



After Action Report

Dominion Energy Nuclear Connecticut, Millstone Power Station

West Hartford Host Community Reception Center Exercise

FEMA Region 1 Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program

Report Date: July 6, 2023



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Executive Summary

On May 13, 2023, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region I evaluated the West Hartford Host Community Reception Center located at Conard High School, 110 Beechwood Road in West Hartford, Connecticut. The town of West Hartford is a new Host Community in support of the Millstone Power Station emergency planning zones (EPZ). This was the first evaluated exercise for the West Hartford Reception Center.

The purpose of the exercise was to assess the capabilities of West Hartford emergency management and Reception Center staff to respond to a radiological incident involving Millstone Power Station. The exercise was held in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of state and local radiological emergency response plans and procedures.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated in this exercise, including community volunteers. Protecting the public's health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities. Cooperation and teamwork of all the participants were evident during this exercise.

This report contains the evaluation of the West Hartford Host Community Reception Center, as well as West Hartford's Emergency Operation Center out-of-sequence (OOS) evaluation conducted on May 4, 2023.

The West Hartford Host Community emergency management response organizations and volunteers successfully demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and adequately implemented them. There were no Level 1 or Level 2 Findings and no planning issues identified.

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Section 1: Exercise Overview

Exercise Name	Millstone Power Station Offsite Exercise West Hartford Host Community Reception Center
Exercise Date	May 13, 2023
Scope	The purpose of the reception center exercise, evacuees and emergency workers monitoring and decontamination and registration, was to assess the level of preparedness of personnel from West Hartford to respond to a simulated radiological emergency.
Core Capabilities	Operational Coordination Environmental Response/Health and Safety Situational Assessment Mass Care Planning
Objectives	Emergency Operations Management Exposure Control Alert Notification Detect, Measure, Sample, Analyze, and Assess Operate Support Operations/Facilities
Program	Department of Homeland Security/FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program
Scenario	Radiological Emergency

1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership

STATE OF CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF EMERGENCY SERVICES AND PUBLIC PROTECTION, DIVISION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY, REP PROGRAM

Stephen Henrick – Emergency Management Program Supervisor

Leonard Nelson – Emergency Management Program Specialist

Gemma Fabris – Emergency Management Program and GIS Specialist

James Belanger – Emergency Management Program Specialist

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, RADIATION DIVISION

Michael Firsick – Radiation Control Specialist

DOMINION ENERGY NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT MILLSTONE POWER STATION

Thomas Rigney – Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Supervisor

Daniel Casey – Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Specialist IV

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, REGION I

Ingrid Pierce – Regional Assistance Committee Chairperson

Taneeka Hollins – Senior Technological Hazards Program Specialist

Helen LaForge – Technological Hazards Program Specialist/Site Specialist

1.3 Participating Organizations

Agencies and organizations from the following jurisdictions participated in the Millstone Power Station exercise:

- State Jurisdictions
 - State of Connecticut
 - Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection Connecticut Division of Emergency Management and Homeland Security (DEMHS)
 - DEMHS Radiological Emergency Preparedness Branch
 - DEMHS Region 3 Office
 - Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection
 - Radiation Division
 - Connecticut Disaster Behavioral Health Response Network (DBHRN)
- Local Jurisdictions
 - Town of West Hartford
 - West Hartford Emergency Management Office
 - West Hartford Fire Department
 - West Hartford Police Department
 - West Hartford Emergency Reporting Center
 - West Hartford Public Works
 - West Hartford Facilities Services
 - West Hartford Public Schools
 - West Hartford Fire Marshal's Office
 - West Hartford Building Department
 - West Hartford/Bloomfield Health District
 - Capital Region Council of Government (CRCOG)
 - Capital Region Medical Reserve Corps (CR-MRC)
 - West Hartford Emergency Response Team (CERT)
- Private/Volunteer Organizations
 - Dominion Energy Nuclear Connecticut, Millstone Power Station
 - American Red Cross of CT
- Federal Jurisdictions
 - Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

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Section 2: Exercise Design Summary

2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design

The FEMA Region I office evaluated the exercise on May 13, 2023, to assess the capabilities of local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their radiological emergency response plans (RERPs) and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving the Millstone Power Station (MPS). The purpose of this report is to present the results and findings on the performance of the offsite response organizations (OROs) during a simulated radiological emergency.

2.2 Exercise Objectives, Capabilities and Activities

Exercise objectives and identified Capabilities/REP Criteria selected to be exercised are discussed in the Extent-of-Play Agreement, contained within Appendix B.

2.3 Scenario Summary

The exercise scenario was developed to evaluate the response of the exercise participants to a radiological emergency.

Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities

3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results

This section contains the results and findings of the West Hartford Emergency Operation Center and Host Community Reception Center Exercise that were evaluated on May 4 and May 13, 2023. The purpose of this exercise was to assess the capabilities of West Hartford Emergency Management and Reception Center personnel to demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment, and personnel responding to a radiological incident involving Millstone Power Station.

