After Action Report

St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise

Exercise Date: February 13, 2024

Final

FEMA

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents 1
Executive Summary 3
Section 1: Exercise Overview 5
Section 2: Exercise Design Summary 7
2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design 7
2.2 Exercise Core Capabilities and Objectives 7
2.3 Exercise Scenario 8
Section 3: Analysis Of Capabilities 11
3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results 11
3.2 Jurisdictional Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation 11
3.2.1 State Jurisdiction 11
3.2.1.1 Florida State Emergency Operations Center 11
3.2.1.2 Dose Assessment 12
3.2.1.3 Field Team Management 13
3.2.1.4 Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory 14
3.2.2 Joint Operations 15
3.2.2.1 Joint Information Center 15
3.2.2.2 All-Hazards Incident Management 17
3.2.3 Risk Jurisdictions 18
3.2.3.1 St. Lucie County 18
3.2.3.2 Martin County 22
3.2.4 Host Jurisdictions 25
3.2.4.1 Brevard County 25
3.2.4.2 Indian River County 27
3.2.4.3 Palm Beach County 29
Section 4: Conclusion 33
Appendix A: Exercise Timeline 35
Appendix B: Evaluator Assignments 37
Appendix C: Exercise Participants 39
Appendix D: Extent of Play Agreement 45

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On February 13, 2024, the Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency Region 4 Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program staff evaluated a plume phase scenario-driven exercise for the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. The plant is located on Hutchinson Island, approximately 4 miles east-northeast of the City of Port St. Lucie. This facility is owned and operated by the Florida Power & Light Company. Parts of St. Lucie and Martin counties lie within the 10-mile plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone and are considered risk counties. Indian River, Brevard, and Palm Beach counties support as host jurisdictions for evacuees from the 10-mile emergency planning zone.

Federal Emergency Management Agency's overall objective of the exercise was to assess the level of state and local preparedness in coordinating and responding to an emergency at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. The purpose of this report is to analyze exercise results, identify strengths to be maintained and built upon, identify potential areas for improvement, and support development of corrective actions.

This exercise was held in accordance with Federal Emergency Management Agency's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of state and local radiological emergency response plans and procedures. The evaluation team conducted this exercise using Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program methodology. The previous Federal evaluated exercise was conducted on February 8, 2022. The original qualifying joint emergency preparedness exercise was conducted March 20, 1991.

Evaluation of out of sequence events and activities took place on November 15, 2023; December 6, 2023; January 10, 2024; and January 31 and February 1, 2024. Those activities are addressed in separate after-action reports. Those activities included: radiological emergency reception centers; emergency worker decontamination, and two medical services drills.

Officials and representatives from the state of Florida; the risk counties of St. Lucie, and Martin; the host counties of Indian River, Brevard, and Palm Beach; Florida Power and Light; and numerous volunteers and other agencies participated in this exercise. These organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them. The jurisdictions met the joint exercise objectives and successfully demonstrated the corresponding Core Capabilities identified in Section 3 of this report. During the exercise no level 1 or 2 findings were identified.

FEMA is honored to acknowledge the successful efforts of the many exercise participants.

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SECTION 1: EXERCISE OVERVIEW

Exercise Name	2024 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise	
Type of Exercise	Full Scale Exercise	
Exercise Date	February 13, 2024	
Program	Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program	
Mission Area	Response	
Scenario Type	Full Participation Plume Phase Exercise	
Participating Organizations	See Appendix C for the list of participating organizations	
Locations	See Appendix D for the extent of play agreement and exercise locations	
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SECTION 2: EXERCISE DESIGN SUMMARY

2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design

FEMA administers the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program pursuant to the regulations found in Title 44 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 350, 351, 352, 353 and 354. 44 CFR Pt. 350 codifies 16 planning standards that form the basis for radiological emergency response planning for the licensee, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments impacted by the emergency planning zones established for each nuclear power plant site in the United States. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations also codify the 16 planning standards for the licensee. 44 CFR Pt. 350 sets forth the mechanisms for the formal review and approval of state, local, tribal, and territorial government radiological emergency response plans and procedures by FEMA. One of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program cornerstones established by these regulations is the biennial exercise of offsite response capabilities. During these exercises, affected state, local, tribal, and territorial governments demonstrate their abilities to implement their plans and procedures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological incident at a nuclear plant.

The results of this exercise, together with reviews of the radiological emergency response plans and verification of the periodic requirements set forth in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, rev. 2, the annual letter of certification, and staff assistance visits, enabled FEMA to provide a statement with the transmission of this final after-action report to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This statement verifies that the affected state, local, tribal, and territorial plans, and preparedness are: (1) adequate to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the nuclear power facility by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological incident; and (2) capable of being implemented.

The federal approval of the formal submission of the radiological emergency response procedures for the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant by the state of Florida was granted on February 15, 1984, and the qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on March 20, 1991.

2.2 Exercise Core Capabilities and Objectives

Core capabilities-based planning allows for exercise planning teams to develop exercise objectives and observe exercise outcomes through a framework of specific action items. Using the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program methodology, the exercise objectives meet Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program requirements and objectives. The capability targets to be demonstrated were negotiated with the state of Florida and risk counties. The core capabilities scheduled for demonstration during this exercise were:

- **Operational Coordination:** Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.
- **Situational Assessment:** Provide all decision makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response.
- **Public Information and Warning:** Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken, and the assistance being made available.

- **Environmental Response/Health and Safety:** Conduct appropriate measures to ensure the protection of the health and safety of the public and workers, as well as the environment, from all-hazards in support of responder operations and the affected communities.
- **On Scene Security, Protection and Law Enforcement:** Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas and for response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.
- **Critical Transportation:** Provide transportation (including infrastructure access and accessible transportation services) for response priority objectives, including the evacuation of people and animals, and the delivery of vital response personnel, equipment, and services into the affected areas.
- **Mass Care Services:** Provide life-sustaining and human services to the affected population, to include hydration, feeding, sheltering, temporary housing, evacuee support, reunification, and distribution of emergency supplies.
- **Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services:** Provide lifesaving medical treatment via emergency medical services and related operations and avoid additional disease and injury by providing targeted public health, medical, and behavioral health support, and products to all affected populations.

These core capabilities, when successfully demonstrated, meet the exercise objectives. The objectives for this exercise were as follows:

- **Objective 1:** Emergency Operations Management
- **Objective 2:** Exposure Control
- **Objective 3:** Alert and Notification
- **Objective 4:** Detect, Measure, Sample, Analyze, and Assess
- **Objective 5:** Operate

2.3 Exercise Scenario

The following scenario summary, developed by Florida Power & Light, drove exercise emergency classification levels; below is the following extract from the approved scenario:

“During the turnover briefing the Operations Crew is informed that Unit 1 is at 100% power with no issues. Unit 2 is at 100% power.

The plant status will result in a declaration of a General Emergency, which will drive protective action decisions for the state and counties. This scenario has a radiological release below protective action guides. Protective action recommendations from the utility for evacuation will affect St. Lucie County two miles around and out to five miles downwind for areas 1 and 2. However, Martin County shares area 8 on Hutchinson Island with St. Lucie County out to 10 miles, which could be included in the protective action decision. Potassium iodide ingestion authorization for the general public and emergency workers is expected as there are radioiodine’s in the plume.

Alarm D-16, Turbine Thrust Bearing Position alarm sporadically coming in. The 'A' Ovation thrust bearing position probe is failing. PDM was called to validate there are no issues with the thrust bearing position. PDM validated this by taking readings on the Bentley Nevada TSI thrust bearing position probes. All readings were normal, confirming that the 'A' Ovation probe is failing. The Bentley Nevada system is a redundant system to Ovation.

2C Charging pump trouble alarm was received and investigation of the pump determined that oil level was low in the normal band but above the low hash mark. The 2A Charging pump was started and the 2C Charging pump was secured until oil can be added. The pump is still operable and a previously identified 1dpm oil leak still exist. The low oil level issue was previously identified with open work order to address oil level the issue.

