Susquehanna Steam Electric Station
Nuangola Borough Exercise
September 19, 2023

Federal Emergency Management Agency
Region 3
Quick Look Report

December 6, 2023

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Purpose

This Quick Look Report summarizes the conduct of the FEMA-evaluated Out-of-Sequence Nuangola Borough, Luzerne County, exercise which took place on September 19, 2023. Nuangola Borough is a risk municipality located in Luzerne County and is within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) of the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES).

Overview

The Nuangola Emergency Management Agency did not participate in the full participation Plume Exposure Pathway Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Exercise conducted and evaluated on October 18, 2022, by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region 3, due to a COVID-19 outbreak that impacted staffing. (It should noted, that contingent plans were in place to support any emergencies using available Nuangola Borough EOC staff, assistance from Luzerne County, and the use of Talen Liaisons if needed.)

Core Capabilities and Objectives

The SSES Nuangola Borough Redemonstration evaluated by FEMA was designed to demonstrate the capabilities of State and local emergency management agencies to mobilize emergency management and emergency response personnel, to activate emergency operations centers and support facilities, and to protect the health, lives, and property of the citizens residing within the 10-mile EPZ. Core capabilities-based planning allowed the exercise planning team to develop the objective and observe associated outcomes through a framework of specific action items. Additionally, the objective and capability target assessed met Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual guidance.

The core capabilities demonstrated during this exercise were:

- Operational Coordination
- Environmental Response/Health
- Public Information and Warning
- Situational Assessment
- Operational Communications
- Access Control/Identify Verification

These core capabilities, when successfully demonstrated, met the exercise objectives. The objectives for this exercise were:
Objective 1: Emergency Operations Management
Objective 2: Exposure Control
Objective 3: Alert and Notification

The Capability Targets for this exercise were selected for evaluation based on the need for initial demonstration:

- Capability Target 1.1: Mobilization
- Capability Target 1.2: Direction and Control
- Capability Target 1.5: Protective Action Decision Implementation for the Plume Phase
- Capability Target 2:2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management
- Capability Target 3.1: Communications
- Capability Target 3.2: Alert and Notification of the Public
- Capability Target 5.4: Traffic and Access Control

Exercise Purpose and Design

The purpose of the exercise was to evaluate player actions against current response plans and capabilities for a nuclear power plant-related incident, and to comply with the requirements of 44 CFR 350 and the planning standards of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2. Exercise planners utilized the elements described in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program Manual (December 2019) to develop this exercise.

The criteria utilized in the FEMA evaluation process are contained in the following:

- NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2, December 2019
- Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual, January 2019

Evaluator Assignments and Location

September 19, 2023		
NUANGOLA BOROUGH EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY		
Demonstration Site	**Evaluator**	**Capability Targets**
Nuangola Borough Emergency Operation Center 5150 Nuangola Road Nuangola, PA 18707	Joe Suders	1.1, 1.2
	Kathy Duran	1.5, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2, 5.4

Summary of Results

The findings in this report are based on the evaluations of the Federal evaluation team, with final determinations made by the FEMA, Region 3 Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) Chairperson, and approved by FEMA Headquarters. These reports are provided to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and participating States. State and local governments utilize the findings contained in these reports for the purposes of planning, training, and improving emergency preparedness.

A Level 1 Finding is defined by the FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual as follows: "An observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a determination that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP)."

A Level 2 Finding is defined as: "An observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health and safety."

Finally, a Plan Issue is: "An observed or identified inadequacy in the offsite response organization's (ORO) emergency plan/implementing procedures, rather than that of the ORO's performance."

The evaluation of this exercise determined that there were no Level One Findings, no Level Two Findings, and no Plan Issues.

Exercise Evaluation Assessments Met

Nuangola Borough Emergency Operation Center

Capability Target	Capability Target Description	Status
1.1	Mobilization	M
1.2	Direction and Control	M
1.5	Protective Action Decision Implementation for the Plume Phase	M
2.2	Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management	M
3.1	Communications	M
3.2	Alert and Notification to the Public	M
5.4	Traffic and Access Control	M

Recommendations

It is recommended that two-part communications should be established between the county and municipal EOCs to avoid any miscommunication or missed messages. There was a lack of coordination between Nuangola Borough and the Luzerne County EOC because the Governor's protective action to order the evacuation of the entire EPZ and for the public to ingest KI was not received by the Nuangola Borough EOC. Communicating, verifying, and confirming all critical information would resolve any confusion and provide clarity at all levels.

