officers would also be given manual control of intersection traffic lights to manage traffic flow.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 2.2, 3.1, 5.4.

Critical Transportation Capability Summary:

Martin County School District school interviews were conducted on December 14, 2022, with four school Principals, the District Safety Manager, and the Director of Safety and Security. The schools were Felix A. Williams Elementary, Jensen Beach High, the Environmental Studies Center, and Jensen Beach Elementary. The Environmental Studies Center was not a traditional school and only receives and manages students from the other three schools for the conductance of classes but does maintain a full teaching staff under normal circumstances.

Each school has a plan which covers notification, communication, school population, student accountability, transportation, law enforcement escort, paired schools, access to student medical records, parent notification, and student pickup. The School Interview Questionnaire was used for each interview to maintain a level of consistent questions between each school.

Each principal was very knowledgeable of plans and procedures and elaborated such during the interviews. The District Safety Manager and the Director of Safety and Security provided additional clarifications to the principals for event initiation, decision making, and notification from the Martin County emergency operations center.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.5.

Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services Capability Summary:

Martin County Fire Rescue successfully demonstrated the capability to manage emergency worker exposure control while transporting and treating potentially contaminated, injured individuals in support of a radiological incident at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. Martin County Fire Rescue had sufficient resources, equipment, and trained personnel to monitor, provide medical services, and transport of a contaminated, injured patient to Cleveland Clinic Martin Health.

Martin County Fire Rescue staff responded to a vehicular accident scene with potentially contaminated injured persons. Martin County Fire Rescue staff wore appropriate personal protective equipment and followed protocols to manage emergency worker exposure control. Staff wore dosimetry and discussed dosimetry usage and placement, frequency of reading dosimetry, dose and potassium iodide record management, radiological exposure control limits, and administrative limits and turn back values. Handheld survey instruments were successfully placed into operation following validation of calibration. Source check and range of reading validation was the responsibility of the hazmat team who issued the equipment to Martin County Fire Rescue and was not observed during the drill; however, staff accurately described the procedure to conduct operational and source checks.

Appropriate medical triage was performed on the patient and treatment provided to the patient's injured left ankle, with care taken to limit the spread of contamination. The patient was transferred to a gurney and a survey was conducted on the patient, with proper survey techniques observed. Contamination above background was identified on the patient's upper right back and left ankle. Following the survey, the patient was wrapped with two cloth layers to contain contamination, buckled into the gurney, and loaded into the ambulance for transport to Cleveland Clinic Martin Health Hospital. Staff performed glove changes frequently and properly handled and disposed of potentially contaminated materials in a marked radioactive waste bag.

Martin County Fire Rescue staff communicated accurate patient information to the receiving hospital. Martin County Fire Rescue staff described how they could continue to treat the patient during transport, while limiting the spread of contamination, by unwrapping only the areas of the patient they required access to, conducting additional surveys with their handheld instruments, and the use of decontamination wipes. Upon arrival at the hospital, the patient's gurney was unloaded off the ambulance inside the radiation emergency area and placed parallel to the hospital's decontamination table. Martin County Fire Rescue staff provided accurate patient vitals, injuries, and contamination readings and locations to hospital staff as the patient was transferred, using appropriate contamination control techniques, to Cleveland Clinic Martin Health Hospital's care.

Following patient transfer to the hospital, handheld survey instruments were used to monitor the gurney and each other. The survey instruments were wielded methodically and deliberately to avoid cross contamination. During the Martin County Fire Rescue doffing process, staff demonstrated excellent communication and teamwork while maintaining appropriate contamination control. Clothing and personal protective equipment were properly handled and disposed of in a marked container. Martin County Fire Rescue staff explained the ambulance would remain in place until a Martin County hazardous materials team surveyed the vehicle for contamination and cleared it for return to service. While the vehicle is surveyed, Martin County Fire Rescue staff would report to an onsite rehabilitation area to rest and rehydrate.

At the hospital, Florida Power & Light provided pre-packaged personnel protective equipment, which included Tyvek with hood, booties and gloves, calibrated electronic self-reading dosimeters, and calibrated thermoluminescent dosimeters. Staff that would respond to an incident included the Hospital Emergency Response Team. Communication from the Martin County Fire Rescue would be by radio at the nurse's station. Cleveland Clinic Martin Health successfully demonstrated the core capability, transportation, and treatment of contaminated individuals. The medical patient was treated for medical injuries (simulated) and radiological contamination.

The assistant nurse manager received a call from Martin County Fire Rescue that the ambulance was on the scene with a radiologically contaminated patient. The command center and Hospital Emergency Response Team were notified by electronic notification, phone, text, and email. The hospital was placed in a Code Orange, hazmat incident and the emergency department, a Code Yellow, lockdown, no patients. The assistant nurse manager received a radio call from the ambulance a 26-year-old female with an open wound on the left ankle and radiological contamination. One decontamination was attempted with no affect. Vital information was provided, and the estimated time of arrival was ten minutes. Cleveland Clinic Martin Health had redundant communication systems including landline, cellular telephones, and radios, all of which were demonstrated during the drill.

The response consisted of nine personnel, a doctor, five nurses, one technician, and two nuclear medicine staff. Personnel protective equipment consisted of safety glasses, surgical mask, Tyvek, booties, hoods, and two pairs of gloves. Boots, gloves and zipper were taped, with easy tear folds and each person was identified, front and back by name and position. The doctor and two nurses were staged between the tent and hospital entrance to document information and verbalize procedures to the team in the tent. Self-reading dosimeters were assigned by serial number and zeroed, then clipped on the left Tyvek pocket. The staff were briefed on dosimetry, read every 30 minutes, 100 milliroentgen reporting limit, and to turn in

once incident was complete. The staff were able to read the dosimeters, knew the turn back limit, and to report any issues to their supervisor. A survey meter was operationally checked, and background was measured at 20 counts per minute, contamination would be higher than twice background.

A decontamination tent was set up outside the entrance and the area marked to avoid any unintended entrance. The tent size was sufficient for the stretcher with attached waste collection tank, the hospital staff, and their equipment to provide safe monitoring, decontamination, and treatment of the patient. At both ends of the tent there were floor extensions, which covered the immediate ground around the tent and provided additional area for operations. Charts with instructions for donning and doffing personal protective equipment were mounted and visible in the tent to aid personnel.

The ambulance crew arrived and removed and placed their stretcher, with the patient, next to the hospital stretcher. The ambulance crew provided patient vital statistics and condition to the hospital staff. The patient was transferred with a flexible plastic board, which made the transfer easier and limited potential cross contamination. The hospital stretcher was monitored for potential radiation, less than background, and staff changed their outer gloves. Additional glove changes were simulated and completed, as needed, to prevent cross contamination. The patient was first checked from head to toe for injuries, there was a bandage on the left lower leg with no active bleeding. The patient was monitored for contamination. The technician maintained the correct distance and speed and was mindful of potential cross contamination. The bandaged area was 1,000 counts per minute and once turned the patients upper right back was 1,600 counts per minute. The back area was decontaminated by using a wet wipe, in one direction across the area. After the first wipe, the reading remained 1,600 counts per minute. An additional two wipes were used and then the reading was less than background. All radiological waste was collected for later disposal by the utility. The staff was requested at the 30-minute time to check their self-reading dosimeters, all readings were zero and were documented. The patients' personal belongings were collected and documented for security.

The bandage was removed from the lower left leg and the wound was decontaminated with a wet wipe and then flushed with saline. The area was monitored and was less than background. The wound was bandaged, and the stretcher was moved out of the tent onto the floor extension towards the hospital entrance. Patient vital statistics, treatment (clean bandage), and radiological contamination (less than background) status was reviewed and then the patient was transferred to another stretcher for transfer into the hospital.

One staff member doffed their personal protective equipment to demonstrate the process. The doffing checklist was posted on the tent by the doffing area. The staff member stepped on a pad and then removed their outer gloves and disposed of them. The staff member was monitored from head to toe, front and back, and bottoms of feet, all less than background. The self-reading dosimeter was removed, read (zero), and collected. All tape was removed, then the hood, safety glasses, mask, booties, then rolling inside the Tyvek, which was collected at the bottom. The feet were monitored as the staff member stepped from dirty to step off pad. One of the feet touched the technician monitoring, so the technician checked where touched, less than background. the staff member was then complete. Throughout the drill, all staff demonstrated successful contamination avoidance and attention to detail, which allowed for a successful drill.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 2.2, 5.3.

3.6 Host Jurisdictions

3.6.1 Brevard County Emergency Operations Center

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

The Brevard County Emergency Management Agency and emergency operations personnel demonstrated the ability to establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure virtually in response to a simulated hostile action-based event at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant.

Emergency operations center staff were alerted of an initial briefing via email notification. Once adequate staff were present virtually the emergency management director declared the emergency operations center fully operational. The operations manager demonstrated proficiency in facilitating the activation of the virtual platform for discussion and communication with the emergency operations staff. 24-hour shift rosters were maintained by each agency for continuous operations and communicated to the operations manager for situational awareness. Security of the emergency operations center was provided by the Rockledge Police Department with a sign in roster for all that entered the area. The emergency management director managed both in-person staff as well as a virtual platform to reduce the footprint inside the emergency operations center due to the ongoing pandemic.

The Director of Brevard County Emergency Management provided direction and control to the emergency operations staff and was present on all discussion line calls. The operations manager sent out update briefings to emergency operations staff via notification emails for situational awareness amongst the group after each emergency notification form was received from the state watch office. The director participated in all decision line conference calls with the risk counties to review plant conditions and emergency classification levels. Organizations that participated in the discussion calls were Brevard County Sheriff's Office, University of Florida Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences Extension Brevard County, Brevard County Fire Rescue, Brevard County Housing and Human Services, Florida Department of Health – Brevard, Space Coast Government TV, Brevard County Sheriff's Office, and the Florida Department of Transportation.

Brevard County is a host county with a support role in assisting the risk counties as they implement protective action decisions. Brevard County listened to decision line calls for situational awareness and to maintain preparedness for when their assistance was requested. The Brevard County emergency management director developed an emergency support function discussion line for all emergency support functions to discuss their roles and process during each emergency classification level. The discussion line call was held in conjunction with the decision line calls with the state and risk counties during the exercise.

The primary method of communication to receive information from the utility was from the state watch office via email. The communication with the state emergency operation center was over a conference bridge line that remained open during the exercise. Backup and redundant communications systems were also utilized via dedicated conference lines for all discussion-based communication amongst the emergency operations staff. The emergency classification levels from the plant were received by email messages. No issues or failures with any communications systems were observed.

An officer with the Brevard County Sheriff Office stated each officer in the field would be supplied with dosimetry kits with record keeping cards and given a safety briefing. The officer assigned to the emergency operations center communicated with officers in the field to keep track of exposure and determine appropriate measures to ensure all stay within the exposure limits set forth in the safety brief. The Brevard Emergency Management Director stated the state health department was the authority to order the ingestion of potassium iodide for the general public and emergency workers.

The Brevard County Emergency Management, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program training records, facilities, equipment, dosimetry, and potassium iodide inventories were verified in a March 2022 staff assistance visit.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.1, 1.2, 1.5, 2.1, 3.1.

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

The Director of Brevard County Emergency Management mobilized personnel to the emergency operations center, via virtual platform, to support public information and warning activities. The public information officer stated three public information officers would be assigned to the emergency operations center, three public information officers would be assigned to the reception and congregate care center, and two public information officers would be assigned to the joint information center. The Brevard County Emergency Management public information officer successfully demonstrated, via discussion, the ability to perform emergency public information and warning to the public. The public information officer at the Brevard County emergency operations center-maintained communication with the public information officers assigned to the joint information center virtually during the event with a dedicated telephone line, three laptop computers with video capabilities, and email.

The public information officer assisted in the collaboration and review of pre-scripted messages that provided incident status and updates. Upon final review from the emergency management director, these messages would be released for distribution thru the joint information center. No news releases were formulated during the exercise.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 3.3.

3.6.2 Indian River County Emergency Operations Center

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

The Indian River County Emergency Operations Center personnel successfully demonstrated the county's ability to establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process in response to a simulated hostile action-based radiological emergency at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. Indian River County serves as a host county for St. Lucie County evacuees. The Indian River County Emergency Services Director and other designated staff received the initial notification of a Site Area Emergency via St. Lucie County's mass notification system. The same emergency notification was received within minutes by designated Indian River County officials via email from the Florida state watch office. At the

direction of the Indian River County Emergency Services Director, emergency management staff used the county's mass notification system to notify and mobilize key personnel in a timely manner. Upon arrival of emergency management staff and select emergency support function personnel, the director declared the emergency operations center activated at Level 1.

The emergency operations center was adequate in size and well equipped to support prolonged emergency operations. The main room consisted of approximately forty workstations with communications and computer connectivity and additional seating along the outside of the room for at least 16 personnel. Adjacent to the main room were multiple breakout rooms and additional meeting space for supporting agencies. Staff utilized an array of digital and static displays to maintain situational awareness and provide emergency information, including televisions, computer monitors, white boards, various mapping products. The main room was adorned with nine large televisions depicting exercise and real-world information including the emergency operations center status, current weather, live traffic feeds, and real-time power outages. Emergency management staff expertly managed audio and visual controls from fixed workstations at the front of the room. From these same workstations, personnel demonstrated the ability to manage resource requests, maintain an event log for the incident, as well as document, print, and disseminate appropriate materials, as needed. Additionally, staff demonstrated multiple layers of redundant communications during response operations. All of which were operational.

The Indian River County Emergency Services Director provided final approving authority for all public messaging and other significant county actions, including a local state of emergency. The Emergency Management Coordinator managed and coordinated the operations of the emergency operations center staff and facilitated frequent briefings to provide and maintain situational awareness. The Public Information Officer drafted public messaging and maintained connectivity with the joint information center. Branch directors, assigned to manage specific elements of the response, including emergency services, infrastructure, human resources, logistics, and support services, provided regular updates on activities and unmet needs. A state liaison provided guidance and support, as well as reach back to additional state assets and resources. The leadership group worked well together, engaged in stimulating discussions, and relied appropriately on input from other support staff. Injects were utilized effectively to keep participants busy and actively engaged.

Indian River County emergency operations center personnel actively listened and participated in regular county coordination conference calls facilitated by St. Lucie County. When Indian River County personnel were notified of the Site Area Emergency, they began coordinating resources to provide traffic management along designated evacuation routes and activate appropriate reception center and shelter operations in preparation for a potential evacuation of citizens from St. Lucie County. Personnel and equipment resources were identified and directed to staging areas in support of the predetermined traffic control points and the designated reception center at the North County Aquatic Center in Vero Beach. The Sheriff's Office representative at the emergency operations center coordinated traffic control operations with the local municipalities and amassed resources (i.e., personnel, vehicles with message boards, other fixed or mobile electronic sign boards, barricades, cones, etc.) from multiple state and local agencies. The representative from the county health department coordinated public health resources in support of reception center and shelter operations, including the shipment of up to 441,500 65 milligram tablets of potassium iodide from the local health department to the reception center for dissemination to evacuees upon the authorization of the designated State Department of Health, Bureau of

Radiation Control official. The Indian River County Fire Department representative coordinated the closing of the aquatic center, as well as the mobilization and staging of the monitoring and decontamination resources, including dosimetry, in support of the reception center operations. An incident action plan for the reception center operation was developed and disseminated internally. Although schools were not in session, emergency management staff coordinated with local school officials in the event shelters were needed.

By the time the decision was made by risk counties to evacuate 74,000 citizens, Indian River County emergency operations center personnel had demonstrated the planning and coordination to implement traffic control, reception center, and shelter operations. Emergency management and public health staff coordinated with school officials, neighboring host county, Brevard County, and other agencies to develop a sheltering plan for the evacuated population, which included 100 citizens with special medical needs. Although the decision was not made to authorize the ingestion of potassium iodide to evacuees, public health representatives discussed the process of receiving authorization from a designated Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control official and communicating this to public health staff at the reception center. Through interview with various emergency operations center personnel, dosimetry, and just-in-time training would be provided to designated county emergency workers at the reception center. Dosimetry is not required for law enforcement staff providing traffic control.

The Indian River County Emergency Services, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program training records, facilities, radiological equipment, dosimetry, and potassium iodide inventories were verified in a January 2022 staff assistance visit. No discrepancies were noted.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.1, 1.2, 1.5, 2.1, 3.1.

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

Indian River County demonstrated their capability to deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the public and media during a simulated radiological incident at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. Indian River County utilized press releases as the primary method to keep the public informed. All press releases were coordinated with neighboring counties and the joint information center via phone and email. All public messaging emanating from Indian River County was reviewed and approved by the Emergency Services Director. All messages marked for dissemination to the public were timely, accurate, and contained the requisite information; copies were maintained in house and provided upon request.