Operator identified a potential through-wall leak on the 2B Intake Cooling Water header downstream of the 2B Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger. Further investigation including cleaning of area and removal of small amount of paint just below the gasketed 4" blind flange revealed the leakage to be from the gasket at the flange and not through-wall. This issue is not an operability concern.

Unit 2 identified increased reactor coolant activity. Since the down-power of Unit 2 for stop valve testing on 8/5/23, the Unit 2 reactor coolant system Noble Gas and Radioiodine Activity has been rising. Following the down-power, reactor coolant system noble gas and radioiodine activity spiked ~10x higher than the steady state values prior to the down power. In the next two months, the reactor coolant system noble gas and radioiodine activity reached a new equilibrium that is ~6x higher than before the down-power. Since December 2023 the reactor coolant system noble gas and radioiodine activity has been rising again and is now ~20x higher than normal. AOP-01.06 has been entered due to the increased reactor coolant system activity and excess letdown is in service. This morning at 0557, the letdown line radiation monitor increased with a step change of a factor of 10x. Chemistry has been directed to obtain a reactor coolant system sample for activity.

At 0740, the Operations Crew will receive a report that the Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System activity is >60 uCi/gm dose equivalent I-131. The Shift Manager evaluates emergency action level criteria and declares an UNUSUAL EVENT (SU4.1), Sample analysis indicates reactor coolant activity value is >60 µCi/gm dose equivalent I-131. If the crew initiates a down-power, when System Operations is contacted, the crew will be informed that they have to wait 1 hour to down power for grid alignment due to the high demand. If the down power was started by the crew, they will stop the down power and remain at their current power level.

At 0820, a minor tube leak of 70 gpm develops in the 2B Steam Generator. The Shift Manager evaluates EAL criteria and declares an ALERT (FA1.1), Any loss or potential loss of EITHER Fuel Clad or reactor coolant system (Table F-1). – reactor coolant system Potential Loss "unisolable reactor coolant system or steam generator tube leakage >50gpm".

At 0930, Containment High Range Radiation Monitors exceed 1.4E+02 R/hr which equals a loss of the fuel clad barrier. The Emergency Coordinator will declare a SITE AREA EMERGENCY (FS1), Loss or Potential Loss of ANY two fission product barriers.

At 1035, the 2B Steam Generator Main Steam Safety Valve V-8215 will fail open. The Emergency Coordinator will declare a GENERAL EMERGENCY (FG1) Loss of ANY Two Fission Product Barriers AND Loss or Potential Loss of the third fission product barrier.

The Recovery Manager will provide protective action recommendations to the general public. Field Monitoring Teams will monitor and track the resulting plume. A Re-Entry Team will be successful in gagging the Steam Safety valve thereby terminating the release."

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SECTION 3: ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITIES

3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results

This section contains the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the February 13, 2024, plume exposure pathway exercise.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity were evaluated based on the demonstration of core capabilities, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program objectives, and capability targets as delineated in the FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program manual dated December 2019. Capability targets are listed by number and the demonstration status of those capability targets are indicated by the use of the following terms:

- **Met (M):** The jurisdiction or functional entity performed all activities under the objective/capability target to the level required per the work plan and/or the extent-of-play agreement, with no Level 1 or Level 2 Findings evaluated under that objective/capability target during the current activity and no unresolved prior Level 2 Finding(s).
- **Level 1 Finding (L1):** An observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance during an assessment activity that could cause a determination that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant.
- **Level 2 Finding (L2):** An observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance during an assessment activity that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health and safety.
- **Plan Issue (P):** An observed or identified inadequacy in the ORO's emergency plan/implementing procedures, rather than in that of the ORO's performance.
- **Not Demonstrated (N):** For a justifiable reason, the jurisdiction or functional entity did not perform assessment activities under the objective/capability target as specified in the extent-of-play agreement.

3.2 Jurisdictional Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation

3.2.1 State Jurisdiction

3.2.1.1 Florida State Emergency Operations Center

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

The state emergency response team in the Florida Emergency Operations Center successfully demonstrated the ability to respond to a simulated radiological emergency at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant.

Alerting and notification between the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant and Florida State Watch Office was accomplished using a utility-provided dedicated automatic ring-down telephone. Information received from the utility was electronically transcribed by the watch officer onto an emergency notification form for dissemination to appropriate state and local officials. Subsequent calls were received, transcribed, and disseminated in the same manner.

Primary communications between the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant and the state of Florida was a dedicated telephone provided by the utility. Secondary communications systems included hard-wire commercial landline telephones, cellular/mobile telephones, the state's 800-megahertz radio network and a satellite telephone link. Auxiliary Communications Network amateur radio operators also provided support to Florida Division of Emergency Management using a network of ultra-high

frequency radio repeaters located throughout the state. No interruptions in the communications systems were observed during this exercise.

State emergency operations center staff were notified of the situation at St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant and informed of the activation of the emergency operations center after the Alert emergency classification level declaration was received. This notification was made using an electronic mass notification system with a pre-populated roster. Senior leaders in the watch office made individual phone calls to mobilize the all-hazards incident management team and state emergency response team liaisons to the utility's emergency operations facility and risk counties, respectively. Once the incident management team was established at the emergency operations facility, command was transferred when a Site Area Emergency was declared using a pre-approved script.

The state emergency response team chief, operations chief, and other emergency operations staff provided effective direction and control until the transfer of command to the all-hazards incident management team was completed. Periodic briefings were held to keep the staff updated on the situation and aware of actions being taken. A utility liaison provided updates on conditions and actions being taken at the plant. Multiple state agencies were represented at the state emergency operations center and coordinated support to the affected counties and members of the public.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.1, 1.2, 3.1.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

3.2.1.2 Dose Assessment

Situational Assessment Capability Summary:

The Florida Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control personnel demonstrated the ability to assess radiological, meteorological, and plant conditions in response to a radiological incident at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. Team members were prepositioned in accordance with the extent of play agreement and staffed the necessary positions at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Operations Facility.

The dose assessment team brought the necessary equipment and reference materials to the facility. Laptop computers were loaded with the current version of dose projection software. The state dose assessment team worked closely with utility dose assessors as they were in the same room. There was a large, computerized monitor with plant parameters and meteorological data in the dose assessment room. There were problems with the initial meteorological data from the simulator; therefore, some wind direction and wind speed values were provided by the controller.

The utility emergency operations facility personnel provided frequent briefings for the participants. The dose assessment team gathered the information for changing plant and meteorological conditions to assess the radiological release. The radiological release was a result of a steam generator tube rupture. Following the start of the release, the initial state dose assessment was magnitudes higher than the utility's projection, indicating that protective action guidelines were exceeded. However, the team self-corrected, identified the errors, and obtained an accurate dose projection. The resultant dose assessment values for both the utility and the state were less than protective action guidelines. Therefore, the state dose projections supported the utility protective action recommendations, county protective action decisions for evacuation, and the potassium iodide decision.

Team members demonstrated their method to determine an incident-specific dose correction factor using the dose assessment software. Administrative dose limits for the field team members were low enough that the default dose correction factor was adequate for this scenario. In addition, the dose assessment team compared field survey results to dose projections with acceptable agreement.

The Bureau of Radiation Control personnel were not responsible for precautionary protective actions or evacuation decisions for the general public, and only made recommendations if the radiological release was greater than protective action guidelines. Based on dose projections less than protective action guidelines for child thyroid committed dose, the operations officer determined that there was no need for ingestion of potassium iodide by the general public. However, due to the presence of radioiodine in the plume, the operations officer recommended potassium iodide for emergency workers. The potassium iodide decision was transmitted verbally to state and county representatives.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.3, 1.4, 4.5.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

3.2.1.3 Field Team Management

Environmental Response/Health and Safety Capability Summary:

The Florida Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control personnel successfully demonstrated the capability to mobilize, use proper dose controls, communicate effectively, perform field radiation measurements, and collect air samples in response to a simulated incident at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. Three field monitoring teams were deployed from the Bureau of Radiation Control Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory staging location. One training team was deployed and performed all tasks but was not evaluated.