It was also noted that although high-range dosimetry of 0-200R is available at Luzerne County, it is recommended that high-range dosimeters be made available at the municipality for issue to emergency workers at the time of the initial radiological briefing and prior to deployment into the EPZ. Not having immediate access to these dosimeters could impact lifesaving activities.

Conclusion

Based on the results of the exercise and a review of the offsite radiological emergency response plans and procedures submitted, FEMA Region 3 has determined they are adequate (meet the planning and preparedness standards of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision 2, December 2019, as referenced in 44 CFR 350.5) and there is reasonable assurance they can be implemented, as demonstrated during this exercise.

A corrective action/improvement plan will not be prepared.

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION

2022 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS REDEMONSTRATION EXERCISE

EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT

OBJECTIVE 1 – Emergency Operations Management

Capability Target 1.1: Mobilization *(Vice Sub-Element 1.a.1)*
Core Capability: Operational Coordination; Planning
Recommended Evaluation Frequencies: At every assessment activity
Recommended Assessment Activities: Exercise; Drill
Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.3, A.4, A.5, C.1, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, E.1, E.1.a, E.3, F.1.c, H.6, and O.1)
Intent: The capability to alert, notify, and mobilize OROs to staff facilities in support of emergency operations.

Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:

1. Alert, notify, and mobilize key personnel, to include a 24-hour staffing roster, and activate facilities in a timely manner.
   - What time was staff notified? What time did they arrive at the facility?
   - Did the ORO demonstrate the activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel upon their arrival?
   - Was activation of facilities/locations completed in accordance with plans/procedures?
   - Were key emergency personnel contacted, alerted, and mobilized in a timely manner?
   - Did the ORO demonstrate the ability to staff and maintain 24-hour operations?
   - Were position staff trained and in place for facility activation?
2. Receive and verify notifications.
   - Who notified the ORO? Licensee or other?
   - For reverse notification, how was the licensee notified?
   - Was the notification/information verified? How?
   - What was the initial ECL? Were changes to ECLs communicated in the same manner?
3. Identify and request additional resources, as needed.
   - Was the ability to identify and request additional resources demonstrated? If not, was the ability to identify compensatory measures demonstrated?
   - Were MOUs and LOAs available for review?
4. Determine a facility operational.
   - What time was the facility declared operational?
   - What criteria was used to determine if the facility was operational?
   - What was the time difference between notifications of personnel and when the facility was declared operational?

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

State Negotiated Extent of Play:
• *Mobilization will be described to the evaluator following the notification of the initiating event along with all communication systems utilized to notify staff.* • *In all instances, the demonstration of a shift change is **NOT** required. Twenty-four-hour staffing will be demonstrated by means of a roster or staffing chart.* • *County and Municipal EOCs, **may pre-stage** at their duty location.* • *Talen liaisons will be participating at each municipality.* • *A Luzerne County EOC Control Cell will provide injects for Nuangola Borough EOC to* drive exercise play for initial declaration and follow-on escalation

Capability Target 1.2: Direction and Control *(Vice Sub-Element 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.e.1)*
Core Capabilities: Operational Coordination; Environmental Response/Health and Safety; Public Information and Warning; Mass Care Services; Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services; Situational Assessment; Critical Transportation; Planning
Recommended Evaluation Frequencies: At every assessment activity
Recommended Assessment Activities: Exercise; Drill
Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.1.c, A.2, A.3, A.5, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, D.4, E.1, H.6, and O.1)
Intent: The capability to provide overall direction and control of response efforts, commensurate with the responsibilities of leadership, as detailed in plans/procedures.

Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:

1. Support protective action decision-making.
   - Who, by title and position, was in charge?
   - Who was authorized to make any PADs prior to an official PAR from the licensee?
   - Did decision-makers obtain input from their support staff?
2. Conduct briefings in a timely manner.
   - Were briefings conducted in a timely manner?
   - What information was provided?
   - How frequently were briefings held?
   - Who gave the briefing?
3. Maintain situational awareness.
   - Did the ORO maintain situational awareness? How?
4. Coordinate response activities with other organizations.
   - Were response activities coordinated with other organizations? How?
5. Obtain resources to support emergency operations.
   - Were resources obtained to support emergency operations (e.g., through MOUs or other agreements)?
   - Was just-in-time training provided, as necessary?
6. Provide and maintain adequate facilities and equipment to support the emergency response.
   - Were facilities and equipment adequate to support operations? How so?
   - Was the facility evacuated during the plume? What means of monitoring and decontamination were used?