3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation

Table 1 includes the assessment activity objectives, demonstration criteria, and status of each demonstration criterion evaluated during the West Hartford Reception Center Exercise.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated based on the demonstration of core capabilities and demonstration criteria. Demonstration criteria are listed and the demonstration status of those criteria are indicated by the use of the following terms:

- **Met (M):** The jurisdiction or functional entity performed all activities under the objective/capability target to the level required per the work plan and/or the extent-of-play agreement, with no Level 1 or Level 2 Findings evaluated under that objective/capability target during the current activity and no unresolved prior Level 2 Finding(s).
 - **Level 1 Finding (L1):** An observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance during an assessment activity that could cause a determination that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a NPP.
 - **Level 2 Finding (L2):** An observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance during an assessment activity that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health and safety.
 - **Plan Issue (P):** An observed or identified inadequacy in the ORO's emergency plan/implementing procedures, rather than in that of the ORO's performance.
 - **Not Demonstrated (N):** For a justifiable reason, the jurisdiction or functional entity did not perform assessment activities under the objective/capability target as specified in the extent-of-play agreement.
- Not Applicable (N/A):** The objective/capability target does not apply to the jurisdiction.

Table 1. Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation

DATE: May 4, 2023 SITE: Millstone Power Station, CT M: Met, L1: Level 1 Finding, L2: Level 2 Finding, P: Plan Issue, N: Not Demonstrated	Capability Target	West Hartford EOC
Mobilization	1.1	M
Direction and Control	1.2	M
Equipment and Supplies	1.2	M
Facilities	1.2	M
Communications	2.2	M
DATE: May 13, 2023 SITE: Millstone Power Station, CT M: Met, L1: Level 1 Finding, L2: Level 2 Finding, P: Plan Issue, N: Not Demonstrated	Capability Target	West Hartford RC
Mobilization	1.1	M
Direction and Control	1.2	M
Equipment and Supplies	1.2	M
Facilities	1.2	M
Implement KI Decision	1.5	M
Communications	2.2	M
Emergency Worker (EW) Exposure Control	3.1	M
Vehicle Monitoring and Decontamination	5.1	M
Personnel Portal Monitoring	5.1	M
Secondary Personnel Monitoring	5.1	M
Male/Female Monitoring and Decontamination	5.1	M
Registration	5.1	M
EW Vehicle Monitoring and Decontamination	5.2	M
Traffic and Access Control	5.4	M

3.3 Criteria Evaluation Summaries

3.3.1 HOST COMMUNITY

3.3.1.1 West Hartford Emergency Operation Center (OOS)

The West Hartford Emergency Management Director and Team did an excellent job during the Emergency Operation Center out of sequence interview. All EOC staff were very proactive and knowledgeable of their EOC roles and responsibilities for a Millstone related incident. They were well versed with the process for mobilizing both the EOC and Community Reception Center.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA capability targets for this location is as follows:

- a) MET: 1.1, 1.2, 1.5
- b) LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c) LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d) PLAN ISSUES: None
- e) NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f) PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: N/A
- g) PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: N/A

3.3.1.2 West Hartford Host Community Reception Center

The Emergency Management Director, Host Community Reception Center (CRC) Manager and CRC supporting staff worked well together as a team. All were proactive and displayed a conscientious and caring attitude which ensured they would go above their duties to assist in providing reasonable assurance for the general public.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA capability targets for this location is as follows:

- a) MET: 1.1, 1.2, 1.5, 2.2, 3.1, 5.1, 5.2, 5.4
- b) LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
- c) LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
- d) PLAN ISSUES: None
- e) NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f) PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: N/A
- g) PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: N/A

Section 4: Conclusion

There were no Level 1 or Level 2 Findings as a result of the May 13, 2023, West Hartford Host Community evaluated Reception Center Exercise.

West Hartford Host Community Reception Center staff successfully demonstrated their knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures. All participants did an excellent job. It was evident that a great deal of time and dedication was put forth into making this a very successful exercise.

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Appendix A: Additional Information

Evaluation Team

Emergency Operation Center May 4, 2023		
Areas Evaluated	Capability Targets	Evaluator
Mobilization, Direction & Control, Communications, Equipment and Supplies, Facilities	1.1, 1.2, 3.1	Helen LaForge
Community Reception Center May 13, 2023		
Areas Evaluated	Capability Targets	Evaluator
Mobilization, Direction & Control, Communications, Equipment and Supplies, Facilities	1.1, 1.2, 3.1	Helen LaForge
Traffic and Access Control	5.4	Taneeka Hollins
Emergency Worker Exposure Control (Dosimetry Issue & Briefing)	2.2	Michael Howe
Portal Monitoring	5.1	Mike DeBonis
Secondary Monitoring	5.1	Michael Howe
Evacuee/Emergency Workers Monitoring and Decontamination	5.1, 2.2	LaShawn Halsey
Evacuee Registration Implement KI Decision	5.1 5.2	Barbara Thomas
Vehicle Monitoring and Decontamination	5.1, 5.2	Linda Gee/Taneeka Hollins
Congregate Care Facilities	(Facilities verified via ARC)	Barbara Thomas

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Appendix B: Extent-of Play Agreement

OBJECTIVE 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Capability Target 1.1 – Mobilization

Individuals with roles in support of emergency operations are identified, alerted, and mobilized in a timely manner.

