After Action Report

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise

Exercise Date: October 31, 2023

Final

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Executive Summary

On October 31, 2023, the offsite response organizations of the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant 10-mile emergency planning zone participated in a plume exposure pathway exercise. FEMA Region 4 Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program staff evaluated this exercise, which also included a medical services drill conducted on August 10, 2023, and out of sequence activities conducted on September 28, 2023. This report outlines the results of the exercise, medical services drill, and out of sequence activities.

The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of state and local preparedness in responding to an incident at the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant. It was conducted in accordance with FEMA policies and guidance concerning the exercise of state and local radiological emergency response plans and procedures. The federal approval of the formal submission of the radiological emergency response procedures for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant by the state of Georgia was granted on May 5, 1981, and the qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on October 25, 1989.

Officials and representatives from participating agencies and organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures, and successfully implemented them during the exercise, medical services drill, and out of sequence activities. All jurisdictions met their exercise objectives and successfully demonstrated the corresponding core capabilities identified in Section 2.2 of this report. FEMA staff did not identify any level 1 or level 2 findings during this exercise, the medical services drill, or out of sequence activities.

It was apparent that a great deal of training and practice was conducted by the offsite response organizations to successfully demonstrate the ability to protect the health and safety of the public. They provided the necessary support and resources to respond to an incident at the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated in the exercise and made it a success. Despite ongoing real-world response efforts, the professionalism and teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all phases of the exercise.

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Section 1: Exercise Overview

Exercise Name	2023 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise	
Type of Exercise	Full Scale Exercise	
Exercise Date	October 31, 2023	
Medical Services Drill Date	August 10, 2023	
Out of Sequence Date	September 28, 2023	
Program	Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program	
Mission Area	Response	
Scenario Type	Full Participation Plume Phase Exercise	
Participating Organizations	See Appendix C for the list of participating organizations	
Locations	See Appendix D for the extent of play agreement and exercise locations	
Points of Contact	John "JT" Ackermann North Section Chief FEMA Region 4 3005 Chamblee-Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341	DeShun Lowery Hatch Site Specialist FEMA Region 4 3005 Chamblee-Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341
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Section 2: Exercise Design Summary

2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design

FEMA administers the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program pursuant to the regulations found in Title 44 of the Code of Federal Regulations (44 CFR) Parts 350, 351, 352, 353 and 354. 44 CFR Pt. 350 codifies 16 planning standards that form the basis for radiological emergency response planning for the licensee, state, local, tribal and territorial governments impacted by the emergency planning zones established for each nuclear power plant site in the United States. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations also codify the 16 planning standards for the licensee. 44 CFR Pt. 350 sets forth the mechanisms for the formal review and approval of state, local, tribal and territorial government radiological emergency response plans and procedures by FEMA. One of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program cornerstones established by these regulations is the biennial exercise of offsite response capabilities. During these exercises, affected state, local, tribal and territorial governments demonstrate their abilities to implement their plans and procedures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological incident at a nuclear plant.

The results of this exercise, together with reviews of the radiological emergency response plans and verification of the periodic requirements set forth in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, the annual letter of certification, and staff assistance visits, enabled FEMA to provide a statement with the transmission of this final after action report to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This statement verifies that the affected state, local, tribal and territorial plans and preparedness are: (1) adequate to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the nuclear power facility by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological incident; and (2) capable of being implemented.

The federal approval of the formal submission of the radiological emergency response procedures for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant by the state of Georgia was granted on May 5, 1981, and the qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on October 25, 1989.

2.2 Exercise Core Capabilities and Objectives

Core capabilities-based planning allows for exercise planning teams to develop exercise objectives and observe exercise outcomes through a framework of specific action items. Using the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program methodology, the exercise objectives meet Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program requirements and objectives. The capability targets to be demonstrated were negotiated with the state of Georgia and risk counties. The core capabilities scheduled for demonstration during this exercise, the medical services drill, and out of sequence activities were:

- **Operational Coordination:** Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.
- **Situational Assessment:** Provide all decision makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response.
- **Public Information and Warning:** Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding

any threat or hazard, as well as the actions being taken and the assistance being made available, as appropriate.

- **Environmental Response/Health and Safety:** Conduct appropriate measures to ensure the protection of the health and safety of the public and workers, as well as the environment, from all-hazards in support of responder operations and the affected communities.
- **Mass Care Services:** Provide life-sustaining and human services to the affected population, to include hydration, feeding, sheltering, temporary housing, evacuee support, reunification, and distribution of emergency supplies.
- **Critical Transportation:** Provide transportation (including infrastructure access and accessible transportation services) for response priority objectives, including the evacuation of people and animals, and the delivery of vital response personnel, equipment, and services into the affected areas.
- **Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services:** Provide lifesaving medical treatment via emergency medical services and related operations and avoid additional disease and injury by providing targeted public health, medical, and behavioral health support, and products to all affected populations.

These core capabilities, when successfully demonstrated, meet the exercise objectives. The objectives for this exercise were as follows:

- **Objective 1:** Emergency Operations Management
- **Objective 2:** Exposure Control
- **Objective 3:** Alert and Notification
- **Objective 4:** Detect, Measure, Sample, Analyze, and Assess
- **Objective 5:** Operate

2.3 Exercise Scenario

The following is a summary of the scenario developed by Southern Nuclear to drive exercise play:

The scenario involves a minimal radiological release with noble gases, radioiodines, and particulates in the release mixture. The radiological release will be less than protective action guides at the site boundary.

The wind direction throughout the exercise is from 90 degrees. Wind speed remains constant at 7-8 miles per hour. Stability class remains at “C” throughout the exercise with no precipitation.

Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities

3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results

This section contains the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the October 31, 2023, plume exposure pathway exercise, medical services drill on August 10, 2023, and out of sequence activities on September 28, 2023.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated based on the demonstration of core capabilities, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program objectives, and capability targets as delineated in the FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual dated December 2019. Capability targets are listed by number and the demonstration status of those capability targets are indicated by the use of the following terms:

- **Met (M):** The jurisdiction or functional entity performed all activities under the objective/capability target to the level required per the work plan and/or the extent-of-play agreement, with no Level 1 or Level 2 Findings evaluated under that objective/capability target during the current activity and no unresolved prior Level 2 Finding(s).
- **Level 1 Finding (L1):** An observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance during an assessment activity that could cause a determination that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant.
- **Level 2 Finding (L2):** An observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance during an assessment activity that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health and safety.
- **Plan Issue (P):** An observed or identified inadequacy in the ORO's emergency plan/implementing procedures, rather than in that of the ORO's performance.
- **Not Demonstrated (N):** For a justifiable reason, the jurisdiction or functional entity did not perform assessment activities under the objective/capability target as specified in the extent-of-play agreement.

3.2 Jurisdictional Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation

3.2.1 State Jurisdiction

3.2.1.1 Georgia State Operations Center

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

The Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency staff successfully demonstrated the operational coordination core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Hatch Nuclear Plant.

Initial notification of a nuclear incident was received and validated by telephone, which was a backup to the dedicated system; the dedicated system did not work due to a technical error. Subsequent notifications were announced and validated on the county call which remained open throughout the exercise. Additionally, emergency notification forms were received via electronic mail and uploaded to an electronic situational awareness tool. Operations staff used an internal mass messaging system to recall staff to the operations center following receipt of the Alert notification. The communications center supervisor had access to a 24-

hour staffing roster if multiple operational period staffing was required. Following notification and mobilization of all staff members, the facility was declared operational.

After the facility was operational, direction and control in the operations center was the primary responsibility of the state operations center manager. The manager coordinated with key emergency management staff, as well as the radiological emergency preparedness program manager and liaisons from several other state agencies. As the incident escalated, the manager requested relevant emergency support function representatives to participate in command staff briefings. The manager also facilitated the county calls, which were used to coordinate and concur with precautionary and protective action decisions.

County calls occurred hourly and included the command staff in the state operations center, as well as the directors of Appling, Toombs, Jeff Davis, and Tattnall Counties. Protective action recommendations were provided by the emergency operations center via the county call. One protective action recommendation was made to evacuate zone A, C-5, and D-5. During the county call, the county directors discussed and concurred with the recommendation and implemented the decision in their respective counties.