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

State Negotiated Extent of Play:
Nuangola Borough will demonstrate Capability Target 1.2 with minimal staffing

Capability Target 1.5: Protective Action Decision Implementation for the Plume Phase *(Vice Sub-Element 3.b.1; 3.c.1; 3.c.2)*
Core Capabilities: Operational Coordination; Public Information and Warning; Environmental Response/Health and Safety; Critical Transportation; Health and Social Services; Housing; Natural and Cultural Resources; Planning
Recommended Evaluation Frequencies: Biennially
Recommended Assessment Activities: Exercise; Drill
Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.4, C.2.a, G.1, J.11, J.11.a, J.11.b, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.g, and O.1)
Intent: The capability to implement precautionary protective action and/or PADs, including evacuation and/or sheltering, for all populations within the plume and ingestion exposure pathway EPZs. The populations include those with access and functional needs, students, and institutionalized individuals.

Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:

1. Implement PADs, ensuring communication and coordination with all appropriate jurisdictions.
   - Were resources identified and utilized effectively?
   - Did OROs communicate and work together in an effective manner?
   - What type of coordination occurred on the implementation of protective actions?
   - Was the public kept informed and was the information provided relevant?
   - Were PADs implemented as directed?
   - What types of populations are in the plume exposure pathway EPZ (e.g., institutionalized, access and functional needs, non-English speaking, etc.)? Who is responsible for notifying each, and at what point during the incident?
   - Were there any gaps in resources identified? If so, how were they addressed?
2. Assist those with access and functional needs during the implementation of PADs.
   - What time was the order received for those with access and functional needs?
   - Were the facility/facilities receiving those with access and functional needs listed in the plans?
   - How were individuals with services animals addressed
3. Communicate, coordinate, and implement protective actions for schools.
   - What school districts are located within the plume exposure pathway EPZ?
   - Who notifies school districts? How?
   - What was the protective action that the school took?
   - With regard to processing students, faculty, and staff, what sort of PADs were made?
   - At which ECL were the school districts notified?
   - If students were moved, which reclamation centers where they sent to? Which is the host school?
   - How were parents and/or guardians notified?
   - Are there schools located outside the plume exposure pathway EPZ that have students living within the EPZ? What arrangements are made for those students?
   - What type of transportation was provided to the students (e.g., bus, etc.)?
   - Who notifies the bus drivers?
   - Were there adequate buses available? And how do they communicate with the school?
   - Do the bus drivers know where to take the students? Are they trained on what to do?
   - Was the school evacuated during the plume? What means of monitoring and decontamination were used?
4. Communicate with transportation officials.
   - What transportation needs, or resources were required?
   - Was a list of the transportation providers available?
   - Were transportation providers contacted?
   - How were needs for transportation-dependent individuals met?
   - Were designated pick-up points used?

5. Identify evacuation routes for the general public.
   - What evacuation routes were selected?
   - Were the direction of the wind/plume and/or other hazardous conditions considered in determining which evacuation routes were used?
   - How was this information communicated to the media and the public?
   - How were alterations to the pre-designated routes communicated to the media and the public?
   - Was the facility evacuated during the plume?
6. Make KI available to both institutionalized persons and the general public, in accordance with plans and procedures.
   - How was the decision to take KI disseminated to the public and institutionalized persons?
   - Did the ORO provide KI to the general public and institutionalized persons? If so, how was it distributed?
   - What quantities of KI are available?
   - Where is KI stored?
   - What dosages of KI are available?
   - What is the expiration date of KI? If there is an extended policy, where is the letter certifying the extension?
   - Did the ORO ensure that the KI is stored in a temperature-controlled facility?
   - What information was provided to the general public with regard to KI?
   - What instructions were provided for the use of KI?
   - Did the instructions include dosages and frequency to take KI?
   - Did the instructions include contradictions and side effects of using KI? How was it explained?
   - How was KI ingestion documented for institutionalized persons?
   - Did staff maintain lists of the institutionalized individual who ingested KI?