Intent: The capability to alert, notify, and mobilize ORO's to staff facilities in support of emergency operations.

Planning reference: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, A.1.a, e; A.3, 4; C.1, 4, 6; D.4; E.1, 2; H.3, 4)

Core Capabilities: Operational Coordination; Planning

ASSESSMENT – DEMONSTRATION AND EVALUATION GUIDANCE

By observing the OROs' capability to address the appropriate bullet points below and while considering the overall capability being assessed, the following key points of review and associated questions should be considered and will support an evaluation of this capability target.

ORO demonstrate the capability to:

Alert, notify, and mobilize key personnel, to include a 24-hour staffing roster, and activate facilities in a timely manner.

- What time was staff notified? What time did they arrive at the facility?
- Did the ORO demonstrate the activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel upon their arrival?
- Was activation of facilities/locations completed in accordance with plans/procedures?
- Were key emergency personnel contacted, alerted, and mobilized in a timely manner?
- Did the ORO demonstrate the ability to staff and maintain 24-hour operations?
- Were position staff trained and in place for facility activation?

Receive and verify notifications.

- Who notified the ORO? Licensee or other?
- For reverse notification, how was the licensee notified?
- Was the notification/information verified? How?
- What was the initial ECL? Were changes to ECLs communicated in the same manner?

Identify and request additional resources, as needed.

- Was the ability to identify and request additional resources demonstrated? If not, was the ability to identify compensatory measures demonstrated?
- Were MOUs and LOAs available for review?

Determine a facility is operational.

- What time was the facility declared operational?
- What criteria was used to determine if the facility was operational?
- What was the time difference between notifications of personnel and when the facility was declared operational?

Exercise Specific Extent of Play:

1. *The West Hartford Host Community will be mobilized by phone call or controller message from the State Division of Emergency Management and Homeland Security (CT DEMHS) Region 3 Coordinator to the West Hartford Emergency Management Director.*
2. *West Hartford CERT/Fire Department personnel may be prepositioned at a nearby location for the rehearsal.*
3. *Activation of congregate care facilities will be simulated.*
4. *Additional responders such as American Red Cross, Disaster Behavioral Health Response Network (DBHRN), Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT), and the Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) may be pre-staged at a nearby location for both the rehearsal and the evaluated exercise.*

Capability Target 1.2 – Direction and Control.

Individuals in leadership roles provide direction and control to the portion of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.

Intent: *The capability to provide overall direction and control of response efforts, commensurate with the responsibilities of leadership, as detailed in plans/procedures.*

Planning reference: *NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.1, A.1.a, A.1.b, A.1.c, A.2, A.3, A.5, C.2, C.2.a, C.2.b, C.3, D.4, E.1, H.6, and O.1)*

Core Capabilities: *Operational Coordination; Environmental Response/Health and Safety; Public Information and Warning; Mass Care Services; Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services; Situational Assessment; Critical Transportation; Planning*

ASSESSMENT – DEMONSTRATION AND EVALUATION GUIDANCE

By observing the OROs' capability to address the appropriate bullet points below and while considering the overall capability being assessed, the following key points of review and associated questions should be considered and will support an evaluation of this capability target.

OROs demonstrate the capability to:

Support protective action decision-making.

- Who, by title and position, was in charge?
- Who was authorized to make any PADs prior to an official PAR from the licensee?
- Did decision-makers obtain input from their support staff?

Conduct briefings in a timely manner.

- Were briefings conducted in a timely manner?
- What information was provided?
- How frequently were briefings held?
- Who gave the briefing?

Maintain situational awareness.

- Did the ORO maintain situational awareness? How?

Coordinate response activities with other organizations.

- Were response activities coordinated with other organizations? How?

Obtain resources to support emergency operations.

- Were resources obtained to support emergency operations (e.g., through MOUs or other agreements)?
- Was just-in-time training provided, as necessary?

Provide and maintain adequate facilities and equipment to support the emergency response.

- Were facilities and equipment adequate to support operations? How so?
- Was the facility evacuated during the plume?
- What means of monitoring and decontamination were used?

Exercise Specific Extent of Play

1. *The West Hartford EOC will not be activated for the exercise and will be evaluated by FEMA during an OOS demonstration.*
2. *The West Hartford Host Community/Reception Center at the Concord High School will be evaluated.*
3. *West Hartford will follow procedures as outlined in Host Community Reception Center plans.*
4. *Communications checks will be demonstrated throughout the Reception Center as well as between the Reception Center and West Hartford EOC. Communications between the DEMHS Region 3 coordinator and the West Hartford EOC will be simulated.*

Capability Target 1.3 – Protective Action Recommendations

Not Applicable

Capability Target 1.4 – Protective Action Decisions for the Plume Phase

Not Applicable

Capability Target 1.5 – Protective Action Decision Implementation for the Plume Phase

Implement decisions for those populations and areas subject to plume phase protective actions.