As a coordinating agency, the state was not required to concur with, or implement protective action decisions. However, during county calls, the state operations center manager requested updates from the county directors, to include any local state of emergency declarations, school relocations, and assistance for those with access and functional needs. This provided the state with situational awareness and allowed them to plan for potential resource requests.

The state operations center manager coordinated with other state agency liaisons to support river clearing operations and restrict rail and air traffic. The manager also worked with the state agriculture liaison to develop a livestock advisory and embargo on agricultural goods.

As the incident continued to escalate, the Georgia Department of Natural Resources-Environmental Protection Division, was consulted on the recommendation for emergency workers to ingest potassium iodide. The recommendation, which was concurred with, was for emergency workers to not ingest potassium iodide due to exposure levels being well below the Environmental Protection Agency's protective action guidelines.

Overall, the state operations center was well maintained and sufficient to support emergency response. The facility was equipped with numerous, redundant communications systems, display and messaging capabilities, break out rooms, and meeting spaces to meet the needs of an evolving and expanding incident.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 2.1, 3.1.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

The Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency public information staff successfully demonstrated the public information and warning core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Hatch Nuclear Plant.

The emergency support function-15, public information, staff of three coordinated the drafting, approving, and distributing of press releases from the state operations center as part of the joint information system. Prepositioning of the public information staff was permitted with response to duty stations following notification that the exercise had begun, and they were instructed to respond.

A joint information system tele-conference platform was used throughout the exercise, allowing for rapid verbal information exchange and coordination between the risk counties, the joint information center, and the state operations center. Because the team was in Atlanta, Georgia, they did not participate in the press conferences conducted at the joint information center located in Vidalia, Georgia. The public information staff followed their operating procedures while developing three press releases.

The assistant public information officer monitored the joint information system tele-conference platform and attended the county calls, gathering critical information using a checklist. The county call checklist closely aligned in structure with the press release templates and was used to organize the information for inclusion in the press releases. The templates were highlighted to quickly identify modifiable or selectable information until final press release approval. The lead public information officer used the checklist information to modify the draft press release templates. The assistant public information officer used a checklist for the press release approval process. This checklist documented verbal or written approvals from state operations center participants and remote emergency management participants and listed follow-up actions for the press releases once approved.

An electronic situational awareness tool was used to post, review, and simulate the distribution of press releases. This process allowed rapid review, editing when needed, and approval of each press release. Press releases provided accurate emergency information, reflecting approved precautionary and protective actions. No errors or omissions were noted. All final published emergency public messaging was clear, concise, accurate, used plain language, and included the required essential elements. Rumors were reported and provided to the joint information center. The lead public information officer used a social media monitoring platform as an additional outlet for posting approved press releases.

The county call participants selected and coordinated one Emergency Alert System message for delivery through the public alert and notification system and the national warning system. The outdoor warning system was activated from the state communications center. Alert and notification, and protective action decision information was included in the final press release to the public and media. Translation of public information from English to Spanish was not required, however translation services were readily available.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 3.2, 3.3.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None

- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

3.2.1.2 Dose Assessment

Situational Assessment Capability Summary:

The Georgia Department of Natural Resources-Environmental Protection Division staff successfully demonstrated the situational assessment core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Hatch Nuclear Plant.

The staff performed dose assessment by conducting dose projections and incorporating field monitoring team results, compared dose assessment results to protective action guidelines to develop protective action recommendations, and effectively communicated recommendations to state and county decision-makers for making protective action decisions. The radiation emergency coordinator provided direction and control for the state dose assessment and field monitoring teams. Upon dose assessment activation and initial evaluation of plant and meteorological conditions, the field team coordinator was promptly notified to deploy two field teams to traverse the projected radiological plume path. The dose assessment coordinator was assigned to routinely communicate with the field team coordinator to receive ambient field readings and air sample results to compare to dose projections.

The dose assessment staff brought two portable computers that were used 10cess an electronic situational awareness tool and the Hatch Nuclear Plant situational awareness page, and to conduct dose projections on the radiological assessment system for consequence analysis application. The electronic situational awareness tool was used to monitor state and county response inputs and utility emergency notification forms. The situational awareness page was used to monitor plant status and parameters used as inputs into the dose projections application.

The dose assessment coordinator received dose projections from the utility and conducted comparable projections on the state dose projections application. All state dose projection results were within the required factor of 10 as compared to the utility results, and most were within a factor of two. Following discussions with the utility technical liaison regarding existing plant status and potential component failure and release pathways, the dose assessment coordinator ran several “what if” dose projections, one of which was a worst-case scenario where the results exceeded protective action guides only out to 1-mile. The radiation emergency coordinator shared this result with state and county decision-makers to ensure their understanding and to provide confirmation of the previous protective action decisions for evacuation of the public and that potassium iodide administration was not required for emergency workers. The state of Georgia does not issue potassium iodide to the general public.

The radiation emergency coordinator and dose assessment coordinator were in routine communication with the utility technical liaison regarding plant conditions and characterization of the offsite radiological release for prompt determination of protective action recommendations. The radiation emergency coordinator then worked closely with state and county decision-makers to make timely and appropriate protective action decisions for the public and emergency workers. The radiation emergency coordinator concurred with the utility protective action recommendations and the state and county protective action decisions to evacuate 2-miles around and 5-miles downwind in zones A, C-5, and D-5.

Toward the end of the exercise, based on field monitoring team air sample results at background levels, the dose assessment coordinator calculated radioiodine concentrations and the resulting thyroid dose commitment, with expected results well below protective

action guides. As such, the dose assessment coordinator indicated the dose conversion factor for field monitoring team members would remain at the default value of five.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.3, 1.4, 4.5.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

3.2.1.3 Field Team Management

Environmental Response/Health and Safety Capability Summary:

The Georgia Department of Natural Resources-Environmental Protection Division staff successfully demonstrated the environmental response/health and safety core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Hatch Nuclear Plant.

The field team coordinator and field monitoring team personnel were prepositioned for the demonstration. Team members were notified of the emergency and subsequent escalations via a group short message service and electronic mail. The field team coordinator explained the notification, mobilization, and 24-hour staffing process that would be used in an actual emergency.

Upon activation, the field team coordinator directed field teams to ready their equipment for deployment. Field teams were issued dosimetry and potassium iodide from the Toombs County dosimetry cache. Team members watched a radiation exposure briefing video and the field team coordinator added additional information using a briefing log, ensuring all pertinent topics were covered. The briefing addressed plant status, meteorological information, how to wear and use dosimetry, radiation exposure limits, and the use of potassium iodide. Radiation exposure was appropriately managed throughout the demonstration; the field team coordinator explained the circumstances where exposure limits could be extended, and the approval needed for a radiation dose extension.

The field team coordinator primarily communicated with field personnel via regional radio; standard cellular telephones were used as a backup means of communication. Communications with the radiological emergency coordinator and dose assessor were via cellular telephone and an electronic situational awareness tool. Communication methods were checked prior to field team deployment, and no communication failures were observed.

The field team coordinator directed field survey and sampling activities for two field monitoring teams. The field team coordinator was assisted by a field team coordinator from the 4th Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team who helped manage the field teams throughout the demonstration. The field team coordinators assessed plant status and meteorological information to ensure teams were positioned in appropriate downwind locations. Field monitoring teams were deployed to traverse across a projected plume path at locations approximately 2- and 6-miles from the plant; field team locations were coordinated with the utility. The field team coordinator advised teams of each emergency classification level escalation and when a release of radioactive material began. The teams reported radiation survey measurements along their assigned routes. Both teams were directed to take particulate and iodine air samples at the projected plume centerline. Field

radiation survey and air sample results were promptly communicated to the state dose assessor for use in calculating projected radiation dose to the public, and for assessing the need for emergency workers to take potassium iodide. Since the exercise scenario resulted in a minimal release of radioactive material, the radiological emergency coordinator advised that potassium iodide would not be necessary for emergency workers.

The field team coordinator explained by interview that upon conclusion of environmental survey and sampling, teams would transfer samples to a courier or a mobile laboratory for processing. Teams would report to an emergency worker monitoring and decontamination facility after completing their duties. Dosimetry and associated exposure tracking forms would be turned to the radiological officer or as directed by the field team coordinator.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 4.1.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

3.2.1.4 Field Teams Alpha and Bravo

Environmental Response/Health and Safety Capability Summary:

The Georgia Department of Natural Resources-Environmental Protection Division, Radiological Emergency Response Teams successfully demonstrated the environmental response/health and safety core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Hatch Nuclear Plant.