The field teams were comprised of two field operations specialists from the Bureau of Radiation Control. In accordance with the extent of play, the field teams were prepositioned at the St. Lucie County Public Safety Department, where the mobile laboratory and support vehicles were staged. The teams would normally be mobilized by a mass notification system or phone call from their supervisor to report to the staging area. As the field monitoring teams arrived, the field team supervisor issued them dosimetry, potassium iodide, radios, radiological equipment, field sampling kits, and a copy of the standard operating procedure. All issued equipment was logged and recorded for each team. Teams were provided with a vehicle that was appropriate for field monitoring. Prior to issuing the equipment, the field team supervisor performed operational checks on all radiological instruments and air samplers in the trailer stationed at the staging area. All instruments were within calibration dates and passed the operational source check. Each team inventoried their equipment kit to ensure that all necessary equipment and supplies for field sampling were available.

The Bureau of Radiation Control Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory Supervisor provided a safety, radiological, and assignment briefing to the teams prior to being dispatched from the staging area. The briefing stated that an Alert emergency classification level was declared at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant due to potential issue with fuel cladding and reactor cooling system. The briefing provided current meteorological conditions, general safety precautions for the surrounding area, radiation exposure limits, communication protocols, use of personal protective equipment, use and side effects of potassium iodide, and initial deployment information.

Several communications systems were in place to communicate and transmit data. The field teams utilized a statewide radio system as the primary means of communication with the field team director. Cellular telephone and a satellite telephone/radio were available as backups. Radio checks for the state radio and satellite radio were done prior to departing the staging area. In addition, the teams used a software tool to electronically log and transmit radiation monitoring data. Each team used proper radio drill communication, repeated information relayed to confirm understanding of each message, and spoke clearly and concise. There were no interruptions in communication.

Once deployed, the field monitoring team personnel demonstrated the capability to properly monitor radiation dose; purpose of use and reporting for the simulated potassium iodide ingestion; and reported proper procedures to obtain authorization to exceed emergency dose limits. Each team member read and reported or recorded their dosimeter readings at thirty-minute intervals.

Field monitoring teams were dispatched to predesignated sampling points. When control of the field teams was transferred from the mobile laboratory supervisor to field team director, a wind shift had occurred, and the initial staging locations were altered. The teams responded to downwind locations in expectation of a release. After the release, the teams were advised to report when readings of twice background were realized. Field monitoring teams used survey instruments to read measurements of ambient radiation, recorded the readings, and relayed them to the field team director. Field teams used appropriate contamination control techniques, and protected radiation survey instrumentation from contamination. When a team arrived at a location where the field team director thought captured the plume, each team was instructed to take radiation readings and take an air sample at their location. Radiation measurements were collected prior to, at the mid-point, and at the end of the air sample collection period to ensure that the plume had not shifted during the collection period. The teams moved to a background location to purge and prepare the sample. According to procedures, counting the samples is optional. The air sample results are vital data for dose assessors and if there was a lapse in time to transport the samples to the lab, the samples should be counted in the field. Samples were properly packaged, labeled, recorded, and delivered to the hot line at the mobile emergency radiological laboratory.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.1, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 4.1.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

3.2.1.4 Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory

Environmental Response Health & Safety Capability Summary:

During the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant exercise, the Florida Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory staff successfully demonstrated the capability to perform radioactive laboratory analyses of field samples to support protective action decision-making. The mobile laboratory had appropriate equipment, space, and layout to receive and screen samples, prepare samples for analysis by the laboratory, and conduct detailed isotopic analysis of field samples using gamma spectroscopy techniques.

The Florida Bureau of Radiation Control personnel were prepositioned near the St. Lucie County Public Safety Department; however, notification was demonstrated as if it were an actual emergency. Team members were notified using an automated notification process that required an acknowledgment from the emergency responder. Mobile laboratory personnel were notified of all

emergency classification level changes and received the appropriate emergency notification form with details on the emergency classification. The field team supervisor explained the mobile laboratory staffing roster, how they would accomplish 24-hour staffing, and how they would obtain supplemental assets from other state agencies.

Communication with the field monitoring teams was primarily via handheld radios. Backup communications were satellite telephone and mobile telephone. Communications devices were checked before use. Radio communication with field personnel was clear throughout the exercise. Communication from the mobile laboratory to outside organizations was primarily via cellular telephone; satellite telephone and email were available for backup. The laboratory was in the parking lot of the St. Lucie County Public Safety Department; as such, landline telephones were available as another backup method of communication. There were no communication failures that warranted the use of backup methods.

The mobile emergency radiological laboratory was set up to process field samples through three functional areas: a hotline with a sample receipt area, a sample preparation vehicle for sample packaging, and a mobile laboratory where gamma spectral analyses of field samples was performed. The three functional areas worked sequentially to minimize the spread of contamination and to process field samples in a timely manner.

Staff performed quality control checks on analytical equipment prior to use. Iodine and particulate air samples were analyzed to determine the concentration of various radionuclides in each sample. The radionuclide analysis library was appropriate for analyzing field samples in response to a nuclear power plant incident with a release of radioactive material. Analytical equipment was set up to count and determine the concentration of radionuclides in each sample. Minimum detection limits for key radionuclides were low enough to support dose assessment decision-making. Gamma spectroscopy procedures did not specify how to generate a final nuclide identification report for dose assessors. The analytical equipment specialist explained how analysis results would be sent via facsimile or other electronic methods to dose assessment personnel to validate dose projections.

Sample storage was adequate for expected samples at the laboratory. In addition, refrigeration was available for samples that could spoil. Sample chain of custody was maintained throughout the process.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.1, 3.1, 4.4.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

3.2.2 Joint Operations

3.2.2.1 Joint Information Center

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

State, county, and utility public information officers and spokespersons successfully demonstrated the public information and warning core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant.

Following notification of an Alert two utility and the state all hazards incident management team public information officers received notification via a mass communications system, from their respective agencies/organizations, to report to the emergency operations facility; the joint

information center was collocated with the emergency operations facility. The joint information center was declared operational shortly after the utility public information officers arrived at the facility. Additionally, following their arrival, the utility public information officers set-up the joint information system public information coordination line. This line allowed utility, state, and county public information officers and spokespersons not present in the joint information center to call in and share information with one another for the duration of the exercise.

The joint information center itself provided the utility and state public information officers adequate space, ample communications systems, and the necessary supplies and equipment. All communications systems were operable and sufficient to support response operations. The primary means of communication within the joint information center and system was a public information officer coordination line. Electronic mail was used frequently and served as a secondary means of communication. Supplemental means were short message service and multiple video conferencing platforms.

The joint information system was a new concept for the utility, state, and county public information officers. In the past, all public information officers reported to the emergency operations facility and then activated the joint information center. Establishment of a joint information system was a more realistic approach to public information; however, formalization of the system, processes, and technology used was lacking and posed some challenges. While information was exchanged between utility, state, and county public information officers, little to no information was coordinated. Each public information officer and spokesperson functioned within their respective agency/organization facility and information was shared as it was occurring or had occurred, not in anticipation so it could be coordinated among all partners. All press releases and talking points were developed at facilities physically outside of the joint information center; final press releases and talking points were shared via the joint information system for situational awareness.

One press conference was conducted via a video conferencing platform. The utility spokesperson facilitated the press conference and all risk and host county spokespersons, except Brevard County, spoke during the press conference. It was noted that prior to the press conference a pre-caucus meeting was not held to determine speaking order; triage information; or prioritize critical information. This was especially important and relevant because evacuations were being ordered or were underway. Evacuation information should be relayed first as it most directly impacts public health and safety.

Because the General Emergency was declared shortly before the press conference, the Martin County spokesperson was delayed, and the press conference began about 10 minutes after it was originally scheduled. In addition, the St. Lucie County spokesperson experienced microphone issues and the public and media were unable to hear the spokesperson initially. The St. Lucie County spokesperson was eventually able to speak to the public and media during the press conference; however, this was less than ideal as the St. Lucie County spokesperson had the most critical information to share – e.g., most areas being evacuated were within St. Lucie County.