Intent: *The capability to implement precautionary protective action and/or PADs, including evacuation and/or sheltering, for all populations within the plume and ingestion exposure pathway EPZs. The populations include those with access and functional needs, students, and institutionalized individuals.*

Planning reference: *NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (A.4, C.2.a, G.1, J.11, J.11.a, J.11.b, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.g, and O.1)*

Core Capabilities: *Operational Coordination; Public Information and Warning; Environmental Response/Health and Safety; Critical Transportation; Health and Social Services; Housing; Natural and Cultural Resources; Planning*

ASSESSMENT – DEMONSTRATION AND EVALUATION GUIDANCE

By observing the OROs' capability to address the appropriate bullet points below and while considering the overall capability being assessed, the following key points of review and associated questions should be considered and will support an evaluation of this capability target.

OROs demonstrate the capability to:

Implement PADs, ensuring communication and coordination with all appropriate jurisdictions.

- Were resources identified and utilized effectively?
- Did OROs communicate and work together in an effective manner?
- What type of coordination occurred on the implementation of protective actions?
- Was the public kept informed and was the information provided relevant?
- Were PADs implemented as directed?
- What types of populations are in the plume exposure pathway EPZ (e.g., institutionalized, access and functional needs, non-English speaking, etc.)? Who is responsible for notifying each, and at what point during the incident?
- Were there any gaps in resources identified? If so, how were they addressed?

Assist those with access and functional needs during the implementation of PADs.

- What time was the order received for those with access and functional needs?
- Were the facility/facilities receiving those with access and functional needs listed in the plans?
- How were individuals with services animals addressed?

Communicate, coordinate, and implement protective actions for schools.

- What school districts are located within the plume exposure pathway EPZ?
- Who notifies school districts? How?
- What was the protective action that the school took?
- With regard to processing students, faculty, and staff, what sort of PADs were made?
- At which ECL were the school districts notified?
- If students were moved, which reclamation centers were they sent to? Which is the host school?
- How were parents and/or guardians notified?
- Are there schools located outside the plume exposure pathway EPZ that have students living within the EPZ? What arrangements are made for those students?
- What type of transportation was provided to the students (e.g., bus, etc.)?

Capability Target 1.5 – Protective Action Decision Implementation for the Plume Phase (Continued)

- Who notifies the bus drivers?
- Were there adequate buses available? And how do they communicate with the school?
- Do the bus drivers know where to take the students? Are they trained on what to do?
- Was the school evacuated during the plume? What means of monitoring and decontamination were used?

Communicate with transportation officials.

- What transportation needs or resources were required?
- Was a list of the transportation providers available?
- Were transportation providers contacted?
- How were needs for transportation-dependent individuals met?
- Were designated pick-up points used?

Identify evacuation routes for the general public.

- What evacuation routes were selected?
- Were the direction of the wind/plume and/or other hazardous conditions considered in determining which evacuation routes were used?
- How was this information communicated to the media and the public?
- How were alterations to the pre-designated routes communicated to the media and the public?
- Was the facility evacuated during the plume?

Make KI available to both institutionalized persons and the general public, in accordance with plans and procedures.

- How was the decision to take KI disseminated to the public and institutionalized persons?
- Did the ORO provide KI to the general public and institutionalized persons? If so, how was it distributed?
- What quantities of KI are available?

- Where is KI stored?
- What dosages of KI are available?
- What is the expiration date of KI? If there is an extended policy, where is the letter certifying the extension?
- Did the ORO ensure that the KI is stored in a temperature-controlled facility?
- What information was provided to the general public with regard to KI?
- What instructions were provided for the use of KI?
- Did the instructions include dosages and frequency to take KI?
- Did the instructions include contradictions and side effects of using KI? How was it explained?
- How was KI ingestion documented for institutionalized persons?
- Did staff maintain lists of the institutionalized individual who ingested KI?

Exercise Specific Extent of Play

1. *The supply of general public (evacuee) KI will be available for evaluator inspection, but only a representative number of tablets will be used for simulated distribution during the evaluated exercise.*

Capability Target 1.6 – Protective Action Decisions for the Post-Plume Phase

Not Applicable

Capability Target 1.7 – Protective Action Decision Implementation for the Post-Plume Phase

Not Applicable

OBJECTIVE 2: EXPOSURE CONTROL

Capability Target 2.1 – Emergency Worker Exposure Control Decision-Making Process

Not Applicable

Capability Target 2.2 – Emergency Worker Exposure Control Management

Not Applicable

OBJECTIVE 3: ALERT AND NOTIFICATION

Capability Target 3.1 – Communications

Communication processes, systems, and equipment are sufficient to support emergency operations.

Intent: *The capability to provide and maintain reliable communications with emergency personnel.*

Planning reference: *NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (E.1.a, E.3, F.1, F.1.a, F.1.b, F.1.c, F.3, and O.1)*

Core Capabilities: *Operational Communications; Operational Coordination; Situational Awareness; Planning*

ASSESSMENT – DEMONSTRATION AND EVALUATION GUIDANCE

By observing the OROs' capability to address the appropriate bullet points below and while considering the overall capability being assessed, the following key points of review and associated questions should be considered and will support an evaluation of this capability target.