The Indian River County Public Information Officer remained actively engaged by participating in regular briefings, listening to county coordination conference calls broadcast over speaker phone, and staying connected to the joint information center. The Public Information Officer communicated frequently by cell phone and email with the joint information center. Any issues were discussed and resolved quickly. There were no communications failures observed.

Through interview, the director described the utilization of the Indian River County Emergency Information Center to respond to public inquiries. The activation of the call center was simulated and a press release providing contact information was disseminated. Any impediments were resolved prior to the evacuation decision; however, emergency operations staff discussed the messaging of revised evacuation routes.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 3.3.

3.6.3 Palm Beach County Emergency Operations Center

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

Palm Beach County Division of Emergency Management staff successfully demonstrated the capability to establish and maintain operational coordination during a simulated hostile action-based event at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. The Palm Beach County Emergency Management Director, the deputy director, and the executive group demonstrated procedures to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel, and activate the facility in a timely manner.

Alert and notification procedures were discussed with the Palm Beach County Warning Point Operations operator. Staffing rosters were identified based on activation level and used to notify emergency support staff through emergency notification software. Each member of the team for the exercise received both text and email and verified that they had been notified. Redundant communication systems were demonstrated during the exercise. Through interview, each communication system was explained from cell phone, satellite phone, and 700 megahertz radios.

The Palm Beach County Emergency Management Director received and reviewed all emergency notification forms sent to the warning point and disseminated vital information to the executive policy group and the emergency support staff in the emergency operations center. The first notification form was a Site Area Emergency that caused the executive policy group to move Palm Beach County to a level 2 status and prepare a local state of emergency. They activated and mobilized teams for the two reception centers.

Most decision line coordination calls were followed by emergency operations center briefings, resulting in situational awareness for all staff and the assignment of critical tasks to the command, logistics, operations, and planning sections. Additionally, the deputy director ensured precautionary actions by Palm Beach County was coordinated and concurred upon amongst the staff. The executive policy group and deputy director also ensured all relevant, available information was considered before making decisions.

The executive policy group provided overall direction and control and decision-making for the incident from the main conference room. In contrast, the deputy director provided direction and control of the emergency operation center. The executive policy group participated in coordination conference calls and monitored emergency management software to stay aware of the incident status. The operations officer coordinated with the executive policy group and provided staff briefings to the emergency operations center as needed. The entire staff worked well together. While responding to challenging exercise injects, the staff communicated and coordinated through inject resolution. A host of visual aids and monitors enhanced the situational awareness for all in the emergency operations center. In addition, the operations officer conducted detailed situational update briefings any time new

information was received. As a result, all emergency operations center personnel were knowledgeable of their plans and procedures. The radiological planner technical specialist also provided a ready-to-go action plan and a plan summary to all the staff during the exercise. This provides a quick look into what needed to be accomplished during the exercise. He also provided job aid for each position for the whole emergency operation center.

The Palm Beach County Fire Department liaison is responsible for dispatching fire units and emergency medical services when responding to any emergency situation. The liaison also manages the implementation of emergency worker exposure control measures. The liaison would issue or dispatch emergency worker kits from the emergency operations center or storage locations near the radiological reception centers. All emergency operation center staff worked well together to ensure evacuation routes, reception centers, and shelters were available to evacuees from Martin County while maintaining the safety of the citizens of Palm Beach County.

The Palm Beach County Division of Emergency Management, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program training records, facilities, radiological equipment, dosimetry, and potassium iodide inventories were verified in a March 2022 staff assistance visit.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.1, 1.2, 1.5, 2.1, 3.1.

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

The Palm Beach County emergency operations center staff successfully demonstrated the ability to deliver coordinated and reliable information to the public. The Palm Beach County Public Information Officer worked with staff and maintained situational awareness with the plant, state, risk counties, and other host counties on status and actions taken with the involvement of Palm Beach County. Public information officer drafted and disseminated press releases related to protective actions which were approved by the Director. Rumor control was effectively managed by the public information staff and logs were maintained. The staff ensured accurate information and instructions were delivered to callers. One press release was developed in Palm Beach County using a set of pre-scripted messages. The staff noted that their messaging is designed to focus on the residents of Palm Beach County and the services that are provided, without discussing details of protective actions for risk counties. The virtual JIC concept seemed to work well for Palm Beach County and the public information staff supported its future use.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 3.3.

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Section 4: Conclusion

This report documents the offsite response to a simulated radiological emergency in support of the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. The hostile action-based scenario exercise was a success. The state and local response organizations showed knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures, and successfully accomplished the implementation of protective actions to protect the health and safety of the public in the emergency planning zones surrounding the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant.

The State of Florida and affected county offsite response organizations were among the first in the nation to complete a hostile action-based exercise during the SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19 pandemic. The state and counties effectively revised and adapted new protocols to protect their workforces while retaining the integrity of their capabilities. The integration of virtual tools and video conferencing platforms not only allowed all responders to participate but enhanced the operational communication capability within the state. The lessons learned and best practices gained through the implementation and use of these technologies should be documented in emergency response plans and procedures and used to supplement future responses.

Based on the results of this exercise and FEMA's review of the 2021 Annual Letter of Certification submitted by Florida, the offsite radiological emergency response plans, and preparedness of the State of Florida and the affected local jurisdictions site-specific to the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant can be implemented. They are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of an emergency at the site.

In lieu of the pandemic and other ongoing response efforts, the offsite response organizations met all exercise objectives. FEMA wishes to acknowledge the hard work of the numerous persons who participated in the exercise and made it a success.

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Appendix A: Exercise Timeline

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Time Utility Declared	Time That Notification Was Received or Action Was Taken									
		SEOC	Decision Makers/ AHIMT	Dose/FTM	St. Lucie County	Incident Command Post	Martin County	Brevard County	Indian River County	Palm Beach County	JIC
Unusual Event	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Alert	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Site Area Emergency	7:54	8:05	8:15	8:19	8:15	8:23	8:06	8:06	8:22	8:19	8:52
General Emergency	10:24	10:32	10:28	10:28	10:43	10:30	10:24	10:32	10:42	10:44	10:28
Simulated Rad. Release Started	10:05	10:32	10:05	10:05	10:43	10:43	10:43	10:43	10:43	10:43	10:43
Simulated Rad. Release Ended	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing
Facility Declared Operational		8:05	8:44	8:30	8:50	8:34	7:30	9:00	8:40	8:51	8:45
State of Emergency Declared	State	9:01	9:01	-	-	9:00	-	-	9:15	-	-
	Local	-	-	-	8:23	-	8:09	-	9:16	9:15	-
End Exercise		12:04	12:04	12:04	12:04	12:04	12:04	12:04	12:04	12:04	12:04
Early Precautionary Actions: Rails, Parks, Beaches, Waterway Closures, Planning for Evacuating Special Needs		N/A	N/A	N/A	9:02	N/A	9:53	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Protective Action Decision 1: Stay tuned		-	8:20	-	8:20	-	8:20	-	-	-	-
Siren Activation		8:40	8:40	-	8:40	8:40	8:40	8:40	8:40	8:40	8:40
EAS Message: SAE Message A		8:40	8:40	-	8:40	8:40	8:40	-	-	-	-
Protective Action Decision 2: Shelter: 2, 3, 4, 5 Evacuation: 1, 6, 7, 8		10:41	10:41	11:39	10:41	10:41	10:41	10:41	10:41	10:41	-
Siren Activation		10:55	10:55	-	10:55	10:55	10:55	10:55	10:55	10:55	10:55
EAS Message: GE Message A1		10:55	10:55	-	10:55	10:55	10:55	-	-	-	-
KI Ingestion Decision: Emergency Workers Ingest within 10-miles		-	10:50	10:19	10:23	10:32	10:19	-	-	-	-

*Denotes the time in which a decision was messaged from the joint information center.

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Appendix B: Evaluator Assignments

Location/Venue	Evaluation Team	Core Capability
State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC)	Quintin Ivy	Operational Coordination
Emergency Operations Facility: Decision Makers	Dave Ortman Glenda Bryson (virtual)	Operational Coordination
Emergency Operations Facility: Joint Operations	Jim Greer	Operational Coordination
All Hazard Incident Management Team (AHIMT)	Roy Smith	Operational Coordination
Virtual Joint Information Center	Erica Houghton (virtual) PJ Nied	Public Information and Warning
Bureau of Radiation Control: Dose Assessment	Jill Leatherman	Situational Assessment
Bureau of Radiation Control: Field Team Management	Marcy Campbell	Environmental Response Health & Safety
Bureau of Radiation Control: Lab	Tom Essig	Environmental Response Health & Safety
Bureau of Radiation Control: Field Team 1/2	Deb Blunt Bart Ray Janise Stoliarova (OJT)	Environmental Response Health & Safety
St. Lucie County Emergency Operations Center	Gene Taylor Farrah Stewart Tom Hegele	Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning
St. Lucie County: Traffic Control Points	Tom Hegele	On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement
St. Lucie County: Backup Route Alerting, Waterway Warning	Tom Hegele	Public Information and Warning
St. Lucie County: Incident Command Post (ICP)	JT Ackermann Mark Dalton	Operational Coordination

Martin County Emergency Operations Center	Gerald McLemore Rosemary Samsel Randi Hendrix (OJT)	Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning
Martin County: Traffic Control Points	Gerald McLemore	On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement
Martin County OOS: Schools	Gerald McLemore	Critical Transportation
Brevard County Emergency Operations Center (virtual)	DeShun Lowery (virtual)	Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning
Indian River County Emergency Operations Center	Nate Nienhius	Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning
Palm Beach County Emergency Operations Center	Robert Nash	Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning

Appendix C: Exercise Participants

Participating Organizations
State of Florida
Florida Division of Emergency Management
Division of Emergency Management, All Hazards Incident Management Team
Florida Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control
Florida Department of Transportation
St. Lucie County
St. Lucie County Public Safety - Emergency Management
St. Lucie County Public Schools
St. Lucie County Sheriff's Office
St. Lucie County Fire District
Fort Pierce Police Department
Lawnwood Regional Medical Center & Heart Institute
Martin County
Cleveland Clinic Martin Health
Martin County Board of Supervisors
Martin County Communications
Martin County Department of Health
Martin County Emergency Management
Martin County Fire Rescue
Martin County Hydrology
Martin County Public Information Office
Martin County School District
Martin County Sheriff's Office

Participating Organizations
Stuart Police Department
Brevard County
Brevard County Emergency Management
Brevard County Fire Rescue
Brevard County Housing and Human Services
Brevard County Sheriff's Office
Florida Department of Health – Brevard
Rockledge Police Department
Space Coast Government Television
University of Florida Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences Extension Brevard County
Indian River County
Indian River County Emergency Services
Indian River County Emergency Management
Palm Beach County
Palm Beach County Emergency Management
Joint Information System
Federal
Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region 4
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II
United States Coast Guard
Private Sector
Florida Power and Light/St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant

Appendix D: Extent of Play Agreement

1. Florida Division of Emergency Management & the All-Hazards Incident Management Team

The following agree to support this Hostile Action Based Plume and Full Participation Exercise as described herein:

State or County REPP Coordinator	FEMA REPP State Lead
Kimberly Sharkey Lead Radiological Coordinator Florida Division of Emergency Management	Gerald McLemore, REPP Lead, State of Florida Federal Emergency Management Agency
Signature: SIGNED 12202021	Signature: SIGNED 12132021

Core Capability: Operational Coordination

Definition: Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

Objective 1: Emergency Operations Management

Capability Target 1.1: Mobilization

Intent: The capability to alert, notify, and mobilize offsite response organizations to staff facilities in support of emergency operations. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 185

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Florida Division of Emergency Management (FDEM) & the All-Hazards Incident Management Team (AHIMT)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception.

Assessment	Extent of Play
	If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Alert, notify, and mobilize key personnel, to include a 24-hour staffing roster, and activate facilities in a timely manner.	No Exception
Receive and verify notifications.	No Exception
Identify and request additional resources, as needed.	No Exception
Determine a facility is operational.	No Exception

Capability Target 1.2: Direction and Control

Intent: The capability to provide overall direction and control of response efforts, commensurate with the responsibilities of leadership, as detailed in plans/procedures. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 186

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.1.c, A.2, A.3, A.5, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, D.4, E.1, H.6, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: FDEM & AHIMT

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Support protective action decision-making.	No Exception
Conduct briefings in a timely manner.	No Exception
Maintain situational awareness.	No Exception
Coordinate response activities with other organizations.	No Exception
Obtain resources to support emergency operations.	No Exception
Provide and maintain adequate facilities and equipment to support the emergency response.	No Exception

Capability Target 1.5: Protective Action Decision Implementation for the Plume Phase

Intent: The capability to implement precautionary protective action and/or protective action decisions, including evacuation and/or sheltering, for all populations within the plume and ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zones. The populations include those with access and functional needs, students, and institutionalized individuals. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 189

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.4, C.2.a, G.1, J.11, J.11.a, J.11.b, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.g, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: FDEM & AHIMT

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Implement PADs, ensuring communication and coordination with all appropriate jurisdictions.	No Exception
Assist those with access and functional needs during the implementation of PADs.	No Exception
Communicate, coordinate, and implement protective actions for schools.	No Exception
Communicate with transportation officials.	No Exception
Identify evacuation routes for the general public.	No Exception
Make KI available to both institutionalized persons and the general public, in accordance with plans and procedures.	Exception: State only provides KI for State Agencies that are responding to the event like State Law Enforcement agencies, when needed.

Objective 3: Alert and Notification

Capability Target 3.1: Communications

Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 200

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: FDEM & AHIMT

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.	No Exception
Maintain periodic test results and corrective actions on a real time basis.	No Exception
Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.	No Exception
Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.	No Exception
Identify and address any failures of the systems.	No Exception
Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., "content check").	No Exception

Core Capability: Public Information and Warning

Definition: Deliver coordination, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

Objective 1: Emergency Operations Management

Capability Target 1.1: Mobilization

Intent: The capability to alert, notify, and mobilize OROs to staff facilities in support of emergency operations. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 185

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Joint Information System (FDEM & AHIMT)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Alert, notify, and mobilize key personnel, to include a 24-hour staffing roster, and activate facilities in a timely manner.	No Exception
Receive and verify notifications.	No Exception
Identify and request additional resources, as needed.	No Exception
Determine a facility is operational.	No Exception

Objective 3: Alert and Notification

Capability Target 3.1: Communications

Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 200

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Joint Information System (FDEM & AHIMT)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.	No Exception
Maintain periodic test results and corrective actions on a real time basis.	No Exception

Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.	No Exception
Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.	No Exception
Identify and address any failures of the systems.	No Exception
Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., "content check").	No Exception

Capability Target 3.2: Alert and Notification of the Public

Intent: The capability to provide instructions to the public. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 201

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.2, E.4, E.5, F.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Joint Information System (FDEM & AHIMT)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	**Negotiated responses:** The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
ALERT AND NOTIFICATION SYSTEM: Sequentially provide an alert signal followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas.	No Exception
ALERT AND NOTIFICATION SYSTEM: Alert and notify the general public.	No Exception
ALERT AND NOTIFICATION SYSTEM: Identify and address any failures of the system(s) or portion of a system(s).	No Exception
ALERT AND NOTIFICATION SYSTEM: Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at an agreed-upon location.	No Exception
EAS: Identify the process to activate the EAS.	No Exception
EAS: Ensure that updated emergency information is disseminated in a timely manner.	No Exception
EAS: Ensure that current emergency information is repeated at pre-established intervals.	No Exception

Assessment	Extent of Play
EAS/NWS STATION: Identify the process to activate the EAS, to include the process to receive and then broadcast updated information/messages and verification of the message, if applicable.	No Exception
EAS/NWS STATION: Broadcast the message on a 24-hour basis.	No Exception
ROUTE/ALTERNATE ALERTING: Complete route alerting, whether because of failure for system/portion of a system or for exception areas, as needed to demonstrate all routes are capable of being run in allotted time. Emphasis on the most challenging routes and demonstration of these routes will be varied from assessment activity to assessment activity. Challenging routes are Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual 203 defined as those that may be difficult to accomplish, such as those that are lengthy or with conditions (physical or otherwise) that may affect the speed and accuracy with which the route can be completed (e.g., traffic patterns and/or capacity, road conditions, etc.).	No Exception

Capability Target 3.3: Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and News Media

Intent: The capability to disseminate emergency information and instructions to the public during all phases of an incident. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 203

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.2, E.4, E.5, G.1, G.2, G.3, G.3.a, G.4, G.5, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Joint Information System (FDEM & AHIMT)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	**Negotiated responses:** The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
PLUME PHASE: Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information in a timely manner.	No Exception

PLUME PHASE: Provide clear, concise, accessible messaging using plain language.	No Exception
PLUME PHASE: Messaging addresses appropriate cultural and linguistic considerations.	No Exception
PLUME PHASE: Ensure subsequent messaging is consistent with protective actions.	No Exception
PLUME PHASE: Update information as the incident progresses, to include validating previously identified protective areas and clearly identifying any new protective action areas, any information that is no longer valid, and any changes to previously provided information (e.g., rerouting of evacuation routes due to impediments, etc.).	No Exception
PLUME PHASE: Respond to media and public inquiries.	No Exception
POST-PLUME PHASE: Rapidly disseminate of ingestion exposure pathway information to predetermined individuals and businesses.	No Exception
POST-PLUME PHASE: Provide information to the public that addresses temporary reentry to a restricted area, permanent relocation from areas not evacuated, and return to formerly restricted areas will be communicated.	No Exception

Objective 5: Operate

Capability Target 5.4: Traffic and Access Control:

Intent: The capability to select, establish, and staff traffic and access control points and removing impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 222

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (H.12, J.8, J.8.b, J.10, J.10.a, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.f, J.14.d, J.14.e, M.1.b, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Joint Information System (FDEM & AHIMT)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	**Negotiated responses:** The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.