Two mock media questions were asked and answered during the press conference. The first question was related to obtaining potassium iodide for children. During the press conference two spokespersons shared information related to potassium iodide. At the time of the press conference a potassium iodide decision had only been made for emergency workers, not the public. Their statements were particularly confusing especially because the public had not been given, or directed to ingest, potassium iodide. Ideally, information shared during press conferences would be relevant and actionable for the public and media.

Rumor control and trends were monitored by utility, state, and county public information officers and support staff outside of the joint information center. Information collected and tracked related to rumors was not shared with the utility or state public information officers at the joint information center.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.1, 3.1, 3.3.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

3.2.2.2 All-Hazards Incident Management

Operational Coordination Capability Summary

The St. Lucie and Martin County decision makers joined the state's all-hazards incident management team at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Operations Facility in response to a simulated incident. By working together, they demonstrated their ability to coordinate direction and control of the incident response and make coordinated protective action decisions for emergency workers and the public.

Following established procedures, the all-hazards incident management team and risk counties mobilized staff to the emergency operations facility. Upon arrival, they quickly set up workstations, checked communications, made notifications, and proceeded to coordinate their response to the incident.

The risk county decision makers maintained overall direction and control of the incident response. The bridge line was open throughout the exercise and provided immediate communication among the risk and host county decision makers. The state emergency operations center staff transferred control of state resources to the all-hazards incident management team following the Site Area Emergency notification. The team's incident commander then acted as the state coordinating officer, participating in briefings with the utility recovery manager and providing updates. The incident commander consistently asked the risk county directors if they had unmet needs or how the team could support their response efforts. The all-hazards incident management team worked closely with the utility, impacted counties, and the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control, offering support, coordination, and clear communication.

The risk county decision makers and all-hazards incident management team collaborated to make precautionary and protective action decisions. Precautionary actions included closing schools, parks, beaches, and waterways; imposing rail and flight restrictions; notifying individuals with access and functional needs; and activating sirens followed by emergency messaging. The risk and host county decision makers agreed to evacuate areas 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and to shelter in place area 5. The decision to exceed the utility's protective action recommendation was based on plant conditions and evacuation time estimates. The Florida Bureau of Radiation Control representative discussed the radiological field measurements for emergency worker dose assessments and recommended potassium iodide ingestion for emergency workers only.

The all-hazards incident management team and risk county decision makers provided and maintained reliable communications with emergency personnel. They utilized hand-held radios, landline and cellular telephones, a critical incident management system, and electronic mail. Additional redundant capabilities were available if needed. Though challenges with internet connectivity were identified during the exercise, it did not impact the response or outcome of the exercise.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 2.1, 3.1.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None

- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

3.2.3 Risk Jurisdictions

3.2.3.1 St. Lucie County

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

The St. Lucie County Public Safety Department staff successfully demonstrated the operational coordination core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant.

The St. Lucie County Division of Emergency Management Planning Officer received the initial notification on the hot ring down phone located in the emergency operations center. Another hot ring down phone was available in the communications center of the same facility. The planning officer recorded handwritten emergency notification forms, and an electronic emergency notification form was received via email and posted to the utility's critical incident management system. At the Alert emergency classification level, the emergency operations center was partially activated with key staff that included emergency management, law enforcement, and fire department representatives. Staff were recalled using a mass notification system. The emergency operations center was fully activated by staff at the Site Area Emergency classification.

The St. Lucie County Public Safety Department Assistant Director became the incident commander following activation, assuming direction and control of county operations. The incident commander coordinated with the St. Lucie County decision maker, public safety staff, and emergency operations center liaisons. Additionally, the incident commander coordinated with the assistant incident commander who manned the bridge line. Periodically, the incident commander conducted briefings to provide updated information, as well as obtain updates from the emergency support functions to maintain situational awareness.

The St. Lucie County Public Safety Department Director acted as the primary decision maker. The director and radiological manager deployed to the utility's emergency operations facility at the Site Area Emergency classification, to coordinate decision making with Martin County leadership and the state all-hazards incident management team.

The protective action decision following the release and General Emergency classification was to evacuate areas 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and to shelter area 5. The counties concurred with this decision and began the evacuation process.

The St. Lucie County Health Department representatives implemented access and functional needs, to include relocation of hospitals/medical facility patients, nursing homes, institutionalized, mobility-impaired and transportation-dependent individuals. For this scenario the county had 17 care facilities located in areas 1, 2, and 8. The county health representatives made notifications to care facility officials and placed them on standby. The county health officials also coordinated transportation for special needs individuals to the reception center after the General Emergency. County law enforcement representatives confirmed the state was responsible for notifying Fort Pierce Correctional Center and St. Lucie Juvenile Detention Center.

The emergency worker exposure control decision-making process for call in, turn back, and dose limits were based on the St. Lucie Radiological Emergency Guidelines and job aids included in the emergency worker kits. The Department of Public Safety Director, in consultation with the Florida Department of Health Operations Officer, is authorized to increase emergency responder exposure

limits. The health department recommended emergency workers ingest potassium iodide due to exposure levels potentially exceeding the protective action guidelines. The county decision makers concurred with this recommendation. Potassium iodide inventory, expiration dates, and instructions were validated during a staff assistance visit on August 20, 2023.

Communications were adequately demonstrated at the St. Lucie County Emergency Operations Center. All forms of communication were fully functional, continuously available, and redundant. Several communications tests were conducted during the exercise and no failures were observed. Additionally, amateur radio operators supplemented communications. Message traffic was managed effectively and delivered without delays or disruptions.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary

The St Lucie County Public Safety Department emergency management staff successfully demonstrated the public information and warning core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the St Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. Two public information staff from emergency support function 14, public information coordinated the selection, approval, and distribution of press releases from the emergency operations center as part of a joint information system. Staff followed mobilization procedures, including participation of a county public information officer within the joint information system.

A public information officer bridge line supported the joint information system, allowing for coordination and information exchange between the risk counties, the utility, and the state emergency operations center. The team participated in one virtual media briefing and the associated pre-media briefing caucus. Using pre-scripted press releases, the public information staff closely adhered to procedures in selecting, modifying, approving, and distributing eight local press releases. In addition, two pre-scripted joint press releases and associated Emergency Alert System messages were coordinated over the public information officer bridge line, approved by the St Lucie County Public Safety Department Director, and distributed. All press releases and emergency messaging were posted to a critical incident management system.

The senior public information officer monitored the public information officer bridge line, gathered official information, and represented the county during the virtual media briefing. The assistant public information officer managed press releases, emergency message printing and distribution, and served as the senior public information officer in the emergency operations center during the media briefing. St. Lucie County and Martin County used pre-scripted joint press releases and Emergency Alert System messages that were compiled into a corresponding emergency messaging guideline. A General Emergency Protective Action Key and instructions made the guideline an effective and well-structured tool for rapidly communicating protective actions to the public and media. This guide helped to ensure that risk county messaging was consistent with protective action decisions. The emergency messaging guideline also included an Emergency Alert System, Message & Local Press Release Timeline, that pre-identified which local and joint pre-scripted press releases to distribute during each emergency classification level. The pre-planning for public and media messaging greatly reduced development time, ensured messaging was consistent with protective

actions, and helped the public information staff deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information.

A critical incident management system was used to post and simulate the distribution of press releases. This process allowed rapid review and, when needed, comments regarding the press releases relative to participants. Press releases provided accurate emergency information, reflecting approved precautionary and protective actions. No errors or omissions were noted. Two rumors were reported by the county public inquiry team and provided to the public information staff. The lead public information officer monitored a social media monitoring platform available as an additional outlet for posting approved press releases.

The public information officer bridge line participants selected and coordinated two Emergency Alert System messages for delivery through the public alert notification system. Sirens were activated from the county 911 center, co-located with the county emergency operations center. The Emergency Alert System information was included in both joint messages. The protective action decision information was also included in associated emergency information joint press releases. Emergency information messaging was accurate, contained the required elements, and was available in English and Spanish.