ORO demonstrate the capability to:

Utilize communication systems that are fully functional, continuously available, and redundant.

- What types of communications system(s) and method(s) were available? Which were demonstrated?

- Was the communication system(s) fully functional?
- Did personnel demonstrate familiarity of use with each system/method?
- Was a communications check with other jurisdictions, field teams, and/or other support organizations required and completed?

Maintain periodic test results and corrective actions on a real time basis.

- How were test results and corrective actions tracked in real time?
- Was documentation of the test results and/or corrective actions made available?

Access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.

- Which communication system(s) available was independent of commercial telephone?
- Was it able to be accessed/utilized?

Manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations.

- Were there any delays in message traffic that disrupted emergency operations? If so, how were the delays addressed/mitigated?

Identify and address any failures of the systems.

- Were there any communication failures? If so, how was the failure identified?
- What actions were taken to correct the failure and/or how was the failure overcome?
- Did the failure affect overall performance?

Transmit, receive, and understand messages (i.e., “content check”).

- Were the messages transmitted/received understood by personnel?
- What was the message?

Capability Target 3.1 – Communications (Continued)

- Was a “content check” (i.e., informational message that could be received during an actual radiological emergency) performed?

Exercise Specific Extent of Play

1. *A limited number of supplies (for demonstration purposes only) will be brought to the Reception Center.*

**This criterion has been approved for re-demonstration of performance only, actual equipment cannot be re-demonstrated.*

Capability Target 3.2 – Alert and Notification of the Public

Not Applicable

Capability Target 3.3 – Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and News Media

Not Applicable

OBJECTIVE 4: DETECT, MEASURE, SAMPLE, ANALYZE, and ASSESS
Capability Target 4.1 – Field Monitoring Teams Management

Not Applicable

Capability Target 4.2 – Plume Phase Measurements and Sampling

Not Applicable

Capability Target 4.3 – Post-Plume Phase Measurements and Sampling

Not Applicable

Capability Target 4.4 – Laboratory Operations

Not Applicable

Capability Target 4.5 – Plume Phase Analysis and Dose Assessment

Not Applicable

Capability Target 4.6 – Post-Plume Phase Sampling Plan Development and Analysis

Not Applicable

OBJECTIVE 5: OPERATE

Capability Target 5.1 – Monitoring, Decontamination, Sheltering, and Registration of Evacuees

Facilities, equipment, and procedures are in place and utilized to provide monitoring, decontamination, identification, temporary shelter, congregate care, and registration of evacuees.

Intent: *The capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees, and to identify, register, temporarily shelter, and provide congregate care for evacuees at reception centers.*

Planning reference: *NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (J.11.d, J.13, K.4, and O.1)*

Core Capabilities: *Operational Coordination; Environmental Response/Health and Safety; Mass Care; Planning*

ASSESSMENT – DEMONSTRATION AND EVALUATION GUIDANCE

By observing the OROs' capability to address the appropriate bullet points below and while considering the overall capability being assessed, the following key points of review and associated questions should be considered and will support an evaluation of this capability target.

ORO demonstrate the capability to:

Set-up operations.

- Was the facility set up and operational? Did it include route markings, instrumentation, record keeping, and contamination control measures?
- Where did monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees occur?
- How was contamination minimized within the facility? What contamination control provisions were utilized?
- What supplies were available to set up the facility?
- What supplies were available to prevent and control spread of contamination?
- What personal protective supplies were available?

Operationally check instruments and equipment.

- What types of monitoring instruments and equipment were available?
- Were the instruments current in calibration?
- Were instruments and equipment operationally checked using an appropriate check source against a known range of reading to verify proper operation?
- Was an appropriate radioactive check source used to verify proper operational response for each low-range radiation measurement instrument?
- Were background readings taken?
- How were background radiation levels established?

MONITORING

Attain and sustain the overall monitoring productivity rate per hour needed to monitor 20 percent of the plume exposure pathway EPZ population, including transients, within a 12-hour period at each facility. The monitoring productivity rate per hour is the number of evacuees that can be monitored, per hour, per location, by the total complement of monitors using an appropriate procedure.

- What is the total population, including transients, of the plume exposure pathway EPZ? What is 20 percent of that figure (the estimate of needed monitoring capability)?

Capability Target 5.1 – Monitoring, Decontamination, Sheltering, and Registration of Evacuees (Continued)

- What was the time for monitoring sequences for the first six simulated evacuees, per monitoring team (determine percentage)?
- Were evacuees monitored using hand-held survey instruments or portal monitors?
- If portal monitors were used, was a body survey made after triggering the portal monitor using hand-held instrument to locate, quantify, and isolate the exact location of the contamination?
- Where were portal monitors used?
- Was a minimum of six simulated evacuees and one-third of the equipment (at that facility) demonstrated?
- Was the monitoring sequences for these simulated evacuees timed by the evaluators to determine whether the monitoring productivity rate per hour can be met?
- Was the facility able to maintain the rate to monitor 20 percent?
- Based on the demonstration, was the facility able to monitor 20 percent of anticipated evacuees within 12 hours? At this rate, is the facility going to meet the 20 percent goal?