Select, establish, and staff appropriate TCP/ACPs, consistent with current conditions and PADs (e.g., evacuating, sheltering, and relocation), in a timely manner.	No Exception
Provide instructions to TAC staff on actions to take, including when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.	No Exception
Contact the state or Federal agencies that have the authority for the different transportation modes (e.g., rail, water, and air traffic).	No Exception
Identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments that affect the evacuation and evacuation routes.	No Exception
Make the decision to re-route traffic and coordinate with key decision-makers and the JIC to ensure the alternate route information is appropriately communicated to evacuees.	No Exception
Establish procedures to control access to and monitor people and vehicles from the evacuated and restricted areas.	No Exception
Authorize reentry of individuals into the restricted areas.	No Exception
Establish exit procedures.	No Exception

2. Bureau of Radiation Control, Department of Health State of Florida

The following agree to support this Hostile Action Based Plume and Full Participation Exercise as described herein:

State or County REPP Coordinator	FEMA REPP State Lead
Mark Seidensticker Environmental Manager Florida Bureau of Radiation Control	Gerald McLemore, REPP Lead, State of Florida Federal Emergency Management Agency
Signature: SIGNED 12112021	Signature: SIGNED 12112021

Core Capability: Situational Assessment

Definition: Provide all decision makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response.

Objective 1: Emergency Operations Management

Capability Target 1.2: Direction and Control

Intent: The capability to provide overall direction and control of response efforts, commensurate with the responsibilities of leadership, as detailed in plans/procedures. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 186

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.1.c, A.2, A.3, A.5, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, D.4, E.1, H.6, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Dose Assessment (Operations Officer)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Support protective action decision-making.	No exception
Conduct briefings in a timely manner.	No exception
Maintain situational awareness.	No exception
Coordinate response activities with other organizations.	No exception
Obtain resources to support emergency operations.	No exception
Provide and maintain adequate facilities and equipment to support the emergency response.	No exception

Capability Target 1.3: Protective Action Recommendations:

Intent: The capability to use dose assessment and field data, compare this data to the PAGs, and choose among a range of protective actions those most appropriate in a given emergency. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 187

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (D.4, J.7, J.8, J.8.b, J.9, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Dose Assessment

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
PLUME: Select and implement pre-planned precautionary protective actions.	No exception
PLUME: Utilize the methodology in plans/procedures to select among a range of protective actions most appropriate in a given emergency. This could also include the use of preplanned precautionary protective actions contained in plans/procedures.	No exception
PLUME: Develop PARs.	No exception
PLUME: Transmit PARs in a timely manner.	No exception
POST-PLUME: Assess radiological consequences and provide appropriate PARs for the ingestion exposure pathway.	N/A

Capability Target 1.4: Protective Action Decisions for the Plume Phase:

Intent: The capability to utilize appropriate factors and necessary coordination in the decision-making process used to make PADs for the public. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 188

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (D.1.b, D.4, J.6, J.7, J.8, J.8.b, J.10, J.10.a, J.10.b, J.11.c-g, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Dose Assessment

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.

Assessment	Extent of Play
Coordinate and make PADs for members of the general public.	No exception
Coordinate and make PADs for those with access and functional needs.	No exception
Coordinate and make PADs for students at schools.	No exception
Coordinate and make subsequent or alternate PADs.	No exception
Coordinate and make decisions on the administration of KI (where applicable) for the public and institutionalized members of the population.	No exception

Objective 2: Exposure Control

Capability Target 2.1: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Decision-Making Process

Intent: The capability to assess and control the radiation exposure and dose received by emergency workers and utilize a decision-making chain to authorize emergency worker exposure limits to be exceeded for specific missions. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 196

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, K.2, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, M.8, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Dose Assessment

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Control emergency workers' exposure and dose, including offsite workers performing duties onsite.	No exception
Maintain record of dose as a result of exposure.	No exception
Authorize exposures and dose in excess of identified limits.	No exception
Process for considering occupational exposures and to authorize individuals to receive doses in excess of occupational dose limits.	No exception

Assessment	Extent of Play
Determine a correction factor for DRD-based isotopic release mixture.	N/A
Control exposure and dose for temporary reentry of emergency workers, or members of the public, to restricted areas.	No exception
Determine the need to authorize radioprotective drugs using projected thyroid doses and field measurements. Projections are compared to previously established PAGs.	No exception
Adequately protect members of the public from radiological exposure and control dose for those who are authorized to temporarily reenter a restricted area.	No exception

Core Capability: Environmental Response/Health and Safety

Definition: Conduct appropriate measures to ensure the protection of the health and safety of the public and workers, as well as the environment, from all-hazards in support of responder operations and the affected communities

Objective 1: Emergency Operations Management

Capability Target 1.1: Mobilization

Intent: The capability to alert, notify, and mobilize OROs to staff facilities in support of emergency operations. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 185

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Field Team Management, Field Monitoring Teams, Fixed/Mobile Radiological Laboratory

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Alert, notify, and mobilize key personnel, to include a 24-hour staffing roster, and activate facilities in a timely manner.	No exception

Assessment	Extent of Play
Receive and verify notifications.	No exception
Identify and request additional resources, as needed.	No exception
Determine a facility is operational.	No exception

Objective 2: Exposure Control

Capability Target 2.1: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Decision-Making Process

Intent: The capability to assess and control the radiation exposure and dose received by emergency workers and utilize a decision-making chain to authorize emergency worker exposure limits to be exceeded for specific missions. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 196

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, K.2, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, M.8, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Field Team Management, Field Monitoring Teams, Fixed/Mobile Radiological Laboratory

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Control emergency workers' exposure and dose, including offsite workers performing duties onsite.	No exception
Maintain record of dose as a result of exposure.	No exception
Authorize exposures and dose in excess of identified limits.	No exception
Process for considering occupational exposures and to authorize individuals to receive doses in excess of occupational dose limits.	No exception
Determine a correction factor for DRD-based isotopic release mixture.	N/A
Control exposure and dose for temporary reentry of emergency workers, or members of the public, to restricted areas.	N/A
Determine the need to authorize radioprotective drugs using projected thyroid	No exception

Assessment	Extent of Play
doses and field measurements. Projections are compared to previously established PAGs.	
Adequately protect members of the public from radiological exposure and control dose for those who are authorized to temporarily reenter a restricted area.	N/A

Capability Target 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management:

Intent: The capability of emergency workers to manage dose and exposure, use equipment (e.g., dosimetry, radio protective drugs), and identify procedures to monitor their exposure and dose, including following procedures to obtain authorization to receive emergency exposures in excess of the PAGs. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 198

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Field Team Management

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Maintain an appropriate inventory of DRDs that are leak-tested or current in calibration.	No exception
Maintain an appropriate inventory of PRDs.	No exception
Retain an adequate supply of radioprotective drugs.	No exception
Adequately distribute appropriate DRDs and PRDs.	Exception: Only use EPD's (electronic personal dosimeters) for field team members
Adequately distribute radioprotective drugs to emergency workers.	No exception
Record and report exposures in the field.	No exception
Implement decisions to administer radioprotective drugs.	No exception
Report to individual responsible for managing exposure and dose when limits are reached.	No exception

Assessment	Extent of Play
Implement exposure control decisions to members of the public from radiological exposure and control dose for those who are authorized to temporarily reenter a restricted area.	N/A

Objective 3: Alert and Notification

Capability Target 3.1: Communications

Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 200

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Field Team Management, Field Monitoring Teams, Fixed/Mobile Radiological Laboratory

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.	No exception
Maintain periodic test results and corrective actions on a real time basis.	No exception
Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.	No exception
Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.	No exception
Identify and address any failures of the systems.	No exception
Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., “content check”).	No exception

Objective 4: Detect, Measure, Sample, Analyze, and Assess

Capability Target 4.1: Field Monitoring Teams Management

Intent: The capability to provide overall management of FMTs to direct movements and measurements to characterize the plume and its impacts. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 206

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (H.11, H.13, I.5, I.6, I.9, I.10, M.7, M.8, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Field Team Management

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Brief FMTs on predicted plume location and direction, plume travel speed, equipment operational checks, background measurement, and exposure control procedures before deployment.	No exception
Direct the FMTs to monitoring locations, predesignated points or otherwise, at times and locations sufficient to characterize the plume.	No exception
Obtain peak plume measurements from FMTs.	No exception
Direct FMTs to collect air samples at locations and times sufficient to characterize the plume.	No exception
Keep Incident Command informed of FMTs activities and location(s) during a HAB incident or other instances when an ICP or other may be in use.	No exception
Coordinate and share information amongst all FMTs (licensee, Federal, state, and local).	No exception
Coordinate sample analysis from field to those responsible for assessing radiological data.	No exception
Coordinate transfer of sample media to locations and organizations responsible for assessing radiological data.	No exception

Assist with development and modification of sampling plans, as appropriate.	N/A

Capability Target 4.2: Plume Phase Measurements and Sampling

Intent: The capability to make and report measurements of ambient radiation. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 207

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (H.9, H.11, H.11.a, H.11.b, H.12, H.13, I.2, I.5, I.6, I.7, I.8, I.9, I.10, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Field Monitoring Teams

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Maintain emergency equipment including calibration and operational checks according to manufacturer's specifications or per national standards.	No exception
Maintain inventory for emergency kits.	No exception
Operate and monitor radiation survey instruments to detect changes in radiation exposure rate while moving and in stationary positions.	No exception
Use appropriate contamination control and PPE.	No exception
Be in location(s) at the appropriate time(s) to detect and characterize the active release (plume).	No exception
Obtain peak plume measurements either directly or from licensee field teams.	No exception
Correctly interpret survey instrument readings to determine submersion in the active plume.	No exception
Collect representative air samples in the active plume on particulate media (e.g., glass or paper filter) and iodine selective media (e.g., silver zeolite cartridge).	No exception
Handle sample media and equipment to avoid sample cross-contamination,	No exception

Assessment	Extent of Play
contamination of equipment and personnel contamination.	
Determine an appropriate low background location to count sample media.	No exception
Count iodine and particulate media using appropriate and effective instrumentation and counting geometries or have samples analyzed by a supporting laboratory within four hours.	No exception
Report to field monitoring team manager all survey and counting results in format and units suitable for use by the organization's dose assessor.	No exception
Procedures, qualified collection and counting efficiencies, and calculations are capable of detecting airborne radioactive iodine concentrations as low as 10-7 µCi/cc.	No exception
Preparation of packaging, sample identification, and chain-of-custody forms ensures integrity of samples throughout transportation and transfer.	No exception

Capability Target 4.4: Laboratory Operations

Intent: The capability to perform laboratory analyses of radioactivity in environmental, food, and drinking water samples to support decision-making. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 210

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.4, H.11, H.11.b, H.13, I.2, I.6, M.7, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Fixed/Mobile Radiological Laboratory

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Prepare analytical equipment for use, including performing calibrations, quality control checks, and background counts, as appropriate.	No exception

Assessment	Extent of Play
Receive and track samples, including completing chain-of-custody records.	No exception
Prepare and process each type of sample necessary to assess the ingestion plume exposure pathway and to support reentry, relocation, and return decisions. The types of samples necessary are based on the exercise scenario and may include drinking water, soil, vegetation, milk, crops, or other agriculture samples.	N/A
Analyze samples to determine the concentration of each radionuclide in each sample. Minimum detection limits (MDLs) for various radionuclides must be low enough to support ORO decisions.	No exception
Provide analysis results to the appropriate organization.	No exception
If the laboratory is used to count air samples during the early phase of an incident and prepare, process, and analyze air filters and cartridges, provide analysis results in a timely manner to support ORO decisions.	No exception

3. St. Lucie County

The following agree to support this Hostile Action Based Plume and Full Participation Exercise as described herein:

State or County REPP Coordinator	FEMA REPP State Lead
Kurt Myers Senior Radiological Coordinator St. Lucie County Public Safety	Gerald McLemore, REPP Lead, State of Florida Federal Emergency Management Agency
Signature: SIGNED 12152021	Signature: SIGNED 12162021

Core Capability: Operational Coordination

Definition: Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

Objective 1: Emergency Operations Management

Capability Target 1.1: Mobilization

Intent: The capability to alert, notify, and mobilize offsite response organizations to staff facilities in support of emergency operations. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 185

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: St. Lucie County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) & Incident Command (IC)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Alert, notify, and mobilize key personnel, to include a 24-hour staffing roster, and activate facilities in a timely manner.	Exception: SLC EOC pre-stage inside the Operations Room and IC will pre-stage inside the Old Fire Station 2.
Receive and verify notifications.	Exception: Simulated since the EOC and the IC will be pre-staged.
Identify and request additional resources, as needed.	No exception
Determine a facility is operational.	No exception

Capability Target 1.2: Direction and Control

Intent: The capability to provide overall direction and control of response efforts, commensurate with the responsibilities of leadership, as detailed in plans/procedures. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 186

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.1.c, A.2, A.3, A.5, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, D.4, E.1, H.6, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: St. Lucie County EOC & IC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Support protective action decision-making.	No exception
Conduct briefings in a timely manner.	No exception
Maintain situational awareness.	No exception
Coordinate response activities with other organizations.	No exception
Obtain resources to support emergency operations.	No exception
Provide and maintain adequate facilities and equipment to support the emergency response.	No exception

Capability Target 1.3: Protective Action Recommendations:

Intent: The capability to use dose assessment and field data, compare this data to the PAGs, and choose among a range of protective actions those most appropriate in a given emergency. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 187

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (D.4, J.7, J.8, J.8.b, J.9, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: St. Lucie County EOC & IC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
PLUME: Select and implement pre-planned precautionary protective actions.	No exception

Assessment	Extent of Play
PLUME: Utilize the methodology in plans/procedures to select among a range of protective actions most appropriate in a given emergency. This could also include the use of preplanned precautionary protective actions contained in plans/procedures.	No exception
PLUME: Develop PARs.	No exception: Utilities does the PARs and St. Lucie County EOC receives those PARs and develop the PAD.
PLUME: Transmit PARs in a timely manner.	No exception
POST-PLUME: Assess radiological consequences and provide appropriate PARs for the ingestion exposure pathway.	No exception: Utilities does the PARs and St. Lucie County EOC receives those PARs and develop the PAD for the situation.

Capability Target 1.4: Protective Action Decisions for the Plume Phase

Intent: The capability to utilize appropriate factors and necessary coordination in the decision-making process used to make protective action decisions for the public. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 188
Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (D.1.b, D.4, J.6, J.7, J.8, J.8.b, J.10, J.10.a, J.10.b, J.11.c-g, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: St. Lucie County EOC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Coordinate and make PADs for members of the general public.	No exception
Coordinate and make PADs for those with access and functional needs.	No exception
Coordinate and make PADs for students at schools.	No exception
Coordinate and make subsequent or alternate PADs.	No exception
Coordinate and make decisions on the administration of KI (where applicable) for the public and institutionalized members of the population.	No exception

Objective 2: Exposure Control

Capability Target 2.1: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Decision-Making Process

Intent: The capability to assess and control the radiation exposure and dose received by emergency workers and utilize a decision-making chain to authorize emergency worker exposure limits to be exceeded for specific missions. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 196

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, K.2, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, M.8, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: St. Lucie County IC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	**Negotiated responses:** The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Control emergency workers' exposure and dose, including offsite workers performing duties onsite.	No exception
Maintain record of dose as a result of exposure.	No exception
Authorize exposures and dose in excess of identified limits.	No exception
Process for considering occupational exposures and to authorize individuals to receive doses in excess of occupational dose limits.	No exception
Determine a correction factor for DRD-based isotopic release mixture.	N/A
Control exposure and dose for temporary reentry of emergency workers, or members of the public, to restricted areas.	N/A
Determine the need to authorize radioprotective drugs using projected thyroid doses and field measurements. Projections are compared to previously established PAGs.	N/A
Adequately protect members of the public from radiological exposure and control dose for those who are authorized to	N/A

temporarily reenter a restricted area.	