The St. Lucie County Public Safety Department Assistant Director and the Martin County Fire Rescue Chief coordinated protective actions during the initial bridge line call. It was determined that the sirens and Emergency Alert System would be completed together at a mutually agreed upon time. It was explained that the startup process takes approximately seven minutes to complete. The St. Lucie County Radiological Emergency Preparedness Coordinator and Technical Specialist demonstrated the process for sounding sirens and the coordinator activated them. The sirens were activated during the Site Area Emergency without failure; however, a simulated siren failure was injected to test backup alerting procedures. A St. Lucie police officer explained the process for determining which areas were not covered by the siren failures and how officers would be dispatched to provide mobile route alerting using a pre-scripted message read over their public alert system. The St. Lucie County Sheriff's Office would also request the emergency operations center to activate the "Alert St. Lucie" site to dispatch the message to registered members of the public.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 3.1, 3.2, 3.3.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

Critical Transportation Capability Summary:

The St. Lucie County School District Administrator was knowledgeable and well trained on plans and procedures as well as primary and alternate communication systems. He was educated on the four protective actions: Cancellation of the School Day, Early Dismissal, Shelter in Place and Evacuation to Pick-up Point. He clearly elaborated school duties and responsibilities referenced in conjunction with the protective action recommendations.

There are sufficient transportation assets available to evacuate the St. Lucie district schools, appropriate capabilities to notify parents simultaneously once students are enroute to designated pick-up points, and a sound plan to maintain accountability of students. If the school is instructed to evacuate, they will facilitate a controlled evacuation where students and staff are evacuated by location. Once all of the children and staff are loaded on the bus, teachers will account for each

student, bus drivers will proceed to the relocation pickup point escorted by law enforcement. Each bus driver is issued a dosimetry kit and is trained on its use. The bus drivers have appropriate communications devices to coordinate with other bus drivers or school officials. Some buses are equipped with mounted radios.

Once the students and staff arrive at the pick-up point, they will be accounted for by using the communication school system which has an updated roster of all students, parents, and guardians. The system also has records and custody related documents of who can pick up each student. When a parent picks up their student, proper identification must be shown.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.5

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement Capability Summary:

The Activation and management of the St. Lucie County traffic control points was successfully evaluated by interview with the St. Lucie County Sheriff's Office and Port St. Lucie Police Department. Authorization of emergency workers to receive emergency exposures more than the protective action guides would be authorized by the public safety director. During the interview, law enforcement noted that all emergency workers entering an affected area would be given just in time refresher training and a briefing by the on-scene team lead, which included exposure recording and reporting, radiological monitor familiarization, and authorized exposure limits. The law enforcement representative clearly defined the reporting and recording procedure.

Sheriff's office personnel were knowledgeable of traffic control procedures, communications requirements, impediment removal, evacuation plans and the proper evacuation routes.

St. Lucie County Sheriff's Office successfully demonstrated the ability to conduct waterway warnings on parks and beaches in response to a radiological incident at St. Lucie Nuclear Plant. Through interview, officers articulated the water way warning mission in accordance with their established plans and procedures. They expressed the zones to be patrolled, the patrol boats, and a zone description and patrol type description for each boat to be activated. Also discussed were dosimeter issue to the law enforcement officers, potassium iodide instructions, exposure cards, turn back limits, and permanent record dosimeters readings and 15 minute checks for all law enforcement officers. The Officers shared a genuine concern for public safety.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 2.2, 3.1, 3.2, 5.4.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

3.2.3.2 Martin County

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

The Martin County Emergency Operations Center staff, and its unified command, successfully demonstrated the ability to mobilize staff, provide direction and control, review recommendations, and make decisions during a simulated radiological incident at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant.

The Notification of Unusual Event declaration was received by the Martin County Communications Supervisor via the hot ring down. During the call, emergency notification form #1 was filled out and details were reviewed and confirmed with the call initiator. Following the call, a staff member, made copies of the form, time stamped and handed it to the emergency management director. The technical specialist reviewed the incoming form with the director for accuracy of information.

The Alert and all subsequent declarations were received and verified in the same manner. Following each declaration emergency operations center staff were mobilized via a mass notification system in three groups starting with level 3 staff which included the unified command, public information, and front desk support. Level 2 and level 1 staff, respectively, were notified which included section chiefs, branch chiefs, emergency support functions, the community information center supervisor, and all remaining staff. Once all key positions were staffed, the facility was declared operational by the director. Staffing was available to support 24-hour operations. The ability to identify and request additional resources was also demonstrated through the county's web-based critical incident management system.

The Martin County unified command, which included county officials, provided overall direction and control of the county response and the authority to make protective action decisions. The operations section chief facilitated periodic briefings with staff to ensure county objectives were relayed and implemented and to provide situational awareness. Emergency support function staff briefed on their respective actions to provide further insight to the entire group. All workstations were equipped with activation guides that included job aids, plant information, and several resources to assist staff with emergency response. A bridge line, with representatives from the state, emergency operations facility, risk and host counties decision makers, was active throughout the event to maintain situational awareness and coordinate resources and response activities.

The Martin County unified command group engaged in discussions that incorporated meteorological data and its impact on the county. This led to the implementation of precautionary actions within the county. Martin County reached out to various agencies to initiate actions such as mobilizing school buses and establishing a reunification center, setting up reception centers, closing beaches and parks, establishing a decontamination site, and deploying law enforcement for traffic control. The decision to distribute potassium iodide to Martin County Fire Rescue personnel was made by the fire rescue chief as part of the unified command operations. Furthermore, the Martin County Administrator declared a local state of emergency.

The initial siren activation followed the Site Area Emergency. Although precautionary actions were taken, no protective actions were recommended or made by either the Bureau of Radiation Control or the utility. After the utility declared a General Emergency, they recommended protective actions Papa 1 (evacuate all sectors 0-2 miles, 2-5 miles downwind, and monitor and prepare all others) on the emergency notification form. The Martin County unified command concurred with evacuating areas 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and to shelter area 5, siren activation times, and an emergency alert system message to the public. Hutchinson Island, which is located in Martin County, was included in the evacuation area. The unified command team, after careful deliberation and review of available meteorological and river data, made an internal decision to shelter in place residents at Jensen Beach and Sewall's Point, which are part of area7.

Martin County implemented the following additional actions at the General Emergency: school evacuation to reunification site; air, rail, waterway restrictions; and evacuation of daycare and

assisted living facilities, nursing homes, and individuals with access and functional needs living on Hutchinson Island. The staff communicated and coordinated with all appropriate jurisdictions to implement precautionary and protective actions. These were decided and implemented due to the wind direction not impacting Martin County. Periodic briefings were held to coordinate these actions by the responsible emergency support function. The county health officer simulated contact with the four assisted living and skilled nursing facilities to implement their evacuation plan. The Martin County Department of Children and Families had oversight of the four local daycare centers; those daycare centers were contacted, and a simulated evacuation was implemented. Martin County does not provide potassium iodide to the general public; potassium iodide would be provided to evacuees at reception centers and shelters opened in Palm Beach County.

The efficient and effective coordination within the emergency operations center and between the emergency operations facility decision makers reflected attention to detail, use of appropriate actions, and a high degree of professionalism.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

The Martin County Emergency Management Director, Board of County Commissioners, and emergency operations staff successfully demonstrated the ability to deliver accurate information and emergency instructions to the public and the media. The public information officer, the assistant public information officer, and the public information staff were notified by a mass notification system to report to the Martin County Emergency Operations Center at Alert. The public information officers in the Martin County Emergency Operations Center communicated with utility, state, and other county public information officers via the joint information system, cellular and landline telephones, and a video conferencing platform.

They also communicated through conference calls with the public information officers in the St. Lucie County Emergency Operations Center and coordinated information and press releases. Martin County issued information on the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant emergency in their first press release. After the declaration of Site Area Emergency, the counties activated the primary notification system which consisted of fixed sirens and Emergency Alert System messages. The counties issued a joint Emergency Alert System message, along with a joint press release with supplemental information that included marine and watercraft restrictions. The initial Emergency Alert System message contained the four required elements.

The primary notification system was activated a second time following the General Emergency declaration. A simulated siren failure was injected St. Lucie County. If one or more of the sirens in Martin County failed, the county emergency operations center command staff was prepared to dispatch personnel to provide backup route alerting. The public information officer conferred with the United States Coast Guard, the primary coordinating agency for waterway clearing and marine zone security.