Monitor evacuees, service animals, pets, vehicles, and possessions.

- Was there an adequate number of personnel available to perform monitoring of vehicles and evacuees?
- What are the provisions for monitoring service animals and pets?
- What were the provisions for individuals who had completed monitoring (and decontamination, if needed)?
- What means were used to indicate that evacuees, and their service animals, pets, possessions, and vehicles, have been monitored, cleared, and found to have no contamination or contamination below the trigger/action level indicated (e.g., hand stamp, sticker, bracelet, form, etc.)?

Utilize trigger/action levels for determining the need for decontamination.

- Did monitoring personnel use trigger/action levels to determine the need for decontamination?
- What trigger or action levels were identified?

DECONTAMINATION

Decontaminate evacuees, and personal belongings, while limiting the spread of contamination.

- What provisions were in place to ensure privacy?
- What is the process for providing modesty garments to evacuees?

- How was decontamination conducted for small areas of contamination?
- How were contaminated individuals separated from non-contaminated individuals?
- How are contaminated clothing and other personal belongings handled?
- What contamination control procedures were utilized?
- Were provisions made to collect contaminated waste and to prevent it from increasing the background radiation levels near portal monitors and survey equipment?
- What is the process to indicate that an individual has been monitored and, if necessary, decontaminated (e.g., hand stamp, sticker, bracelet, form, etc.)?

Follow-up with any evacuee(s) who cannot be appropriately decontaminated for assessment; ensure the capability to provide evacuee-referrals.

- What procedures were used if evacuees could not be adequately decontaminated?
- What was the follow-up and associated assessment process for those evacuees who could not appropriately be decontaminated?

Capability Target 5.1 – Monitoring, Decontamination, Sheltering, and Registration of Evacuees (Continued)

VEHICLES

Monitor and decontaminate vehicles.

- How are vehicles monitored? Were the following monitored: air intake systems, radiator grills, bumpers, wheel wells, tires, and door handles?
- What procedures were demonstrated for vehicle monitoring?
- Was at least one vehicle monitored?
- Was there adequate space for the expected number of vehicles (space must be observed by evaluator)?
- How are vehicles decontaminated?
- What contamination control procedures were utilized?

Provide adequate, separate space for both contaminated and non-contaminated vehicles.

- Was there appropriate space for vehicle parking of both contaminated and non-contaminated vehicles?
- How were non-contaminated vehicles separated from contaminated or not-yet-monitored vehicles?

Monitor emergency worker personnel and their equipment and vehicles for contamination.

- Was there adequate space for evacuee vehicles at the facility?
- Were there an adequate number of personnel trained to operate monitoring equipment at the facility?
- What provisions were in place to ensure privacy?

Decontaminate evacuee vehicles based on trigger/action levels.

- What is the action level for determining the need for decontamination of vehicles?
- What process is used to decontaminate vehicles?
- What was done when an evacuee's vehicle could not be successfully decontaminated?

SHELTERING & CONGREGATE CARE

Coordinate for incoming evacuees who have been monitored and, if necessary, decontaminated.

- How was coordination amongst and between congregate care facilities/mass care for those evacuees that have already been monitored and, if necessary, decontaminated?
- What identifier was used for those evacuees (and where applicable, service animals, pets, and vehicles) who had been monitored, decontaminated as appropriate, and registered?

Establish shelter operations.

- What is the process for determining if evacuees, service animals, and pets had been monitored for contamination, decontaminated as appropriate, and registered before entering the facility?
- Did the staff check for arriving individual's confirmation of monitoring/decontamination?
- Did the ORO appropriately plan for the population expected at this location?

Congregate care centers and operations in host/support jurisdictions are sufficient to support the expected number of evacuees.

- What agency (or agencies) is responsible for managing the congregate care center?
- What is the capacity of the congregate care center?
- What resources were available for evacuees (real or simulated) arriving at the congregate care center?

REGISTRATION**Register evacuees.**

- What is the process to register evacuees after they have completed the monitoring and decontamination process?
- Did the record contain the individual's name, address, results of monitoring, and time of any decontamination needed?
- What organization(s) registered evacuees upon completion of monitoring and decontamination?
- What is the process for registering evacuees?
- Was a registration record established for each individual?

Ensure the registration area is clean and controlled.

- Was the access to the clean registration area controlled adequately? How?