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

State Negotiated Extent of Play
All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement. • *A Luzerne County Control Cell will provide injects for Nuangola Borough EOC to demonstrate this Capability Target.*

Capability Target 2.2: Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management *(VICE Sub-Element 3.a.1)*
Core Capabilities: Operational Coordination; Environmental Response/Health and Safety; Planning
Recommended Evaluation Frequencies: Biennially
Recommended Assessment Activities: Exercise; Drill
Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (C.2.c, H.11, H.11.b, K.2.b, K.3, K.3.a, M.1.b, and O.1)
Intent: The capability of emergency workers to manage dose and exposure, use equipment (e.g., dosimetry, radio protective drugs), and identify procedures to monitor their exposure and dose, including following procedures to obtain authorization to receive emergency exposures in excess of the PAGs.

Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:

1. Maintain an appropriate inventory of DRDs that are leak-tested or current in calibration.
   - What types of DRDs were used?
   - Were they consistent with the plans?
   - Were they current in calibration or leak test?

2. Maintain an appropriate inventory of PRDs.
   - What type of PRDs were used?
   - Was the inventory of available PRDs sufficient for the number of workers?
   - How many PRDs were available?
3. Retain an adequate supply of radioprotective drugs.
   - Was there an adequate supply of radioprotective drugs?
   - How many doses of radioprotective drugs were available?
   - Was the quantity of radioprotective drugs available sufficient for the number of individuals needing to take it?
4. Adequately distribute appropriate DRDs and PRDs.
   - Was dosimetry distributed in a timely manner?
   - Was dosimetry distributed appropriately to read identified exposure limits?
   - Did workers receive personal dosimetry or group dosimetry?
5. Adequately distribute radioprotective drugs to emergency workers.
   - Were radioprotective drugs distributed in a timely manner?
6. Record and report exposures in the field.
   - Did workers read and record dosimetry on a regular basis?
   - At what frequency were readings recorded?
   - To who were the readings reported?
   - Who briefed emergency workers? Did the briefing include the following:
     - Ensuring dosimetry are zeroed or initial reading is recorded.
     - Frequency to read and record dosimeters.
     - The process of reporting exposures.
     - Proper placement of dosimeters.
     - Proper use of PRDs.
     - Ingestion and documentation of radioprotective drugs.
     - Potential adverse effects of radioprotective drugs.
     - The location to report to for monitoring and decontamination.
7. Implement decisions to administer radioprotective drugs.
   - What was the quantity of the inventory of radioprotective drugs and the expiration date?
   - Was the available quantity of radioprotective drugs sufficient to support the number of emergency workers?
   - Was the supply of radioprotective drugs stored according to manufacturer recommendations?
   - How was the ingestion of radioprotective drugs documented?
   - Did emergency workers have a basic knowledge of procedures for ingesting and recording the use of radioprotective drugs, even if the scenario did not drive its use?
   - How were records of exposure and ingestion of radioprotective drugs maintained?
   - Did plans/procedures include a mechanism for identifying an emergency worker who has declined to take radioprotective drugs in advance? If so, how was this documented?
8. Report to individual responsible for managing exposure and dose when limits are reached.
   - What was the identified exposure limit?
   - What was the dosimeter correction factor and how was it communicated to emergency workers?
   - What is the process for receiving approval for exceeding exposure limits and dose limits?
   - Who authorized emergency workers to exceed limits or replace a worker who has reached exposure limits?
   - Who coordinated with offsite emergency workers who were performing duties onsite?
9. Implement exposure control decisions to members of the public from radiological exposure and control dose for those who are authorized to temporarily reenter a restricted area.
   - What exposure control decisions were implemented to members of the public? What was the control dose for those who were authorized to temporarily reenter a restricted area?

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

State Negotiated Extent of Play:
Radiological briefings will be provided to address exposure limits, procedures to replace those approaching limits, and how permission to exceed limits is obtained from the county. Emergency workers will also be briefed on when to take KI and on whose authority. Distribution of KI will be simulated. *OROs should also demonstrate the use of all applicable dosimetry forms to emergency workers. The completion of one "Dosimetry-KI Form" will be demonstrated.* *At any time, players may ask other players or supervisors to clarify radiological information.* *In Pennsylvania, emergency workers do not have turn-back values.* *Emergency workers who are assigned to low exposure rate areas, (e.g., counting laboratories, emergency operations centers, and communications centers) may have individual direct reading dosimeters or they may be monitored by dosimeters strategically placed in the work area. In Pennsylvania, this will be accomplished through the use of an area kit. The area kit process is explained in State, County and Municipal Plans.* *Standard issue of dosimetry and KI for each category of emergency worker is as follows:* *Category A: 1 PRD, 1 DRD, and 1 unit of KI* *Category B: 1 PRD and 1 unit of KI* *Category C: 1 PRD* *NOTE: Emergency responders located outside the EPZ have limited potential for radiation exposure (e.g., monitoring/decontamination teams, MS-1 hospital staffs). EMS crews transporting contaminated or potentially contaminated individuals outside of the EPZ are <u>not</u> provided dosimetry as per Annex E, Appendix 5 – Radiological Exposure Control, page E-5-35.* *If Nuangola Borough has dosimetry equipment indicated within their Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP), will make the dosimetry equipment (and KI) available for inspection by the Federal Evaluator. Simulation PRDs with mock serial numbers will be used.* *A radiological briefing will be performed, and dosimetry will be distributed for one EOC staff member.*

