

After Action Report

Oconee Nuclear Station

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise

Exercise Date: March 29, 2022

Final

FEMA

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Executive Summary

On March 29, 2022, the offsite response organizations of the Oconee Nuclear Station 10-mile emergency planning zone participated in a plume exposure pathway exercise. FEMA Region 4 Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program staff evaluated that exercise, which also included out of sequence activities conducted on October 13, 2021, and January 27, 2022. This report outlines that exercise and out of sequence activities.

The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of state and local preparedness in responding to an incident at the Oconee Nuclear Station. It was conducted in accordance with FEMA policies and guidance concerning the exercise of state and local radiological emergency response plans and procedures. The federal approval of the formal submission of the radiological emergency response procedures for the Oconee Nuclear Station by the state of South Carolina was granted on February 23, 1983, and the qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on March 7 and 8, 1982. The previous federally evaluated exercise at this site was conducted September 1, 2020.

Officials and representatives from participating agencies and organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures, and successfully implemented them during the exercise and out of sequence activities. All jurisdictions met their exercise objectives and successfully demonstrated the corresponding core capabilities identified in Section 2.2 of this report. FEMA staff did not identify any level 1 or level 2 findings during this exercise or the out of sequence activities.

The state and local offsite response organizations for the Oconee Nuclear Station implemented appropriate precautionary and protective actions in response to an exercise scenario with no radiological release. They provided the necessary support and resources to respond to the incident. It was apparent that a great deal of planning, training, and exercising was conducted by the offsite response organizations to protect the health and safety of the public. Additionally, the exercise was leveraged by response organizations to test new capabilities and train individuals from outside of the affected areas. FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated in this exercise and maximized the opportunities to improve preparedness in their communities.

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Section 1: Exercise Overview

Exercise Name	2022 Oconee Nuclear Station Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise	
Type of Exercise	Partial Participation Exercise	
Exercise Date	March 29, 2022	
Out of Sequence Dates	October 12, 2021, and January 27, 2022	
Program	Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program	
Mission Area	Response	
Scenario Type	Plume Phase Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise	
Participating Organizations	See Appendix C for the list of participating organizations	
Locations	See Appendix D for the extent of play agreement and exercise locations	
Points of Contact	Mr. Robert Spence South Section Chief FEMA Region 4 3005 Chamblee-Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341	Mr. Matt Bradley Emergency Management Specialist FEMA Region 4 3005 Chamblee-Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341
	Ms. Danilyn Bock REP Manager South Carolina Emergency Management Division 2779 Fish Hatchery Road West Columbia, SC 29172	Mr. Parker Riggs REP Coordinator South Carolina Emergency Management Division 2779 Fish Hatchery Road West Columbia, SC 29172

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Section 2: Exercise Design Summary

2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design

FEMA administers the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program pursuant to the regulations found in Title 44 CFR parts 350, 351, 352, 353 and 354. CFR 350 codifies 16 planning standards that form the basis for radiological emergency response planning for the licensee, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments impacted by the emergency planning zones established for each nuclear power plant site in the United States. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations also codify the 16 planning standards for the licensee. 44 CFR 350 sets forth the mechanisms for the formal review and approval of state, local, tribal, and territorial government radiological emergency response plans and procedures by FEMA. One of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program cornerstones established by these regulations is the biennial exercise of offsite response capabilities. During these exercises, affected state, local, tribal, and territorial governments demonstrate their abilities to implement their plans and procedures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological incident at a nuclear plant.

The results of this exercise, together with reviews of the radiological emergency response plans and verification of the periodic requirements set forth in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, the annual letter of certification, and staff assistance visits, enabled FEMA to provide a statement with the transmission of this final after-action report to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This statement verifies that the affected state, local, tribal, and territorial plans and preparedness are: (1) adequate to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the nuclear power facility by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological incident; and (2) capable of being implemented.

The federal approval of the formal submission of the radiological emergency response procedures for the Oconee Nuclear Station by the state of South Carolina was granted on February 23, 1983, and the qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on March 7 and 8, 1982.

2.2 Exercise Core Capabilities and Objectives

Core capabilities-based planning allows for exercise planning teams to develop exercise objectives and observe exercise outcomes through a framework of specific action items. Using the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program methodology, the exercise objectives meet Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program requirements and objectives. The capability targets to be demonstrated were negotiated with the state of South Carolina and risk counties. The core capabilities scheduled for demonstration during this exercise were:

- **Operational Coordination:** Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.
- **Situational Assessment:** Provide all decision makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response.

- **Public Information and Warning:** Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard, as well as the actions being taken and the assistance being made available, as appropriate.
- **On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement:** Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas and also for response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.
- **Critical Transportation:** Provide transportation (including infrastructure access and accessible transportation services) for response priority objectives, including the evacuation of people and animals, and the delivery of vital response personnel, equipment, and services into the affected areas.

These core capabilities, when successfully demonstrated, meet the exercise objectives. The objectives for this exercise were as follows:

- **Objective 1:** Emergency Operations Management – Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify, and mobilize response personnel and facilities; provide direction and control; make precautionary and protective action decisions; and implement those decisions.
- **Objective 2:** Exposure Control – Demonstrate the ability to manage radiological exposure and dose to emergency workers.
- **Objective 3:** Alert and Notification – Demonstrate the ability to activate the prompt alert and notification system and provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and news media in a timely manner. Provide and maintain reliable communication with emergency personnel.
- **Objective 4:** Detect, Measure, Sample, Analyze, and Assess – Demonstrate the ability to perform plume-phase analysis and dose assessment.
- **Objective 5:** Operate – Demonstrate the ability to establish appropriate traffic and access controls.

2.3 Exercise Scenario

The following is a summary of the scenario developed by Duke Energy to drive exercise play.

The wind direction throughout the exercise varied from 63 degrees to 72 degrees toward Oconee County with a maximum wind speed of 12 miles per hour during the height of a thunderstorm, and stability class of E. Oconee County and Pickens County were affected by inclement weather and precautionary actions. The scenario did not have a radiological release.

Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities

3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results

This section contains the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the March 29, 2022, plume exposure pathway exercise and out of sequence activities on October 13, 2021, and January 27, 2022.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated based on the demonstration of core capabilities, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program objectives, and capability targets as delineated in the FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual dated December 2019. Capability targets are listed by number and the demonstration status of those capability targets are indicated by the use of the following terms:

- **Met (M):** The jurisdiction or functional entity performed all activities under the objective/capability target to the level required per the work plan and/or the extent-of-play agreement, with no Level 1 or Level 2 Findings evaluated under that objective/capability target during the current activity and no unresolved prior Level 2 Finding(s).
- **Level 1 Finding (L1):** An observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance during an assessment activity that could cause a determination that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant.
- **Level 2 Finding (L2):** An observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance during an assessment activity that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health and safety.
- **Plan Issue (P):** An observed or identified inadequacy in the ORO's emergency plan/implementing procedures, rather than in that of the ORO's performance.
- **Not Demonstrated (N):** For a justifiable reason, the jurisdiction or functional entity did not perform assessment activities under the objective/capability target as specified in the extent-of-play agreement.

3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation

The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program methodology is an analytical process used to assess the demonstration of specific capabilities during an exercise. A capability provides a means to perform one or more capability targets under specified conditions and to specific performance standards. Core capabilities form the foundation of the FEMA Region IV Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program evaluations. The core capability summaries below provide an overall combined assessment of state and local jurisdictions based upon their collective demonstrated performance as it relates to the specific core capability. Each jurisdiction's standalone capability summaries are provided below.

- **Operational Coordination:** The state executive group and county emergency management directors established and maintained a unified and coordinated operational structure. The overall decision-making process integrated critical stakeholders and enabled protective action decisions to be made without undue delay.

Facilities, communications equipment, and information sharing resources were used effectively during the exercise to support the response and enhance situational awareness. Supporting staff in the emergency operations centers effectively used plans and checklists to implement response actions and ensure appropriate resources were available and in place to carry out those actions.

- **Situational Assessment:** State dose assessment personnel provided decision makers relevant information regarding radiological and plant conditions. Personnel gathered information from changing plant and meteorological conditions to assess the impacts and potential for a radiological release. Although there was not a radiological release or licensee protective action recommendations in this scenario, the dose assessment coordinator performed dose projection calculations based on hypothesized data. Adult and child thyroid committed dose and total dose were calculated and compared to protective action guides. This information allowed decision makers to understand the extent of the potential hazards, their cascading effects, and to make the appropriate precautionary and protective action decisions.
- **Public Information and Warning:** Federal, state, county, utility, and private sector public information officers and spokespersons successfully operated within the joint information system/center to develop and deliver prompt and reliable information to the public and media through press releases and press conferences. Alert and notification of the public was accomplished via the outdoor warning system activated by the risk counties and the Emergency Alert System activated through the integrated public alert and warning system from the state emergency operations center.
- **On Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement:** Representatives from the South Carolina Highway Patrol and the Oconee County Sheriff's Office discussed their abilities to activate and maintain traffic and access control points to support an evacuation from the 10-mile emergency planning zone. The pre-designated points would be manned by trained officers who were familiar with exposure control equipment and record keeping. The South Carolina Department of Natural Resources discussed their ability to clear Lake Keowee and inform boaters of the hazard. Their officers also demonstrated knowledge of plans and exposure control equipment.
- **Critical Transportation:** Oconee and Pickens County School Districts' staff discussed their ability to implement protective actions for their students and staff during out of sequence interviews. The districts' leadership, school principals, and bus drivers discussed actions they would take based on a variety of protective action decisions. They were well-versed with their plans and procedures, and protective actions were well defined. There would be sufficient transportation assets available to relocate students and staff; appropriate capabilities to notify parents simultaneously; and redundant methods of maintaining accountability of students.

3.3 Jurisdictional Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation

3.3.1 State Jurisdiction

3.3.1.1 State of South Carolina

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

South Carolina Emergency Management Division staff successfully demonstrated the capability to coordinate emergency operations in response to a radiological emergency at the Oconee Nuclear Station. Coordination activities were conducted in the Governor's Situation

Room located within the South Carolina Emergency Management Division State Emergency Operations Center.