Exercise Specific Extent of Play

1. *Three portal monitors assigned to West Hartford will be demonstrated- two for evacuees and one for vehicles.*
2. *The monitoring sequence of 6 evacuees will be conducted in order to demonstrate that the 12 hour requirement is met. This activity will be performed at a time during the exercise that is agreed upon by the FEMA evaluator and the controller.*
3. *At least one staff radiological monitor will demonstrate hand-held instrument "frisking" techniques for evacuees at the Secondary Monitoring Station.*
4. *Contamination control measures and decontamination techniques for at least two males and two females will be simulated and the requirements met through interviews.*
5. *Vehicle monitoring will be demonstrated via portal monitor only for evacuee's vehicles that arrive at the Host Community/Reception Center. Contaminated vehicles will be segregated to the contaminated vehicle parking area for decontamination that would be conducted as time permits.*
6. *A representative sample of replacement clothing resources for decontaminated individuals will be available in the male and female decontamination areas.*
7. *Monitoring and decontamination of pets may be demonstrated, but will not be evaluated.*
8. *There are no new shelters. Congregate care facilities will not be demonstrated.*
9. *The American Red Cross **Safe and Well** program will be simulated and will not be formally evaluated.*
10. *Dosimetry will be issued to radiological emergency workers only. Non-radiological emergency workers (on the "clean side") such as KI issue and registration staff will not be issued dosimetry.*

NOTE: if Behavioral Health, CERT, MRC or other non-radiological workers are assigned to supplement radiological areas such as Decon, they will be given just-in-time training and issued dosimetry.

**This criterion has been approved for re-demonstration during exercises.*

Capability Target 5.2 – Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers, Equipment, and Vehicles

Facilities, equipment, and procedures are in place and utilized to provide monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and their equipment and vehicles.

Intent: *The capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers, equipment, and vehicles.*

Planning reference: *NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (K.4 and O.1)*

Core Capabilities: *Operational Coordination; Environmental Response/Health and Safety; Planning*

ASSESSMENT – DEMONSTRATION AND EVALUATION GUIDANCE

By observing the OROs' capability to address the appropriate bullet points below and while considering the overall capability being assessed, the following key points of review and associated questions should be considered and will support an evaluation of this capability target.

ORO demonstrate the capability to:

Set-up operations.

- Where will monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers occur?
- Where will emergency workers' equipment be monitored and decontaminated?
- Was the facility set up and operational? Did it include route markings, instrumentation, record keeping, and contamination control measures?
- What supplies were available to set up the facility?
- What supplies were available to prevent and control spread of contamination?
- What personal protective supplies were available?
- How was contamination minimized within the facility?
- What contamination control provisions were utilized?

Operationally check instruments and equipment.

- Were the instruments current in calibration?
- Were instruments and equipment operationally checked using an appropriate check source against a known range of reading to verify proper operation?
- Was an appropriate radioactive check source used to verify proper operational response for each low-range radiation measurement instrument?
- Were background readings taken?
- How were background radiation levels established?

Monitor emergency worker personnel and their equipment and vehicles for contamination.

- Was there adequate space for emergency workers at the facility?
- Were there an adequate number of personnel trained to operate monitoring equipment at the facility?
- During vehicle monitoring, were the following monitored: air intake systems, radiator grills, bumpers, wheel wells, tires, and door handles?
- What provisions were in place to ensure privacy?

Capability Target 5.2 – Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers, Equipment, and Vehicles (Continued)

Decontaminate emergency worker personnel and their equipment and vehicles based on trigger/action levels.

- What is the action level for determining the need for decontamination of personnel, equipment, and vehicles?
- What process is used to decontaminate personnel, equipment, and vehicles?
- How was decontamination conducted for small areas of contamination?
- What was done when an emergency worker could not be successfully decontaminated?

Control the spread of contamination.

- What procedures are used to minimize contamination within the facility?
- How are contaminated emergency workers separated from non-contaminated emergency workers?
- How are contaminated clothing and other personal belongings addressed? Will clean clothing be provided to emergency workers?
- Were contamination control procedures, including storage of contaminated clothing and possessions followed?

Create and maintain a record of monitoring and decontaminating workers upon completion of monitoring and decontamination activities.

- Was a record of monitoring and decontamination (if necessary) kept for each emergency worker?

Process for prioritizing emergency workers and equipment before the public in facilities where the public and emergency workers are both processed for contamination.

- What is the process for prioritizing emergency workers and equipment before the public in facilities where the public and emergency workers are both processed for contamination?

Exercise Specific Extent of Play

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

1. *Two of the simulated evacuees being monitored will be designated as emergency workers.*
2. *In accordance with the OROs' plans and procedures, decontamination of evacuee vehicles is not an emergency function.*
3. *Criteria requirements for decontamination capabilities, and provisions for vehicle and equipment will be met through interviews.*
4. *At least one of the vehicles to be monitored will be considered an **Emergency Worker Vehicle**. The vehicle monitoring team will demonstrate the ability to monitor the vehicle, to include the radiator grill, wheel wells, tires, and door handles. The vehicle monitoring team will also demonstrate the ability to monitor the interior of the emergency worker vehicle where the worker may have contacted, such as the driver's seat, steering wheel, shifter lever, etc.*

**This criterion has been approved for re-demonstration during exercises*

Capability Target 5.3 – Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated, Injured Individuals

Not Applicable

Capability Target 5.4 – Traffic and Access Control

Appropriate traffic and access control is established; accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control staff.