Capability Target 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management

Intent: The capability of emergency workers to manage dose and exposure, use equipment (e.g., dosimetry, radio protective drugs), and identify procedures to monitor their exposure and dose, including following procedures to obtain authorization to receive emergency exposures in excess of the PAGs. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 198

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: St. Lucie County EOC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Maintain an appropriate inventory of DRDs that are leak-tested or current in calibration.	No exception
Maintain an appropriate inventory of PRDs.	No exception
Retain an adequate supply of radioprotective drugs.	No exception
Adequately distribute appropriate DRDs and PRDs.	No exception
Adequately distribute radioprotective drugs to emergency workers.	No exception
Record and report exposures in the field.	No exception
Implement decisions to administer radioprotective drugs.	No exception
Report to individual responsible for managing exposure and dose when limits are reached.	No exception
Implement exposure control decisions to members of the public from radiological exposure and control dose for those who are authorized to temporarily reenter a restricted area.	No exception

Objective 3: Alert and Notification

Capability Target 3.1: Communications

Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 200

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: St. Lucie County EOC & IC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	**Negotiated responses:** The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.	No exception
Maintain periodic test results and corrective actions on a real time basis.	No exception
Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.	No exception
Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.	No exception
Identify and address any failures of the systems.	No exception
Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., “content check”).	No exception

Capability Target 3.3: Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and News Media

Intent: The capability to disseminate emergency information and instructions to the public during all phases of an incident. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 203
Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.2, E.4, E.5, G.1, G.2, G.3, G.3.a, G.4, G.5, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: St. Lucie IC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
PLUME PHASE: Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information in a timely manner.	No exception
PLUME PHASE: Provide clear, concise, accessible messaging using plain language.	No exception
PLUME PHASE: Messaging addresses appropriate cultural and linguistic considerations.	No exception
PLUME PHASE: Ensure subsequent messaging is consistent with protective actions.	No exception
PLUME PHASE: Update information as the incident progresses, to include validating previously identified protective areas and clearly identifying any new protective action areas, any information that is no longer valid, and any changes to previously provided information (e.g., rerouting of evacuation routes due to impediments, etc.).	No exception
PLUME PHASE: Respond to media and public inquiries.	No exception
POST-PLUME PHASE: Rapidly disseminate of ingestion exposure pathway information to predetermined individuals and businesses.	N/A
POST-PLUME PHASE: Provide information to the public that addresses temporary reentry to a restricted area, permanent relocation from areas not evacuated, and return to formerly restricted areas will be communicated.	N/A

Core Capability: Public Information and Warning

Definition: Deliver coordination, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

Objective 1: Emergency Operations Management

Capability Target 1.1: Mobilization

Intent: The capability to alert, notify, and mobilize OROs to staff facilities in support of emergency operations. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 185

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: St. Lucie County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Joint Information System (JIS), Backup Route Alerting (BURA)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	**Negotiated responses:** The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Alert, notify, and mobilize key personnel, to include a 24-hour staffing roster, and activate facilities in a timely manner.	Exception: SLC EOC and IC personnel will be pre-stage. Exception: Back-up Route Alerting will be by interview.
Receive and verify notifications.	Exception: Simulated since the EOC and the IC will be pre-staged.
Identify and request additional resources, as needed.	No exception
Determine a facility is operational.	No exception

Objective 3: Alert and Notification

Capability Target 3.1: Communications

Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 200

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: St. Lucie County EOC/JIS, BURA

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.	Exception: Back-up Route Alerting will be by interview.
Maintain periodic test results and corrective actions on a real time basis.	No exception
Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.	No exception
Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.	No exception
Identify and address any failures of the systems.	No exception
Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., "content check").	No exception

Capability Target 3.2: Alert and Notification of the Public

Intent: The capability to provide instructions to the public. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 201

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.2, E.4, E.5, F.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: St. Lucie County EOC/JIS, BURA

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.

Assessment	Extent of Play
ALERT AND NOTIFICATION SYSTEM: Sequentially provide an alert signal followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas.	Exception: Alert St. Lucie will be simulated to the public.
ALERT AND NOTIFICATION SYSTEM: Alert and notify the general public.	Exception: Alert St. Lucie will be simulated to the public.
ALERT AND NOTIFICATION SYSTEM: Identify and address any failures of the system(s) or portion of a system(s).	Exception: Back-up Route Alerting will be by interview. Exception: planning (tentatively) a live siren sounding in conjunction with quarterly siren testing.
ALERT AND NOTIFICATION SYSTEM: Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at an agreed-upon location.	Exception: Public Address system from any vehicle will be simulated to the public.
EAS: Identify the process to activate the EAS.	No exception
EAS: Ensure that updated emergency information is disseminated in a timely manner.	No exception
EAS: Ensure that current emergency information is repeated at pre-established intervals.	No exception
EAS/NWS STATION: Identify the process to activate the EAS, to include the process to receive and then broadcast updated information/messages and verification of the message, if applicable.	No exception
EAS/NWS STATION: Broadcast the message on a 24-hour basis.	No exception
ROUTE/ALTERNATE ALERTING: Complete route alerting, whether because of failure for system/portion of a system or for exception areas, as needed to demonstrate all routes are capable of being run in allotted time. Emphasis on the most challenging routes and demonstration of these routes will be varied from assessment activity to assessment activity. Challenging routes are Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual 203 defined as those that may be difficult to accomplish, such as those that are lengthy or with conditions (physical or otherwise) that may affect the speed and accuracy with which the route can be completed (e.g., traffic patterns and/or capacity, road conditions, etc.).	Exception: Public Address system from any vehicle will be simulated to the public.

Capability Target 3.3: Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and News Media

Intent: The capability to disseminate emergency information and instructions to the public during all phases of an incident. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 203

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.2, E.4, E.5, G.1, G.2, G.3, G.3.a, G.4, G.5, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: St. Lucie County EOC/JIS

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	**Negotiated responses:** The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
PLUME PHASE: Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information in a timely manner.	No exception
PLUME PHASE: Provide clear, concise, accessible messaging using plain language.	No exception
PLUME PHASE: Messaging addresses appropriate cultural and linguistic considerations.	No exception
PLUME PHASE: Ensure subsequent messaging is consistent with protective actions.	No exception
PLUME PHASE: Update information as the incident progresses, to include validating previously identified protective areas and clearly identifying any new protective action areas, any information that is no longer valid, and any changes to previously provided information (e.g., rerouting of evacuation routes due to impediments, etc.).	No exception
PLUME PHASE: Respond to media and public inquiries.	No exception
POST-PLUME PHASE: Rapidly disseminate of ingestion exposure pathway information to predetermined individuals and businesses.	N/A
POST-PLUME PHASE: Provide information to the public that addresses temporary reentry to a restricted area, permanent relocation	N/A

Assessment	Extent of Play
from areas not evacuated, and return to formerly restricted areas will be communicated.	

Objective 5: Operate

Capability Target 5.4: Traffic and Access Control

Intent: The capability to select, establish, and staff traffic and access control points and removing impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 222

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (H.12, J.8, J.8.b, J.10, J.10.a, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.f, J.14.d, J.14.e, M.1.b, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: St. Lucie County EOC/JIS-TCP

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	**Negotiated responses:** The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Select, establish, and staff appropriate TCP/ACPs, consistent with current conditions and PADs (e.g., evacuating, sheltering, and relocation), in a timely manner.	N/A
Provide instructions to TAC staff on actions to take, including when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.	N/A
Contact the state or Federal agencies that have the authority for the different transportation modes (e.g., rail, water, and air traffic).	Exception: Interview in EOC only.
Identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments that affect the evacuation and evacuation routes.	Exception: Interview in EOC only.

Assessment	Extent of Play
Make the decision to re-route traffic and coordinate with key decision-makers and the JIC to ensure the alternate route information is appropriately communicated to evacuees.	Exception: Interview in EOC only.
Establish procedures to control access to and monitor people and vehicles from the evacuated and restricted areas.	N/A
Authorize reentry of individuals into the restricted areas.	N/A
Establish exit procedures.	N/A

Core Capability: Environmental Response/Health and Safety

Definition: Conduct appropriate measures to ensure the protection of the health and safety of the public and workers, as well as the environment, from all-hazards in support of responder operations and the affected communities

Objective 1: Emergency Operations Management

Capability Target 1.1: Mobilization

Intent: The capability to alert, notify, and mobilize OROs to staff facilities in support of emergency operations. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 185

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: St. Lucie County Emergency Worker Decontamination (EWD)

Assessment	Extent of Play
<u>Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:</u> The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	<u>Negotiated responses</u>: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Alert, notify, and mobilize key personnel, to include a 24-hour staffing roster, and activate facilities in a timely manner.	Exception: Alert St. Lucie will be simulated due to being pre-staged.
Receive and verify notifications.	Exception: Alert St. Lucie will be simulated due to being pre-staged.

Assessment	Extent of Play
Identify and request additional resources, as needed.	No exception
Determine a facility is operational.	No exception

Objective 2: Exposure Control

Capability Target 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management

Intent: The capability of emergency workers to manage dose and exposure, use equipment (e.g., dosimetry, radio protective drugs), and identify procedures to monitor their exposure and dose, including following procedures to obtain authorization to receive emergency exposures in excess of the PAGs. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 198

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: St. Lucie County EWD

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Maintain an appropriate inventory of DRDs that are leak-tested or current in calibration.	No exception
Maintain an appropriate inventory of PRDs.	No exception
Retain an adequate supply of radioprotective drugs.	No exception
Adequately distribute appropriate DRDs and PRDs.	No exception
Adequately distribute radioprotective drugs to emergency workers.	No exception
Record and report exposures in the field.	No exception
Implement decisions to administer radioprotective drugs.	No exception
Report to individual responsible for managing exposure and dose when limits are reached.	No exception

Assessment	Extent of Play
Implement exposure control decisions to members of the public from radiological exposure and control dose for those who are authorized to temporarily reenter a restricted area.	No exception

Objective 3: Alert and Notification

Capability Target 3.1: Communications

Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 200

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: St. Lucie County EWD

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.	No exception
Maintain periodic test results and corrective actions on a real time basis.	No exception
Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.	No exception
Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.	No exception
Identify and address any failures of the systems.	No exception
Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., “content check”).	No exception

Objective 5: Operate

Capability Target 5.2: Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers, Equipment, and Vehicles

Intent: The capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers, equipment, and vehicles. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 218

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (K.4 and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: St. Lucie County EWD

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	**Negotiated responses:** The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Set-up operations.	No exception
Operationally check instruments and equipment.	No exception
Monitor emergency worker personnel and their equipment and vehicles for contamination.	No exception
Decontaminate emergency worker personnel and their equipment and vehicles based on trigger/action levels.	No exception
Control the spread of contamination.	No exception
Create and maintain a record of monitoring and decontaminating workers upon completion of monitoring and decontamination activities.	No exception
Process for prioritizing emergency workers and equipment before the public in facilities where the public and emergency workers are both processed for contamination.	No exception

Core Capability: On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement

Definition: Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas and also for response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.

Objective 2: Exposure Control

Capability Target 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management:

Intent: The capability of emergency workers to manage dose and exposure, use equipment (e.g., dosimetry, radio protective drugs), and identify procedures to monitor their exposure and dose, including following procedures to obtain authorization to receive emergency exposures in excess of the PAGs. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 198

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: St. Lucie County Traffic Control Points (TCP)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	**Negotiated responses:** The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Maintain an appropriate inventory of DRDs that are leak-tested or current in calibration.	Exception: Interview at the EWD drill location with responsible organization.
Maintain an appropriate inventory of PRDs.	Exception: Interview at the EWD drill location with responsible organization.
Retain an adequate supply of radioprotective drugs.	Exception: Interview at the EWD drill location with responsible organization.
Adequately distribute appropriate DRDs and PRDs.	Exception: Interview at the EWD drill location with responsible organization.
Adequately distribute radioprotective drugs to emergency workers.	Exception: Interview at the EWD drill location with responsible organization.
Record and report exposures in the field.	Exception: Interview at the EWD drill location with responsible organization.
Implement decisions to administer radioprotective drugs.	Exception: Interview at the EWD drill location with responsible organization.
Report to individual responsible for managing exposure and dose when limits are reached.	Exception: Interview at the EWD drill location with responsible organization.
Implement exposure control decisions to members of the public from radiological exposure and control dose for those who are authorized to temporarily reenter a restricted area.	Exception: Interview at the EWD drill location with responsible organization.

Objective 3: Alert and Notification

Capability Target 3.1: Communications

Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 200

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: St. Lucie County TCP

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	**Negotiated responses:** The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.	Exception: Interview at the EWD drill location with responsible organization.
Maintain periodic test results and corrective actions on a real time basis.	Exception: Interview at the EWD drill location with responsible organization.
Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.	Exception: Interview at the EWD drill location with responsible organization.
Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.	Exception: Interview at the EWD drill location with responsible organization.
Identify and address any failures of the systems.	Exception: Interview at the EWD drill location with responsible organization.
Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., “content check”).	Exception: Interview at the EWD drill location with responsible organization.

Objective 5: Operate

Capability Target 5.4: Traffic and Access Control

Intent: The capability to select, establish, and staff traffic and access control points and removing impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 222

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (H.12, J.8, J.8.b, J.10, J.10.a, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.f, J.14.d, J.14.e, M.1.b, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: St. Lucie County TCP

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	**Negotiated responses:** The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Select, establish, and staff appropriate TCP/ACPs, consistent with current conditions and PADs (e.g., evacuating, sheltering, and relocation), in a timely manner.	Exception: Interview at the EWD drill location with responsible organization.
Provide instructions to TAC staff on actions to take, including when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.	Exception: Interview at the EWD drill location with responsible organization.
Contact the state or Federal agencies that have the authority for the different transportation modes (e.g., rail, water, and air traffic).	N/A
Identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments that affect the evacuation and evacuation routes.	Exception: Interview at the EWD drill location with responsible organization.
Make the decision to re-route traffic and coordinate with key decision-makers and the JIC to ensure the alternate route information is appropriately communicated to evacuees.	N/A
Establish procedures to control access to and monitor people and vehicles from the evacuated and restricted areas.	N/A
Authorize reentry of individuals into the restricted areas.	N/A
Establish exit procedures.	N/A

Core Capability: Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services (TRANSPORTATION)

Definition: Provide lifesaving medical treatment via Emergency Medical Services and related operations and avoid additional disease and injury by providing targeted public health, medical and behavioral health support, and products to all affected populations.

Objective 2: Exposure Control

Capability Target 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management

Intent: The capability of emergency workers to manage dose and exposure, use equipment (e.g., dosimetry, radio protective drugs), and identify procedures to monitor their exposure and dose, including following procedures to obtain authorization to receive emergency exposures in excess of the PAGs. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 198

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: St. Lucie County Emergency Services

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	**Negotiated responses:** The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Maintain an appropriate inventory of DRDs that are leak-tested or current in calibration.	No exception
Maintain an appropriate inventory of PRDs.	No exception
Retain an adequate supply of radioprotective drugs.	No exception
Adequately distribute appropriate DRDs and PRDs.	No exception
Adequately distribute radioprotective drugs to emergency workers.	No exception
Record and report exposures in the field.	No exception
Implement decisions to administer radioprotective drugs.	No exception
Report to individual responsible for managing exposure and dose when limits are reached.	No exception
Implement exposure control decisions to members of the public from radiological exposure and control dose for those who are authorized to temporarily reenter a restricted area.	No exception

Objective 5: Operate

Capability Target 5.3: Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated, Injured Individuals

Intent: The capability to provide medical transport and treatment services to contaminated, injured individuals. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 219

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.d, F.2, H.11, H.12, J.2, K.3, K.4, L.1, L.3, L.4, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: St. Lucie County Emergency Services

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	**Negotiated responses:** The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
TRANSPORTATION: Transport contaminated, injured individuals to medical facilities.	No exception
TRANSPORTATION: Maintain communications between the medical transportation provider and the receiving medical facility.	No exception
MEDICAL FACILITY: Operationally check instruments and equipment.	N/A
MEDICAL FACILITY: Set-up, activate, and operate an REA.	N/A
MEDICAL FACILITY: Monitor and decontaminate the individual, equipment, and other items.	N/A

Core Capability: Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services (MEDICAL FACILITY)

Definition: Provide lifesaving medical treatment via Emergency Medical Services and related operations and avoid additional disease and injury by providing targeted public health, medical and behavioral health support, and products to all affected populations.