The state emergency operations center was adequately equipped with computers, office supplies, displays, audio system, and breakout rooms. Supplies were in sufficient quantity to maintain space and conduct emergency operations planning and implementation. Participants for this exercise were the technical officer, serving as the incident commander; the chief of operations; the chief of plans; the Governor's Authorized Representative; and personnel representing the department of transportation, emergency traffic management, mass care, law enforcement, public information, and health and medical services.

South Carolina Emergency Management Division demonstrated mobilization of key response personnel in a timely manner. Emergency classification notifications were received and verified by state warning point personnel without delay. Upon receipt of emergency notification forms, state warning point personnel notified the fixed nuclear facility group through an electronic notification system. This contact group provided initial notification to South Carolina Emergency Management Division management staff via cell, email, and text message. A faxed emergency notification form followed each notification and was quickly reproduced and distributed to executive group and State Emergency Response Team leaders. Once the Alert notification was made to the executive group, the operations chief initiated a mass notification message to be sent to all emergency support function staff, instructing them to respond to the state emergency operations center. The state emergency operations center was declared operational at 11:14 a.m. upon arrival of key emergency operations center staff. There were no resource support requests from Oconee or Pickens Counties noted during the exercise. Subsequent notifications followed the same notification and distribution flow from the utility to the state warning point to the state emergency response team.

The executive group consisted of the technical officer, the chief of operations, the chief of plans, and the Governor's Authorized Representative. Key protective action decision were determined internally among the key leaders with support from representatives of the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, South Carolina Department of Natural Resources, and the State Emergency Response Team consisting of emergency support functions 1, 6, 8, 15, 16, 17, and 19. Final protective action decisions were coordinated among the South Carolina State Emergency Operations Center staff and the Pickens and Oconee County Emergency Management Directors on the dedicated decision line. Decision line calls were conducted after receiving each new emergency notification form and each emergency classification level change, but then more frequently at the request of county leadership. The decision line remained open throughout the exercise to facilitate situational awareness. Additionally, the chief of operations assisted in maintaining the situational awareness of the state emergency operations center staff through staff briefings. The briefings informed the staff of the current situation and allowed the utility technical liaison to brief current plant conditions. The South Carolina Emergency Management Division maintained the ability to request additional resources; however, additional resources were not required during the exercise.

The Duke Emergency Management Network was the primary means of receiving and coordinating emergency information from the Oconee Nuclear Station and decisions among offsite organizations. A commercial telephone line and decision line bridge; satellite phone; and fax were backup methods of communication. The decision line was used for coordination during the exercise as indicated in the extent of play. The Duke Emergency Management

Network, satellite phone, conference bridge line, and facsimile were successfully utilized, and no communication failures were noted. The state warning point accomplished content checks with various organizations during daily communication activities. The state warning point personnel exercised ideal management of the communications systems and ensured all message traffic was handled without delays or disruptions to emergency response operations.

Discussion of protective action decisions for the general public and precautionary actions were led by the South Carolina Emergency Management Division Technical Officer. The technical officer coordinated protective action decision with the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control representative and the Governor's Authorized Representative. Decisions were then discussed and coordinated over the decision line. Precautionary actions implemented included the clearing of public waterways; the placement of livestock on stored feed and water; and a hunting and fishing band within the 10-mile emergency planning zone. The agreed protective action decision consisting of a shelter-in-place order for zones A-0, E-1, E-2, D-1, and D-2 was made at 11:33 a.m. after a verbal declaration of a state of emergency by the Governor's Authorized Representative at 11:14 a.m. The decision was made based on meteorological conditions and the potential for worsening conditions at Oconee Nuclear Station. Distribution of potassium iodide was also approved for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals within the 10-mile emergency planning zone. The protective action decision was followed by a coordinated siren activation, demonstrated through a silent test, and a simulated Emergency Alert System message at 11:45 a.m. The technical officer confirmed that the alert and notification system activation was completed with no failures at 11:52 a.m.

State liaisons from South Carolina Emergency Management Division and South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, who were deployed to the emergency operations facility located in Charlotte, North Carolina, coordinated with Duke Energy Corporation personnel. This coordination was in support of the offsite response to the incident. The presence of these liaisons facilitated information sharing among Duke Energy Corporation and state decision makers. The two state liaisons worked closely with utility personnel in the emergency operations facility to provide and share information with one another, as well as with the state emergency operations center in a timely manner.

The South Carolina Emergency Management Division Liaison worked with Duke Energy Corporation personnel to obtain current plant conditions and provide the information in a timely manner to decision makers in the state emergency operations center. The liaison also responded to various queries from utility personnel with respect to offsite precautionary and/or protective actions. The liaison provided utility personnel with verification that certain offsite key actions had been implemented, such as the simulated activation of the outdoor warning system. The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control Liaison facilitated the exchange of information between state and utility dose assessment personnel, including the exchange of dose assessment calculation results based on potential release scenarios. He tracked plant conditions through participation in discussions with utility personnel and by observing simulated plant information provided by the Emergency Reactor Data System. These insights were then shared with state dose assessment personnel. Both liaisons made effective use of facilities and equipment, particularly information technology systems to maintain situational awareness and communication.

The exercise was terminated at 12:29 p.m.; however, the technical officer stated that in the event of a General Emergency declaration, evacuation procedures would potentially be

implemented. Emergency support function 16 would ensure the five designated traffic control points were established. Shelters would be activated at McCants Middle School, T.L. Hanna High School, and Westside High School.

For this capability, the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, and 3.1.

Situational Assessment Capability Summary:

South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control personnel demonstrated the ability to provide staff and to assess radiological, meteorological, and plant conditions in response to a radiological incident at Oconee Nuclear Station. Staff members were prepositioned near the state emergency operations center and responded promptly when notified of the Alert emergency classification level, staffing emergency support functions 8 and 10. A roster was provided for 24-hour operations. The emergency support functions had workstations equipped with computers, landline telephones, office supplies, reference materials, and office supplies.

The emergency response coordinator provided direction to the emergency support function 10 team members. The team monitored changing adverse meteorological conditions, which affected plant systems. The emergency response coordinator participated in conference calls with state and county decision makers, providing technical information and recommendations during discussions of precautionary and protective actions. Precautionary actions taken following the Alert emergency classification level included clearing of public waterways and a hunting and fishing ban in the 10-mile emergency planning zone. Following the Site Area Emergency declaration, the emergency response coordinator added a precautionary action for livestock to be placed on stored feed and water. After the emergency response coordinator suggested that the group consider sheltering in place, the state and counties made a protective action decision to shelter in place areas two miles around and 10 miles downwind in case the situation at the plant further degraded. There was no upgrade to General Emergency in this exercise.

Although there was not a radiological release or licensee protective action recommendations in this scenario, the dose assessment coordinator performed dose projection calculations based on hypothesized data. Adult and child thyroid committed dose and total dose were calculated and compared to protective action guides. Since the state field teams did not participate in this exercise, the dose analyst demonstrated how this comparison would be made using the dose assessment software. The dose assessment coordinator maintained communication with the licensee and stated that utility field teams had only observed background levels.

Although there was no need for potassium iodide ingestion, the state public health medical officer approved the distribution of potassium iodide for emergency workers and institutionalized populations. If potassium iodide ingestion had been authorized, the emergency support function 8 would issue a written recommendation for emergency workers, institutionalized populations, and the general public in the plume emergency planning zone.

For this capability, the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 4.5

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

Federal, state, county, utility, and private sector public information officers and spokespersons successfully operated within the joint information system/center to develop and deliver prompt and reliable information to the public and media. Following notification of an Alert declaration, the joint information center was activated and declared operational in accordance with plans and procedures. The joint information center was staffed and operated from the state emergency operations center in Columbia, South Carolina. As a result, federal, state, county, utility, and private sector public information officers participated in the joint information system virtually from their respective facilities and locations to deliver accurate information to the public and media promptly. This was the first time the utility's joint information center within the vicinity of Oconee Nuclear Station was not used.

The joint information center itself provided the state public information officer and public information staff adequate space, ample communications systems, and necessary supplies and equipment. All communications systems were operable and sufficient to support response operations. The primary means of communication was a public information officer coordination line. This line was used to communicate information related to press releases, as well as provide situational awareness between all public information officers. Information was exchanged among federal, state, county, utility, and private sector public information officers about messages being released. Each entity functioned independently to release messages.

Overall direction and control for the joint information system/center was provided by the South Carolina Emergency Management Division Public Information Officer. The state public information officer attended and participated in decision line calls and then shared information, including precautionary and protective action decisions, with virtual public information officers via the public information officer coordination line. The state public information officer was also responsible for overseeing the state press release development, review, and approval process and disseminating approved joint press releases on behalf of the state. This process included a public information press release writer drafting each press release, and the chief of staff, chief of plans, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manager, and state public information officer reviewing and approving each press release. Draft messages were shared in a dedicated joint information system email group for coordination, review, and editing by all public information staff prior to final approval. Once approved, the public information press release writer emailed the approved press release to the main media distribution list, and then uploaded it into an electronic tracking system for record retention. In total, four joint press releases were disseminated, and one Emergency Alert System message was sent (simulated) via the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System.