Upon approval from the Martin County Administrator, the public information officer issued two press releases. The press releases were written in English, and the Spanish translation process was discussed but not simulated. The public information staff published all information on all Martin

County social media accounts as well as the Martin County Board of County Commissioners website and a group messaging system that utilizes phone, text, or email.

The public information officer also coordinated with the personnel operating the community information center public inquiry telephone center in the emergency operations center. The public information officer ensured the community information center staff had updated information and monitored the calls to discourage rumors or trends that were being tracked. The Blake Library was available with a phone bank for additional personnel to staff the community information center if needed. Spanish-speaking personnel were on staff to receive calls from the public as well.

Following the declaration of the General Emergency, a press conference was successfully demonstrated to simulated media and public attendees. The presenters included the Martin County Administrator, Emergency Management Director, Chief of Fire Rescue, Martin County Sheriff's Office Communication Director, Assistant Superintendent of Schools, and representatives from the United States Coast Guard and Florida State of Emergency Management. Information regarding the initial and current emergency at St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant was described by the county administrator. More detailed information was provided by the Emergency Management Director, including where the media and public could find additional information on websites and the phone numbers for public inquiry calls. The chief of fire rescue provided an update on mutual aid requests for transportation and assistance from the sheriff's office. Information was also provided about potassium iodide for emergency workers. The assistant superintendent of schools provided an update on the relocation of school students, how parents were alerted to the emergency, and where parents could be reunited with their children. The Sheriff's Office Communications Director updated the current roadway construction and open freeways. The Florida Division of Emergency Management assured the attendees that the Governor was being kept informed of the emergency. Questions from the media and public included inquiries about school relocation centers, a request to describe a shelter-in-place order, and a question regarding agricultural advisories.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 3.2, 3.3.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

Critical Transportation Capability Summary:

Martin County Emergency Operations Center staff successfully demonstrated the critical transportation core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant.

The Martin County Assistant Superintendent of Schools and the safety manager were responsible for ensuring protective action implementation for schools. Through interview, the Martin County School Department Safety Manager explained the process for requesting transportation resources for school relocation. There are four schools within Martin County emergency planning zone: Felix A. Williams Elementary, Jensen Beach High, Jensen Beach Elementary and the Environmental Studies Center. At the Site Area Emergency, the safety manager initiated the staging of the school buses. The approximate number of buses and students was pre-identified. Buses were on standby until the decision to relocate children was made. Martin County Sheriff's Office was on standby to provide escort during relocation. During this time, the assistant superintendent communicated with the Martin County School Board Public Information Officer who was tasked with notifying parents of student status and informing them not to report to the school, but instead meet children at the Christ

Fellowship reunification center. Communications methods include 800 megahertz radios, cellphone, email, or land line telephone. Radios were present and used during the exercise. A message was also sent via the school's normal mass messaging system. Schools were relocated following the General Emergency.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.5

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement Capability Summary:

The Martin County Sheriff's Office Deputy, Sewall's Point Police Department Officer, and the United States Coast Guard Auxiliary Fort Pierce staff successfully demonstrated the knowledge and understanding to select and establish traffic and access control points and waterway clearing, while maintaining reliable communications and managing emergency worker dose and exposures.

A Martin County Sheriff's Office Deputy was interviewed and observed performing traffic and access control duties within the emergency operations center. The sheriff's deputy coordinated with the Coast Guard and described coordination with the sheriff's office marine and aviation unit. Although the Marine and Aviation units were not present during the evaluation, the Sewall's Point Police Department was identified as part of the traffic control staff and would assist in coordinating and staffing various points. The coordination between agencies ensured there were no gaps in coverage for response planning. The deputy used maps, weather information, and predetermined traffic and access control points to preposition emergency workers. Communications were through 800 megahertz radios, but cellphones were also available if needed. Both methods of communications were reliable and accessible to all emergency workers.

In an interview, it was mentioned that the Martin County Fire Rescue Hazardous Material team was responsible for dose and exposure control. The team provides dosimetry to each emergency worker within the 10-mile emergency planning zone, including the marine and waterway clearance teams. Once this process was completed, the hazardous materials team reports the completion or status to the sheriff's office or the respective agency representative.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 2.2, 3.1, 3.2, 5.4.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

3.2.4 Host Jurisdictions

3.2.4.1 Brevard County

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

The Brevard County Emergency Operations Center staff successfully demonstrated the operational coordination core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the St. Lucie Nuclear

Power Plant. Brevard County Emergency Management staff facilitated a discussion-based exercise while concurrently participating in the biennial plume-phase exercise. Participants used facilitated discussion and controller injects that promoted internal and external collaboration across disciplines to effectively validate plans and procedures.

Designated Brevard County Emergency Management staff received emergency notifications via email and follow-up phone calls from the state watch office. The Brevard County Operations Manager mobilized emergency operations center staff through the county's mass notification system via phone, email, and text message. Staff began arriving immediately. The facility was declared operational and partially activated following the Site Area Emergency notification, and fully activated at General Emergency. Each participating agency and liaison developed a two-week, 24-hour staffing roster for the emergency response.

The Brevard County Emergency Management Director provided overall direction and control of county response efforts with input from staff. The operations manager facilitated briefings for each change in emergency classification levels. Staff maintained situational awareness and coordinated activities with other impacted counties by participating on the open bridge line with the other risk and host counties and monitoring the state's critical incident management system. A state liaison provided guidance and support, as well as reach back to additional state assets and resources. The emergency operations center had adequate staff, equipment, and supplies to support the response. Staff utilized the critical incident management system to request additional supplies and equipment as the incident progressed.

At Site Area Emergency, Brevard County Emergency Operations Center staff coordinated resources to support traffic control, reception and congregate care facilities, and transportation services in preparation for St. Lucie County evacuees. After evacuations were ordered, the Brevard County Sheriff's Office coordinated with state law enforcement to establish and manage traffic and access control to support evacuations along designated routes. Traffic impediments were discussed and resolved. Through interview, emergency support function 1 (transportation) described protocols for mobilizing public transportation resources to transport evacuees from the reception center to area shelters. Although potassium iodide was not authorized for public ingestion, public health officials discussed protocols for transporting and disseminating potassium iodide at the reception center, if instructed.

Brevard County Emergency Operations Center staff demonstrated redundant communications systems which operated properly and dependably throughout the operational period. Brevard County's primary means of communications with the risk and other host counties was the bridge line. Backup and tertiary communications included email, commercial landlines, cellular phones, facsimile machines, 800 megahertz radios, satellite phones, and other handheld electronic devices. There were no communications issues observed.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.1, 1.2, 1.5, 3.1.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary

The Brevard County Public Information Section was notified by the Brevard County Emergency Management Director using a mass notification system following the Notification of Unusual Event

declaration. The Brevard County Public Information Officer and an assistant reported to the emergency operations center. Upon arrival the public information officer requested two additional assistants from the Brevard County Health Department. Together they established electronic contact with the Brevard Public Information Network and advised them of the incident. They also established contact with the joint information system through the Brevard County Communications Officer. Through interview, it was learned that one or two public information officers would be dispatched to the reception center, if activated. An additional public information officer would be sent to the joint information center once the facility was operational.

The public information section prepared four news releases for this exercise, each was requested by the emergency management director and contained concise, accurate, and timely information. All releases were approved by the emergency management director before release and were forwarded to the joint information center. News releases were sent to the Brevard County Public Information Network for distribution through numerous social media platforms. A request was made to each member of the network to monitor social media for false or misleading posts. They were also asked to report any trends or rumors to the Brevard County Public Information Officer. Public information personnel crafted news releases from previously prepared templates. The process was expedient and consistently produced quality documents. The public information group was also tasked with preparing a list of talking points for use by the emergency management director in exercise briefings. This was done in a timely manner and included a succinct description of all pertinent activities performed during the exercise.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.1, 3.3.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

3.2.4.2 Indian River County

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

The Indian River County Emergency Operations Center staff successfully demonstrated the ability to establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process in response to a simulated radiological incident at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. As a host county for St. Lucie County evacuees, the Indian River County Emergency Services Director and designated staff received initial notification of a Notification of Unusual Event via the state watch office's mass notification system. This notification was quickly confirmed by command staff in communication with St. Lucie County Emergency Management.