Objective 2: Exposure Control

Capability Target 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management

Intent: The capability of emergency workers to manage dose and exposure, use equipment (e.g., dosimetry, radio protective drugs), and identify procedures to monitor their exposure and dose,

including following procedures to obtain authorization to receive emergency exposures in excess of the PAGs. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 198

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Lawnwood Medical Center & Heart Institute

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	**Negotiated responses:** The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Maintain an appropriate inventory of DRDs that are leak-tested or current in calibration.	Exception: FP&L maintains survey meters and related equipment and provides to hospital.
Maintain an appropriate inventory of PRDs.	Exception: Utilized by limited hospital radiology staff.
Retain an adequate supply of radioprotective drugs.	No exception
Adequately distribute appropriate DRDs and PRDs.	No exception
Adequately distribute radioprotective drugs to emergency workers.	No exception
Record and report exposures in the field.	No exception
Implement decisions to administer radioprotective drugs.	No exception
Report to individual responsible for managing exposure and dose when limits are reached.	No exception
Implement exposure control decisions to members of the public from radiological exposure and control dose for those who are authorized to temporarily reenter a restricted area.	No exception

Objective 5: Operate

Capability Target 5.3: Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated, Injured Individuals

Intent: The capability to provide medical transport and treatment services to contaminated, injured individuals. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 219

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.d, F.2, H.11, H.12, J.2, K.3, K.4, L.1, L.3, L.4, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Lawnwood Medical Center & Heart Institute

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
TRANSPORTATION: Transport contaminated, injured individuals to medical facilities.	N/A
TRANSPORTATION: Maintain communications between the medical transportation provider and the receiving medical facility.	N/A
MEDICAL FACILITY: Operationally check instruments and equipment.	No exception
MEDICAL FACILITY: Set-up, activate, and operate an REA.	No exception
MEDICAL FACILITY: Monitor and decontaminate the individual, equipment, and other items.	No exception

4. Martin County

The following agree to support this Hostile Action Based Plume and Full Participation Exercise as described herein:

State or County REPP Coordinator	FEMA REPP State Lead
Jeffrey Childs Emergency Management Coordinator Martin County Fire Rescue Department	Gerald McLemore, REPP Lead, State of Florida Federal Emergency Management Agency
Signature: SIGNED 12102021	Signature: SIGNED 12132021

Core Capability: Operational Coordination

Definition: Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

Objective 1: Emergency Operations Management

Capability Target 1.1: Mobilization

Intent: The capability to alert, notify, and mobilize offsite response organizations to staff facilities in support of emergency operations. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 185

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Martin County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) & Incident Command (IC)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	**Negotiated responses:** The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Alert, notify, and mobilize key personnel, to include a 24-hour staffing roster, and activate facilities in a timely manner.	No Exception
Receive and verify notifications.	No Exception
Identify and request additional resources, as needed.	No Exception
Determine a facility is operational.	No Exception

Capability Target 1.2: Direction and Control

Intent: The capability to provide overall direction and control of response efforts, commensurate with the responsibilities of leadership, as detailed in plans/procedures. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 186

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.1.c, A.2, A.3, A.5, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, D.4, E.1, H.6, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Martin County EOC & IC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Support protective action decision-making.	No Exception
Conduct briefings in a timely manner.	No Exception
Maintain situational awareness.	No Exception
Coordinate response activities with other organizations.	No Exception
Obtain resources to support emergency operations.	No Exception
Provide and maintain adequate facilities and equipment to support the emergency response.	No Exception

Capability Target 1.3: Protective Action Recommendations:

Intent: The capability to use dose assessment and field data, compare this data to the PAGs, and choose among a range of protective actions those most appropriate in a given emergency. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 187

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (D.4, J.7, J.8, J.8.b, J.9, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Martin County EOC & IC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
PLUME: Select and implement pre-planned precautionary protective actions.	No Exception
PLUME: Utilize the methodology in plans/procedures to select among a range	No Exception

Assessment	Extent of Play
of protective actions most appropriate in a given emergency. This could also include the use of preplanned precautionary protective actions contained in plans/procedures.	
PLUME: Develop PARs.	No Exception
PLUME: Transmit PARs in a timely manner.	No Exception
POST-PLUME: Assess radiological consequences and provide appropriate PARs for the ingestion exposure pathway.	No Exception

Capability Target 1.4: Protective Action Decisions for the Plume Phase

Intent: The capability to utilize appropriate factors and necessary coordination in the decision-making process used to make protective action decisions for the public. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 188

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (D.1.b, D.4, J.6, J.7, J.8, J.8.b, J.10, J.10.a, J.10.b, J.11.c-g, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Martin County EOC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Coordinate and make PADs for members of the general public.	No Exception
Coordinate and make PADs for those with access and functional needs.	No Exception
Coordinate and make PADs for students at schools.	No Exception
Coordinate and make subsequent or alternate PADs.	No Exception
Coordinate and make decisions on the administration of KI (where applicable) for the public and institutionalized members of the population.	No Exception

Objective 2: Exposure Control

Capability Target 2.1: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Decision-Making Process

Intent: The capability to assess and control the radiation exposure and dose received by emergency workers and utilize a decision-making chain to authorize emergency worker exposure limits to be exceeded for specific missions. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 196

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, K.2, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, M.8, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Martin County IC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	**Negotiated responses:** The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Control emergency workers' exposure and dose, including offsite workers performing duties onsite.	No Exception
Maintain record of dose as a result of exposure.	No Exception
Authorize exposures and dose in excess of identified limits.	No Exception
Process for considering occupational exposures and to authorize individuals to receive doses in excess of occupational dose limits.	No Exception
Determine a correction factor for DRD-based isotopic release mixture.	No Exception
Control exposure and dose for temporary reentry of emergency workers, or members of the public, to restricted areas.	No Exception
Determine the need to authorize radioprotective drugs using projected thyroid doses and field measurements. Projections are compared to previously established PAGs.	No Exception
Adequately protect members of the public from radiological exposure and control dose for those who are authorized to temporarily reenter a restricted area.	No Exception

Capability Target 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management

Intent: The capability of emergency workers to manage dose and exposure, use equipment (e.g., dosimetry, radio protective drugs), and identify procedures to monitor their exposure and dose, including following procedures to obtain authorization to receive emergency exposures in excess of the PAGs. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 198

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Martin County EOC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Maintain an appropriate inventory of DRDs that are leak-tested or current in calibration.	No Exception
Maintain an appropriate inventory of PRDs.	No Exception
Retain an adequate supply of radioprotective drugs.	No Exception
Adequately distribute appropriate DRDs and PRDs.	No Exception
Adequately distribute radioprotective drugs to emergency workers.	No Exception
Record and report exposures in the field.	No Exception
Implement decisions to administer radioprotective drugs.	No Exception
Report to individual responsible for managing exposure and dose when limits are reached.	No Exception
Implement exposure control decisions to members of the public from radiological exposure and control dose for those who are authorized to temporarily reenter a restricted area.	No Exception

Objective 3: Alert and Notification

Capability Target 3.1: Communications

Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 200

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Martin County EOC & IC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.	No Exception
Maintain periodic test results and corrective actions on a real time basis.	No Exception
Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.	No Exception
Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.	No Exception
Identify and address any failures of the systems.	No Exception
Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., “content check”).	No Exception

Capability Target 3.3: Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and News Media

Intent: The capability to disseminate emergency information and instructions to the public during all phases of an incident. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 203

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.2, E.4, E.5, G.1, G.2, G.3, G.3.a, G.4, G.5, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Martin County IC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
PLUME PHASE: Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information in a timely manner.	No Exception
PLUME PHASE: Provide clear, concise, accessible messaging using plain language.	No Exception
PLUME PHASE: Messaging addresses appropriate cultural and linguistic considerations.	No Exception
PLUME PHASE: Ensure subsequent messaging is consistent with protective actions.	No Exception
PLUME PHASE: Update information as the incident progresses, to include validating previously identified protective areas and clearly identifying any new protective action areas, any information that is no longer valid, and any changes to previously provided information (e.g., rerouting of evacuation routes due to impediments, etc.).	No Exception
PLUME PHASE: Respond to media and public inquiries.	No Exception
POST-PLUME PHASE: Rapidly disseminate of ingestion exposure pathway information to predetermined individuals and businesses.	N/A
POST-PLUME PHASE: Provide information to the public that addresses temporary reentry to a restricted area, permanent relocation from areas not evacuated, and return to formerly restricted areas will be communicated.	N/A

Core Capability: Public Information and Warning

Definition: Deliver coordination, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

Objective 1: Emergency Operations Management

Capability Target 1.1: Mobilization

Intent: The capability to alert, notify, and mobilize OROs to staff facilities in support of emergency operations. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 185

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Martin County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Joint Information System (JIS), Backup Route Alerting (BURA) & Waterway Warning (WW)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Alert, notify, and mobilize key personnel, to include a 24-hour staffing roster, and activate facilities in a timely manner.	No Exception
Receive and verify notifications.	No Exception
Identify and request additional resources, as needed.	No Exception
Determine a facility is operational.	No Exception

Objective 3: Alert and Notification

Capability Target 3.1: Communications

Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 200

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Martin County EOC/JIS, BURA/WW

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.	No Exception
Maintain periodic test results and corrective actions on a real time basis.	No Exception
Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.	No Exception
Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.	No Exception
Identify and address any failures of the systems.	No Exception
Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., "content check").	No Exception

Capability Target 3.2: Alert and Notification of the Public

Intent: The capability to provide instructions to the public. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 201

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.2, E.4, E.5, F.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Martin County EOC/JIS, BURA/WW

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space

Assessment	Extent of Play
	provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
ALERT AND NOTIFICATION SYSTEM: Sequentially provide an alert signal followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas.	No Exception
ALERT AND NOTIFICATION SYSTEM: Alert and notify the general public.	No Exception
ALERT AND NOTIFICATION SYSTEM: Identify and address any failures of the system(s) or portion of a system(s).	No Exception
ALERT AND NOTIFICATION SYSTEM: Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at an agreed-upon location.	No Exception
EAS: Identify the process to activate the EAS.	No Exception
EAS: Ensure that updated emergency information is disseminated in a timely manner.	No Exception
EAS: Ensure that current emergency information is repeated at pre-established intervals.	No Exception
EAS/NWS STATION: Identify the process to activate the EAS, to include the process to receive and then broadcast updated information/messages and verification of the message, if applicable.	No Exception
EAS/NWS STATION: Broadcast the message on a 24-hour basis.	No Exception
ROUTE/ALTERNATE ALERTING: Complete route alerting, whether because of failure for system/portion of a system or for exception areas, as needed to demonstrate all routes are capable of being run in allotted time. Emphasis on the most challenging routes and demonstration of these routes will be varied from assessment activity to assessment activity. Challenging routes are Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual 203 defined as those that may be difficult to accomplish, such as those that are lengthy or with conditions (physical or otherwise) that may affect the speed and accuracy with which the route can be completed (e.g., traffic patterns and/or capacity, road conditions, etc.).	No Exception

Capability Target 3.3: Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and News Media

Intent: The capability to disseminate emergency information and instructions to the public during all phases of an incident. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 203

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.2, E.4, E.5, G.1, G.2, G.3, G.3.a, G.4, G.5, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Martin County EOC/JIS

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
PLUME PHASE: Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information in a timely manner.	No Exception
PLUME PHASE: Provide clear, concise, accessible messaging using plain language.	No Exception
PLUME PHASE: Messaging addresses appropriate cultural and linguistic considerations.	No Exception
PLUME PHASE: Ensure subsequent messaging is consistent with protective actions.	No Exception
PLUME PHASE: Update information as the incident progresses, to include validating previously identified protective areas and clearly identifying any new protective action areas, any information that is no longer valid, and any changes to previously provided information (e.g., rerouting of evacuation routes due to impediments, etc.).	No Exception
PLUME PHASE: Respond to media and public inquiries.	No Exception
POST-PLUME PHASE: Rapidly disseminate of ingestion exposure pathway information to predetermined individuals and businesses.	N/A
POST-PLUME PHASE: Provide information to the public that addresses temporary reentry to a restricted area, permanent relocation from areas not evacuated, and return to	N/A

Assessment	Extent of Play
formerly restricted areas will be communicated.	

Objective 5: Operate

Capability Target 5.4: Traffic and Access Control

Intent: The capability to select, establish, and staff traffic and access control points and removing impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 222

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (H.12, J.8, J.8.b, J.10, J.10.a, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.f, J.14.d, J.14.e, M.1.b, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Martin County EOC/JIS-TCP

Assessment	Extent of Play
<u>Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance</u>: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	<u>Negotiated responses</u>: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Select, establish, and staff appropriate TCP/ACPs, consistent with current conditions and PADs (e.g., evacuating, sheltering, and relocation), in a timely manner.	No Exception
Provide instructions to TAC staff on actions to take, including when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.	No Exception
Contact the state or Federal agencies that have the authority for the different transportation modes (e.g., rail, water, and air traffic).	No Exception
Identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments that affect the evacuation and evacuation routes.	No Exception
Make the decision to re-route traffic and coordinate with key decision-makers and the JIC to ensure the alternate route information is appropriately communicated to evacuees.	No Exception

Assessment	Extent of Play
Establish procedures to control access to and monitor people and vehicles from the evacuated and restricted areas.	No Exception
Authorize reentry of individuals into the restricted areas.	No Exception
Establish exit procedures.	No Exception

Core Capability: On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement

Definition: Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas and also for response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.

Objective 2: Exposure Control

Capability Target 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management:

Intent: The capability of emergency workers to manage dose and exposure, use equipment (e.g., dosimetry, radio protective drugs), and identify procedures to monitor their exposure and dose, including following procedures to obtain authorization to receive emergency exposures in excess of the PAGs. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 198

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Martin County Traffic Control Points (TCP)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Maintain an appropriate inventory of DRDs that are leak-tested or current in calibration.	No Exception
Maintain an appropriate inventory of PRDs.	No Exception
Retain an adequate supply of radioprotective drugs.	No Exception
Adequately distribute appropriate DRDs and PRDs.	No Exception
Adequately distribute radioprotective drugs to emergency workers.	No Exception
Record and report exposures in the field.	No Exception

Assessment	Extent of Play
Implement decisions to administer radioprotective drugs.	No Exception
Report to individual responsible for managing exposure and dose when limits are reached.	No Exception
Implement exposure control decisions to members of the public from radiological exposure and control dose for those who are authorized to temporarily reenter a restricted area.	No Exception

Objective 3: Alert and Notification

Capability Target 3.1: Communications

Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 200

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Martin County TCP

Assessment	Extent of Play
<u>Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance</u>: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	<u>Negotiated responses</u>: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.	No Exception
Maintain periodic test results and corrective actions on a real time basis.	No Exception
Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.	No Exception
Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.	No Exception
Identify and address any failures of the systems.	No Exception

Assessment	Extent of Play
Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., "content check").	No Exception

Objective 5: Operate

Capability Target 5.4: Traffic and Access Control

Intent: The capability to select, establish, and staff traffic and access control points and removing impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 222

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (H.12, J.8, J.8.b, J.10, J.10.a, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.f, J.14.d, J.14.e, M.1.b, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Martin County TCP

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	**Negotiated responses:** The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Select, establish, and staff appropriate TCP/ACPs, consistent with current conditions and PADs (e.g., evacuating, sheltering, and relocation), in a timely manner.	No Exception
Provide instructions to TAC staff on actions to take, including when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.	No Exception
Contact the state or Federal agencies that have the authority for the different transportation modes (e.g., rail, water, and air traffic).	No Exception
Identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments that affect the evacuation and evacuation routes.	No Exception
Make the decision to re-route traffic and coordinate with key decision-makers and the JIC to ensure the alternate route information is appropriately communicated to evacuees.	No Exception

Assessment	Extent of Play
Establish procedures to control access to and monitor people and vehicles from the evacuated and restricted areas.	No Exception
Authorize reentry of individuals into the restricted areas.	No Exception
Establish exit procedures.	No Exception

Core Capability: Critical Transportation

Definition: Provide transportation (including infrastructure access and accessible transportation services) for response priority objectives, including the evacuation of people and animals, and the delivery of vital response personnel, equipment, and services into the affected areas.