In addition to press releases and an Emergency Alert System message, the public information officer coordination line was used to coordinate two virtual press conferences. A press conference pre-caucus was held via the line to triage information and establish the speaking order. A separate video conferencing platform was used to conduct the press conference virtually. The first press conference was facilitated and conducted solely by Duke Energy. As such, this press conference was not evaluated by FEMA. The second press conference was facilitated and conducted by the state public information officer with spokespersons representing the state, Oconee County, Pickens County, and Duke Energy. The state spokesperson went first and announced a state of emergency had been declared; a protective action decision had been made to shelter in place zones A-0, D-1, E-1, D-2, and

E-2; a hunting and fishing ban had been issued; farmers had been asked to place livestock on stored feed and water; Lake Keowee had been cleared; and the sirens and Emergency Alert System activated. The spokesperson encouraged residents to review their brochure and/or the Duke Energy or South Carolina Emergency Management Division websites for more information. Next, the Oconee County Emergency Services announced a state of emergency had been declared and students at Keowee Elementary School had been relocated. The Pickens County Emergency Management spokesperson also announced a state of emergency had been declared. The Duke Energy spokesperson discussed overall plant status and dispelled several rumors. Once each spokesperson had spoken, the mock media was given the opportunity to ask questions. The types of questions fell primarily into two categories: (1) plant status/condition; and (2) what actions the public should take. A total of six questions were asked and answered. While the agricultural advisory and the hunting and fishing ban were addressed in the press conference, it is recommended that those precautionary actions also be included in written press releases for consistency and accuracy.

Through controller inject, the joint information center received calls via their public information phone system. The public inquiry phone number was included in a press release so the public and media could call and ask questions related to the incident at Oconee Nuclear Station. Many calls were received throughout the exercise; the joint information center manager addressed each callers' concerns and provided additional sources of information as appropriate.

For this capability, the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.2, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3.

On Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement Core Capability Summary:

Representatives from the South Carolina Department of Natural Resources discussed their procedures and coordination protocols for clearing Lake Keowee following an incident at the Oconee Nuclear Station. The officers demonstrated knowledge of the plans, as well as the resources that would be required to clear the lake under a variety of circumstances. A designated "go-case" is maintained at their Clemson office which contains all of the plans, maps, and reference guides needed to accomplish the mission as intended. The officers discussed Oconee County Emergency Services' issuance of exposure control equipment, just-in-time training to those responding, and recordkeeping forms. The officers were familiar with administrative dose limits and the actions to take if the limits were exceeded. All responding officers would have access to interoperable communications and could coordinate operations on a common channel. The South Carolina Department of Natural Resources would have the responsibility for directing the operation and would provide assignments to other responders dependent on lake conditions and population. Boats would be launched into the lake to traverse pre-determined routes. While navigating the routes, a pre-scripted message would be read over a public address system to alert boaters to an incident at Oconee Nuclear Station and emergency instructions.

For this capability, the following capability targets were MET: 1.1, 2.2, 3.1, and 5.4.

3.3.2 Risk Jurisdictions

3.3.2.1 Oconee County

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

Oconee County Emergency Services and the emergency operations center staff established and maintained a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrated all critical stakeholders and supported the execution of core capabilities successfully during their response to a simulated incident at the Oconee Nuclear Station.

Appropriate staff were notified of the incident through an automated reverse calling system. They received notifications by email, text, and phone. Staff were pre-positioned in the area but did not report to their duty stations until notified to respond to the emergency operations center. Once operational, the emergency operations center was fully staffed in accordance with procedures. There were 14 emergency operations center support staff members participating virtually. To reduce the footprint in the facility, the emergency operations center manager utilized their newly installed audio/video equipment to establish a virtual platform that included some key emergency operations center personal. This virtual platform stayed operational during the exercise and appeared to foster seamless integration of those participants. There were adequate staff for 24-hour operations and shift rosters were available for review.

The emergency operations center had adequate space, equipment, and resources for sustained operations. A large multi-screen monitor in the front of the emergency operations center displayed: current plant emergency status; emergency planning maps with wind direction; the plant significant events log; the time; and three other screens that displayed the video site used by virtual participants. These displays provided staff with current and accurate incident status. Primary communications with Oconee Nuclear Station were via the Duke Emergency Management Network. Commercial landline telephones served as an alternate method of notification. Landline telephones provided primary communications in the emergency operations center. The coordination conference calls were conducted over a dedicated conference bridge line which was led by the state operations center command staff to provide situational awareness and coordination between the state and risk counties. Computers, cellular phones, and automated notification systems were also utilized.

The Director of Oconee County Emergency Services provided direction and control to the emergency operations staff. The emergency operations center manager conducted frequent staff briefings and facilitated updates from key support staff. The director participated in all conference calls with the other risk county and state agencies to review plant status, emergency classification levels, and response actions. The conference calls were also used to develop coordinated and well-informed precautionary and protective action decisions. Before each conference call, the director reviewed all information and input provided by the emergency operations center staff and the other risk county to ensure that the county was prepared. Precautionary actions included lake closure; relocation of one school in the plume exposure planning zone; hunting and fishing ban; and an agricultural advisory regarding stored feed and water for livestock. A coordinated protective action decision was made to shelter in place zones A-0, E-1, E-2, D-1 and D-2. Residents were also instructed to stay tuned to local television and radio for any additional potential emergency instructions. There were robust discussions prior to the protective action decisions. All participants were able to

ask questions and suggest actions in a constructive manner, which lead to collaborative protective action decisions.

Emergency operations center staff effectively implemented precautionary actions and took pre-planned steps to prepare for potential protective actions. Emergency medical services staff simulated contacting all access and functional needs individuals in Oconee County to alert them of the incident and assess their needs in case of relocation or evacuation. They used a database of residents who had identified their needs using mail in cards provided in the annual public safety brochure. All schools in the emergency planning zone were notified of the incident and buses were placed on standby to transport students if needed. Following the declaration of Site Area Emergency, the decision was made to relocate Keowee Elementary. The students would be relocated to West Oak Elementary, and parents would be notified by the school's reverse calling system. The remaining schools were to be released at their normal scheduled times. Oconee Memorial Hospital was also preparing for any potential patient transfers in the event of any further protective actions. Reception Centers in Anderson County were activated and placed on standby. Traffic control points maintained by the Oconee County Sheriff's Office and South Carolina Highway Patrol were established and placed on standby. Oconee County emergency workers had sufficient dosimetry and potassium iodide for operations. Potassium iodide was distributed (simulated) to emergency workers, institutionalized populations, and to reception centers, but ingestion was not directed during the exercise. Oconee County would have been well-prepared for further protective actions if required due to their proactive posture.

For this capability, the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, and 5.4.

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

Oconee County Emergency Services personnel successfully demonstrated their ability to alert the public and provide emergency information and instructions during a simulated radiological emergency at the Oconee Nuclear Station.

The joint timing of one siren activation was coordinated with Pickens County, the other risk county in South Carolina. After the increase to Site Area Emergency, the decision was made to sound the sirens in Oconee and Pickens Counties. At the coordinated time, both counties simultaneously activated a silent test of all sirens in the emergency planning zone. The test was completed, and all Oconee sirens reported as operational. The test was followed by receipt of the state-issued Emergency Alert System message instructing residents to stay tuned to local television and radio for potential emergency instructions.

Oconee County Emergency Operations Center staff developed appropriate public information using pre-scripted messages and obtained proper concurrence for issuance of three messages. The Oconee County Public Information Officer and staff successfully operated within the joint information system to deliver coordinated, prompt, and reliable information to the public and media in a timely manner. This was accomplished through a variety of systems, including a mass-notification phone/text/email system, and a dedicated, continuously open public information conference phone line. Frequent communication between the Oconee Public Information Officer in the emergency operations center and their counterparts in Pickens County and in the state joint information center ensured all were continuously updated on both anticipated and actual public information releases. The public information officer represented Oconee County in one virtual media news briefing broadcast,

which aided the timely flow of public information and messaging. Nine public inquiries of information and questions specific to the emergency at Oconee Nuclear Station were coordinated by the county public information office staff located in the emergency operations center.

An interview with county emergency services fire representatives who would be sent into the area of a failed siren to accomplish route alerting was conducted. Utilizing a binder of maps detailing roads around all Oconee County sirens, planning for notifications within the area was discussed. It was explained how each backup notification would be assigned to multiple two person crews and accomplished throughout the area within a reasonable target of approximately 45-minutes following failure of any or all parts of the primary alert system. The teams were familiar of the route areas, the broadcast messages, and had placards to place on homes that appeared vacant. The teams travelling in the siren areas would be considered emergency workers and were well-trained in the use of dosimetry; their reporting requirements; and the issuance of potassium iodide, and to ingest only when instructed.

For this capability, the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 3.2 and 3.3

On Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement Capability Summary:

The South Carolina Highway Patrol, the South Carolina Department of Natural Resources, and the Oconee County Sheriff's Office were mobilized and prepared to respond to the simulated events impacting the Oconee Nuclear Station and the impacted area. They demonstrated the capability to identify and request additional resources as needed via the web-based electronic incident management system.

Upon notification of a simulated major traffic accident, dispatch alerted the state highway patrol, fire and rescue, and hazardous material crews of the incident. This accident involved a dump truck and a logging semi-truck, resulting in the contents of both vehicles spilling over the roadway, blocking traffic in both directions. The road was closed for the duration of the event. Requests for support were submitted within the web-based communication portal per the standard operating procedure. South Carolina Highway Patrol simulated the deployment of additional officers to support, in addition to requesting barricades and support vehicles to assist with cleanup.

A second notification was received of another simulated major accident on I-85 southbound. This accident impacted a pre-identified evacuation route to the reception center. Dispatch notified highway patrol of the accident. Troopers were immediately deployed to the scene (simulated). Southbound message boards were simulated activated. Troopers simulated the arrival on scene to evaluate the need to detour traffic. A resource request was sent to South Carolina Department of Transportation to reroute traffic to South Carolina-81.

Through the actions of the responding agencies, the simulated accidents were managed and cleared, resulting in limited to no impact on the evacuation routes and traffic control points. All responding officers would have been issued exposure control equipment by the Oconee County Emergency Services Radiological Officer. Upon issuance, they would receive just in time training in addition to the annual training they receive on its use.

For this capability, the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 5.4.