Upon receiving notification, the director and the emergency management staff was in place for a normal business day, utilized the county's mass notification system to alert key emergency and executive staff. The receipt of Alert and Site Area Emergency notifications prompted the mobilization of additional staff. Once the emergency management staff and select emergency support functions arrived, the director declared the emergency operations center activated.

The emergency operations center was adequate in size and well equipped to support prolonged emergency operations. It had a security check point and badging as well as a secure facility with fencing, parking, generator, and communications tower/antennas. Inside, the building included ample audio-visual equipment, a digital wall clock (synchronized to ambient cellular telephone time),

desk telephones, cellular telephones with text message capability, and laptop computers with email. Additionally, staff used multiple, redundant communications systems during response operations.

The emergency management operations chief effectively managed and coordinated the emergency operations center staff and facilitated frequent briefings to provide and maintain situational awareness. The public information officer drafted public messaging and maintained connectivity with other county public information officers via the joint information system. Branch directors, assigned to manage specific elements of the response, included emergency services, infrastructure, human services, logistics, and emergency management support services. They provided regular updates on activities and identified any unmet needs. The Indian River School District Safety Director engaged in discussions with command staff regarding the dismissal of 18 schools to open their designated shelters.

The Indian River County Fire Rescue representative coordinated the mobilization and staging of the monitoring and decontamination resources. Branch directors worked together to coordinate the opening of congregate care sheltering at the Site Area Emergency. The sheriff's office deputy and Vero Beach Police Department coordinated traffic control operations with the local municipalities to marshal resources from multiple state and local agencies. The representative from the county health department coordinated public health resources in support of reception center and shelter operations, including the movement of up to 440,000 potassium iodide tablets from the local health department to the reception center for potential evacuees.

During the Site Area Emergency, Indian River County received information over the bridge line that indicated a wind shift towards their county. As a result, and in anticipation of a classification upgrade to a General Emergency with a plume release, command staff shifted their thinking to a possible evacuee population between 100,000 – 200,000. By the time the General Emergency was declared, decisions were already made to open 18 shelters, coordinate hotels for possible evacuee overflow, close access to the Blue River Wildlife Trail, open evacuee radiological reception monitoring, conduct traffic and waterway management and monitoring, and declare a local state of emergency. Through interview with the emergency management analyst, emergency workers were not issued dosimetry or potassium iodide in Indian River County due to their proximity on the 50-mile emergency planning zone.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.1, 1.2, 1.5, 3.1.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

The Indian River County Public Information Officer and staff demonstrated the capability to deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the public and media during a simulated radiological incident at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. The public information officer and staff were notified and briefed by the Indian River Emergency Services Director via a simulated telephone call of the Notification of an Unusual Event at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. The public information officer was notified of the escalation to an Alert and directed to report to the emergency operations center. The Indian River County Public Information Officer was the point of contact for coordinating the release of all county agencies' approved press releases. These included press releases on school closings, reception center locations, updated evacuation routes, and road

conditions. The Indian River County press releases were reviewed and approved by the director. The public information officer coordinated with neighboring counties via the joint information system. All messages marked for dissemination to the public were accurate and contained the requisite information for prompt release. Copies were maintained internally and provided upon request.

The Indian River County Public Information Officer participated in regular briefings with the emergency operations center command staff and on the county coordination conference calls. The public information officer stayed in contact with the joint information system by telephone and electronic mail and participated in a virtual press conference.

The public information officer simulated monitoring multiple social media platforms for false information and rumors. Social media platforms would also be used to provide updated information to the public and any identified rumors or trends would have been checked for validity through joint information system. The public information officer simulated staffing the emergency information center located in the emergency operations center with well-trained county personnel and activating the published county hotline. The call center staff would have been supplied with current information to provide the public. The call center supervisor would coordinate between the public information officer, the command staff, and the call center staff.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.1, 3.3.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

3.2.4.3 Palm Beach County

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

Palm Beach County Emergency Operations Center staff successfully demonstrated the operational coordination core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant. Participating agencies and personnel validated local radiological emergency plans and procedures, collaborated effectively, and made informed decisions to protect the health and safety of the public.

Palm Beach County Emergency Operations Center staff demonstrated the ability to alert, notify, and mobilize key personnel in response to a radiological event that included 24-hour staffing capabilities, and activated the facility in a timely manner. The Palm Beach County communications center was notified of an Unusual Event emergency classification level at the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant via email/fax. Emergency management staff mobilized key personnel by text message using a call down roster. Supporting agencies and staff were pre-positioned in accordance with the extent-of-play agreement. The director declared the emergency operations center fully activated after the Alert emergency classification level once all key positions were staffed. A 24-hour staffing roster was provided to validate prolonged operations.

The Palm Beach County Emergency Management Agency Director provided overall direction and control of the county response. Key leaders made up the policy team and provided critical and timely decision making to support the response. The emergency operations center manager facilitated regular briefings in conjunction with updated emergency notification forms as plant conditions progressed. Periodic training was given to the emergency operations center staff to keep them engaged with the exercise. Coordination calls with the other impacted counties were conducted on a

bridge line facilitated by St Lucie County to provide situational awareness. The emergency operations center staff routinely coordinated response activities with other organizations using various, redundant communications. The facility, equipment, and trained staff adequately supported the emergency response.

Palm Beach County leadership participated in regular bridge line calls to hear precautionary or protective actions and the associated alert and notification. These calls provided critical planning information to respond to protective action decisions. Prior to any protective action decision, Palm Beach County implemented precautionary actions to include establishing two reception centers and two shelters to receive evacuees. After the plant declared a General Emergency and issued protective actions, Palm Beach County leadership understood that the change in wind direction would cause most of the evacuees to go to their reception centers within the county. On the subsequent coordination call, St. Lucie and Martin Counties' leadership coordinated with the state and made the decision to shelter area 5 and evacuate areas 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8, activate sirens, and issue an Emergency Alert System message to the public. Emergency workers was ordered to ingest potassium iodide.

In addition to the use of the cell phone, the county was equipped with landline telephones, email, facsimile, and a web-based communications system. Alternate communications were provided by the local amateur radio group, who set up equipment inside of the emergency operations center and demonstrated the ability to communicate with Martin and St. Lucie Counties. Their equipment included the use of very high frequency and high frequency band radios. A communication log was initiated to track all incoming and outgoing message traffic. There were no communications failures observed.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.1, 1.2, 1.5, 3.1.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

Palm Beach County Public Information Unit successfully demonstrated the public information and warning core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant.

The initial notification was received in the county's warning point through their email system with message also transmitted simultaneously to the dedicated cell phone. Upon receipt the message was pushed out to all of the personnel on the county's call down roster. Staff to support the public information unit reported in and began the process of establishing communication links to the public information officers at the other host and risk counties and Florida Power & Light.

As a host county Palm Beach did not publish any press releases or messages but did participate in conference calls and the virtual news briefing for situational awareness at the emergency operations center. Through discussion the public affairs director stated that the virtual method was proven to work well with all members of the public information group, and it allows for each county to add or delete information based on actual events or current scenario. Copies of all messages and news releases were forwarded by the unit to the information board on the critical incident management system.

For this core capability the following capability targets were MET: 1.1, 3.3

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

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SECTION 4: CONCLUSION

Officials and representatives from the State of Florida; the risk counties of Martin and St Lucie, and Florida Power & Light as well as many other agencies and numerous volunteers participated in the exercise. The cooperation and teamwork of the participants was apparent throughout the evaluated activities.

The risk counties of Martin, and St. Lucie, along with the State of Florida, and the host counties of Indian River, Brevard, and Palm Beach activated their emergency operations centers in accordance with plans and procedures, providing direction and control, and coordination of the response. Protecting the public health and safety was evident in the protective action decisions of the leadership. State and local emergency response organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them.

FEMA would also like to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals, agencies and volunteers who planned, prepared for, and participated in this exercise. The role of the St Lucie Task Force in scheduling and conducting the necessary meetings and training events established the foundation that led to the success of the exercise.