The two field monitoring teams, consisting of personnel from the Georgia Department of Natural Resources and the 4th Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team, were prepositioned in accordance with the extent of play agreement. They were initially notified at the Alert emergency classification level, in a timely manner, by cellular telephone. Changes to the emergency classification levels were communicated by regional radio.

Field monitoring team members received their pre-deployment briefing from the field team coordinator and were issued direct reading dosimetry, simulated permanent record dosimetry, and radioprotective drugs. The provided direct reading dosimeters were appropriate for reading the reporting exposure limit and the turnback exposure limit. Each team member demonstrated the use of the direct reading dosimetry, recording results, and reporting exposures at 30-minute intervals. By interview, members explained the procedures to obtain authorization to receive emergency exposures more than the protective action guidelines. Additionally, by interview, members explained the procedures for ingesting and recording the use of potassium iodide if instructed by the field team coordinator. For this exercise, there was no recommendation for emergency workers to ingest potassium iodide.

Communication processes, systems, and equipment were sufficient to support emergency operations. Field monitoring team members demonstrated the capability to utilize and maintain reliable communications with the field team coordinator and demonstrated familiarity of cellular telephones and radios. Prior to deployment, a communications check was performed with each field team.

Field monitoring team personnel made, recorded, and reported measurements of ambient radiation to the field team coordinator by cellular telephone, and successfully collected (simulated) radioiodine and particulate samples. Team members demonstrated the capability to take measurements to assist in the characterization of the plume. They performed operational checks on the air samplers and each radiation survey instrument and obtained a background radiation measurement with each instrument before entering the potentially impacted area. The emergency kits contained supplies and equipment sufficient to support field team operations. Field team members successfully demonstrated the donning and doffing of personal protective equipment, although there was not a written donning and doffing procedure included as part of the team's operations manual. Field monitoring team personnel used appropriate contamination control techniques and protected instrumentation from cross-contamination.

During deployment, field team members monitored survey instruments to prevent inadvertent radiation exposure to the plume. During their assigned traversals, both teams collected an air sample at the direction of the field team coordinator. Team members took radiation measurements while collecting the air sample to determine the (simulated) plume had not shifted during the air sampling process. Packaging and handling of samples was adequate to prevent cross-contamination, sample identification was completed, and chain of custody procedures were explained. During this minimal release scenario exercise, all field monitoring results were at background levels.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 2.2, 3.1, 4.2.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

3.2.2 Joint Operations

3.2.2.1 Joint Information Center

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

The state of Georgia, Jeff Davis County, and Southern Nuclear Company Public Information Officers successfully demonstrated the public information and warning core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Hatch Nuclear Plant.

Alert, notification, and mobilization of staff supporting the joint information center was successfully demonstrated and in accordance with state and county plans and procedures. Joint information center staff were appropriately notified by their respective organizations of a simulated incident at the Hatch Nuclear Plant and directed to report to the joint information center. The Jeff Davis County Public Information Officer first reported to the county emergency operations center and from there was dispatched to the joint information center. The joint information system was activated by the utility's public information director once participation and minimum staffing of utility personnel was confirmed in accordance with plans and procedures.

A variety of communications processes, systems, and equipment were effectively used to support joint information center operations including the coordination of public messaging,

development and distribution of press releases, and preparation and delivery of press conferences. Systems observed included landline and cellular telephone, short message service, electronic mail, and internet-connected computers and handheld devices. An electronic situational awareness tool was used to coordinate the development of press releases with members of the joint information center and offsite state and county organizations. All systems used were operational and no system failures were observed.

Three state press releases were drafted at the state operations center and sent to the joint information center staff for review. Once reviewed and approved, state press releases were shared with the joint information center and media were provided copies. Georgia Power press releases were drafted and approved at the joint information center and given to the media as well. All press releases were clear, accurate, and completed in a timely manner.

Three press conferences were scheduled and only two were held. One was cancelled due to delays caused by emergency classification level increases during the pre-conference caucus. Staff had informative discussions on how to proceed with the conferences when the updated emergency classification level information was not ready to be shared with the public; ensuring public messaging was validated and consistent with protective actions.

The first press conference consisted solely of a statement from the state on precautionary actions and no questions were taken. The second press conference occurred after the General Emergency declaration and consisted of statements from Jeff Davis County, the state, and utility spokespersons. Questions were asked by mock media and answered by the three spokespersons as applicable.

Throughout the exercise, media monitoring was completed by utility staff within the joint information center and shared with state and county staff. Public inquiries and rumors were received via inject by Georgia Power staff within the joint information center. These inquiries were also shared with state public information officers and addressed appropriately. There were no trends identified and one rumor was dispelled in a press conference.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 3.1, 3.3.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

3.2.2.2 Emergency Operations Facility

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

The Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency's field coordinators in the Southern Nuclear Company emergency operations facility successfully demonstrated the operational coordination core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Hatch Nuclear Plant.

The field coordinators assumed the role as state liaisons to the utility. Per the extent of play agreement, both were prepositioned in the area and responded to the facility upon receiving notification by the state operations center. The liaisons setup operations in the dedicated space provided to the state. Once situated, the liaisons called into the county call; the county

call was the primary method used for sharing and learning information. Backup communications methods included agency issued cellular telephones and electronic mail, as needed. Additionally, access to an electronic situational awareness tool was used to enhance situational awareness.

Working closely with utility offsite coordinator, the state liaisons passed relevant updates on the plant's emergency conditions to the state operations center and county emergency management directors. Likewise, the liaisons made sure the utility was aware of the state and county response activities, to include all precautionary and protective action decisions.

The liaison's role directly aided the offsite organizations and the utility's situational awareness. This was evident during the radiological release and General Emergency declaration where the liaisons provided additional information prior to the official emergency notification form being sent to the offsite response organizations. This proactive response clarified the severity of the emergency and led to the successful execution of this core capability.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.3.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

3.2.3 Risk Jurisdictions

3.2.3.1 Appling County Emergency Operations Center

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

Appling County Emergency Operations Center staff successfully demonstrated the operational coordination core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Hatch Nuclear Plant.

Emergency operations center staff demonstrated the ability to alert, notify, and mobilize key personnel in response to a radiological event that included 24-hour staffing capabilities, and activated the facility in a timely manner. The Appling County communications center was notified of an Alert at the Hatch Nuclear Plant via a regional radio system. Emergency management staff mobilized key personnel by short message service via the county's mass notification system. Supporting agencies and staff were prepositioned in accordance with the extent of play agreement and immediately reported upon notification to respond. The director declared the emergency operations center operational once all key positions were staffed. A 24-hour staffing roster was provided to validate 24-hour operations.

Appling County personnel had redundant communication systems which operated properly and dependably throughout the operational period. The primary means of communication was through a regional radio system. Secondary and tertiary means included an electronic situational awareness tool, commercial and cellular telephone, facsimile, and electronic mail. There were no communication delays or failures observed.

The Appling County Emergency Management Agency Director provided overall direction and control of the county response with contributions from well-trained and knowledgeable staff.

A leadership team of elected officials provided critical and timely decision making to support the response. The director facilitated regular briefings in conjunction with updated emergency notification forms as plant conditions evolved. Coordination calls with the state and other impacted counties were conducted on a speaker phone to provide situational awareness. The emergency operations center staff routinely coordinated response activities with other organizations using various, redundant communications. The facility, equipment, and trained staff adequately supported the emergency response.

Appling County leadership participated in regular county calls to discuss and concur with various precautionary or protective actions and the associated alert and notification. They considered students, transportation dependent individuals, and other citizens with access and functional needs when coordinating precautionary and protective actions. Prior to any protective action recommendations from the utility, Appling County selected and implemented several precautionary actions including the relocation of students and citizens with access and functional needs, and the clearance of waterways. After the plant declared a General Emergency and issued protective action recommendations, Appling County leadership agreed with the utility's recommendations to evacuate Appling County zones A and C-5. On the subsequent county call, Appling County leadership coordinated with the state and other impacted counties to evacuate zones A, C-5, and D-5, activate the outdoor warning system, and issue an Emergency Alert System message to the public. Potassium iodide ingestion for emergency workers was considered but ultimately, not authorized.