Objective 1: Emergency Operations Management

Capability Target 1.5: Protective Action Decision Implementation for the Plume Phase

Intent: The capability to implement precautionary protective action and/or PADs, including evacuation and/or sheltering, for all populations within the plume and ingestion exposure pathway EPZs. The populations include those with access and functional needs, students, and institutionalized individuals. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 189

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.4, C.2.a, G.1, J.11, J.11.a, J.11.b, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.g, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Martin County Schools

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Implement PADs, ensuring communication and coordination with all appropriate jurisdictions.	No Exception
Assist those with access and functional needs during the implementation of PADs.	No Exception
Communicate, coordinate, and implement protective actions for schools.	No Exception
Communicate with transportation officials.	No Exception
Identify evacuation routes for the general public.	No Exception

Assessment	Extent of Play
Make KI available to both institutionalized persons and the general public, in accordance with plans and procedures.	No Exception

5. Martin County Emergency Worker Decontamination Drill

The following agree to support this exercise as described herein:

Martin County REPP Coordinator	FEMA REPP State Lead
Jeffrey Childs Emergency Management Coordinator Martin County Fire Rescue Department	Gerald McLemore REPP Lead, State of Florida Federal Emergency Management Agency
Signature: SIGNED 08122021	Signature: SIGNED 08112021

Core Capability: Environmental Response/Health and Safety

Definition: Conduct appropriate measures to ensure the protection of the health and safety of the public and workers, as well as the environment, from all-hazards in support of responder operations and the affected communities

OBJECTIVE 1: Emergency Operations Management

Capability Target 1.1: Mobilization:

Intent: The capability to alert, notify, and mobilize OROs to staff facilities in support of emergency operations. Pg 185

Responsible Jurisdictions: Martin County Fire Rescue

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
<u>Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:</u> The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions.	<u>Expected responses</u>: No exception. Not applicable (lines should be deleted). Exception: (negotiated written response below).

Alert, notify, and mobilize key personnel, to include a 24-hour staffing roster, and activate facilities in a timely manner.	No exception
Receive and verify notifications.	No exception
Identify and request additional resources, as needed.	No exception
Determine a facility is operational.	No exception

OBJECTIVE 2: Exposure Control

Capability Target 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management:

Intent: The capability of emergency workers to manage dose and exposure, use equipment (e.g., dosimetry, radio protective drugs), and identify procedures to monitor their exposure and dose, including following procedures to obtain authorization to receive emergency exposures in excess of the PAGs. Pg 198

Responsible Jurisdictions: Martin County Fire Rescue

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions.	Expected responses: No exception. Not applicable (lines should be deleted). Exception: (negotiated written response below).
Maintain an appropriate inventory of DRDs that are leak-tested or current in calibration.	No exception
Maintain an appropriate inventory of PRDs.	No exception
Retain an adequate supply of radioprotective drugs.	No exception
Adequately distribute appropriate DRDs and PRDs.	No exception
Adequately distribute radioprotective drugs to emergency workers.	No exception
Record and report exposures in the field.	No exception
Implement decisions to administer radioprotective drugs.	No exception
Report to individual responsible for managing exposure and dose when limits are reached.	No exception
Implement exposure control decisions to members of the public from radiological exposure and control dose for those who are authorized to temporarily reenter a restricted area.	No exception

OBJECTIVE 3: Alert and Notification

Capability Target 3.1: Communications:

Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel. Pg 200

Responsible Jurisdictions: Martin County Fire Rescue

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions.	Expected responses: No exception. Not applicable (lines should be deleted). Exception: (negotiated written response below).
Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.	No exception
Maintain periodic test results and corrective actions on a real time basis.	No exception
Access at least one communication system thatis independent of the commercial telephone system.	No exception
Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.	No exception
Identify and address any failures of the systems.	No exception
Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., “content check”).	No exception

OBJECTIVE 5: Operate

Capability Target 5.2: Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers, Equipment, and Vehicles:

Intent: The capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers, equipment, and vehicles. Pg 218

Responsible Jurisdictions: Martin County Fire Rescue

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (K.4 and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions.	Expected responses: No exception. Not applicable (lines should be deleted). Exception: (negotiated written response below).
Set-up operations.	No exception
Operationally check instruments and equipment.	No exception
Monitor emergency worker personnel and their equipment and vehicles for contamination.	No exception
Decontaminate emergency worker personnel and their equipment and vehicles based on trigger/action levels.	No exception
Control the spread of contamination.	No exception
Create and maintain a record of monitoring anddecontaminating workers upon completion of monitoring and decontamination activities.	No exception
Process for prioritizing emergency workers and equipment before the public in facilities where the public and emergency workers are both processed for contamination.	No exception

6. Martin County Medical Services Drill

The following agree to support this exercise as described herein

Martin County REPP Coordinator	Signature
Jeffrey Childs Emergency Management Coordinator Martin County Fire Rescue Department	SIGNED 12132021
Cleveland Clinic Martin Health, Emergency Manager	**Signature**
Christina Proulx Senior Manager, Emergency Management Cleveland Clinic Martin Health	SIGNED 12132021
FEMA REPP State Lead	**Signature**
Gerald McLemore REPP Lead, State of Florida Federal Emergency Management Agency	SIGNED 12122021

Core Capability: Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services (TRANSPORTATION)

Definition: Provide lifesaving medical treatment via Emergency Medical Services and related operations and avoid additional disease and injury by providing targeted public health, medical and behavioral health support, and products to all affected populations.

OBJECTIVE 2: Exposure Control

Capability Target 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management:

Intent: The capability of emergency workers to manage dose and exposure, use equipment (e.g., dosimetry, radio protective drugs), and identify procedures to monitor their exposure and dose, including following procedures to obtain authorization to receive emergency exposures in excess of the PAGs. Pg 198

Responsible Jurisdictions: Martin County Fire Rescue

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions.	Expected responses: No exception. Not applicable (lines should be deleted). Exception: (negotiated written response below).
Maintain an appropriate inventory of DRDs that are leak-tested or current in calibration.	No exception
Maintain an appropriate inventory of PRDs.	No exception
Retain an adequate supply of radioprotective drugs.	No exception
Adequately distribute appropriate DRDs and PRDs.	No exception
Adequately distribute radioprotective drugs to emergency workers.	No exception
Record and report exposures in the field.	No exception
Implement decisions to administer radioprotective drugs.	No exception
Report to individual responsible for managing exposure and dose when limits are reached.	No exception
Implement exposure control decisions to members of the public from radiological exposure and control dose for those who are authorized to temporarily reenter a restricted area.	No exception

OBJECTIVE 5: Operate

Capability Target 5.3: Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated, Injured Individuals:

Intent: The capability to provide medical transport and treatment services to contaminated, injured individuals. Pg 219

Responsible Jurisdictions: Martin County Fire Rescue

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.d, F.2, H.11, H.12, J.2, K.3, K.4, L.1, L.3, L.4, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions.	**Expected responses:** No exception. Not applicable (lines should be deleted). Exception: (negotiated written response below).
TRANSPORTATION: Transport contaminated, injured individuals to medical facilities.	No exception
TRANSPORTATION: Maintain communications between the medical transportation provider and the receiving medical facility.	No exception
MEDICAL FACILITY: Operationally check instruments and equipment.	N/A
MEDICAL FACILITY: Set-up, activate, and operate a REA.	N/A
MEDICAL FACILITY: Monitor and decontaminate the individual, equipment, and other items.	N/A

Core Capability: Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services (MEDICAL FACILITY)

Definition: Provide lifesaving medical treatment via Emergency Medical Services and related operations and avoid additional disease and injury by providing targeted public health, medical and behavioral health support, and products to all affected populations.

OBJECTIVE 2: Exposure Control

Capability Target 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management:

Intent: The capability of emergency workers to manage dose and exposure, use equipment (e.g., dosimetry, radio protective drugs), and identify procedures to monitor their exposure and dose, including following procedures to obtain authorization to receive emergency exposures in excess of the PAGs. Pg 198

Responsible Jurisdictions: Cleveland Clinic Martin Health

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions.	**Expected responses:** No exception. Not applicable (lines should be deleted). Exception: (negotiated written response below).
Maintain an appropriate inventory of direct-reading dosimeters (DRDs) that are leak-tested or current in calibration.	FPL provides/maintains DRDs kept on site
Maintain an appropriate inventory of permanent record dosimeters (PRDs).	No exception
Retain an adequate supply of radioprotective drugs.	Retained by Martin County RAD and FPL
Adequately distribute appropriate direct-reading dosimeters (DRDs) and permanent record dosimeters (PRDs).	No exception
Adequately distribute radioprotective drugs to emergency workers.	Received from Martin County RAD and/or FPL; distributed to CCMH staff and/or patients by CCMH
Record and report exposures in the field.	No exception
Implement decisions to administer radioprotective drugs.	No exception
Report to individual responsible for managing exposure and dose when limits are reached.	No exception
Implement exposure control decisions to members of the public from radiological exposure and control dose for those who are authorized to temporarily reenter a restricted area.	No exception

OBJECTIVE 5: Operate

Capability Target 5.3: Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated, Injured Individuals:

Intent: The capability to provide medical transport and treatment services to contaminated, injured individuals. Pg 219

Responsible Jurisdictions: Cleveland Clinic Martin Health

Planning reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.d, F.2, H.11, H.12, J.2, K.3, K.4, L.1, L.3, L.4, and O.1)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions.	Expected responses: No exception. Not applicable (lines should be deleted). Exception: (negotiated written response below).
TRANSPORTATION: Transport contaminated, injured individuals to medical facilities.	N/A
TRANSPORTATION: Maintain communications between the medical transportation provider and the receiving medical facility.	N/A
MEDICAL FACILITY: Operationally check instruments and equipment.	FPL and CCMH preform checks on their own respective equipment
MEDICAL FACILITY: Set-up, activate, and operate a radiation emergency area (REA).	No exception
MEDICAL FACILITY: Monitor and decontaminate the individual, equipment, and other items.	No exception

7. Brevard County

The following agree to support this Hostile Action Based Plume and Full Participation Exercise as described herein:

State or County REPP Coordinator	FEMA REPP State Lead
Debbie Coles Radiological Coordinator Brevard County Emergency Management	Gerald McLemore, REPP Lead, State of Florida Federal Emergency Management Agency
Signature: SIGNED 12132021	Signature: SIGNED 12132021

Core Capability: Operational Coordination

Definition: Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

Objective 1: Emergency Operations Management

Capability Target 1.1: Mobilization

Intent: The capability to alert, notify, and mobilize offsite response organizations to staff facilities in support of emergency operations. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 185

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Brevard County Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Alert, notify, and mobilize key personnel, to include a 24-hour staffing roster, and activate facilities in a timely manner.	No exception
Receive and verify notifications.	No exception
Identify and request additional resources, as needed.	No exception
Determine a facility is operational.	No exception

Capability Target 1.2: Direction and Control

Intent: The capability to provide overall direction and control of response efforts, commensurate with the responsibilities of leadership, as detailed in plans/procedures. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 186

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.1.c, A.2, A.3, A.5, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, D.4, E.1, H.6, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Brevard County EOC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Support protective action decision-making.	No exception
Conduct briefings in a timely manner.	No exception
Maintain situational awareness.	No exception
Coordinate response activities with other organizations.	No exception
Obtain resources to support emergency operations.	No exception
Provide and maintain adequate facilities and equipment to support the emergency response.	No exception

Capability Target 1.5: Protective Action Decision Implementation for the Plume Phase

Intent: The capability to implement precautionary protective action and/or protective action decisions, including evacuation and/or sheltering, for all populations within the plume and ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zones. The populations include those with access and functional needs, students, and institutionalized individuals. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 189

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.4, C.2.a, G.1, J.11, J.11.a, J.11.b, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.g, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Brevard County EOC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.

Assessment	Extent of Play
Implement PADs, ensuring communication and coordination with all appropriate jurisdictions.	No exception
Assist those with access and functional needs during the implementation of PADs.	No exception
Communicate, coordinate, and implement protective actions for schools.	No exception
Communicate with transportation officials.	No exception
Identify evacuation routes for the general public.	No exception
Make KI available to both institutionalized persons and the general public, in accordance with plans and procedures.	No exception

Objective 2: Exposure Control

Capability Target 2.1: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Decision-Making Process

Intent: The capability to assess and control the radiation exposure and dose received by emergency workers and utilize a decision-making chain to authorize emergency worker exposure limits to be exceeded for specific missions. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 196

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, K.2, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, M.8, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Brevard County EOC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	**Negotiated responses:** The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Control emergency workers' exposure and dose, including offsite workers performing duties onsite.	No exception
Maintain record of dose as a result of exposure.	No exception
Authorize exposures and dose in excess of identified limits.	No exception
Process for considering occupational exposures and to authorize individuals to	No exception

Assessment	Extent of Play
receive doses in excess of occupational dose limits.	
Determine a correction factor for DRD-based isotopic release mixture.	No exception
Control exposure and dose for temporary reentry of emergency workers, or members of the public, to restricted areas.	No exception
Determine the need to authorize radioprotective drugs using projected thyroid doses and field measurements. Projections are compared to previously established PAGs.	No exception
Adequately protect members of the public from radiological exposure and control dose for those who are authorized to temporarily reenter a restricted area.	No exception

Objective 3: Alert and Notification

Capability Target 3.1: Communications

Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 200

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Brevard County EOC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	**Negotiated responses:** The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.	No exception
Maintain periodic test results and corrective actions on a real time basis.	No exception

Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.	No exception
Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.	No exception
Identify and address any failures of the systems.	No exception
Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., "content check").	No exception

Core Capability: Public Information and Warning

Definition: Deliver coordination, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

Objective 3: Alert and Notification

Capability Target 3.3: Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and News Media

Intent: The capability to disseminate emergency information and instructions to the public during all phases of an incident. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 203

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.2, E.4, E.5, G.1, G.2, G.3, G.3.a, G.4, G.5, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Brevard County EOC Joint Information System

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	**Negotiated responses:** The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
PLUME PHASE: Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information in a timely manner.	No exception
PLUME PHASE: Provide clear, concise, accessible messaging using plain language.	No exception

Assessment	Extent of Play
PLUME PHASE: Messaging addresses appropriate cultural and linguistic considerations.	No exception
PLUME PHASE: Ensure subsequent messaging is consistent with protective actions.	No exception
PLUME PHASE: Update information as the incident progresses, to include validating previously identified protective areas and clearly identifying any new protective action areas, any information that is no longer valid, and any changes to previously provided information (e.g., rerouting of evacuation routes due to impediments, etc.).	No exception
PLUME PHASE: Respond to media and public inquiries.	No exception
POST-PLUME PHASE: Rapidly disseminate of ingestion exposure pathway information to predetermined individuals and businesses.	N/A
POST-PLUME PHASE: Provide information to the public that addresses temporary reentry to a restricted area, permanent relocation from areas not evacuated, and return to formerly restricted areas will be communicated.	N/A

8. Indian River County

The following agree to support this Hostile Action Based Plume and Full Participation Exercise as described herein:

State or County REPP Coordinator	FEMA REPP State Lead
Mercedes Laney Radiological Coordinator Indian River County	Gerald McLemore, REPP Lead, State of Florida Federal Emergency Management Agency
Signature: SIGNED 12142021	Signature: SIGNED 12142021

Core Capability: Operational Coordination

Definition: Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

Objective 1: Emergency Operations Management

Capability Target 1.1: Mobilization

Intent: The capability to alert, notify, and mobilize offsite response organizations to staff facilities in support of emergency operations. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 185

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Indian River County Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Alert, notify, and mobilize key personnel, to include a 24-hour staffing roster, and activate facilities in a timely manner.	No exception
Receive and verify notifications.	No exception
Identify and request additional resources, as needed.	No exception
Determine a facility is operational.	No exception

Capability Target 1.2: Direction and Control

Intent: The capability to provide overall direction and control of response efforts, commensurate with the responsibilities of leadership, as detailed in plans/procedures. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 186

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.1.c, A.2, A.3, A.5, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, D.4, E.1, H.6, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Indian River County EOC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Support protective action decision-making.	No exception
Conduct briefings in a timely manner.	No exception
Maintain situational awareness.	No exception
Coordinate response activities with other organizations.	No exception
Obtain resources to support emergency operations.	No exception
Provide and maintain adequate facilities and equipment to support the emergency response.	No exception

Capability Target 1.5: Protective Action Decision Implementation for the Plume Phase

Intent: The capability to implement precautionary protective action and/or protective action decisions, including evacuation and/or sheltering, for all populations within the plume and ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zones. The populations include those with access and functional needs, students, and institutionalized individuals. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 189

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.4, C.2.a, G.1, J.11, J.11.a, J.11.b, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.g, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Indian River County EOC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.