Based on the results of this exercise and FEMA's review of the 2023 Annual Letter of Certification submitted by Florida, the offsite radiological emergency response plans, and preparedness of the State of Florida and the affected local jurisdictions site-specific to the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant can be implemented. They are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of an emergency at the site.

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APPENDIX A: EXERCISE TIMELINE

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Time Utility Declared	2024 St. Lucie Timeline								
		SEOC	Decision Makers /AHIMT	JIC	Dose	St. Lucie County	Martin County	Brevard County	Indian River County	Palm Beach County
Unusual Event	7:50	8:01	**	**	**	8:01	8:01	8:11	8:12	8:13
Alert	8:28	8:42	**	**	8:58	8:41	8:41	8:58	8:58	8:58
Site Area Emergency	9:37	9:48	**	10:30	9:39	9:48	9:48	10:11	9:57	9:57
General Emergency	10:41	10:48	10:57	10:55	10:44	10:50	10:50	10:58	10:58	10:57
Simulated Rad. Release Started	10:41	10:48	10:57	10:55	10:41	10:50	10:50	10:58	10:58	10:57
Simulated Rad. Release Terminated	12:14	12:17	12:17	12:17	12:14	12:17	12:17	12:17	12:17	12:17
Facility Declared Operational		9:45	10:20	9:09	8:45	9:58	9:58	10:37	9:05	10:30
Declaration of State of Emergency	State	10:20								
	Local			11:16		8:56	10:05	10:06	10:06	10:30
Exercise Terminated		12:30	12:17	12:20	12:17	12:18	12:17	12:19	12:20	12:18
Precautionary Actions: **St. Lucie**- Air, Rail restrictions, affected schools, closed beaches and parks. Waterway warning. **Martin** - No precautionary actions **Indian River** - Activated reception center. Early dismissal of students or staff. **Palm Beach**- Opened reception centers and 2 shelters. **Brevard** -Prepared reception center and shelter				11:11	**	9:48	**	10:15	1009	10:45
Stay Tuned Messaging		10:02	10:02	**	**	10:02	10:02	**	**	**
1st Siren Activation		10:10	10:10			10:10	10:10	10:10	10:10	10:10
1st EAS Message/ IPAWS WEA						10:10	10:10			
1st Protective Action Decision: Shelter: Area 5		11:15	11:00	11:11		11:00	11:00	11:00	11:00	11:00

Evacuation: Areas 1,2,3,4,6,7,8 Martin subsequent PAD: Shelter Area 7						11:10			
2nd Siren Activation	11:10	11:10			11:10	11:10	11:10	11:10	11:10
2nd EAS Message:	11:10	11:10			11:10	11:10			
KI Administration Decision: 11:12 EW (Issued/ Distribute) EW Ingest	 ** 11:23	 10:45 11:11	 11:11 **	 ** 11:21	 10:48 11:30	 10:03 **	 10:03 **		 10:03 **

**: Denotes no action at that time.

APPENDIX B: EVALUATOR ASSIGNMENTS

1. Evaluator Assignments, Exercise: February 13, 2024

Location/Venue	Evaluation Team	Core Capability
State Emergency Operations Center	James Young* Tom Hegele	Operational Coordination
Emergency Operations Facility	Matt Bradley* Roy Smith Lynn Steffensen Megan Hutchinson (OJT) John Pelchat*	Operational Coordination
Joint Information Center	Erica Houghton*	Public Information and Warning
Dose Assessment	Jill Leatherman*	Situational Assessment
Field Team Management	John Wiecjorek	Environmental Response/Health and Safety
Laboratory	Marcy Campbell	Environmental Response/Health and Safety
Field Teams	Debbie Cummings* Ron Bonner Bart Ray (Mentor) Irvin Gibson (OJT)	Environmental Response/Health and Safety
St. Lucie County Emergency Operations Center	Robert Nash* Randi Hendrix Linda Gee Steve Hebblethwaite (OJT) PJ Nied	Operational Coordination Public Information/Warning Critical Transportation

Location/Venue	Evaluation Team	Core Capability
Martin County Emergency Operations Center	Gene Taylor* Taneeka Hollins Meg Swearingen	Operational Coordination Public Information/Warning Critical Transportation
Brevard County Emergency Operations Center	Nate Nienhius* LaShawn Halsey Mark Dalton	Operational Coordination Public Information/Warning
Indian River County Emergency Operations Center	Matt Webb* Rosemary Samsel	Operational Coordination Public Information/Warning Critical Transportation
Palm Beach County Emergency Operations Center	DeShun Lowery* Brenda Rembert	Operational Coordination Public Information/Warning Critical Transportation

APPENDIX C: EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS

Participating Organizations
State of Florida
Florida Highway Patrol
Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services
Florida Department of Children and Families
Florida Department of Commerce
Florida Department of Corrections
Florida Department of Environmental Protection
Florida Department of Health
Florida Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control
Florida Department of Law Enforcement
Florida Department of Management Services
Florida Department of Transportation
Florida Division of Emergency Management
Florida Division of Emergency Management, West Central All Hazards Incident Management Team
Florida National Guard
Florida Public Service Commission
Florida State Fire Marshal
St. Lucie County
Florida Department of Health, St. Lucie County
Fort Pierce Fire Department
Fort Pierce Police Department
Fort Pierce Public Works
Hospital Corporation of America Lawnwood Regional Medical Center

Participating Organizations
Port St. Lucie Police Department
St. Lucie County Fire District
St. Lucie County Parks and Recreations
St. Lucie County Public Safety
St. Lucie County Public Safety - Emergency Management
St. Lucie County Public Schools
St. Lucie County Public Works
St. Lucie County School Board
St. Lucie County Sheriff's Office
Martin County
Cleveland Clinic Martin Health
Florida Department Health, Martin County
Martin County Administrator
Martin County Board of County Commissioners
Martin County Board of Supervisors
Martin County Communication
Martin County Department of Children and Families
Martin County Emergency Management Agency
Martin County Fire Rescue
Martin County Hydrology
Martin County Public Information Office
Martin County School District
Martin County Sheriff's Office
Seawall's Point Police Department

Participating Organizations
Stuart Police Department
Brevard County
Brevard County Department of Solid Waste
Brevard County Emergency Management
Brevard County Fire Rescue
Brevard County Health Department
Brevard County Housing and Human Services
Brevard County Planning and Development
Brevard County Public Works Department
Brevard County Sheriff's Office
Florida Department Health, Brevard County
Space Coast Area Transit
Indian River County
Florida Department Health, Indian River County
Indian River County Amateur Radio Emergency Service
Indian River County Animal Control
Indian River County Department of Emergency Services Public Information
Indian River County Department of Emergency Services, Emergency Management
Indian River County Fire Rescue
Indian River County Fire Rescue Hazardous Materials
Indian River County School Safety Emergency Operations Director
Indian River County Sherriff's Office
Vero Beach Police Department
Palm Beach County

Participating Organizations
Florida Department Health, Palm Beach County
Palm Beach County Administration
Palm Beach County Board of Supervisors
Palm Beach County Community Services
Palm Beach County Cooperative Extension
Palm Beach County Department of 9-1-1 Program Services
Palm Beach County Department of Animal Care and Control
Palm Beach County Department of Facilities, Development and Operations
Palm Beach County Department of Public Safety
Palm Beach County Department of Risk Management
Palm Beach County Department of Transportation, Palm Tran
Palm Beach County Division of Emergency Management
Palm Beach County Fire Rescue Department
Palm Beach County Information Support Services
Palm Beach County Office of Financial Management and Budget
Palm Beach County Public Affairs
Palm Beach County Purchasing Department
Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office
Palm Beach Medical Society
Federal
United States Coast Guard
United States Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region 2
Private Sector
American Red Cross

Participating Organizations
Florida Power & Light/NextEra Energy, St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant
University of Florida Institute of Food and Agriculture

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APPENDIX D: EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT

The signed extent of play agreement is available here: https: //preptoolkit.fema.gov/web/2024-st.-lucie-plume-repp-exercise .