Appling County Emergency Operations Center staff communicated and coordinated with all appropriate jurisdictions to implement precautionary and protective actions in response to the ongoing emergency. Traffic control points, school relocation, and provisions for access and functional needs were decided and implemented in accordance with plans and procedures. Periodic briefings were held to discuss plant conditions, weather, simulated evacuation route impediments, traffic control points along, and movement of those with access and functional needs. Communication for resources and assistance between agencies was done via the electronic situational awareness tool or landline and cellular telephones.

Exposure control management and decision making was demonstrated through interview with the county's radiation protection officer. All emergency workers with essential missions within the 10-mile emergency planning zone would report to the Appling County Emergency Operations Center to receive an emergency worker kit and a radiological briefing. The kits included a direct reading and permanent record dosimeter, potassium iodide, and associated instructions. The radiation protection officer provided just-in-time training and instructions that included the proper use of dosimetry and potassium iodide, recording and reporting exposure, exposure limits, and protocols for exceeding identified limits. Per discussion, the authority to exceed exposure limits resides with the Appling County Emergency Management Director or appropriate supervising authority. There were sufficient supplies of potassium iodide, dosimetry, and procedures to manage the radiological exposure to emergency workers for extended operations. Dosimetry leak test dates, survey meter calibration dates, and potassium iodide expiration dates were validated during the staff assistance visit conducted on February 23, 2023.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None

- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

Critical Transportation Capability Summary:

Appling County Emergency Operations Center staff successfully demonstrated the critical transportation core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Hatch Nuclear Plant.

Through interview, Appling County school officials validated plans and procedures to provide timely transportation and accountability for students and faculty at Altamaha Elementary School. The school superintendent discussed early dismissal of the host school, Appling County High School, and the relocation of Altamaha's students, teachers, and staff ensured their safety. Parents were notified via the school's messaging system that students were being relocated and provided instructions for family reunification. Once contacted via the school's mass notification system, the primary communications with bus drivers would be with portable radios using the school's radio system. The 15 buses provided adequate transportation to relocate students, teachers, and faculty in one trip. Law enforcement would assist with the movement of buses. Appling County School Resource Officers would provide security, assist with the dismissal of the host school in preparation for reception and shelter setup by the American Red Cross, and remain at the site as safety officers.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.5.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

The Appling County Emergency Operations Center staff successfully demonstrated the public information and warning core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Hatch Nuclear Plant.

The deputy director handled the primary duties and responsibilities of the county's public information officer for this exercise and was supported by well-trained staff. Together, they demonstrated the county's ability to deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to protect the health and safety of the public in accordance with plans and procedures.

The primary alert and notification system consisted of an outdoor warning system and broadcast of Emergency Alert System messages. A simulated outdoor warning system activation and Emergency Alert System broadcast was demonstrated at the state operations center. Through interview, Appling County staff explained their capability to activate the outdoor warning system, if needed. In the event of a system failure, the county would activate their automated notification system to inform subscribers via cellular telephone, short message service, and electronic mail. Subscribers who failed to answer or acknowledge receipt of the message would be called individually by county emergency management staff. Boaters would be notified by Georgia Department of Natural Resources Officers patrolling the waterways. Georgia Forestry Commission Rangers stated they would

undertake the task of notifying loggers who may not hear the outdoor warning system or have access to broadcast news media.

During the exercise three press releases and one Emergency Alert System message were generated. All were drafted by personnel in the state operations center then reviewed and approved by the participating agencies before being disseminated by the joint information center.

The press releases were timely, each containing relevant information consistent with protective actions. No news media were present at the Appling County Emergency Operations Center; two press conferences were conducted at the joint information center. This was also the location of the media monitoring and rumor control which the county had access to as applicable. The Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency Spokesperson was authorized to speak on behalf of Appling County per state and county plans.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 3.2, 3.3.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

3.2.3.2 Appling County Medical Services Drill

Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services Capability Summary:

Emergency Medical Services

The Appling County Emergency Management Agency staff and Appling County Ambulance Service paramedics successfully demonstrated the public health, healthcare, and emergency medical services core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Hatch Nuclear Plant.

The drill commenced at the emergency medical services headquarters in Baxley, Georgia, where a simulated General Emergency notification was received. At headquarters, the Appling County Radiological Protection Officer provided two personal radiation kits to the paramedics. The kits included direct reading and personal record dosimeters, potassium iodide tablets, and a procedural pamphlet. The officer played a radiation exposure briefing video that covered topics such as potassium iodide usage, proper dosimetry equipment placement, dose limits, and emergency worker decontamination sites. After the video, the officer instructed the paramedics to check their direct reading dosimeters to ensure accurate readings. Additionally, the paramedics completed administrative data on their dosimetry and potassium iodide logs.

Upon receiving a radio call about an injured person, the paramedics prepared to depart from headquarters. The reported injuries included lacerations to the left knee and both palms. Initially, the paramedics wore gloves as their personal protective equipment, intending to decide on additional protective equipment before reaching the incident scene. During an interview, the paramedics confirmed that they would wear masks, face shields, gloves, shoe covers, and gowns; however, during the drill all protective equipment was simulated with the exception of gloves. No protective coverings inside the ambulance were observed.

Upon arrival at the incident site, the paramedics read their direct reading dosimeter immediately after exiting the ambulance and confirmed a reading of zero. The lead paramedic performed an initial triage of the injured person, assessing consciousness and identifying areas requiring immediate attention. Following the lead paramedic's instructions, the assisting paramedic placed two clean sheets on the ground, one as a surface for the aid bag and the other as a designated discard area. Effective communication between the paramedics facilitated seamless coordination.

The lead paramedic cut the persons clothing, exposing the injured knee, and applied bandages to cover the injury. To prevent potential contamination, the lead paramedic placed the shears on a boot rather than allowing them to touch the ground. Though this may have prevented the shears from becoming contaminated from the ground, the shears would have been considered contaminated after cutting the person’s clothing. Moving on to the injured palms, the lead paramedic wrapped them in gauze and used the potentially contaminated shears to cut the gauze. While another pair of shears should have been used to prevent potential cross contamination, the paramedics were focused on treating the persons injuries so they could be transported to the hospital where they would be decontaminated. Furthermore, the shears never came into contact with the person, only their clothing, which was removed, and the gauze. Overall, careful attention was given to ensure no further potential contamination occurred. After providing initial treatment for the wounds, both paramedics created a clean space using a sheet to transfer the patient onto a gurney and then inside the ambulance. Glove changes were performed after all contact with the person and potentially contaminated areas. Gloves, shears, and other discarded items were properly placed in a designated area at the incident scene, and the radiation protection officer was notified about the waste.

Before leaving the incident site, both paramedics checked their dosimeters, which showed no changes. The lead paramedic used the internal ambulance radio to contact the receiving hospital, sharing vital signs, patient information, and the estimated time of arrival. While enroute, the paramedics reassessed the injured person. Upon arrival at the hospital, the injured person was transferred over to the hospital staff. An external radiation protection technician promptly monitored the ambulance, focusing on high-traffic areas and typical debris accumulation spots, such as the front grill, door handles, wheel-wells, and the ambulance's interior. The radiation protection technician then checked the paramedics using a handheld survey meter. Contamination was discovered on the left boot of the lead paramedic; the technician used a disposable cloth to wipe the boot and re-monitored the area. After the initial wipe, the area was deemed clean or no longer contaminated. Following monitoring and spot decontamination, the ambulance and paramedics were cleared to resume service.

Hospital

Appling Healthcare staff successfully demonstrated the public health, healthcare, and emergency medical services core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Hatch Nuclear Plant.

Upon receiving a General Emergency notification, hospital staff were notified and mobilized. The charge nurse initiated notifications in accordance with hospital protocols and directed nursing staff to prepare for potentially contaminated patients. The hospital received notification that paramedics were responding to a potentially contaminated, injured individual. The charge nurse requested utility health physics technicians respond to the hospital. Hospital staff completed setup of the radiation emergency area timely and efficiently. After assessing the injured individuals, the responding paramedics provided

hospital staff with patient vitals and injuries that included a lacerated lower leg and abrasions to the hands, as well as an estimated time of arrival. No communications issues were observed.

Hospital staff donned personal protective equipment to limit or prevent the spread of contamination in accordance with plans and procedures. Personal protective equipment included two pairs of gloves, shoe covers, a gown, head cover, surgical mask, safety glasses, an electronic direct reading dosimeter, and a permanent record dosimeter. After issuing the dosimetry, the charge nurse provided guidance to staff on proper dosimetry usage, placement, and record keeping. Dosimetry was attached to a lanyard, worn around the neck, and taped to the chest for easy access. A dosimeter log was started for each nurse and maintained by the charge nurse throughout the event. The charge nurse requested and documented dosimeter readings every 30-minutes.