Assessment	Extent of Play
Implement PADs, ensuring communication and coordination with all appropriate jurisdictions.	No exception
Assist those with access and functional needs during the implementation of PADs.	No exception
Communicate, coordinate, and implement protective actions for schools.	No exception
Communicate with transportation officials.	No exception
Identify evacuation routes for the general public.	No exception
Make KI available to both institutionalized persons and the general public, in accordance with plans and procedures.	No exception

Objective 2: Exposure Control

Capability Target 2.1: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Decision-Making Process

Intent: The capability to assess and control the radiation exposure and dose received by emergency workers and utilize a decision-making chain to authorize emergency worker exposure limits to be exceeded for specific missions. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 196

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, K.2, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, M.8, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Indian River County EOC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Control emergency workers' exposure and dose, including offsite workers performing duties onsite.	No exception
Maintain record of dose as a result of exposure.	No exception
Authorize exposures and dose in excess of identified limits.	No exception

Assessment	Extent of Play
Process for considering occupational exposures and to authorize individuals to receive doses in excess of occupational dose limits.	No exception
Determine a correction factor for DRD-based isotopic release mixture.	No exception
Control exposure and dose for temporary reentry of emergency workers, or members of the public, to restricted areas.	No exception
Determine the need to authorize radioprotective drugs using projected thyroid doses and field measurements. Projections are compared to previously established PAGs.	No exception
Adequately protect members of the public from radiological exposure and control dose for those who are authorized to temporarily reenter a restricted area.	No exception

Objective 3: Alert and Notification

Capability Target 3.1: Communications

Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 200

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Indian River County EOC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	**Negotiated responses:** The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.	No exception
Maintain periodic test results and corrective actions on a real time basis.	No exception

Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.	No exception
Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.	No exception
Identify and address any failures of the systems.	No exception
Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., "content check").	No exception

Core Capability: Public Information and Warning

Definition: Deliver coordination, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

Objective 3: Alert and Notification

Capability Target 3.3: Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and News Media

Intent: The capability to disseminate emergency information and instructions to the public during all phases of an incident. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 203

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.2, E.4, E.5, G.1, G.2, G.3, G.3.a, G.4, G.5, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Indian River County EOC Joint Information System

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
PLUME PHASE: Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information in a timely manner.	No exception
PLUME PHASE: Provide clear, concise, accessible messaging using plain language.	No exception

Assessment	Extent of Play
PLUME PHASE: Messaging addresses appropriate cultural and linguistic considerations.	No exception
PLUME PHASE: Ensure subsequent messaging is consistent with protective actions.	No exception
PLUME PHASE: Update information as the incident progresses, to include validating previously identified protective areas and clearly identifying any new protective action areas, any information that is no longer valid, and any changes to previously provided information (e.g., rerouting of evacuation routes due to impediments, etc.).	No exception
PLUME PHASE: Respond to media and public inquiries.	No exception
POST-PLUME PHASE: Rapidly disseminate of ingestion exposure pathway information to predetermined individuals and businesses.	N/A
POST-PLUME PHASE: Provide information to the public that addresses temporary reentry to a restricted area, permanent relocation from areas not evacuated, and return to formerly restricted areas will be communicated.	N/A

Core Capability: Environmental Response/Health and Safety

Definition: Conduct appropriate measures to ensure the protection of the health and safety of the public and workers, as well as the environment, from all-hazards in support of responder operations and the affected communities

Objective 1: Emergency Operations Management

Capability Target 1.1: Mobilization

Intent: The capability to alert, notify, and mobilize OROs to staff facilities in support of emergency operations. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 185

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Indian River County Radiological Emergency Response Center (RERC)

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Alert, notify, and mobilize key personnel, to include a 24-hour staffing roster, and activate facilities in a timely manner.	No exception Indian River County will **TRAIN ONLY** Radiological Emergency Reception Center operations on February 18, 2022. **Location**: North County Aquatic Center, 9450 County Road 512, Sebastian, FL. 32958.
Receive and verify notifications.	No exception
Identify and request additional resources, as needed.	No exception
Determine a facility is operational.	No exception

Objective 2: Exposure Control

Capability Target 2.1: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Decision-Making Process

Intent: The capability to assess and control the radiation exposure and dose received by emergency workers and utilize a decision-making chain to authorize emergency worker exposure limits to be exceeded for specific missions. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 196

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, K.2, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, M.8, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Indian River County RERC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	Negotiated responses: The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.

Control emergency workers' exposure and dose, including offsite workers performing duties onsite.	No exception Indian River County will **TRAIN ONLY** Radiological Emergency Reception Center operations on February 18, 2022. **Location**: North County Aquatic Center, 9450 County Road 512, Sebastian, FL. 32958.
Maintain record of dose as a result of exposure.	No exception
Authorize exposures and dose in excess of identified limits.	No exception
Process for considering occupational exposures and to authorize individuals to receive doses in excess of occupational dose limits.	No exception
Determine a correction factor for DRD-based isotopic release mixture.	No exception
Control exposure and dose for temporary reentry of emergency workers, or members of the public, to restricted areas.	No exception
Determine the need to authorize radioprotective drugs using projected thyroid doses and field measurements. Projections are compared to previously established PAGs.	No exception
Adequately protect members of the public from radiological exposure and control dose for those who are authorized to temporarily reenter a restricted area.	No exception

Objective 3: Alert and Notification

Capability Target 3.1: Communications

Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 200

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Indian River County RERC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	**Negotiated responses:** The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception.

	If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.	No exception Indian River County will **TRAIN ONLY** Radiological Emergency Reception Center operations on February 18, 2022. **Location**: North County Aquatic Center, 9450 County Road 512, Sebastian, FL. 32958.
Maintain periodic test results and corrective actions on a real time basis.	No exception
Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.	No exception
Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.	No exception
Identify and address any failures of the systems.	No exception
Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., "content check").	No exception

Objective 5: Operate

Capability Target 5.1: Monitoring, Decontamination, Sheltering, and Registration of Evacuees

Intent: The capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees, and to identify, register, temporarily shelter, and provide congregate care for evacuees at reception centers. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 215

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (J.11.d, J.13, K.4, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: Indian River County RERC

Assessment	Extent of Play
Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance: The Assessment column lists Capability Targets intended for evaluation. If the Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance is not applicable, that line should be deleted.	**Negotiated responses:** The Extent of Play column lists ORO and FEMA negotiated exceptions to established ORO plans/procedures. Examples are: No exception or Exception. If an Exception is utilized, a negotiated written response should be inserted in space provided detailing the plan change and/or deviation.
Set-up operations.	No exception

Assessment	Extent of Play
	Indian River County will **TRAIN ONLY** Radiological Emergency Reception Center operations on February 18, 2022. **Location**: North County Aquatic Center, 9450 County Road 512, Sebastian, FL. 32958.
Operationally check instruments and equipment.	No exception
Attain and sustain the overall monitoring productivity rate per hour needed to monitor 20 percent of the plume exposure pathway EPZ population, including transients, within a 12-hour period at each facility. The monitoring productivity rate per hour is the number of evacuees that can be monitored, per hour, per location, by the total complement of monitors using an appropriate procedure.	No exception
Monitor evacuees, service animals, pets, vehicles, and possessions.	No exception
Utilize trigger/action levels for determining the need for decontamination.	No exception
Decontaminate evacuees, and personal belongings, while limiting the spread of contamination.	No exception
Follow-up with any evacuee(s) who cannot be appropriately decontaminated for assessment; ensure the capability to provide evacuee-referrals.	No exception
Monitor and decontaminate vehicles.	No exception
Provide adequate, separate space for both contaminated and non-contaminated vehicles.	No exception
Monitor emergency worker personnel and their equipment and vehicles for contamination.	No exception
Decontaminate evacuee vehicles based on trigger/action levels.	No exception
Coordinate for incoming evacuees who have been monitored and, if necessary, decontaminated.	No exception
Establish shelter operations.	N/A
Congregate care centers and operations in host/support jurisdictions are sufficient to support the expected number of evacuees.	N/A
Register evacuees.	N/A
Ensure the registration area is clean and controlled.	N/A

9. Palm Beach County

The following agree to support this Hostile Action Based Plume and Full Participation Exercise as described herein:

State or County REPP Coordinator	FEMA REPP State Lead
Mike Geier Radiological Planner Palm Beach County Division of Emergency Management	Gerald McLemore, REPP Lead, State of Florida Federal Emergency Management Agency
Signature: SIGNED 12212021	Signature: SIGNED 12212021

Core Capability: Operational Coordination

Definition: Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

Objective 1: Emergency Operations Management

Capability Target 1.1: Mobilization

Intent: The capability to alert, notify, and mobilize offsite response organizations to staff facilities in support of emergency operations. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 185

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: **Palm Beach County (PBC) Emergency Operations Center (EOC)**

Assessment	Extent of Play
	IN-SEQUENCE AT PBC EOC
Alert, notify, and mobilize key personnel, to include a 24-hour staffing roster, and activate facilities in a timely manner.	The **PBC DEM Director** will explain the County Waring Point's (CWP) process for alert, notification, and mobilization of key personnel, as well as activating the EOC and EOC staffing.
Receive and verify notifications.	The **PBC DEM Director** will explain how the PBC EOC receives and verifies notifications to key personnel.
Identify and request additional resources, as needed.	The **DEM Radiological Planner** will explain the pre-identified resources necessary to conduct radiological operations.

Determine a facility is operational.	The **PBC DEM Director** will explain how the EOC is determined to be operational.

Capability Target 1.2: Direction and Control

Intent: The capability to provide overall direction and control of response efforts, commensurate with the responsibilities of leadership, as detailed in plans/procedures. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 186

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.1.c, A.2, A.3, A.5, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, D.4, E.1, H.6, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: **Palm Beach County EOC**

Assessment	Extent of Play
	IN-SEQUENCE AT PBC EOC
Support protective action decision-making (PAD).	The **PBC DEM Director** will explain the PAD – making process for the PBC EOC.
Conduct briefings in a timely manner.	The **PBC DEM Director** will explain the EOC briefing process.
Maintain situational awareness.	The **PBC DEM Director** will explain how situational awareness is maintained at the PBC EOC.
Coordinate response activities with other organizations.	The **PBC DEM Director** will explain how the PBC EOC performs operational coordination with other response organizations.
Obtain resources to support emergency operations.	The **PBC DEM Director** will explain how the PBC EOC requests resources needed to conduct planned operations.
Provide and maintain adequate facilities and equipment to support the emergency response.	The **PBC DEM Director** will discuss the PBC EOC's operational readiness for sustained emergency response.

Capability Target 1.5: Protective Action Decision Implementation for the Plume Phase

Intent: The capability to implement precautionary protective action and/or protective action decisions, including evacuation and/or sheltering, for all populations within the plume and ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zones. The populations include those with access and functional needs, students, and institutionalized individuals. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 189

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.4, C.2.a, G.1, J.11, J.11.a, J.11.b, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.g, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: **Palm Beach County EOC**

Assessment	Extent of Play
	IN-SEQUENCE AT PBC EOC
Implement PADs, ensuring communication and coordination with all appropriate jurisdictions.	The **PBC DEM Director** will explain PBC EOC's PAD implementation process
Assist those with access and functional needs during the implementation of PADs.	The **PBC DEM Director** will explain how people with functional needs are assisted within the PAD implementation process
Communicate, coordinate, and implement protective actions for schools.	**Not discussed since pad implementation for schools is not a host county function or responsibility**
Communicate with transportation officials.	The **PBC DEM Director** will explain the communication process with transportation stakeholders of the PBC EOC
Identify evacuation routes for the general public.	The **PBC DEM Director** will identify the major evacuation routes for the general public from the point where evacuees enter PBC
Make KI available to both institutionalized persons and the general public, in accordance with plans and procedures.	The **PBC DEM Director and the DEM Radiological Planner** will explain the Health Department's (DOH) role in making KI available to Risk County evacuees utilizing services at PBC Radiological Emergency Reception Centers (RERCs)

Objective 2: Exposure Control

Capability Target 2.1: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Decision-Making Process

Intent: The capability to assess and control the radiation exposure and dose received by emergency workers and utilize a decision-making chain to authorize emergency worker exposure limits to be exceeded for specific missions. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 196

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, K.2, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, M.8, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: **Palm Beach County EOC**

Assessment	Extent of Play
	IN-SEQUENCE AT PBC EOC
Control emergency workers' exposure and dose, including offsite workers performing duties onsite.	The **PBC DEM Radiological Planner** will discuss radiation exposure control for emergency workers
Maintain record of dose as a result of exposure.	The **PBC DEM Radiological Planner** will discuss how exposure dose records for emergency workers will be maintained by the DOH
Authorize exposures and dose in excess of identified limits.	The **PBC DEM Radiological Planner** will discuss how authorization is obtained for emergency workers to receive a dose in excess of published guidance

Process for considering occupational exposures and to authorize individuals to receive doses in excess of occupational dose limits.	**Not discussed since over exposure for occupational dose is not a host county function or responsibility**
Determine a correction factor for DRD-based isotopic release mixture.	**Not discussed since characterizing the isotopic mixture is not a host county function or responsibility**
Control exposure and dose for temporary reentry of emergency workers, or members of the public, to restricted areas.	**Not discussed as risk county field operations are not a host county function or responsibility**
Determine the need to authorize radioprotective drugs using projected thyroid doses and field measurements. Projections are compared to previously established PAGs.	**Not discussed as field measurement and health physics decision making for KI is not a host county function or responsibility**
Adequately protect members of the public from radiological exposure and control dose for those who are authorized to temporarily reenter a restricted area.	**Not discussed as risk county field operations are not a host county function or responsibility**

Objective 3: Alert and Notification

Capability Target 3.1: Communications

Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 200

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: **Palm Beach County EOC**

Assessment	Extent of Play
	IN-SEQUENCE AT PBC EOC
Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.	The **Lead Communicator** will discuss and demonstrate the interoperability, procedures, and redundant systems used 24/7 by the PBC CWP
Maintain periodic test results and corrective actions on a real time basis.	
Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.	
Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.	
Identify and address any failures of the systems.	The **PBC Radio System Manager** will discuss radio system failure, redundancy, and repairs

Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., "content check").	The **CWP Lead Communicator** will discuss positive message content check and acknowledgement procedures used by the CWP

Core Capability: Public Information and Warning

Definition: Deliver coordination, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

Objective 3: Alert and Notification

Capability Target 3.3: Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and News Media

Intent: The capability to disseminate emergency information and instructions to the public during all phases of an incident. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 203

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.2, E.4, E.5, G.1, G.2, G.3, G.3.a, G.4, G.5, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: **Palm Beach County EOC Joint Information System**

Assessment	Extent of Play
	IN-SEQUENCE AT PBC EOC
PLUME PHASE: Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information in a timely manner.	The Public Information Unit Leader of the PBC EOC will discuss the unit's role & responsibilities in leading PBC Joint Information Systems (JIS) and participation in Virtual Joint Information Center (VJIC) operations with the nuclear utility & other jurisdictions
PLUME PHASE: Provide clear, concise, accessible messaging using plain language.	
PLUME PHASE: Messaging addresses appropriate cultural and linguistic considerations.	
PLUME PHASE: Ensure subsequent messaging is consistent with protective actions.	
PLUME PHASE: Update information as the incident progresses, to include validating previously identified protective areas and clearly identifying any new protective action areas, any information that is no longer valid, and any changes to previously provided information (e.g., rerouting of evacuation routes due to impediments, etc.).	
PLUME PHASE: Respond to media and public inquiries.	
POST-PLUME PHASE: Rapidly disseminate of ingestion exposure pathway information to predetermined individuals and businesses.	N/A

POST-PLUME PHASE: Provide information to the public that addresses temporary reentry to a restricted area, permanent relocation from areas not evacuated, and return to formerly restricted areas will be communicated.	N/A

Core Capability: Environmental Response/Health and Safety

Definition: Conduct appropriate measures to ensure the protection of the health and safety of the public and workers, as well as the environment, from all-hazards in support of responder operations and the affected communities

Objective 1: Emergency Operations Management

Capability Target 1.1: Mobilization

Intent: The capability to alert, notify, and mobilize OROs to staff facilities in support of emergency operations. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 185

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: **PBC Radiological Emergency Reception Center (RERC)**

Assessment	Extent of Play
	OUT OF SEQUENCE AT RERC COMMAND POST
Alert, notify, and mobilize key personnel, to include a 24-hour staffing roster, and activate facilities in a timely manner.	The **PBC DEM Radiological Planner** will discuss the mobilization of RERC personal & resources during in-sequence play at the PBC EOC
Receive and verify notifications.	
Identify and request additional resources, as needed.	
Determine a facility is operational.	The **RERC Incident Commander** will discuss how the RERC is determined to be operational

Objective 2: Exposure Control

Capability Target 2.1: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Decision-Making Process

Intent: The capability to assess and control the radiation exposure and dose received by emergency workers and utilize a decision-making chain to authorize emergency worker exposure limits to be exceeded for specific missions. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 196

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, K.2, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, M.8, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: **Palm Beach County RERC**

Assessment	Extent of Play
	OUT OF SEQUENCE AT RERC COMMAND POST
Control emergency workers' exposure and dose, including offsite workers performing duties onsite.	The **PBC DEM Radiological Planner** will discuss radiation exposure control for emergency workers
Maintain record of dose as a result of exposure.	The **PBC DEM Radiological Planner** will discuss how exposure dose records for emergency workers will be maintained by the DOH
Authorize exposures and dose in excess of identified limits.	The **PBC DEM Radiological Planner** will discuss how authorization is obtained for emergency workers to receive a dose in excess of published guidance
Process for considering occupational exposures and to authorize individuals to receive doses in excess of occupational dose limits.	**Not discussed since over exposure for occupational dose is not a host county function or responsibility**
Determine a correction factor for DRD-based isotopic release mixture.	**Not discussed since characterizing the isotopic mixture is not a host county function or responsibility**
Control exposure and dose for temporary reentry of emergency workers, or members of the public, to restricted areas.	**Not discussed as risk county field operations are not a host county function or responsibility**
Determine the need to authorize radioprotective drugs using projected thyroid doses and field measurements. Projections are compared to previously established PAGs.	**Not discussed as field measurement and health physics decision making for KI is not a host county function or responsibility**
Adequately protect members of the public from radiological exposure and control dose for those who are authorized to temporarily reenter a restricted area.	**Not discussed as risk county field operations are not a host county function or responsibility**

Objective 3: Alert and Notification

Capability Target 3.1: Communications

Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 200

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: **Palm Beach County RERC**

Assessment	Extent of Play
	OUT OF SEQUENCE AT RERC COMMAND POST

Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.	The Communications Unit Leader will discuss and demonstrate field communications capabilities, procedures, failures, redundancies, and content verification at the RERC Incident Command Post (ICP) using the mobile communications vehicle and related equipment
Maintain periodic test results and corrective actions on a real time basis.	
Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.	
Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.	
Identify and address any failures of the systems.	
Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., "content check").	