OBJECTIVE 3 - Alert and Notification

Capability Target 3.1: Communications *(Vice Sub-Element: 1.d.1)*
Core Capabilities: Operational Communications; Operational Coordination; Situational Awareness; Planning
Recommended Evaluation Frequencies: At every assessment activity
Recommended Assessment Activities: Exercise; Communication Drill (N.4.e)
Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)
Intent: The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel.

Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:

1. Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.
   - What types of communications system(s) and method(s) were available? Which were demonstrated?

- Was the communication system(s) fully functional?
- Did personnel demonstrate familiarity of use with each system/method?
- Was a communications check with other jurisdictions, field teams, and/or other support organizations required and completed?

2. Maintain periodic test results and corrective actions on a real time basis.
   - How were test results and corrective actions tracked in real time?
   - Was documentation of the test results and/or corrective actions made available?
3. Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.
   - Which communication system(s) available was independent of commercial telephone?
   - Was it able to be accessed/utilized?
4. Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.
   - Were there any delays in message traffic that disrupted emergency operations? If so, how were the delays addressed/mitigated?
5. Identify and address any failures of the systems.
   - Were there any communication failures? If so, how was the failure identified?
   - What actions were taken to correct the failure and/or how was the failure overcome?
   - Did the failure affect overall performance?
6. Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., "content check").
   - Were the messages transmitted/received understood by personnel?
   - What was the message?
   - Was a "content check" (i.e., informational message that could be received during an actual radiological emergency) performed?

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

State Negotiated Extent of Play:
The Commonwealth coordinates commonwealth and county response via a phone/internet bridge line. When warranted, siren sounding will be coordinated on the phone/internet bridge line. A Simulation cell will be utilized to deliver notifications during this exercise *Risk counties may communicate with their risk municipalities via public safety radio frequencies (EMA Radio), commercial telephone, email, fax, or Amateur Radio Communications (ARES/RACES) or other available means. If the risk county does not participate in the exercise the Simulation Cell may notify the municipality directly.or a liaison may be present to provide injects directly.*

Capability Target 3.2: Alert and Notification of the Public *(Vice Sub-Element: 5.a.1; 5.a.3; 5.a.4)*
Core Capabilities: Public Information and Warning; Planning
Recommended Evaluation Frequencies: Biennially
Recommended Assessment Activities: Biennial exercise only
Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.2, E.4, E.5, F.3, and O.1)
Intent: The capability to provide instructions to the public.

Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:
Alert and Notification System

1. Sequentially provide an alert signal followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas.
   - Who has releasing authority of initial EAS or other notification method messaging?

- Who made the decision to activate the alert and notification system?
- What process is followed to activate the system?
- Who activated the system?
- What alert method(s) was used (siren-system, tone-alert radio, route alerting, telephone, Telecommunication Device for the Deaf/TeleType [TDD/TTY], etc.)?