The hospital had sufficient space, adequate resources, and trained staff to monitor, decontaminate, and provide medical services to the contaminated, injured individual. Staff, equipment, and supplies were readily available for the arrival of the contaminated, injured individual. Most of the supplies and equipment resided in cabinets within the decontamination room. A sampling kit, decontamination cart, wall charts, waste containers, gloves, and other supplies were strategically placed around the decontamination room for accessibility. Access to the decontamination room was controlled by a locked door to the outside. Hospital staff were positioned outside the doorway to the hospital. Only designated staff were allowed access to the decontamination room. The charge nurse provided overall supervision of the hospital response. A team of trained nurses, supported by the utility technicians, assessed and treated the patient. Urgent medical care took precedence over all else. Monitoring and decontamination were only implemented after hospital staff assessed the patient's injuries and vitals to determine they were not life threatening. Utility health physics technicians employed two handheld survey meters with pancake probes to detect contamination. Both instruments were current in calibration as indicated by an affixed sticker, and operationally checked using an appropriate source. Although not observed, utility staff provided documentation that operational checks occurred on both survey meters prior to their use.

At Appling Healthcare, the paramedics quickly transferred the patient to the waiting hospital staff. The paramedics provided the nurses with the patient's vitals and injuries. The team of nurses successfully triaged, evaluated, treated, and released a contaminated, injured patient while minimizing the spread of contamination. An initial screening by the utility technicians identified contamination above 300 counts per minute on the patient's clothes, hands, and wounded knee. The charge nurse documented the survey results on the appropriate form. Staff took care to remove contaminated sheets, clothing, bandages, and other materials, and properly discarded them in marked waste receptacles. Staff changed gloves routinely after touching the patient or potentially contaminated articles. The utility technicians screened the patient again and the charge nurse recorded the results. Contamination above 300 counts per minute was identified on the patient's hands and wounded knee. Staff swabbed the patient's orifices and wounds according to hospital protocols. These samples were bagged, labeled, and surveyed prior to leaving the decontamination room. Hospital staff gloved the patient's hands and placed absorbent pads around and under the contaminated areas to contain excess water during decontamination. Staff used saline solution and gauze to clean the contaminated areas. Contaminated areas were re-surveyed after each cleaning attempt. This process continued until contamination was below 300 counts per minute. After decontamination was completed, the nurses properly discarded contaminated materials. The patient received a final, full-body scan before being transferred to a clean stretcher. The

utility technicians surveyed the stretcher wheels prior to its exit. No person or item left the radiation emergency area without being screened for contamination.

Hospital staff and nurses correctly implemented doffing procedures and discussed decontamination area cleanup. Staff safely discarded personal protective outerwear in marked waste receptacles. The utility health physics technicians collected the dosimetry and the charge nurse recorded the final readings. The utility technicians screened the team of nurses prior to exiting the radiation emergency area. Per discussion, the utility technicians would survey the decontamination room and equipment within, decontaminate as necessary, and arrange for the removal of radiological waste, prior to returning it to normal operations.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 5.3.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

3.2.3.3 Jeff Davis County Emergency Operations Center

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

The Jeff Davis County Emergency Management Agency staff successfully demonstrated the operational coordination core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Hatch Nuclear Plant.

The Jeff Davis County Emergency Management Director demonstrated the ability to alert, notify, and mobilize key staff in response to the incident; a 24-hour staffing roster was available. The initial notification of Alert was received over the emergency notification network in the Jeff Davis County Communications Center. The director used a call down list to mobilize emergency operations staff via telephone call, short message service, and electronic mail. Because emergency operations center staff were prepositioned in accordance with the extent of play agreement, the facility was quickly staffed and declared operational once key positions were staffed.

The Jeff Davis County Emergency Management Director had decision making authority as delegated by the county commissioners. Due to the scenario, no evacuations were recommended or implemented in Jeff Davis County. On the county call the director concurred with the decision to evacuate zones A, C-5, and D-5 in Toombs and Appling Counties, which were recommended by the utility. The Georgia Department of Agriculture ordered an embargo of crops in Jeff Davis County.

The director and operations officer conducted several briefings, these briefings were for situational awareness and followed each plant update, county call, and/or protective action decision. Emergency support function representatives were also asked to brief their respective actions to provide greater situational awareness. Coordination of response activities was facilitated through the emergency management director assisted by a liaison from the Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency. The liaison provided information on the availability of state resources should they be needed; there were no resources requested from the state during this exercise.

The emergency operations center had adequate communications capabilities. Communications systems available included landline telephones, cellular telephones, radio systems, electronic situational awareness tool, tele- and video-conference platforms, and internet. The communications center and emergency operations centers also had an emergency notification network and trunked radio system that linked the county to other response organizations. There were no communications failures observed during the exercise. The Jeff Davis Communications Center was located in a separate building, staff there received the initial notification of an Alert and then transferred responsibility for notification receipt to the Jeff Davis County Emergency Operations Center Director.

Exposure control management and decision making were demonstrated or validated through interview with the Jeff Davis County Radiological Protection Officer. All emergency workers within the 10-mile emergency planning zone would be issued dosimetry and potassium iodide at designated staging locations. These emergency workers would be provided just-in-time training and instructions on the proper use of dosimetry and potassium iodide, recording and reporting exposure, exposure limits, and protocols for exceeding identified limits. Per discussion, the person authorized to allow higher exposure limits was the county emergency management director. There were sufficient supplies of potassium iodide and dosimetry to manage the radiological exposure to emergency workers for extended operations. Dosimetry leak test dates, survey meter calibration dates, and potassium iodide expiration dates were validated during the staff assistance visit conducted on February 23, 2023.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

The public within the 10-mile emergency planning zone were notified of an incident at the Hatch Nuclear Plant after the General Emergency. Notification occurred through activation of the outdoor warning system and Emergency Alert System. The outdoor warning system and Emergency Alert System were activated by the Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency following discussion and concurrence with the county emergency management directors. There were no failures of either system reported during the exercise.

The Emergency Alert System message was followed by a press release that provided additional details on protective actions for the public. The release was drafted at the state operations center and reviewed by the counties and personnel at the joint information center. The evacuated zones A, C-5, and D-5, located in Toombs and Appling counties, were described in detail and the emergency information brochure was referenced. The press release provided the addresses of the reception center, essential telephone numbers, what items to take, and protective actions for livestock. The Jeff Davis County Public Information Officer noted the press release would be duplicated on the county's social media platform.

The public information officers at the county emergency operations center and the joint information center worked closely with one another. The public information officer at the

emergency operations center supplied the public information officer at the joint information center with a county update prior to each press conference.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 3.2, 3.3.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

3.2.3.4 Jeff Davis County Emergency Vehicle Decontamination

Environmental Response/Health and Safety Capability Summary:

The Hazlehurst-Jeff Davis County Fire Rescue Firefighters successfully demonstrated the environmental response/health and safety core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Hatch Nuclear Plant.

The emergency worker vehicle decontamination site was set up in a parking lot adjacent the high school. The site was spacious and clear of any school related vehicles, like buses or vans. In accordance with the extent of play agreement, equipment for the site was prepositioned and set up prior to the evaluation. A site manager was designated, and conducted a thorough walk through of the site, explaining procedures, equipment, and vehicle traffic flow. Signage, directional arrows, traffic cones, stanchions, barrier ribbon, and plastic chains were used to create traffic lanes. Two other paved areas bordering the parking lot were available for parking and storing contaminated or non-contaminated/decontaminated vehicles. Once operational, traffic flowed efficiently through the site.

Prior to the start of the drill, firefighters received a detailed safety briefing and were issued dosimetry. Potassium iodide, instructions for use, safety precautions, administrative exposure limits, and action levels were also part of the safety briefing. Additionally, the firefighters received a personal radiation exposure record form and were instructed on its use and advised to read their direct reading dosimeter every 30-minutes.

Vehicle monitoring was accomplished through the use of a portal monitor and four handheld survey meters. The portal monitor was assembled onsite and configured for vehicular use. Operational checks were completed on all the equipment prior to use. Upon completion of source and operability checks, the handheld survey meters were wrapped in thin layer of plastic to prevent them from becoming contaminated while being used.