Core Capability: Critical Transportation

Oconee County School District staff discussed their ability to implement protective actions for the students and staff of Blue Ridge Elementary School; Northside Elementary School; and Walhalla Middle School, which were located within the 10-mile emergency planning zone of Oconee Nuclear Station. An interview was conducted with the district's director of student services; director of transportation; an area bus supervisor; and the principals of each school as an out-of-sequence activity on January 27, 2022. During the interview, school officials discussed actions they would take based on a variety of protective action decisions. They were well-versed with their plans and procedures, and protective actions were well defined. There would be sufficient transportation assets available to relocate students and staff; appropriate capabilities to notify parents simultaneously; and redundant methods of maintaining accountability of students.

For this capability, the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.5.

3.3.2.2 Pickens County

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

Pickens County Emergency Management Agency successfully demonstrated operational coordination during the Oconee Nuclear Station radiological preparedness exercise. A decision line was kept open on a web conference platform throughout the exercise to allow coordination among the state and counties. The emergency management director, county administrator, and supporting staff effectively gathered pertinent emergency information, analyzed it, and discussed possible actions in anticipation of coordination calls. Their proactive planning resulted in effective decision-making and coordination of actions to protect county emergency workers and the general population in the emergency planning zone. Periodic staff briefings kept the staff informed of emergency conditions and plant status, and the staff maintained effective internal coordination about response actions.

Initial emergency notification and incident updates from the Oconee Nuclear Station were received in Pickens County over the Duke Emergency Management Network. The system was set up in the Pickens County 911 center and the emergency operations center to produce a loud audible tone over loudspeaker. When the loudspeaker alarmed, emergency notification forms were received via email and fax. Pickens County Emergency Management Agency staff verified receipt of the emergency notification forms on the duke emergency management network phoneline. For this demonstration, Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, and Site Area Emergency classification level changes were all received in the same manner.

Following the Alert emergency classification level, the director instructed the E-911 supervisor to mobilize staff to the emergency operations center using a mass notification system and distribution lists. Pickens County Emergency Operations Center staff did not report to their duty stations until they received notification to do so. The Pickens County Emergency Management Agency maintains a 24-hour staffing roster to support extended operations.

Following the declaration of Site Area Emergency, a protective action decision was made to shelter in place zones A-0, D-1, D-2, E-1, and E-2 due to meteorological conditions and their affects on a potential radiological release. Zone A-0 was the only zone impacting Pickens County. In coordination with Oconee County, the emergency management director activated

the sirens in the Pickens County portion of the emergency planning zone to alert residents of the protective action. A coordinated Emergency Alert System message was broadcast (simulated) from the state emergency operations center. The director, in coordination with emergency management agency staff, ensured effective coordination during the implementation of the protective action decision. They coordinated with Pickens County Health Department and emergency medical services to ensure the residents in zone A-0 with access and/or functional needs were aware of the need to shelter in place. Pickens County staff maintained a file of all individuals identified as having access and/or functional needs that resided within the emergency planning zone. The location and specific needs of those populations were readily available to responders to support their evacuation if needed. The director periodically held conferences with the county school district and Clemson University liaisons to proactively coordinate plans to evacuate the schools if the situation continued to deteriorate. As a precautionary action, Pickens County schools were instructed to close midday; students would be transported back to their homes. Clemson University courses and events were cancelled as well.

The Pickens County Emergency Management Radiological Officer provided an emergency worker briefing and simulated distribution of exposure control kits to emergency workers as they signed into the emergency operations center. Dosimetry and potassium iodide tablets are maintained by the Pickens County Emergency Management staff and would be further distributed by representatives from respective agencies as necessary. Emergency worker exposure would be tracked on emergency worker forms, which would be distributed and collected by the radiological officer at the emergency operations center.

Pickens County Emergency Operations Center staff successfully utilized several communications systems to ensure information and communication was continuously available and reliable. Loudspeaker alarms were used to notify emergency operations center staff of incoming messages from the Oconee Nuclear Station. Emergency notification forms were posted on the online incident management program, which enabled cross-agency status updates. A web-based conferencing platform was used to host the discussion line. A mass notification messaging system was used to send alerts to emergency operations center staff via text message and automated voice call. The Pickens County Emergency Management Director brought attention to miscommunication issues that took place during the decision line calls. Clearance of Lake Keowee was not coordinated with Pickens County prior to implementation. While the lack of information sharing did not affect the overall performance or outcome of the demonstration, it highlighted areas of improvement for coordination.

Representatives from the South Carolina Highway Patrol and Pickens County Sheriff's Office managed traffic and access control. The department of transportation provided signage and barriers. Through interview, a representative from the South Carolina Highway Patrol explained staffing of traffic control points in Pickens County. Routes and traffic control point locations are pre-established and listed in *Pickens County Emergency Operations Plan, Annex Q*, and in a checklist utilized by the South Carolina Highway Patrol. Through discussion, the highway patrol representative explained that clearance of impediments would primarily be coordinated through himself, the Pickens County Sheriff's Office, the Pickens County Fire Department, and emergency services representative in the emergency operations center.

For this capability, the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, and 5.4.

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

Public information staff from Pickens County delivered coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information for the whole community. Information regarding threats and hazards; actions taken; and assistance available were successfully messaged to the public and the media while operating within a virtual joint information system.

Public information staff used laptops, computers, cellular phones, landline conferencing telephones, email, conference bridge lines, and a video conference platform to communicate and collaborate in support of emergency operations. A public information coordination bridge line for exclusive use by joint information system staff was established following notification of Alert. The coordination line was used to establish and maintain communication among public information officers for joint information system coordination. A video conference platform was used to conduct media briefings, with a video streaming link available for remote viewing. No communication failures were observed. Sufficient equipment, maps, displays, supplies, and administrative resources were available to support emergency operations.

The decision to activate the alert and notification system was coordinated by command staff on their discussion line following declaration of Site Area Emergency and the protective action decision to shelter in place A-0, D-1, D-2, E-1, and E-2. Pickens County successfully simulated, up to the point of activation, the initiation of sirens. Transmission of one Emergency Alert System message via the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System was initiated (simulated) from the state emergency operations center. No failures were observed.

Pickens County Emergency Operations Center staff discussed their ability to alert and notify the public in the event of siren failure. Upon notification from Pickens County Emergency Management Agency staff of siren failure and initiation of backup route alerting, Pickens County Special Operations Team staff assigned to the task would receive just-in-time training as needed; a briefing of the incident; emergency worker radiological exposure record forms; and dosimetry. Pickens County Emergency Operations Center staff demonstrated knowledge of radiological exposure control limits; dosimetry usage and placement; administrative limits and turn back values; dose and potassium iodide record management; and the locations of emergency worker and vehicle decontamination stations. Potassium iodide would be distributed in accordance with plans and procedures. Pickens County staff described backup route alerting procedures consistent with established plans and procedures. They were familiar with how to identify the pre-determined route to run based on the coverage area of the failed siren. While navigating the route, a scripted message would be announced via the vehicle's public address system to alert the public of an incident and to tune in to local radio for further guidance. It was stated backup alerting procedures for each route could be completed within a reasonable time.

Public information staff demonstrated the preparation and delivery of coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the public in news releases and press conferences. Pickens County issued one individual county news release prior to activation of the joint information system. The director used a modified pre-scripted message template, which was reviewed by the county administrator prior to release to the public and media. Once the joint information system was activated, subsequent messages were released as joint messages from the state. Pre-scripted message templates were modified to include accurate precautionary and protective action decisions made by command staff on the discussion

line. Draft messages were shared in a dedicated joint information system email group for coordination, review, and editing by public information staff prior to approval. The release of approved messages to the media and public was simulated by email to a mock media distribution list. A total of 11 news releases, including the reissuance of one corrected new release, were developed by Pickens County, Oconee County, the South Carolina State Emergency Response Team, and Clemson University. News releases included accurate emergency information and instructions consistent with the protective action decision. Information regarding the precautionary actions of a hunting and fishing ban and placement of livestock on stored feed and water were not included in the news releases. However, the media and public were informed of these precautionary actions during a joint press conference.

One joint press conference was held following declaration of Site Area Emergency with participating spokespersons from Pickens County, Oconee County, the South Carolina State Emergency Response Team, and Clemson University. Mock media was also present and asked several questions, which were accurately responded to by the state and utility representative. Spokespersons provided the public and media with accurate emergency information and instructions consistent with the precautionary actions and protective action decision as applicable to each jurisdiction.

Pickens County public information staff received and addressed questions from citizens and the media via controller inject. Two citizen questions pertained to how to receive the latest emergency instructions, which were accurately responded to by instructing them to stay tuned to local media and providing emergency alert system radio station channels. One question from the media asked where to go for briefings and was responded to by providing the web link to the video conference platform used to conduct media briefings. Rumor control functions were performed at other locations, with rumors reported to public information staff in the joint information system. Rumors were shared on the public information coordination line and validated as true or false among the public information staff before being addressed to the public and media as needed.

For this capability, the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 3.2 and 3.3.

Core Capability: Critical Transportation

Pickens County School District staff discussed their ability to implement protective actions for the students and staff of Six Mile Elementary School and D.W. Daniel High School, which were located within the 10-mile emergency planning zone of Oconee Nuclear Station. An interview was conducted with the district's assistant superintendent of school administration; the coordinator of transportation; a bus driver; and the principals of Six Mile Elementary School and D.W. Daniel High School as an out-of-sequence activity on January 27, 2022. During the interview, school officials discussed actions they would take based on

a variety of protective action decisions. They were well-versed with their plans and procedures, and protective actions were well defined. There would be sufficient transportation assets available to relocate students and staff; appropriate capabilities to notify parents simultaneously; and a sound plan to maintain accountability of students.

For this capability, the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.5.

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Section 4: Conclusion

FEMA assesses offsite response organization preparedness on an ongoing basis which meets the intent of the 44 CFR 350 planning standards and, through the assessment of selected core capabilities, the National Preparedness Goal. This report is used to document biennial demonstration-based assessment activities and will be used to inform the Biennial Preparedness Report in December 2022.

The offsite response organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures, and successfully demonstrated the ability to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of an incident involving the Oconee Nuclear Station. The state and local offsite response organizations implemented appropriate precautionary and protective actions in response to an exercise scenario with no radiological release. They provided the necessary support and resources to respond to the incident. It was apparent that a great deal of planning, training, and exercising was conducted by the offsite response organizations to protect the health and safety of the public.