2. Alert and notify the general public.
   - Was the same method used for approving and releasing subsequent alert and notification as the initial alert/ notification?
   - What alert method(s) was used (siren-system, tone-alert radio, route alerting, telephone, TDD/TTY, etc.)?
   - What message was sent out? Was it pre-scripted?
   - How often were messages repeated?
   - Conduct initial messaging with, at a minimum, the following four essential elements in the message:
     - Identification of the ORO responsible and the official with authority for providing the alert and instructional message.
     - Identification of the commercial NPP and a statement that an emergency exists there.
     - Reference to REP-specific emergency information (e.g., brochures, calendars, and/or online information) for use by the general public during an emergency.
     - A closing statement asking that the affected and potentially affected population stay tuned for additional information, or that the population tune to another station for additional information.
3. Identify and address any failures of the system(s) or portion of a system(s).
   - Were there any failures of the system or a portion(s) of the system?
   - How were any failures of the system or a portion(s) of the system identified?
   - Was the failure attributed to a specific portion of the plume and/or ingestion exposure pathway EPZ or segment of the population? How?
   - What alternate means of alert and notification (e.g., simultaneous, or concurrent failure models have overlapping systems which will seamlessly address failures; activation of additional system(s); route alerting; etc.) was utilized for the area of the plume and/or ingestion exposure pathway EPZ or segment of the population affected by the failure(s)? How were the alerts/notifications provided? What was the message?
   - Once the failure was identified, what actions were taken?
   - If message dissemination is identified as not being accomplished in a timely manner, what was the specific delay? What caused the message to not be provided in a timely manner?
4. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at an agreed upon location.
   - What notification methods were tested?
   - How does the notification system deliver messages (e.g., via phone call, text message, and email based on a database of contact information associated with physical addresses)?
   - How, and how often, is the system tested?

EAS

1. Identify the process to activate the EAS.
   - What protocol or system was used to activate the EAS? (i.e., software, NWS, radio station, IPAWS)
   - How long did the process take to activate the system?
   - If NWS or radio station was used, was there verification between the ORO and the broadcast station of the EAS message prior to broadcast?
2. Ensure that updated emergency information is disseminated in a timely manner.
   - Were messages updated to relay the most current information concerning the incident?
3. Ensure that current emergency information is repeated at pre-established intervals.
   - What are the pre-established intervals?
   - How often was information repeated?

4. Identify the process to activate the EAS, to include the process to receive and then broadcast updated information/ messages and verification of the message, if applicable.
   - Did the station have a copy of current plans, procedures, and messages?
   - Did station staff demonstrate the process to broadcast messages?
   - If required, did the EAS station verify who the message came from and that it is the correct message?
   - Was the EAS station kept updated with new information and messages? How?
5. Broadcast the message on a 24-hour basis.
   - What is the 24-hour capability of this location?
   - Is there back-up power supply or is an alternate station used?

Route/Alternate Alerting

1. Complete route alerting, whether because of failure for system/portion of a system or for exception areas, as needed to demonstrate all routes are capable of being run in allotted time. Emphasis on the most challenging routes and demonstration of these routes will be varied from assessment activity to assessment activity. Challenging routes are defined as those that may be difficult to accomplish, such as those that are lengthy or with conditions (physical or otherwise) that may affect the speed and accuracy with which the route can be completed (e.g., traffic patterns and/or capacity, road conditions, etc.).
   - Why was route/alternate alerting initiated?
   - Was this a FEMA-approved exception area?
   - What organization(s) are responsible for providing route/alternate alerting?
   - Under what conditions was route/alternate alerting initiated?
   - Who notified the resources to begin route/alternate alerting? How were they notified?
   - What resources provided route/alternate alerting?
   - How long did it take to complete the route/alternate alerting?
   - How was the message announced? What was the content of the message?
   - For exception area notification, was it completed within 45 minutes of the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an incident?
   - What system was used for exception areas?
   - Who approves the use of the system for alerting exception areas?
   - Who deployed the system for alerting exception areas and what was the process?
   - Can individual sub-areas be activated using the system to alert FEMA approved exception areas?
   - Was a test done or was a previous tests report used as confirmation of operation in alerting exception areas?

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

State Negotiated Extent of Play:
.   *The Risk County has primary responsibility for Alert and Notification. Each evaluated municipality per risk county will demonstrate, by interview, notification of the hearing-impaired residents within their jurisdiction. Hearing impaired notification teams will not be deployed.*   *Controller injects will be provided to Nuangola Borough simulating precautionary actions, protective action decisions, and EAS messages as applicable to each Emergency Classification Level (ECL).*   *Backup Route Alerting will not be demonstrated during this Exercise.*

OBJECTIVE 5 - Operate

Capability Target 5.4: Traffic and Access Control *(Vice Sub-Element: 3.d.1; 3.d.2)*
Core Capabilities: Critical Transportation; Access Control/Identity Verification; Environmental Response/Health and Safety; On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement; Operational Coordination; Planning; Situational Assessment.
Recommended Evaluation Frequencies: Biennially
Recommended Assessment Activities: Exercise; Drill
Planning Reference: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (H.12, J.8, J.8.b, J.10, J.10.a, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.f, J.14.d, J.14.e, M.1.b, and O.1)
Intent: The capability to select, establish, and staff traffic and access control points and removing impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic.