Intent: *The capability to select, establish, and staff traffic and access control points and removing impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic.*

Planning reference: *NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2 (H.12, J.8, J.8.b, J.10, J.10.a, J.11.c, J.11.e, J.11.f, J.14.d, J.14.e, M.1.b, and O.1)*

Core Capabilities: *Critical Transportation; Access Control/Identity Verification; Environmental Response/Health and Safety; On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement; Operational Coordination; Planning; Situational Assessment*

ASSESSMENT – DEMONSTRATION AND EVALUATION GUIDANCE

By observing the OROs' capability to address the appropriate bullet points below and while considering the overall capability being assessed, the following key points of review and associated questions should be considered and will support an evaluation of this capability target.

OROs demonstrate the capability to:

Select, establish, and staff appropriate TCP/ACPs, consistent with current conditions and PADs (e.g., evacuating, sheltering, and relocation), in a timely manner.

- Were there pre-identified TCPs/ACPs in the plan?
- What was the basis for determining the location of TCPs/ACPs (e.g., evacuation of area, danger in area, etc.)?
- At what ECL were TCPs/ACPs established?
- Who was responsible for establishing traffic routes and/or TCPs/ACPs?
- Who deployed TCP/ACP personnel to the assigned location?
- Were necessary resources available when needed?
- Were there any gaps identified between the TCP/ACP resources needed and the resources available? If so, what alternate resource providers were identified and resources provided?
- Were TCPs/ACPs identified, staffed, and established in timely manner?

Provide instructions to TAC staff on actions to take, including when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.

- Did the TCP/ACP staff receive an emergency worker briefing? If so, what did the briefing include?
- When PADs expanded into the affected area, were TAC personnel relocated?
- Were instructions provided to TCP/ACP staff on the modification of PADs?
- Were TCP/ACP personnel able to provide the following information:
 - * Location of TCPs/ACPs.
 - * Location of reception/registration centers.
 - * Location of emergency worker monitoring and decontamination center.
 - * Equipment available (e.g., cones) to establish TCPs/ACPs.

Capability Target 5.4 – Traffic and Access Control (Continued)

- * The means used to verify emergency worker identification and access.
- * Their roles and responsibilities.
- What plans/procedures were in place for verifying emergency worker identification and access authorization?

Contact the state or Federal agencies that have the authority for the different transportation modes (e.g., rail, water, and air traffic).

- Who notified which agency for control of water, rail, and air traffic?
- Were times and ECLs documented when rail, water, and air traffic access control were notified by the ORO?

- What actions were requested? How were actions coordinated?

Identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments that affect the evacuation and evacuation routes.

- Were there impediments to evacuation? If so, where did the impediment occur on the evacuation route? Was the impediment on the evacuation route left in place for the remainder of the demonstration or was it removed?
- Were appropriate actions for impediments that affected evacuation routes identified?
- How were the resources to remove impediments to evacuation identified and coordinated? Was this done in a timely manner? What organizations assisted in impediment removal?

Make the decision to re-route traffic and coordinate with key decision-makers and the JIC to ensure the alternate route information is appropriately communicated to evacuees.

- What key decision-makers were involved in the coordinated effort to re-route traffic?
- Who made the decision to re-route traffic?
- What coordination occurred among various OROs, such as local law enforcement, state law enforcement, National Guard, and/or state and/or local transportation departments?
- What coordination occurred to alert the public of the need to take an alternate route?
- How and when was the public alerted to take an alternate route?
- Were decisions made in coordination with all agencies (both internal and external) involved?
- Was the messaging coordinated and consistent?

Establish procedures to control access to and monitor people and vehicles from the evacuated and restricted areas.

- How did the ORO determine location of ACPs?
- How was the area identified (e.g., ropes, fences, gates, etc.)?
- What did the ORO do to control access to the restricted areas?
- Which agencies have the responsibility to establish procedures to control access to evacuated and restricted areas?

Authorize reentry of individuals into the restricted areas.

- What was the process to approve individuals to reenter the restricted areas?
- How were individuals authorized to reenter the restricted areas?
- What provisions were made to determine and control their exposure?
- How were these individuals tracked to ensure they returned out of the restricted areas?

Capability Target 5.4 – Traffic and Access Control (Continued)

Establish exit procedures.

- How were individuals, vehicles, and equipment monitored?
- What was the decision-making guidance for decontamination?
- What was the disposition of dosimeters, maintenance of the reentry radiation exposure records of dosimetry, and maintenance of emergency worker radiation exposure records?

Exercise Specific Extent of Play

1. *Traffic and access control will be demonstrated through interview and/or at designated locations. Traffic control points, designated in the plan may not actually be posted.*

**This criterion has been approved for re-demonstration during exercises.*

**Traffic control is demonstrated on RC grounds for evacuee vehicles coming in and on the RC grounds, going through vehicle monitoring and to parking lots, as well as demonstrated EW vehicles.*

**Interviews are conducted regarding Traffic Access Control Points (TACPs) as noted for outside TACPs.*

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