Despite the current pandemic and other ongoing real-world response efforts, the professionalism and teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all phases of the exercise. Additionally, the exercise was leveraged by response organizations to test new capabilities and train individuals from outside of the affected areas. Oconee County Emergency Services personnel tested new audio-visual equipment as well as software used to communicate more effectively with the hearing-impaired community. Pickens County Emergency Management brought in a neighboring emergency management director to observe the exercise in an effort to add depth to response capabilities.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated in this exercise and maximized the opportunities to improve preparedness in your communities.

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Appendix A: Exercise Timeline

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Time Utility Declared	Time That Notification Was Received or Action Was Taken				
		SC SEOC	SC DOSE ASSESSMENT	OCONEE COUNTY EOC	PICKENS COUNTY EOC	JIS*
Unusual Event	8:33 a.m.	8:46 a.m.	8:52 a.m.	8:41 a.m.	8:44 a.m.	
Alert	9:26 a.m.	9:38 a.m.	9:42 a.m.	9:35 a.m.	9:36 a.m.	
Site Area Emergency	10:56 a.m.	11:05 a.m.	11:05 a.m.	11:03 a.m.	11:06 a.m.	11:09 a.m.*
General Emergency	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Simulated Rad. Release Started	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Simulated Rad. Release Ended	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Facility Declared Operational		9:26 a.m.	9:26 a.m.	9:40 a.m.	9:34 a.m.	10:02 a.m.*
State of Emergency Declared	State	11:14 a.m.				
	Local			11:50 a.m.	11:40 a.m.	
End Exercise		12:30 p.m.	12:30 p.m.	12:31 p.m.	12:31 p.m.	12:29 p.m.
Precautionary Actions: Early release/relocation of schools				11:15 a.m.	12:30 p.m.	12:29 p.m.*
Hunting/Fishing Ban		11:33 a.m.	10:30 a.m.	11:33 a.m.	11:33 a.m.	
Waterway Clearing		10:30 a.m.	10:30 a.m.	11:33 a.m.	11:33 a.m.	10:48 a.m.*
Animals on Stored Feed and Water		11:33 a.m.	11:10 a.m.	11:33 a.m.	11:33 a.m.	
Protective Action Decision 1: Shelter-in-Place: A0, E1, E2, D1, D2 Stay Tuned		11:33 a.m.	11:33 a.m.	11:33 a.m.	11:33 a.m.	11:45 a.m.*
Siren Activation		11:45 a.m.	11:45 a.m.	11:45 a.m.	11:45 a.m.	11:45 a.m.
EAS Message		11:45 a.m.		11:45 a.m.	11:45 a.m.	
KI Ingestion Decision: Distribute to Emergency Workers and Institutionalized Population (Not to Ingest)		11:10 a.m.	11:10 a.m.	11:33 a.m.	11:33 a.m.	

*Denotes the time in which a decision was messaged from the joint information center.

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Appendix B: Evaluator Assignments

Location/Venue	Evaluation Team	Core Capability
State Emergency Operations Center	Quintin Ivy Gerald McLemore	Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning
Dose Assessment	Jill Leatherman	Situational Assessment
Joint Information System / State JIC	Erica Houghton Farrah Stewart	Public Information and Warning
EOF Liaison	John Pelchat	Operational Coordination
Waterway Clearance OOS October 11, 2021	Matt Bradley	On Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement
Oconee County Emergency Operations Center	DeShun Lowery Dave Ortman Ashanti Smith Roy Smith	Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning
Oconee County – Protective Actions for Schools OOS January 26, 2022	Matt Bradley	Critical Transportation
Pickens County Emergency Operations Center	Robert Nash Randi Hendrix Glenda Bryson	Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning
Protective Actions for Schools OOS January 26, 2022	Matt Bradley	Critical Transportation

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Appendix C: Exercise Participants

Participating Organizations
State of South Carolina
South Carolina Office of the Adjutant General, Emergency Management Division
South Carolina Department of Health & Environmental Control
South Carolina Department of Natural Resources
South Carolina Highway Patrol
South Carolina Department of Public Safety – South Carolina Law Enforcement Division
South Carolina Department of Social Services
South Carolina Department of Transportation
Clemson University
Oconee County
Oconee County Emergency Services
Oconee County Hazardous Materials Team
Oconee County Sheriff's Office
Oconee County Public Works
Oconee County Department of Mental Health
Oconee County Roads and Bridges Department
Oconee County Assessor
Seneca Police Department
Oconee County Emergency Medical Services
Clemson Area Transit
County Animal/Agricultural Response Team
Oconee County Procurement
Walhalla Fire Department

Participating Organizations
Civilian Emergency Response Team
Pickens County
Pickens County Emergency Management
Pickens County Fire Department
Pickens County Health Department
Pickens County Emergency Medical Services,
Pickens County School District
Pickens County Sheriff's Department
Pickens County Rescue Service
Pickens County Roads and Bridges Department
Pickens County 911
Private Sector
Duke Energy
Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service
Amateur Radio Emergency Services
American Red Cross
Salvation Army
Prism Health
Federal
United States Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region 4
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Appendix D: Extent of Play Agreement

Oconee Nuclear Station 2022 Partial Participation
Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Exercise

Unless otherwise noted, all activities will be fully demonstrated in accordance with respective plans and procedures, as they would be in an actual emergency. South Carolina Emergency Management Division (SCEMD) must provide these plans, guides, and procedures to Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) NLT 60 days before the exercise. If an activity is not listed as an exception, it will be demonstrated as described in the plans, standard operating guides (SOGs) and/or standard operating procedures (SOPs). In some cases, a task may be listed as "demonstrate/discuss" to indicate that actions may be completed or discussed via interview as the scenario dictates. Any activity to be evaluated out-of-sequence (OOS), during staff assistance visits (SAVs), and/or by discussion will be clearly identified. Any issue or discrepancy arising during exercise play may be re-demonstrated, if allowed by the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) Chair or as listed herein. This allowance may be granted if it is not disruptive to exercise play and is mutually agreed to by the Offsite Response Organization (ORO) Controller and FEMA Evaluator.

Offsite Response Organizations (ORO)	Page #
State of South Carolina	
State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC)	1
Dose Assessment	3
Joint Information System (JIS)	4
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Liaisons	6
Waterway Clearance	6
Risk Counties (Oconee and Pickens)	
Emergency Operations Center (EOC)	8
Schools	12
Traffic Control Points (TCPs)	13
Backup Route Alerting	14
Emergency Worker Decontamination (EWD)	15
Emergency Medical Services (EMS)/ Medical Facilities	17
Host Counties (Anderson and Greenville)	
Reception Center (RC)	20
Congregate Care (CC)	21
Signatures	
Signature Page	23

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC)

Core Capability: Operational Coordination
Definition: Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

Capability Target: 1.1: Mobilization

Individuals with roles in support of emergency operations are identified, alerted, and mobilized in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, O.1).

South Carolina Emergency Management Division (SCEMD) will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to receive notification of an incident from the licensees; verify the notification; contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner.
- The ability to staff and maintain 24-hour operations.
- The activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel upon their arrival.
- The ability to identify and request additional resources or identify compensatory measures.

Exception: Personnel cannot be at their duty station but may be pre-positioned in the area prior to notification. Personnel may participate virtually during the exercise; as circumstances require.

Capability Target: 1.2: Direction and Control
Individuals in leadership roles provide direction and control to the portion of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.1.c, A.2, A.3, A.5, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, D.4, E.1, H.6, O.1).

State Emergency Response Team (SERT) members at the SEOC will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The availability of facilities to support emergency operations.
- The ability to carry out the essential management functions of the response effort.
- The ability to prioritize resource tasking and replace/supplement resources.

Exception: All coordination telephone calls should occur in accordance with plans and procedures. However, the simcell may substitute for non-participating agencies.

Capability Target: 1.4: Protective Action Decisions for the Plume Phase
Appropriate PADS are based on available information for the plume phase. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: D.1.b, D.4, J.6, J.7, J.8, J.8.b, J.10, J.10.a, J.10.b, J.11.c-g, O.1).

The SERT will demonstrate/discuss the following Critical Tasks:

- The ability to conduct the decision-making process taking those with disabilities and access/functional needs (e.g., nursing homes, correctional facilities, licensed day cares, mobility-impaired individuals, and transportation-dependent individuals) into account.
- The capability to make prompt decisions on protective actions for students.
- The capability to make both initial and subsequent precautionary and/or protective action decisions in a timely manner appropriate to the incident.

- The capability to change protective actions based on the combination of the following factors: subsequent dose projections, field monitoring data, or information on plant conditions, magnitude of ongoing threat, the response, and/or site conditions.
- The capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI to supplement sheltering and evacuation.
- The capability to communicate the results of decisions to all the affected locations.

Capability Target: 3.1: Communications
Communication processes, systems, and equipment are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, O.1).

SCEMD will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:
- A primary system and at least one backup system are fully functional at all times.
- The capability to manage the communications systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.
- That the SEOC has sufficient equipment, maps and displays to perform the assigned role.

Exception or Note: (comms system if different than site specific plans, i.e., conference bridge line)

Core Capability: Public Information and Warning
Definition: Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

Capability Target: 3.2: Alert and Notification of the Public
Alert and notification of the public is completed in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: E.2, E.4, E.5, F.3, O.1).

The SERT will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:
- A primary system and at least one backup system are fully functional at all times.
- The capability to coordinate siren activation followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ. The procedures to broadcast the message will be fully demonstrated as they would in an actual emergency up to the point of transmission.
- The backup alert and notification procedures utilized in the event of a siren failure.

Exception: All siren soundings will be conducted via silent test.

Dose Assessment

Core Capability: Situational Assessment
Definition: Provide all decision-makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response.

Capability Target: 1.1: Mobilization
Individuals with roles in support of emergency operations are identified, alerted, and mobilized in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, O.1).