Objective 5: Operate

Capability Target 5.1: Monitoring, Decontamination, Sheltering, and Registration of Evacuees

Intent: The capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees, and to identify, register, temporarily shelter, and provide congregate care for evacuees at reception centers. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 215

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (J.11.d, J.13, K.4, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: **Palm Beach County RERC & Sheltering**

Assessment	Extent of Play
	OUT OF SEQUENCE AT RERC COMMAND POST
Set-up operations.	The **PBC RERC Incident Commander** will pre-stage 11/12 stations of the Okeeheelee RERC according to the DEM RERC Field Operations Guide, in advance of exercise play. The RERC Command Post will perform a radio-check with RERC stations to verify operational readiness. Station Q will not be playing; however, its role & responsibilities the DEM Radiological Planner will discuss its role and responsibility.
Operationally check instruments and equipment.	The **Unit Leaders or designee of RERC Stations 3MV, 4M, and 4D** will physically demonstrate a pre-operational check of their radiation detection instruments using a sealed gamma radiation check-source.

Assessment	Extent of Play
Attain and sustain the overall monitoring productivity rate per hour needed to monitor 20 percent of the plume exposure pathway EPZ population, including transients, within a 12-hour period at each facility. The monitoring productivity rate per hour is the number of evacuees that can be monitored, per hour, per location, by the total complement of monitors using an appropriate procedure.	• The **DEM Radiological Planner** will discuss evacuee processing rates at each PBC RERC. • A minimum of **10** mock evacuees will actually participate in modified RERC activities. • Undressing for wet decon will not be performed. • Evaluators may time performance at evacuee monitoring & decon stations to extrapolate overall RERC performance.
Monitor evacuees, service animals, pets, vehicles, and possessions.	The **Unit Leaders of RERC Stations 3MV, 4M, and 4A** will physically demonstrate proper monitoring techniques of vehicles, people, household pet / service animals (live animals are subject to availability), and possessions following the DEM RERC FOG. NOTE one evacuee will have real radioactive contamination in the form of a sealed check source and shielding packet, concealed on their person.
Utilize trigger/action levels for determining the need for decontamination.	Following the DEM RERC FOG, the **Unit Leader of RERC Station 4M or designee** will discuss the action level at which decontamination is warranted for evacuees.
Decontaminate evacuees, and personal belongings, while limiting the spread of contamination.	Following the DEM RERC FOG and local guidance, the **Unit Leader of RERC Station 4M or designee** will demonstrate decontamination procedures on evacuees and one personal item.
Follow-up with any evacuee(s) who cannot be appropriately decontaminated for assessment; ensure the capability to provide evacuee-referrals.	Following the DEM RERC FOG, the **Unit Leader of RERC Station 4M or designee** will discuss that evacuees who cannot be decontaminated to a level below the trigger threshold, will be transported to a hospital for medical care.
Monitor and decontaminate vehicles.	Following the DEM RERC FOG, the Unit Leaders of RERC Station 2R & 3MV will demonstrate preliminary vehicle rinsing with water and vehicle monitoring of two vehicles.
Provide adequate, separate space for both contaminated and non-contaminated vehicles.	The **DEM Radiological Planner** will discuss movement of contaminated vs uncontaminated vehicles within the RERC.

Assessment	Extent of Play
Monitor emergency worker personnel and their equipment and vehicles for contamination.	Following the DEM RERC FOG and local guidance, the Unit Leaders of the EWD Station will demonstrate monitoring, decontamination, and rehabilitation of emergency workers by discussion and static demonstration.
Decontaminate evacuee vehicles based on trigger/action levels.	The **DEM Radiological Planner** will discuss vehicle decontamination.
Coordinate for incoming evacuees who have been monitored and, if necessary, decontaminated.	The **DEM Radiological Planner** will discuss the CONOPS of evacuee movement.
SHELTERING	IN-SEQUENCE AT PBC EOC
Establish shelter operations.	IN-SEQUENCE at the EOC **The DEM Operations Section Manager and/or designee** will discuss by interview PBC's planned sheltering operations for a response to a nuclear power plant emergency.
Congregate care centers and operations in host/support jurisdictions are sufficient to support the expected number of evacuees.	
Register evacuees.	
Ensure the registration area is clean and controlled.	

Core Capability: On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement

Definition: Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas and also for response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.

Objective 2: Exposure Control

Capability Target 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management:

Intent: The capability of emergency workers to manage dose and exposure, use equipment (e.g., dosimetry, radio protective drugs), and identify procedures to monitor their exposure and dose, including following procedures to obtain authorization to receive emergency exposures in excess of the PAGs. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 198

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: **PBC Traffic Control Points (TCP) / RERC Command Post**

Assessment	Extent of Play
RECEPTION CENTER	OUT OF SEQUENCE AT RERC COMMAND POST
Maintain an appropriate inventory of DRDs that are leak-tested or current in calibration.	The **DEM Radiological Planner** will discuss by interview PBC's plan for emergency response dosimetry at TCPs including implementation, reporting and record keeping.
Maintain an appropriate inventory of PRDs.	
Adequately distribute appropriate DRDs and PRDs.	
Record and report exposures in the field.	

Report to individual responsible for managing exposure and dose when limits are reached.	
Implement exposure control decisions to members of the public from radiological exposure and control dose for those who are authorized to temporarily reenter a restricted area.	**Not discussed since decision-making for exposure for the general public reentering restricted areas of risk counties is not a host county function or responsibility**
Retain an adequate supply of radioprotective drugs.	The **DOH Public Health Preparedness Manager** and/or designee will discuss by field interview PBC's plan for Potassium Iodide.
Adequately distribute radioprotective drugs to emergency workers.	
Implement decisions to administer radioprotective drugs.	

Objective 3: Alert and Notification

Capability Target 3.1: Communications

Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 200

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: **Palm Beach County TCP / RERC Command Post**

Assessment	Extent of Play
RECEPTION CENTER	**OUT OF SEQUENCE AT RERC COMMAND POST**
Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.	The **PBC Radio System Manager & COM Unit Leader** will discuss and demonstrate the interoperability, procedures, and redundant systems used 24/7 between state-local emergency response agencies operating in PBC. This includes positive message content check and acknowledgement procedures.
Maintain periodic test results and corrective actions on a real time basis.	
Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.	
Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.	
Identify and address any failures of the systems.	
Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., "content check").	

Objective 5: Operate

Capability Target 5.4: Traffic and Access Control

Intent: The capability to select, establish, and staff traffic and access control points and removing impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 222

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (H.12, J.8, J.8.b, J.10, J.10.a, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.f, J.14.d, J.14.e, M.1.b, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: **Palm Beach County TCP**

Assessment	Extent of Play
Select, establish, and staff appropriate TCP/ACPs, consistent with current conditions and PADs (e.g., evacuating, sheltering, and relocation), in a timely manner.	**OUT OF SEQUENCE AT RERC COMMAND POST** The **PBSO/FHP Traffic Control Unit Leaders** will discuss how PBC will implement its traffic control plan for evacuee movement into PBC's two RERCs
Provide instructions to TAC staff on actions to take, including when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.	**IN-SEQUENCE AT PBC EOC** **Members of the PBC EOC Emergency Services and Infrastructure Branches** will discuss policies, procedures, alternative strategies, decision-making processes, and implementation of the emergency traffic operations necessary to support PBC's two RERCs
Contact the state or Federal agencies that have the authority for the different transportation modes (e.g., rail, water, and air traffic).	
Identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments that affect the evacuation and evacuation routes.	
Make the decision to re-route traffic and coordinate with key decision-makers and the JIC to ensure the alternate route information is appropriately communicated to evacuees.	
Establish exit procedures.	
Establish procedures to control access to and monitor people and vehicles from the evacuated and restricted areas.	**Not discussed as risk county field operations are not a host county function or responsibility**
Authorize reentry of individuals into the restricted areas.	**Not discussed as risk county field operations are not a host county function or responsibility**

Core Capability: Mass Care

Definition: The capability to provide life-sustaining services to the affected population with a focus on hydration, feeding and sheltering to those who have the most need as well as support for reunifying families.

Objective 1: Emergency Operations Management

Capability Target 1.5: Protective Action Decision Implementation for the Plume Phase

Intent: The capability to implement precautionary protective action and/or PADs, including evacuation and/or sheltering, for all populations within the plume and ingestion exposure pathway EPZs. The populations include those with access and functional needs, students, and institutionalized individuals. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 189

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.4, C.2.a, G.1, J.11, J.11.a, J.11.b, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.g, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: **Palm Beach County Congregate Care**

Assessment	Extent of Play
	IN-SEQUENCE AT PBC EOC
Implement PADs, ensuring communication and coordination with all appropriate jurisdictions.	The **PBC DEM Director** will explain PBC EOC's PAD implementation process
Assist those with access and functional needs during the implementation of PADs.	The **PBC DEM Director** will explain how people with functional needs are assisted within the PAD implementation process
Communicate, coordinate, and implement protective actions for schools.	**Not discussed since pad implementation for schools is not a host county function or responsibility**
Communicate with transportation officials.	The **PBC DEM Director** will explain the communication process with transportation stakeholders of the PBC EOC
Identify evacuation routes for the general public.	The **PBC DEM Director** will identify the major evacuation routes for the general public from the point where evacuees enter PBC
Make KI available to both institutionalized persons and the general public, in accordance with plans and procedures.	The **PBC DEM Director and the DEM Radiological Planner** will explain the Health Department's (DOH) role in making KI available to Risk County evacuees utilizing services at PBC Radiological Emergency Reception Centers (RERCs)

Objective 3: Alert and Notification

Capability Target 3.1: Communications

Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 200

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: **Palm Beach County Congregate Care**

Assessment	Extent of Play
	IN-SEQUENCE AT THE PBC EOC
Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.	The **DEM Operations Section Manager and/or designee** will discuss by interview PBC's planned sheltering operations for a response to a nuclear power plant emergency
Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.	
Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.	
Identify and address any failures of the systems.	The **PBC Radio System Manager** will discuss radio system failure, redundancy, and repairs
Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., "content check").	The DEM Operations Section Manager and/or designee will discuss by interview how shelter personnel utilize the PBC Radio System

Objective 5: Operate

Capability Target 5.1: Monitoring, Decontamination, Sheltering, and Registration of Evacuees

Intent: The capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees, and to identify, register, temporarily shelter, and provide congregate care for evacuees at reception centers. RPM 2019 Pt III Pg. 215

Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (J.11.d, J.13, K.4, and O.1)

Responsible Offsite Response Organization: **Palm Beach County Congregate Care**

Assessment	Extent of Play
	IN-SEQUENCE AT THE PBC EOC
Set-up operations.	The **DEM Operations Section Manager and/or designee** will discuss by interview, how shelters are set up in PBC
Operationally check instruments and equipment.	The **DEM Radiological Planner** will discuss the topics listed during an IN-SEQUENCE interview at the PBC EOC
Attain and sustain the overall monitoring productivity rate per hour needed to monitor 20 percent of the plume exposure pathway EPZ population, including transients, within a 12-hour period at each facility. The monitoring productivity rate per hour is the number of evacuees that can be monitored, per hour, per location, by the total complement of monitors using an appropriate procedure.	
Monitor evacuees, service animals, pets, vehicles, and possessions.	

Assessment	Extent of Play
Utilize trigger/action levels for determining the need for decontamination.	
Decontaminate evacuees, and personal belongings, while limiting the spread of contamination.	
Follow-up with any evacuee(s) who cannot be appropriately decontaminated for assessment; ensure the capability to provide evacuee-referrals.	
Monitor and decontaminate vehicles.	
Provide adequate, separate space for both contaminated and non-contaminated vehicles.	
Monitor emergency worker personnel and their equipment and vehicles for contamination.	
Decontaminate evacuee vehicles based on trigger/action levels.	
Coordinate for incoming evacuees who have been monitored and, if necessary, decontaminated.	
Establish shelter operations.	The **DEM Operations Section Manager and/or designee** will discuss the topics listed during an IN-SEQUENCE interview at the PBC EOC
Congregate care centers and operations in host/support jurisdictions are sufficient to support the expected number of evacuees.	
Register evacuees.	
Ensure the registration area is clean and controlled.	

Appendix E: Acronyms

Acronym	Term
AAR	After-Action Report
ACP	Access Control Point
AHIMT	All Hazards Incident Management Team
ALC	Annual Letter of Certification
ANS	Alert and Notification System
ARC	American Red Cross
BURA	Backup Route Alerting
CEMP	Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan
CFR	Code of Federal Regulation
cpm	Counts Per Minute
Cs	Cesium
DRD	Direct-Reading Dosimeters
EAL	Emergency Action Level
EAS	Emergency Alert System
ECL	Emergency Classification Listing
EEG	Exercise Evaluation Guide
EMS	Emergency Medical Service
ENF	Emergency Notification Form
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EOF	Emergency Operations Facility
EOPA	Extent of Play Agreement
EPZ	Emergency Planning Zone
EW	Emergency Worker
EWD	Emergency Worker Decontamination
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDEM	Florida Division of Emergency Management
FLDOH/BRC	Florida Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control
FMT	Field Monitoring Team
FPM	Final Planning Meeting
FRMAC	Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center
FTM	Field Team Management
GE	General Emergency
GIS	Geographic Information System
HAB	Hostile Action Based
HSEEP	Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program
IC	Incident Commander
ICP	Incident Command Post
ID	Integrated Drill
IP	Improvement Plan
IPM	Initial Planning Meeting
JIC	Joint Information Center
JIS	Joint Information System

KI	Potassium Iodide
LOA	Letter of Agreement
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPM	Midterm Planning Meeting
mR/h	milliRoentgen per hour
MSD	Medical Service Drill
MSEL	Master Scenario Events List
NLT	No Later Than
NOUE	Notification of Unusual Event
NPP	Nuclear Power Plant
NRC	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NWS	National Weather Service
OOS	Out-of-Sequence
ORO	Offsite Response Organization
OSLD	Optically Stimulated Luminescence Dosimeter
PAD	Protective Action Decision
PAG	Protective Action Guide
PAR	Protective Action Recommendation
PIO	Public Information Officer
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
PRD	Permanent Record Dosimeter
R	Roentgen
RAC	Regional Assistance Committee Chairman
RACES	Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services
rad	Radiation Absorbed Dose
REA	Radiation Emergency Area
rem	Roentgen Equivalent Man
REPP	Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program
RERC	Radiological Emergency Response Center
RPM	Radiological Program Manual
RSO	Radiation Safety Officer
SAE	Site Area Emergency
SAV	Staff Assistance Visit
SEOC	State Emergency Operations Center
SLNPP	St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SOG	Standard Operating Guide
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
TAC	Traffic and Access Control
TCP	Traffic Control Point
TLD	Thermoluminescent Dosimeter
TTX	Tabletop Exercise
µ	micro
UE	Unusual Event
µR	microRoentgen
WEA	Wireless Emergency Alert (system)
WW	Waterway Warning