The first emergency worker vehicle to enter the monitoring and decontamination queue was hand monitored by a firefighter across the front grill and rear bumper before entering the portal monitor. The hand monitoring was conducted in accordance with plans and procedures. With no contamination located, the vehicle was moved through the portal monitor which also resulted in a negative response to contamination. The firefighter then replaced the plastic covering on the survey meter, changed gloves, and motioned the next vehicle forward. The second vehicle was monitored in the same manner as the first. Upon entering the portal monitor contamination was indicated on the left, front panel of the vehicle. This location was noted on a form and passed along to the next station for review and completion.

The driver of the second vehicle was directed forward to the first decontamination station. At this station the vehicle was rinsed with water. The driver was then directed to a second monitoring station and a second monitoring was performed by hand, over the area of concern. Contamination was located in the left front wheel well. A second rinse was performed and the vehicle received a third hand monitoring which indicated that all contamination had successfully been removed.

Once the first vehicle had passed through the site entrance, was monitored by initial screening personnel, and determined not to be contaminated, the driver was directed to continue to the interior vehicle monitoring and decontamination station.

Upon arriving at the interior vehicle monitoring station, firefighters instructed the driver to place the vehicle in park, undo their seat belt and open the door, but not to exit. Utilizing a handheld survey meter, a firefighter surveyed the driver's shoes. The driver's shoes measured below 300 counts per minute; the driver was allowed to exit the vehicle while additional interior vehicle monitoring was conducted.

As part of the interior survey, a simulated radiation reading of 1,000 counts per minute was detected on the vehicle's steering wheel. Once detected, a firefighter used a clean cloth to wipe the steering wheel until the affected area of the steering wheel was reported to not be contaminated. The firefighter completed the remaining interior survey with no reported additional detection of radiation. The vehicle operator was released with the vehicle to the non-contaminated area of the site.

Prior to terminating the drill, a firefighter demonstrated doffing of their personal protective equipment. An area for site workers to doff was clearly marked and completely separate from the vehicle monitoring and decontamination stations. Doffing was successfully completed and performed in accordance with plans/procures.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 5.2.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

3.2.3.5 Jeff Davis County Reception & Congregate Care Center

Environmental Response/Health and Safety Capability Summary:

The Jeff Davis County reception center and congregate care staff successfully demonstrated the mass care services core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Hatch Nuclear Plant.

Prior to beginning operations, the staff watched a radiation exposure briefing video created by the state. The video covered dosimetry, potassium iodide, reading and recording direct reading dosimeters, and exposure limits. Staff were then issued dosimetry kits with both direct reading and permanent record dosimeters, potassium iodide, and an exposure record card. Designated staff were also issued handheld survey meters for contamination monitoring.

Upon entering the high school, the evacuees were given booties and gloves to wear. Their names and birthdates were recorded on a monitoring form which stayed with the evacuee up

through the shelter registration station. After donning booties and gloves evacuees were directed to the monitoring station. Staff used one portal monitor and one handheld survey meter to monitor evacuees. The spacing and layout of the personal monitoring station was adequate for safe and efficient operations. Signage, barricades, and directional markings were adequate to prevent or minimize the spread of contamination.

Monitoring staff demonstrated and discussed their ability to monitor evacuees, service animals, and emergency workers in accordance with plans and procedures. Staff processed individuals based on the results of the portal monitor screening. Individuals that did not alarm the portal monitor were deemed not contaminated, provided a form indicating no contamination, and directed to the shelter registration station. Before exiting the monitoring station, staff instructed individuals to remove their protective booties and screened their shoes for contamination at or above 300 counts per minute. Individuals that alarmed the portal monitor were deemed contaminated and escorted to the decontamination station.

A productivity rate of 3-minutes and 22-seconds was required to monitor the expected population within 12-hours. Staff screened nine simulated evacuees and emergency workers by portal monitor and/or handheld survey meter with an average time of 2-minutes and 3-seconds per evacuee; therefore, the monitoring productivity rate was met.

Individuals who alarmed the portal monitor were escorted to a male or female locker room for decontamination. Decontamination stations had contamination control supplies, protective clothing, step-off pads, barriers, stanchions, and signage including directional arrows that were sufficient to control the spread of contamination. Two large job aid posters were affixed to the wall in each decontamination station and were used extensively. Upon entering the male or female decontamination station, the individual was directed by the recorder to proceed to the locker room attendant. The locker room attendant had the individual place personal items in a large sealable plastic bag that was labeled and then returned to the evacuee or emergency worker.

The contaminated individuals were first instructed to remove their clothing and to shower with provisions in place to ensure privacy. They were given a towel to dry with as well as a disposable modesty garment to don after drying. Individuals were then monitored for residual contamination with a handheld survey meter. If appropriate, spot decontamination methods such as wipes or hand washing would be used to remove residual contamination from small areas. If two attempts had been made to decontaminate an individual, and the individual measured less than 10,000 counts per minute, they were assumed to have fixed contamination and could be released to go to the shelter registration station. If an individual could not be successfully decontaminated, the reception center manager would arrange transport to a medical services hospital for further evaluation and medically supervised decontamination. Upon completion of decontamination, each of the evacuees was given their monitoring/decontamination form and directed to the shelter registration station.

Evacuees who arrived at the shelter registration desk with a completed monitoring and decontamination form were considered not contaminated and eligible for entrance into the shelter. Once an individual presented the appropriate documentation, they were fitted with a green wristband to indicate their non-contaminated status. They were then questioned as to whether they needed shelter or had family/friends that would house them. Those that needed shelter were assisted in completing a shelter dormitory registration form and admitted to the shelter facility.

The shelter was managed by the Valdosta Chapter of the American Red Cross. American Red Cross staff were assisted by the Georgia Department of Human Services-Division of Family and Children Services. All evacuees were asked to register regardless of whether sheltering was required for accountability and future communication purposes. Documentation for

shelter occupants were maintained by the American Red Cross and the Jeff Davis County Emergency Management Agency.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 5.1.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

3.2.3.6 Tattnall County Emergency Operations Center

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

The Tattnall County Emergency Operations Center staff successfully demonstrated the operational coordination core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Hatch Nuclear Plant.

Tattnall County communication capabilities were fully functional, continuously available, and redundant. The communication capabilities included radio systems, landline and cellular telephones, short messaging service, and an electronic situational awareness tool. A communications center officer noted that all systems were used daily or tested weekly. All messages from the Hatch Nuclear Plant were received via the emergency notification network. There were no communications failures during the exercise.

Under the direction of the emergency management director, communications center officers notified the emergency operations center staff using the county's mass notification system. The mass notification system called and messaged pre-identified staff after the Alert and Site Area Emergency notifications were received. Staff reported to the emergency operations center and the facility was subsequently declared operational. A 24-hour staffing roster was maintained by the communication center officers and each workstation had position specific plans and procedures for emergency response operations.

The Tattnall County Emergency Management Agency Director oversaw emergency response for the county during the simulated radiological incident. The director was supported by key staff, which included an administrative assistant, the communications center director, and operations chief. The Chairman of the Tattnall County Board of Commissioners and the Mayor of the City of Reidsville were overall responsible for emergency response operations, and the director was responsible for incident emergency response and coordination within the emergency operations center. The emergency management director conducted one briefing during the incident. This was a situational briefing that explained the current emergency classification level of Site Area Emergency, the main stack release, meteorological data, and the declaration of a state of emergency to make resources available from the state operations center. The operations officer then took over the briefing and reviewed staff duties and responsibilities. Subsequent briefings contained emergency coordination updates and information on the plant's status provided by the utility liaison to the county. Briefings were conducted upon receipt of significant information or emergency classification level changes.

The director coordinated emergency response activities with state operations center leadership, risk county emergency management directors, and the emergency operations

facility liaisons. Coordination occurred during the regularly scheduled county calls; the director did not request any state resources during the county calls.

The director did not make any precautionary or protective actions during the exercise as the county was not in the plume exposure pathway. The director and the emergency operations center staff, however, were prepared to act if the situation changed. The county participated in the county calls, particularly during the discussion concerning the administration of potassium iodide for emergency workers; however, considerations did not apply to Tattnall County.