South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to receive notification of an incident from the licensees; verify the notification; contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner.
- The ability to staff and maintain 24-hour operations.
- The activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel upon their arrival.
- The ability to identify and request additional resources or identify compensatory measures.

Exception: Personnel cannot be at their duty station but may be pre-positioned in the area prior to notification. Personnel may participate virtually during the exercise; as circumstances require.

Capability Target: 1.2: Direction and Control
Individuals in leadership roles provide direction and control to the portion of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.1.c, A.2, A.3, A.5, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, D.4, E.1, H.6, O.1).

SCDHEC will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The availability of facilities to support emergency operations.
- The ability to carry out the essential management functions of the response effort.
- The ability to prioritize resource tasking and replace/supplement resources.

Exception: All coordination telephone calls should occur in accordance with plans and procedures. However, the simcell may substitute for non-participating agencies.

Capability Target: 1.3: Protective Action Recommendations
Appropriate PARs are selected based on available information and other factors. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: D.4, J.7, J.8, J.8.b, J.9, O.1).

SCDHEC will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to develop PARs for decision-makers based on available information and recommendations provided by the licensee, as well as field monitoring data if available.
- The capability to independently validate dose projections.
- The capability to use any additional data to refine projected doses and exposure rates and revise the associated PARs.

Capability Target: 4.5: Plume Phase Analysis and Dose Assessment
Dose Assessment considers all available information including plant conditions, environmental conditions, field monitoring data, sample analysis results, and dose projection calculations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: A.3, H.13, I.6, I.8, I.10, K.3, O.1).

SCDHEC will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to develop PARs for decision-makers based on available information and recommendations provided by the licensee, as well as field monitoring data if available.
- The capability to independently validate dose projections.
- The capability to use any additional data to refine projected doses and exposure rates and revise the associated PARs.

Joint Information System (JIS)

<u>Core Capability: Public Information and Warning</u>

Definition: Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

Capability Target: 1.1: Mobilization
Individuals with roles in support of emergency operations are identified, alerted, and mobilized in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, O.1).

ESF-15 (Public Information) will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to receive notification of an incident from the licensees; verify the notification; contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner.
- The ability to staff and maintain 24-hour operations.
- The activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel upon their arrival.
- The ability to identify and request additional resources or identify compensatory measures.

Exception: Personnel cannot be at their duty station but may be pre-positioned in the area prior to notification. Personnel may participate virtually during the exercise; as circumstances require.

Capability Target: 1.2: Direction and Control
Individuals in leadership roles provide direction and control to the portion of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.1.c, A.2, A.3, A.5, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, D.4, E.1, H.6, O.1).

ESF-15 (Public Information) will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The availability of facilities to support emergency operations.
- The ability to carry out the essential management functions of the response effort.
- The ability to prioritize resource tasking and replace/supplement resources.

Capability Target: 3.1: Communications
Communication processes, systems, and equipment are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, O.1).

ESF-15 (Public Information) will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- A primary system and at least one backup system are fully functional at all times.
- The capability to manage the communications systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.
- That the SEOC has sufficient equipment, maps, and displays to perform the assigned role.

Exception or Note: (comms system if different than site specific plans, i.e., conference bridge line)

Capability Target: 3.2: Alert and Notification of the Public
Alert and notification of the public is completed in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: E.2, E.4, E.5, F.3, O.1).

ESF-15 (Public Information) will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- A primary system and at least one backup system are fully functional at all times.
- The capability to coordinate siren activation followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the 10-mile plume exposure

pathway EPZ. The procedures to broadcast the message will be fully demonstrated as they would in an actual emergency up to the point of transmission.
- The backup alert and notification procedures utilized in the event of a siren failure.

Exception: All siren soundings will be conducted via silent test. EAS messages will prepared and coordinated, but broadcast will be simulated. Procedures for broadcasting EAS messages will be discussed.

Capability Target: 3.3: Emergency Information and Instructions for Public and News Media
Accurate emergency information and instructions are provided to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: E.2, E.4, E.5, G.1, G.2, G.3, G.3.a, G.4, G.5, O.1).

ESF-15 (Public Information) will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:
- The ability to provide emergency information and instructions to the public and media in a timely manner following the initial alert and notification (not subject to specific time requirements).
- The capability to ensure that emergency information that is no longer valid is rescinded and not repeated by broadcast media.
- The capability to ensure that current emergency information is repeated at pre-established intervals.
- The capability to provide timely, accurate, concise, and coordinated information to the news media for subsequent dissemination to the public.
- The capability to respond appropriately to inquiries from the news media.
- The capability to deal with calls received via the public inquiry hotline.
- The capability to provide or obtain accurate information for public inquiry callers or make appropriate referrals.
- The capability to ensure that emergency information and instructions are consistent with PADs made by appropriate officials.
- The capability to ensure that emergency information contains all necessary and applicable instructions to assist the public in carrying out the PADs provided.
- The capability to conduct timely and pertinent media briefings and distribute media releases as the incident warrants.

Emergency Operations Facility/Liaison

Core Capability: Operational Coordination
Definition: Provide all decision-makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response.

Capability Target: 1.2: Direction and Control
Individuals in leadership roles provide direction and control to the portion of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.1.c, A.2, A.3, A.5, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, D.4, E.1, H.6, O.1).

Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Liaison will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:
- The availability of facilities to support emergency operations.
- The ability to carry out the essential management functions of the response effort.
- The ability to prioritize resource tasking and replace/supplement resources.

Waterway Clearance

Note: Waterway Clearance discussion was completed on 13 October 2021

Core Capability: On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement
Definition: Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas and also for all traditional and atypical response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.

Capability Target: 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management
Emergency workers manage radiological exposure and dose in accordance with the plans/procedures. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, O.1).

SCDNR will discuss the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to provide DNR emergency workers (including supplemental resources) with the appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, KI, and instructions on the use of these items.
- The capability to determine whether to replace DNR workers, authorize DNR workers to incur additional exposures, or other actions related to exposure limits.
- The capability to accomplish distribution of KI to DNR emergency workers consistent with decisions made.
- The capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take.

Capability Target: 3.1: Communications
Communication processes, systems, and equipment are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, O.1).

SCDNR will discuss the following Critical Tasks:

- A primary system and at least one backup system are fully functional at all times.
- The capability to manage the communications systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.
- That the SEOC has sufficient equipment, maps, and displays to perform the assigned role.

Exception or Note: (comms system if different than site specific plans, i.e., conference bridge line)

Capability Target: 5.4: Traffic and Access Control
Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev.2: H.12, J.8, J.8.b, J.10, J.10.a, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.f, J.14.d, J.14.e, M.1.b, O.1).

SCDNR will discuss the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to select, establish, and staff appropriate traffic control points and access control points consistent with current conditions and PADs (e.g., evacuating, sheltering, and relocation) in a timely manner.
- The capability to provide instructions to access control staff on actions to take when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.

- Accurate knowledge of their roles and responsibilities including verifying emergency worker identification and access authorization to the affected areas.
- The capability to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation, including re-routing of traffic and coordination with the JIS to communicate alternate routes to evacuees, as appropriate.

RISK COUNTIES
Oconee and Pickens Counties

EOC

Core Capability: Operational Coordination
Definition: Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

Capability Target: 1.1: Mobilization
Individuals with roles in support of emergency operations are identified, alerted, and mobilized in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, O.1).

Oconee and Pickens Counties will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:
- The capability to receive notification of an incident from the licensees; verify the notification; contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner.
- The ability to staff and maintain 24-hour operations.
- The activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel upon their arrival.
- The ability to identify and request additional resources or identify compensatory measures.

Exception: Personnel cannot be at their duty station but may be pre-positioned in the area prior to notification. Personnel may participate virtually during the exercise; as circumstances require.

Capability Target: 1.2: Direction and Control
Individuals in leadership roles provide direction and control to the portion of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.1.c, A.2, A.3, A.5, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, D.4, E.1, H.6, O.1).

Oconee and Pickens Counties will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:
- The availability of facilities to support emergency operations.
- The ability to carry out the essential management functions of the response effort.
- The ability to prioritize resource tasking and replace/supplement resources.

Exception: All coordination telephone calls should occur in accordance with plans and procedures. However, the simcell may substitute for non-participating agencies.

Capability Target: 1.4: Protective Action Decisions for the Plume Phase
Appropriate PADs are based on available information for the plume phase. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: D.1.b, D.4, J.6, J.7, J.8, J.8.b, J.10, J.10.a, J.10.b, J.11.c-g, O.1).

Oconee and Pickens Counties will discuss the following Critical Tasks:
- The ability to conduct the decision-making process taking those with disabilities and access/functional needs (e.g., nursing homes, correctional facilities, licensed day cares, mobility-impaired individuals, and transportation-dependent individuals) into account.

- The capability to make prompt decisions on protective actions for students.
- The capability to make both initial and subsequent precautionary and/or protective action decisions in a timely manner appropriate to the incident.
- The capability to change protective actions based on the combination of the following factors: subsequent dose projections, field monitoring data, or information on plant conditions, magnitude of ongoing threat, the response, and/or site conditions.
- The capability to communicate the results of decisions to all the affected locations.

Capability Target: 1.5: Protective Action Decision Implementation for the Plume Phase
Implement decisions for those populations and areas subject to plume phase protective actions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: A.4, C.2.a, G.1, J.11, J.11.a, J.11.b, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.g, O.1).

Oconee and Pickens Counties will discuss/demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to make KI available to institutionalized individuals and members of the general public.
- The capability to accomplish distribution of KI consistent with decisions made.
- The capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take it.
- The capability to alert and notify persons with disabilities and access/functional needs, including hospitals/medical facilities, licensed daycares, nursing homes, correctional facilities, and mobility-impaired and transportation-dependent individuals.
- The capability to provide for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs.
- The ability to implement precautionary and/or protective action decisions for students.
- The capability to develop and provide timely information to OROs for use in messages to parents, the general public, and the media on the status of protective actions for schools.