Demonstration and Evaluation Guidance:

1. Select, establish, and staff appropriate TCP/ACPs, consistent with current conditions and PADs (e.g., evacuating, sheltering, and relocation), in a timely manner.
   - Were there pre-identified TCPs/ACPs in the plan?
   - What was the basis for determining the location of TCPs/ACPs (e.g., evacuation of area, danger in area, etc.)?
   - At what ECL were TCPs/ACPs established?
   - Who was responsible for establishing traffic routes and/or TCPs/ACPs?
   - Who deployed TCP/ACP personnel to the assigned location?
   - Were necessary resources available when needed?
   - Were there any gaps identified between the TCP/ACP resources needed and the resources available? If so, what alternate resource providers were identified and resources provided?
   - Were TCPs/ACPs identified, staffed, and established in timely manner?
2. Provide instructions to TAC staff on actions to take, including when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.
   - Did the TCP/ACP staff receive an emergency worker briefing? If so, what did the briefing include?
   - When PADs expanded into the affected area, were TAC personnel relocated?
   - Were instructions provided to TCP/ACP staff on the modification of PADs?
   - Were TCP/ACP personnel able to provide the following information:
     - Location of TCPs/ACPs.
     - Location of reception/registration centers.
     - Location of emergency worker monitoring and decontamination center.
     - Equipment available (e.g., cones) to establish TCPs/ACPs.
     - The means used to verify emergency worker identification and access.
     - Their roles and responsibilities.
   - What plans/procedures were in place for verifying emergency worker identification and access authorization?
3. Contact the state or Federal agencies that have the authority for the different transportation modes (e.g., rail, water, and air traffic).
   - Who notified which agency for control of water, rail, and air traffic?
   - Were times and ECLs documented when rail, water, and air traffic access control were notified by the ORO?
   - What actions were requested? How were actions coordinated?
4. Identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments that affect the evacuation and evacuation routes.

- Were there impediments to evacuation? If so, where did the impediment occur on the evacuation route? Was the impediment on the evacuation route left in place for the remainder of the demonstration or was it removed?
- Were appropriate actions for impediments that affected evacuation routes identified?
- How were the resources to remove impediments to evacuation identified and coordinated? Was this done in a timely manner? What organizations assisted in impediment removal?

5. Make the decision to re-route traffic and coordinate with key decision-makers and the JIC to ensure the alternate route information is appropriately communicated to evacuees.
   - What key decision-makers were involved in the coordinated effort to re-route traffic?
   - Who made the decision to re-route traffic?
   - What coordination occurred among various OROs, such as local law enforcement, state law enforcement, National Guard, and/or state and/or local transportation departments?
   - What coordination occurred to alert the public of the need to take an alternate route?
   - How and when was the public alerted to take an alternate route?
   - Were decisions made in coordination with all agencies (both internal and external) involved?
   - Was the messaging coordinated and consistent?
6. Establish procedures to control access to and monitor people and vehicles from the evacuated and restricted areas.
   - How did the ORO determine location of ACPs?
   - How was the area identified (e.g., ropes, fences, gates, etc.)?
   - What did the ORO do to control access to the restricted areas?
   - Which agencies have the responsibility to establish procedures to control access to evacuated and restricted areas?
7. Authorize reentry of individuals into the restricted areas.
   - What was the process to approve individuals to reenter the restricted areas?
   - How were individuals authorized to reenter the restricted areas?
   - What provisions were made to determine and control their exposure?
   - How were these individuals tracked to ensure they returned out of the restricted areas?
8. Establish exit procedures.
   - How were individuals, vehicles, and equipment monitored?
   - What was the decision-making guidance for decontamination?
   - What was the disposition of dosimeters, maintenance of the reentry radiation exposure records of dosimetry, and maintenance of emergency worker radiation exposure records?

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

State Negotiated Extent of Play:
An Impediment inject will not be provided to the Municipality during this exercise. *Municipal traffic and access control will be demonstrated by interview.* *The traffic/access control personnel will not be deployed to a traffic/access control point.* *Personnel will receive a radiological briefing and one team member will be issued dosimetry and complete the appropriate paperwork.*

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