The scenario did not necessitate precautionary or protective action decision-making or implementation in Tattnall County. However, the director explained by interview that precautionary and protective action decisions would be coordinated through emergency support function representatives in the emergency operations center, when appropriate. The director also explained that Tattnall County currently had no individuals with access and functional needs, but should they have individuals with non-medical needs during a real-world incident, they would be transported to the reception center at North Tattnall Middle School. Individuals needing medical assistance would be transported to Optim Health in Reidsville, Georgia. Traffic and access control points were not established during the exercise; deputies with the Tattnall County Sheriff's Office explained via interview the process of establishing and staffing the six traffic and access control points within the county. Supplemental resources and personnel to support traffic and access control points would be obtained from the Reidsville Police Department, Glenville Police Department, and Tattnall County Roads Department.

The radiological protection officer in the emergency operations center oversaw emergency worker exposure control decision-making and emergency worker exposure management. No emergency workers were dispatched to the field from the emergency operations center during the exercise; however, the officer stated that emergency workers would report to the emergency operations center to receive radiation exposure control kit, which included a direct reading dosimeter, a permanent record dosimeter, potassium iodide, and instructions for ingesting potassium iodide. The officer played a radiation exposure briefing video and supplemented the briefing using job aids, including procedures, dosimetry kits, and knowledge checks following the briefing. The briefing included instructions for dosimetry use, radiological limits, record keeping, and potassium iodide use and precautions. Emergency workers would be notified of the decision to ingest potassium iodide through the emergency operations center. Dosimetry leak test dates, survey meter calibration dates, and potassium iodide expiration dates were validated during the staff assistance visit conducted on February 22, 2023.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

The Tattnall County Emergency Operations Center staff successfully demonstrated public information and warning core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Hatch Nuclear Plant.

The first protective action decision was made to evacuate zones A, C-5, and D-5, and all other zones were instructed to stay tuned to their Emergency Alert System station. None of these zones were in Tattnall County. The primary means to alert the public was an outdoor warning system that the state activated. When the state and counties agreed that a protective action decision had been made that affected the public, the state activated the outdoor warning system in the 10-mile emergency planning zone and transmitted an Emergency Alert System message.

The Tattnall County Emergency Management Director managed public information for the county. The director passed information the county wanted to be released to the public to the state public information office for inclusion in the state's press releases. The director reviewed the state press releases for accuracy before the state released them. The Tattnall County Emergency Management Director did not prepare any county-specific press releases. The director stated that the state managed all public inquiries.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 3.2, 3.3.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

3.2.3.7 Toombs County Emergency Operations Center

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

Toombs County Emergency Management staff successfully demonstrated the operational coordination core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Hatch Nuclear Plant.

Emergency operations center staff executed their plan to notify and mobilize key staff and activate the facility. Upon receipt of the Alert, a communications officer notified the emergency management director who directed the officer to mobilize key staff and county officials using a call down list. As the emergency classification level changed, the communications officer notified the operations officer who routinely briefed emergency operations center staff of each classification upgrade. Briefings included plant status and instructions to review the plan for position specific actions. A 24-hour staffing roster was available.

The Toombs County Emergency Management Director was responsible for direction and control in the emergency operations center. This was successfully demonstrated through participation in county calls in which precautionary and protective action decisions, with state, local elected officials, and emergency operations center staff concurrence, were made and implemented.

The director discussed precautionary actions on the county call and agreed to relocate Toombs Central Elementary School. The director expressed concern for workers and hunters

near the river. A Georgia Department of Natural Resources liaison stated that rangers would be dispatched to patrol closer to the shore to ensure workers and hunters were advised to leave the area. The director considered available meteorological and plant conditions and opted not to implement a local state of emergency or relocate individuals with access and functional needs in Toombs County.

On the county call following the General Emergency declaration, the state announced the Governor had issued a state of emergency based on the utility's recommendation to evacuate zones A, C-5, and D-5. Additionally, the state recommended a livestock advisory for the 10-mile emergency planning zone and an agricultural embargo. Following these decisions by the state, the director reviewed the emergency planning zone map and current meteorological conditions and decided to relocate individuals with access and functional needs. The director instructed the operations officer to brief the emergency operations center staff and begin movement of individuals with access and functional needs along with the evacuation of Toombs County zones A and D-5. The outdoor warning system and Emergency Alert System were used to advise the public of the evacuation.

The emergency operations center staff, state, and non-governmental organizations worked to implement simulated precautionary and protective action decisions including relocating students and staff from Toombs Central Elementary School, moving individuals with access and functional needs, and evacuating the public in zones A and D-5. Staffing and other resources were readily available to support response operations. The various county and state organizations discussed how they would request additional resources through the emergency management director and partner agencies. Activities were tracked on handwritten forms and through an electronic situational awareness tool.

The distribution of dosimetry and potassium iodide for Toombs County emergency workers was simulated and discussed with emergency operations center staff and the emergency management director. Emergency workers operating in the 10-mile emergency planning zone would be issued dosimetry and potassium iodide at the emergency operations center.

A radiological protection officer or the emergency management director would provide just-in-time and play a radiation exposure briefing video that included the proper use of dosimetry and potassium iodide, recording and reporting exposure, exposure limits, and processes for exceeding identified limits. A decision was made before exercise termination to authorize emergency worker distribution of potassium iodide without ingestion; however, implementation was not observed. Dosimetry leak test dates, survey meter calibration dates, and potassium iodide expiration dates were validated during the staff assistance visit conducted on February 23, 2023.

Staff from the communications center and the emergency operations center utilized redundant communication systems that were functional and continuously available throughout the response. The primary method of notification was through the emergency notification network and an electronic situational awareness tool. Secondary methods included landline and cellular telephones, short message service, and electronic mail. Tertiary communication systems included a tele-conference platform for county calls, along with facsimile and amateur radio. A brief facsimile malfunction occurred; however, the emergency management director quickly resolved the issue. No other communications failures or delays were observed.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None

- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

Critical Transportation Capability Summary:

Toombs County Emergency Operations Center staff successfully demonstrated the critical transportation core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Hatch Nuclear Plant.

The Toombs County Schools Transportation Director demonstrated coordination for relocation of students and faculty from Toombs Central Elementary School to Toombs Middle School as a precautionary at Alert. The director notified school administrative staff to implement internal mass notification, transportation, and accountability which included early dismissal of the host school per plans and procedures. School buses and drivers routinely stage at the school when in session, therefore marshaling was ready to be accomplished without the need for recall. The director noted that other transportation resources could be obtained from city school districts in the county. Toombs County Sheriff's Office Deputies would assist with traffic and access control; however, this was not demonstrated during this exercise.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 1.5.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved**: None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

Toombs County Emergency Management Agency staff successfully demonstrated the public information and warning core capability in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Hatch Nuclear Plant.

Staff at the state operations center drafted three press releases and one media advisory that captured the events at each emergency classification level. The Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency Area Field Coordinator received the drafts and provided them to the Toombs County Emergency Management Director for review and approval. The field coordinator then forwarded the director's approval back to the state operations center. A press release to inform parents and the community was generated from the state operations center when the relocation of students and staff from Toombs Central Elementary School to Toombs Middle School occurred. All approved press releases were then provided to the emergency management administrative assistant for record and distribution within the emergency operations center.

Toombs County had an outdoor warning system throughout the 10-mile emergency planning zone; the system was activated by the Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency on behalf of the counties. The state activated the outdoor warning system following the General Emergency declaration. Activation was followed by an Emergency Alert

System message notifying the public to evacuate zones A, C-5, and D-5. There were no outdoor warning system failures.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness capability targets were met: 3.2, 3.3.

- **Level 1 Finding:** None
- **Level 2 Finding:** None
- **Not Demonstrated:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Resolved:** None
- **Prior Level 2 Findings – Unresolved:** None

Section 4: Conclusion

FEMA assesses offsite response organization preparedness on an ongoing basis which meets the intent of the 44 CFR 350 planning standards and, through the assessment of selected core capabilities, the National Preparedness Goal. This report is used to document biennial demonstration-based assessment activities and will be used to inform the Biennial Preparedness Report in December 2024.

The analysis of capabilities section above described the state of Georgia and Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant offsite response capabilities. Overall, the exercise was a success. The demonstration-based assessment activities evaluated by core capabilities, objectives, and capability targets were successfully demonstrated, and no level 1 or level 2 findings were identified. All offsite response organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures, and successfully demonstrated the ability to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of an incident involving the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant.