Capability Target: 2.1: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Decision-Making Process
A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to ensure that an exposure control system is in place for emergency workers, and includes the use of radio protective drugs and procedures to authorize emergency exposures in excess of the PAGs. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: C.2.c, H.11, K.2, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, M.8, O.1).

Oconee and Pickens Counties will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to comply with county emergency worker exposure limits.
- The capability to make decisions concerning authorization of exposure levels in excess of pre-authorized levels and the number of county emergency workers receiving radiation doses above pre-authorized levels.
- The capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure for county emergency workers based on the established PAGs for KI administration.

Capability Target: 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management
Emergency workers manage radiological exposure and dose in accordance with the plans/procedures. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, O.1).

Oconee and Pickens Counties will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to provide county emergency workers (including supplemental resources) with the appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, KI, and instructions on the use of these items.

- The capability to determine whether to replace workers, authorize workers to incur additional exposures, or other actions related to exposure limits.
- The capability to accomplish distribution of KI to county emergency workers consistent with decisions made.
- The capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take.

Capability Target: 3.1: Communications
Communication processes, systems, and equipment are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, O.1).

Oconee and Pickens Counties will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- A primary system and at least one backup system are fully functional at all times.
- The capability to manage the communications systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.
- That the counties EOC's have sufficient equipment, maps and displays to perform the assigned role.

Exception or Note: (comms system if different than site specific plans, i.e., conference bridge line)

Capability Target: 5.4: Traffic and Access Control
Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev.2: H.12, J.8, J.8.b, J.10, J.10.a, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.f, J.14.d, J.14.e, M.1.b, O.1).

Oconee and Pickens Counties will discuss/demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to select, establish, and staff appropriate traffic control points and access control points consistent with current conditions and PADs (e.g., evacuating, sheltering, and relocation) in a timely manner.
- The capability to provide instructions to access control staff on actions to take when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.
- Accurate knowledge of their roles and responsibilities including verifying emergency worker identification and access authorization to the affected areas.
- The capability to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation, including re-routing of traffic and coordination with the JIS to communicate alternate routes to evacuees, as appropriate.

Core Capability: Public Information and Warning
Definition: Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken, and the assistance being made available.

Exception: County public information officers will not be deployed to the Oconee Joint Information Center due to the facility's closure.
Capability Target: 3.2: Alert and Notification of the Public
Alert and notification of the public is completed in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: E.2, E.4, E.5, F.3, O.1).

Oconee and Pickens Counties will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- A primary system and at least one backup system are fully functional at all times.
- The capability to coordinate siren activation followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ. The procedures to broadcast the message will be fully demonstrated as they would in an actual emergency up to the point of transmission.
- The backup alert and notification procedures utilized in the event of a siren failure.

Capability Target: 3.3: Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and News Media
Accurate emergency information and instructions are provided to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: E.2, E.4, E.5, G.1, G.2, G.3, G.3.a, G.4, G.5, O.1)

Oconee and Pickens Counties will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The ability to provide emergency information and instructions to the public and media in a timely manner following the initial alert and notification (not subject to specific time requirements).
- The capability to ensure that emergency information that is no longer valid is rescinded and not repeated by broadcast media.
- The capability to ensure that current emergency information is repeated at pre-established intervals.
- The capability to provide timely, accurate, concise, and coordinated information to the news media for subsequent dissemination to the public.
- The capability to respond appropriately to inquiries from the news media.
- The capability to deal with calls received via the public inquiry hotline.
- The capability to provide or obtain accurate information for public inquiry callers or make appropriate referrals.
- The capability to ensure that emergency information and instructions are consistent with PADs made by appropriate officials.
- The capability to ensure that emergency information contains all necessary and applicable instructions to assist the public in carrying out the PADs provided.
- The capability to conduct timely and pertinent media briefings and distribute media releases as the incident warrants.

Schools

School interviews will be conducted out of sequence virtually at the following times:

Date & Time	County	School
January 26th, 2022	Oconee	Blue Ridge ES
January 26th, 2022	Oconee	Northside ES
January 26th, 2022	Oconee	Walhalla MS
January 26th, 2022	Pickens	DW Daniel HS
January 26th, 2022	Pickens	Six Mile ES

Core Capability: Critical Transportation
Definition: Provide transportation (including infrastructure access and accessible transportation services) for response priority objectives, including the evacuation of people and animals, and the delivery of vital response personnel, equipment, and services into the affected areas.
Capability Target: 1.5: Protective Action Decision Implementation for the Plume Phase
Implement decisions for those populations and areas subject to plume phase protective actions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: A.4, C.2.a, G.1, J.11, J.11.a, J.11.b, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.g, O.1).

Oconee and Pickens Counties will discuss the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to make KI available to institutionalized individuals and members of the general public.
- The capability to accomplish distribution of KI consistent with decisions made.
- The capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take it.
- The capability to alert and notify persons with disabilities and access/functional needs, including hospitals/medical facilities, licensed daycares, nursing homes, correctional facilities, and mobility-impaired and transportation-dependent individuals.
- The capability to provide for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs.
- The ability to implement precautionary and/or protective action decisions for students.
- The capability to develop and provide timely information to OROs for use in messages to parents, the general public, and the media on the status of protective actions for schools.

Traffic Control Points (TCPs)

TCP interviews will be conducted in sequence during the exercise.

Core Capability: On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement

Definition: Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas and also for all traditional and atypical response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.

Capability Target: 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management

Emergency workers manage radiological exposure and dose in accordance with the plans/procedures. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, O.1).

Oconee County will discuss the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to provide county emergency workers (including supplemental resources) with the appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, KI, and instructions on the use of these items.
- The capability to determine whether to replace workers, authorize workers to incur additional exposures, or other actions related to exposure limits.
- The capability to accomplish distribution of KI to county emergency workers consistent with decisions made.
- The capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take.

Capability Target: 3.1: Communications

Communication processes, systems, and equipment are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, O.1).

Oconee County will discuss the following Critical Tasks:

- A primary system and at least one backup system are fully functional at all times.
- The capability to manage the communications systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.
- That the counties EOC's have sufficient equipment, maps and displays to perform the assigned role.

Exception or Note: (comms system if different than site specific plans, i.e., conference bridge line)

Capability Target: 5.4: Traffic and Access Control
Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: H.12, J.8, J.8.b, J.10, J.10.a, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.f, J.14.d, J.14.e, M.1.b, O.1).

Oconee County will discuss the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to select, establish, and staff appropriate traffic control points and access control points consistent with current conditions and PADs (e.g., evacuating, sheltering, and relocation) in a timely manner.
- The capability to provide instructions to access control staff on actions to take when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.
- Accurate knowledge of their roles and responsibilities including verifying emergency worker identification and access authorization to the affected areas.
- The capability to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation, including re-routing of traffic and coordination with the JIS to communicate alternate routes to evacuees, as appropriate.

Backup Route Alerting

Backup Route Alerting interviews will be conducted in sequence during the exercise.

Core Capability: Public Information and Warning
Definition: Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken, and the assistance being made available.

Capability Target: 1.1: Mobilization
Individuals with roles in support of emergency operations are identified, alerted, and mobilized in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, O.1).

Oconee County will discuss the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to receive notification of an incident from the licensees; verify the notification; contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner.
- The ability to staff and maintain 24-hour operations.
- The activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel upon their arrival.
- The ability to identify and request additional resources or identify compensatory measures.

Exception: Personnel cannot be at their duty station but may be pre-positioned in the area prior to notification. Personnel may participate virtually during the exercise; as circumstances require.

Capability Target: 3.1: Communications
Communication processes, systems, and equipment are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, O.1).

Oconee County will discuss the following Critical Tasks:

- A primary system and at least one backup system are fully functional at all times.
- The capability to manage the communications systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.
- That the SEOC has sufficient equipment, maps, and displays to perform the assigned role.

Exception or Note: (comms system if different than site specific plans, i.e., conference bridge line)

Capability Target: 3.2: Alert and Notification of the Public
Alert and notification of the public is completed in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: E.2, E.4, E.5, F.3, O.1).

Oconee County will discuss the following Critical Tasks:

- A primary system and at least one backup system are fully functional at all times.
- The capability to coordinate siren activation followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ. The procedures to broadcast the message will be fully demonstrated as they would in an actual emergency up to the point of transmission.
- The backup alert and notification procedures utilized in the event of a siren failure.

Emergency Worker Decontamination (EWD)

EWDs for Oconee and Pickens counties will be a courtesy evaluation and conducted out of sequence at the following time and location:

Date & Time	County	Facility
February 16th, 2022	Oconee	Oakway FD
February 17th, 2022	Pickens	DOT/Stockade

Core Capability: Environmental Response/Health and Safety
Definition: Ensure the availability of guidance and resources to address all hazards including hazardous materials, acts of terrorism, and natural disasters in support of the responder operations and the affected communities.

Capability Target: 2.1: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Decision-Making Process
A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to ensure that an exposure control system is in place for emergency workers, and includes the use of radio protective drugs and procedures to authorize emergency exposures in excess of the PAGs. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: C.2.c, H.11, K.2, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, M.8, O.1).

Oconee and Pickens Counties will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to comply with county emergency worker exposure limits.
- The capability to make decisions concerning authorization of exposure levels in excess of pre-authorized levels and the number of county emergency workers receiving radiation doses above pre-authorized levels.
- The capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure for county emergency workers based on the established PAGs for KI administration.

Capability Target: 3.1: Communications

Communication processes, systems, and equipment are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, O.1).

Oconee and Pickens Counties will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- A primary system and at least one backup system are fully functional at all times.
- The capability to manage the communications systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.
- That the counties EOC's have sufficient equipment, maps and displays to perform the assigned role.

Exception or Note: (comms system if different than site specific plans, i.e., conference bridge line)

Capability Target: 5.2: Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers, Equipment, and Vehicles
Facilities, equipment, and procedures are in place and utilized to provide monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and their equipment and vehicles. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev.2: K.4, O.1).

Oconee and Pickens Counties will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to monitor emergency worker personnel and their equipment and vehicles for contamination.
- The capability to make decisions on the need for decontamination of personnel, equipment, and vehicles based on trigger/action levels and procedures.
- The process of checking the instruments for proper operation before use.
- Monitoring procedures for a minimum of two emergency workers, their equipment, and one vehicle.
- Provisions for separate showering and same-sex decontamination.
- Provisions for limiting the spread of contamination.
- Provisions to separate contaminated and uncontaminated individuals, provide changes of clothing for those with contaminated clothing, and store contaminated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further contamination of emergency workers or facilities.
- The capability to register emergency workers upon completion of the monitoring and decontamination activities.

Exception: Decontamination of emergency workers will be simulated.

Emergency Medical Services (EMS)/ Medical Facilities

MSD for Pickens County will be conducted out of sequence at the following time and location:

Date & Time	County	Hospital
February 17th, 2022	Pickens	AnMed Health Cannon

Core Capability: Public Health, Health Care, and Emergency Medical Services
Definition: Provide Lifesaving medical treatment via emergency medical services and related operations and avoid additional disease and injury by providing targeted public health and medical support and products to all people in need within the affected area.

Capability Target: 2.1: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Decision-Making Process

A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to ensure that an exposure control system is in place for emergency workers, and includes the use of radio protective drugs and procedures to authorize emergency exposures in excess of the PAGs. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: C.2.c, H.11, K.2, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, M.8, O.1).

Pickens County EMS will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to comply with county emergency worker exposure limits.
- The capability to make decisions concerning authorization of exposure levels in excess of pre-authorized levels and the number of county emergency workers receiving radiation doses above pre-authorized levels.
- The capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure for county emergency workers based on the established PAGs for KI administration.

Capability Target: 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management
Emergency workers manage radiological exposure and dose in accordance with the plans/procedures. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, O.1).

Pickens County EMS will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability of emergency workers to manage dose and exposure, use equipment (e.g., dosimetry, radio protective drugs), and identify procedures to monitor their exposure and dose, including following procedures to obtain authorization to receive emergency exposures in excess of the PAG's.
- The capability to maintain an appropriate inventory of DRD's that are leak-tested or current in calibration.
- The ability to maintain inventory of PRD's and have sufficient inventory for the number of workers.
- The capability to adequately supply of radio protective drugs.
- The ability to adequately distribute appropriate DRD's and PRD's, and radio protective drugs to emergency workers.
- The capability to record and report exposures in the field.

Note: EMS personnel will be questioned about procedures after patient turnover, including the location of the Emergency Worker Decontamination Station.

Exceptions:

- A patient care manikin will be utilized in place of a human patient. If there is an issue with the manikin, there will be a human patient available for the demonstration.
- Complete Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) will be worn by EMS crews and hospital staff with direct patient contact. The driver of the ambulance and hospital administrative staff outside of the decontamination room can reduce PPE to gloves and booties only.
- One EMS Crew Member will also be asked to demonstrate the removal of PPE.
- One AnMed Health Cannon Radiation Response Team member will demonstrate the removal of PPE.

Capability Target: 5.3: Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated, Injured Individuals
Transport contaminated, injured individuals to medical facilities with the capability to monitor and decontaminate. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: C.2.d, F.2, H.11, H.12, J.2, K.3, K.4, L.1, L.3, L.4, O.1).

Pickens County EMS will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to monitor and (if appropriate) transport contaminated, injured individuals to AnMed Health Cannon.
- Normal communications between the ambulance and AnMed Health Cannon, to include reporting radiation monitoring results, if available.
- Knowledge of where the ambulance crew would be monitored and decontaminated, if required, or whom to contact for such information.
- Appropriated contamination control measures before and during transport.
- The process of checking the monitoring instruments for proper operation before use.

AnMed Health Cannon will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to monitor and decontaminate a contaminated, injured individual.
- The process of checking the monitoring instruments for proper operation before use.
- Communications between the ambulance/dispatcher and AnMed Health Cannon, to include reporting radiation monitoring results, if available.
- Appropriate contamination control measures (at the hospital).
- The capability to activate and setup a radiological emergency area for treatment.
- The capability to make decisions on the need for decontamination, follow appropriate decontamination procedures, and maintain records of all survey measurements and samples taken.

Notes:

- One FEMA Evaluator will be allowed to ride in the ambulance to monitor communications between the ambulance crew and the hospital while the patient is in route to the hospital.

Exceptions:

- A patient care manikin will be utilized in place of a human patient. If there is an issue with the manikin, there will be a human patient available for the demonstration.
- Permanent Record Dosimeters (PRDs) and KI will be simulated.
- One EMS Crew Member and one AnMed Health Cannon Radiation Response Team Member will demonstrate the process of checking the instruments for proper operation.
- The use of medical supplies in the drill will be limited so that hospital and EMS supplies are conserved for actual medical emergency response.
- In the event that the ambulance has to respond to real life events, another vehicle will be used to transport the contaminated injured person to the hospital.
- Decontamination of hair and a full-body shower will be discussed. Water will be utilized in place of saline for demonstrating wound decontamination, as necessary. The controller and evaluator will determine how many times wound decontamination will be done based on the quality of the application on the first decontamination attempt.

HOST COUNTIES
Anderson and Greenville Counties

Reception Center

RC/CCs facilities for Anderson and Greenville Counties to be evaluated will be conducted out of sequence at the following time and location:

Date & Time	County	Facility

TBD	Anderson	Westside HS
TBD	Greenville	Berea HS

Core Capability: Environmental Response/Health and Safety
Definition: Ensure the availability of guidance and resources to address all hazards including hazardous materials, acts of terrorism, and natural disasters in support of the responder operations and the affected communities.

Capability Target: 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management
Emergency workers manage radiological exposure and dose in accordance with the plans/procedures. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, O.1).

Anderson and Greenville Counties will demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to provide county emergency workers (including supplemental resources) with the appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, KI, and instructions on the use of these items.
- The capability to determine whether to replace workers, authorize workers to incur additional exposures, or other actions related to exposure limits.
- The capability to accomplish distribution of KI to county emergency workers consistent with decisions made.
- The capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take.

Capability Target: 5.1: Monitoring, Decontamination, Sheltering and Registration of Evacuees
Facilities, equipment, and procedures are in place and utilized to provide monitoring, decontamination, identification, temporary shelter, congregate care, and registration of evacuees. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: J.11.d, J.13, K.4, O.1).

Anderson and Greenville Counties will discuss/demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The process of checking the instruments for proper operation before use.
- Radiological monitoring and decontamination, for evacuees utilizing at least one-third of the resources available at the facilities as necessary to monitor 20% of the population within a 12-hour period. A minimum of six evacuees must be monitored per station.
- The capability to register evacuees upon completion of the monitoring and decontamination activities.
- Provisions for limiting the spread of contaminations
- Provisions to separate contaminated and uncontaminated evacuees, provide changes of clothing for those with contaminated clothing, and store contaminated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further contamination of evacuees or facilities.
- The capability to provide care services to simulated evacuees.
- The capability to ensure that evacuees, service animals, and vehicles have been monitored for contamination, decontaminated as appropriate, and registered before registering and entering the facility.
- The availability of supplies (e.g., cots, blankets, and food supplies) and verify by providing a list of sources for such items and estimated quantities.

Exception: Decontamination of evacuees will be simulated

Exception: Vehicles will not be monitored or decontaminated but will be evaluated and separated as necessary as per the Anderson County Hazardous Materials Team Standard Operating Procedure: Radiation Monitoring at Reception Centers.

Congregate Care

Core Capability: Mass Care
Definition: Provide life-sustaining services to the affected population with a focus on hydration, feeding and sheltering to those who have the most need as well as support for reunifying families.

Capability Target: 5.1: Monitoring, Decontamination, Sheltering and Registration of Evacuees
Facilities, equipment, and procedures are in place and utilized to provide monitoring, decontamination, identification, temporary shelter, congregate care, and registration of evacuees. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2: J.11.d, J.13, K.4, O.1).

Anderson and Greenville Counties will discuss/demonstrate the following Critical Tasks:

- The capability to coordinate evacuees who have been monitored and, if necessary, decontaminated.
- The capability to establish shelter operations.
- The capability of congregate care centers and operations in host/support jurisdictions are sufficient to support the expected number of evacuees.
- The capability to register evacuees upon completion of the monitoring and decontamination activities.
- The capability to ensure the registration area is clean and controlled, with provisions for limiting the spread of contaminations.
- Provisions to separate contaminated and uncontaminated evacuees, provide changes of clothing for those with contaminated clothing, and store contaminated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further contamination of evacuees or facilities.
- The capability to provide care services to simulated evacuees.
- The capability to ensure that evacuees, service animals, and vehicles have been monitored for contamination, decontaminated as appropriate, and registered before registering and entering the facility.
- The availability of supplies (e.g., cots, blankets, and food supplies) and verify by providing a list of sources for such items and estimated quantities.

Exception: Decontamination of evacuees will be simulated.

Signatures

The following agree to support this exercise as described herein:

State Director	Radiological Assistance Committee Chair
X Kim Stenson Mr. Kim Stenson Director South Carolina Emergency Management Division	X KEVIN B WELLS Digitally signed by KEVIN B WELLS Date: 2022.03.17 09:59:01 -04'00' Mr. Kevin Wells Chief, Technological Hazards Branch FEMA Region 4
Risk County Directors	**Host County Directors**
X Scott R Krein Mr. Scott Krein Director, Emergency Services Oconee County	X Joshua D Hawkins Mr. Joshua Hawkins Director, Emergency Management Anderson County
X Denise Kwiatek Ms. Denise Kwiatek Director, Emergency Management Pickens County	X Jessica Stumpf 2022.03.08 08:55:10 -05'00' Ms. Jessica Stumpf Director, Emergency Management Greenville County