Based on the results of this exercise and FEMA's review of the 2022 Annual Letter of Certification submitted by Georgia, the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness of the state of Georgia and the affected local jurisdictions site-specific to the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant can be implemented. They are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of an emergency at the site. The 44 CFR, Pt. 350 approval of the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness site-specific to the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant granted on May 5, 1981, will remain in effect.

Despite other ongoing real-world response efforts, the professionalism and teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all phases of the exercise. FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated and made this exercise a success.

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Appendix A: Exercise Timeline

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Time Utility Declared	Time That Notification Was Received or Action Was Taken						
		SOC	Dose Assessment	Toombs County	Appling County	Jeff Davis County	Tattnall County	JIC
Unusual Event	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Alert	8:14 a.m.	8:22 a.m.	8:22 a.m.	8:18 a.m.	8:18 a.m.	8:25 a.m.	8:19 a.m.	9:56 a.m.
Site Area Emergency	9:53 a.m.	9:57 a.m.	9:57 a.m.	9:58 a.m.	9:56 a.m.	9:58 a.m.	9:56 a.m.	11:00 a.m.
General Emergency	11:17 a.m.	11:25 a.m.	11:25 a.m.	11:21 a.m.	11:25 a.m.	11:26 a.m.	11:27 a.m.	12:34 p.m.
Simulated Rad. Release Started	10:29 a.m.	10:30 a.m.	10:30 a.m.	10:30 a.m.	10:30 a.m.	10:30 a.m.	10:30 a.m.	12:34 p.m.
Simulated Rad. Release Ended	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing
Facility Declared Operational	8:45 a.m.	8:45 a.m.	8:45 a.m.	9:05 a.m.	9:00 a.m.	9:25 a.m.	10:35 a.m.	8:51 a.m.
Declaration of Emergency	**State**	11:00 a.m.	-	-	11:23 a.m.	11:23 a.m.	11:23 a.m.	-
	Local	-	-	-	10:13 a.m.	10:01 a.m.	10:40 a.m.	-
Exercise Terminated		1:24 p.m.	1:24 p.m.	1:14 p.m.	1:16 p.m.	1:00 p.m.	1:14 p.m.	1:08 p.m.
Precautionary Actions: Relocated Schools		-	-	9:10 a.m.	9:28 a.m.	-	-	9:56 a.m.
Precautionary Actions: Relocated Access/Functional Needs in A, C-5		-	-	-	9:55 a.m.	-	-	-
Precautionary Actions: Cleared River, Hunters & Loggers; Restricted Air & Rail; Issued Livestock Advisory		10:24 a.m.	-	-	10:40 a.m.	-	-	11:00 a.m.
Protective Action Decision 1: Evacuate A, C-5, D-5		11:53 a.m.	-	11:53 a.m.	11:53 a.m.	11:53 a.m.	-	12:47 p.m.
Outdoor Warning System Activation		12:02 p.m.	-	12:02 p.m.	12:02 p.m.	12:02 p.m.	12:02 p.m.	12:34 p.m.
EAS Message		12:11 p.m.	-	12:11 p.m.	12:11 p.m.	12:11 p.m.	12:11 p.m.	12:34 p.m.
KI Ingestion Decision: Emergency Workers – Do Not Ingest		1:00 p.m.	1:00 p.m.	1:00 p.m.	1:00 p.m.	1:00 p.m.	1:00 p.m.	-

**Denotes the time in which a decision was messaged from the joint information center.*

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Appendix B: Evaluator Assignments

1. Evaluator Assignments, Medical Services Drill: August 10, 2023

Location/Venue	Evaluation Team	Core Capability
Appling County Medical Services Drill	Nathan Nienhius Gene Taylor DeShun Lowery Erica Houghton	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services

2. Evaluator Assignments, Out of Sequence Activities: September 28, 2023

Location/Venue	Evaluation Team	Core Capability
Jeff Davis County Emergency Vehicle Decontamination	Robert Nash Steve Watts Mark Dalton	Environmental Response/Health and Safety
Jeff Davis County Reception & Congregate Care Center	James Young Steve Watts Nathan Nienhius Marcy Campbell Mark Dalton DeShun Lowery Erica Houghton	Mass Care Services

3. Evaluator Assignments, Exercise: October 31, 2023

Location/Venue	Evaluation Team	Core Capability
State Operations Center	Randi Hendrix Gene Taylor PJ Nied	Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning
Emergency Operations Facility	Robert Spence	Operational Coordination
Joint Information Center	James Young Steve Watts	Public Information and Warning
Dose Assessment	Brad McRee	Situational Assessment
Field Team Management	Marcy Campbell	Environmental Response/Health and Safety
Field Team Alpha & Bravo	Debbie Cummings Cheryl Weaver	Environmental Response/Health and Safety
Appling County Emergency Operations Center	Nate Nienhius George Odom Tom Hegele	Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning

Location/Venue	Evaluation Team	Core Capability
		Critical Transportation
Jeff Davis County Emergency Operations Center	Robert Nash Roy Smith Jon Christiansen	Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning
Tattnall County Emergency Operations Center	Quintin Ivy Irvin Gibson Rosemary Samsel	Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning
Toombs County Emergency Operations Center	Gerald McLemore Matt Webb Brenda Rembert	Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning Critical Transportation

Appendix C: Exercise Participants

Participating Organizations
State of Georgia
Georgia Department of Agriculture
Georgia Department of Human Services-Division of Family & Children Services
Georgia Department of Natural Resources
Georgia Department of Natural Resources-Environmental Protection Division
Georgia Department of Public Health Southeast Health District
Georgia Department of Transportation
Georgia Emergency Management Agency and Homeland Security
Georgia Forestry Commission
Georgia State Patrol
Georgia State Prison Fire Department
Appling County
Appling County Board of Commissioners
Appling County Emergency Management Agency
Appling County Emergency Medical Services
Appling County Extension
Appling County Fire
Appling County Health Department
Appling County Manager
Appling County Public Works
Appling County Schools
Appling County Sheriff's Office
Appling Healthcare System
Baxley Fire Department

Participating Organizations
Baxley Police Department
City of Baxley
City of Baxley Public Works
Jeff Davis County
City of Hazlehurst
City of Hazlehurst Police Department
Jeff Davis 911 Communications
Jeff Davis County Commissioners Office
Jeff Davis County Emergency Management
Jeff Davis County Emergency Medical Services
Jeff Davis County Family and Children Services
Jeff Davis County Fire Department
Jeff Davis County Health Department
Jeff Davis County Public Works
Jeff Davis County Rescue
Jeff Davis County Schools
Jeff Davis County Sheriff's Office
Jeff Davis County Transportation Department
Tattnall County
City of Glenville
City of Reidsville
Glennville Police Department
Glenville City Management
Glenville Fire Department

Participating Organizations
Glenville Public Works
Reidsville Police Department
Reidsville Public Works
Tattnall County Board of Commissioners
Tattnall County Coroner's Office
Tattnall County Department of Corrections
Tattnall County Department of Family and Child Services
Tattnall County E911 Operations
Tattnall County Emergency Management Agency
Tattnall County Emergency Medical Services
Tattnall County Emergency Response
Tattnall County Extension
Tattnall County Fire Department
Tattnall County Health Department
Tattnall County Road Department
Tattnall County Schools
Tattnall County Sheriff's Office
Tattnall Healthcare System
Toombs County
City of Lyons
City of Lyons Fire Department
City of Lyons Police Department
City of Vidalia
City of Vidalia Fire Department

Participating Organizations
City of Vidalia Police Department
Mayor of Lyons
Toombs County Clerk
Toombs County Commission Chairman
Toombs County Commissioners
Toombs County Coroner
Toombs County Department of Family and Children Services
Toombs County Emergency Management Agency
Toombs County Manager
Toombs County Public Works
Toombs County Schools
Toombs County Sheriff's Office
Toombs Health Department
Toombs-Montgomery Emergency Medical Services
Private Sector
American Red Cross
Canoochee Electric Membership Corporation
Georgia Eye Institute
Georgia Power Company
Glenville Eye Surgery Center
Hatch Nuclear Plant
Memorial Health Meadows Hospital
Optim Medical System Hospital
Pineland Telephone Cooperative

Participating Organizations
Southern Nuclear Company
University of Georgia Cooperative Extension
Federal
4th Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region 4
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region 2

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Appendix D: Extent of Play Agreement

The signed extent of play agreement is available here: Documents and Media - 2023 Hatch Plume Exercise - Preparedness Toolkit (fema.gov).